Journal Article Reflections on the Illumina–GRAIL merger Get access Brianna L Alderman, Brianna L Alderman Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Roger D Blair Roger D Blair Department of Economics, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USALevin College of Law, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA Corresponding author: E-mail: rdblair@ufl.edu https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3943-743X Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, jnad046, https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad046 Published: 13 October 2023
期刊文章对Illumina-GRAIL合并的反思获取Brianna L Alderman, Brianna L Alderman经济学系，哈佛大学，剑桥，马萨诸塞州，美国搜索作者的其他作品:牛津学术谷歌学者罗杰·D·布莱尔罗杰·D·布莱尔经济学系，佛罗里达大学，盖恩斯维尔，佛罗里达州，美国alvin法学院，佛罗里达大学，盖恩斯维尔，佛罗里达州，美国通讯作者:E-mail:rdblair@ufl.edu https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3943-743X搜索作者的其他作品:牛津学术谷歌学者反垄断执法杂志，jnad046, https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad046出版:2023年10月13日
{"title":"Reflections on the Illumina–GRAIL merger","authors":"Brianna L Alderman, Roger D Blair","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnad046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad046","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Reflections on the Illumina–GRAIL merger Get access Brianna L Alderman, Brianna L Alderman Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Roger D Blair Roger D Blair Department of Economics, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USALevin College of Law, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA Corresponding author: E-mail: rdblair@ufl.edu https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3943-743X Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, jnad046, https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad046 Published: 13 October 2023","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135854401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Having their say: everyone weighs in on Illumina GRAIL Get access Gwendolyn J Lindsay Cooley Gwendolyn J Lindsay Cooley The NAAG Multistate Antitrust Task Force Chair and Wisconsin’s Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Madison, Wisconsin, USA Corresponding author: E-mail: CooleyGJ@DOJ.STATE.WI.US Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, jnad045, https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad045 Published: 13 October 2023
{"title":"Having their say: everyone weighs in on Illumina GRAIL","authors":"Gwendolyn J Lindsay Cooley","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnad045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad045","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Having their say: everyone weighs in on Illumina GRAIL Get access Gwendolyn J Lindsay Cooley Gwendolyn J Lindsay Cooley The NAAG Multistate Antitrust Task Force Chair and Wisconsin’s Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Madison, Wisconsin, USA Corresponding author: E-mail: CooleyGJ@DOJ.STATE.WI.US Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, jnad045, https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad045 Published: 13 October 2023","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":"92 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135918927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Lacking predictability of enforcement hinders the deterrent function of competition law. This article shows that academic analyses of optimal competition rules do not always treat this factor adequately, paying instead excessive attention to the problem of error. Sometimes, predictability is completely ignored as a relevant factor. At other times, it is taken into account but its effects are framed in a way that undermines their significance. This article further discusses three possible reasons why a part of competition law and economics scholarship engages in such mistreatment of predictability. First, it may be a result of writing convenience. Secondly, the role of predictability in selecting the optimal competition rule may simply be misunderstood. Thirdly, the role of predictability may be belittled intentionally in order to advocate rules benefiting the interests of competition practitioners and/or defendants. This article also briefly explores how problematic each reason is and what solutions might be available.
{"title":"Predictability: a mistreated virtue of competition law","authors":"Jan Broulík","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnad043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad043","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Lacking predictability of enforcement hinders the deterrent function of competition law. This article shows that academic analyses of optimal competition rules do not always treat this factor adequately, paying instead excessive attention to the problem of error. Sometimes, predictability is completely ignored as a relevant factor. At other times, it is taken into account but its effects are framed in a way that undermines their significance. This article further discusses three possible reasons why a part of competition law and economics scholarship engages in such mistreatment of predictability. First, it may be a result of writing convenience. Secondly, the role of predictability in selecting the optimal competition rule may simply be misunderstood. Thirdly, the role of predictability may be belittled intentionally in order to advocate rules benefiting the interests of competition practitioners and/or defendants. This article also briefly explores how problematic each reason is and what solutions might be available.","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135581611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dario da Silva Oliveira Neto, Otávio Augusto de Oliveira Cruz Filho, Alexandre Cordeiro Macedo
Abstract This article advocates against more presumption-based illegality legal standards. The focus is on the Rule of Reason analysis, which is in line with CADE’s case laws for analysing unilateral conducts, distinguishing between restraints with an anti-competitive effect (or resulting in conduct likely to cause such injury) that are harmful to the consumer, and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer’s best interest. In this sense, the article recalls some basic concepts, such as market power, dominant position, concentration indexes, and its interactions, since the recent discussions appear to have forgotten its basics. Moreover, a brief analysis of CADE’s procedures and the Brazilian Competition system, especially the analyses of unilateral conduct cases, is made in order to present a background for the readers. At the end, we report three digital antitrust cases judged by Cade to demonstrate the steps used by the authority in order to reach a decision on the case. In a nutshell, CADE has not shifted the analysis of unilateral conduct from the use of the rule of reason to a more presumption-based illegality approach.
{"title":"The rule of reason and the fundamentals against more presumption-based illegality legal standards: highlights on CADE’s decisions on digital economy issues","authors":"Dario da Silva Oliveira Neto, Otávio Augusto de Oliveira Cruz Filho, Alexandre Cordeiro Macedo","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnad042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad042","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article advocates against more presumption-based illegality legal standards. The focus is on the Rule of Reason analysis, which is in line with CADE’s case laws for analysing unilateral conducts, distinguishing between restraints with an anti-competitive effect (or resulting in conduct likely to cause such injury) that are harmful to the consumer, and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer’s best interest. In this sense, the article recalls some basic concepts, such as market power, dominant position, concentration indexes, and its interactions, since the recent discussions appear to have forgotten its basics. Moreover, a brief analysis of CADE’s procedures and the Brazilian Competition system, especially the analyses of unilateral conduct cases, is made in order to present a background for the readers. At the end, we report three digital antitrust cases judged by Cade to demonstrate the steps used by the authority in order to reach a decision on the case. In a nutshell, CADE has not shifted the analysis of unilateral conduct from the use of the rule of reason to a more presumption-based illegality approach.","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135236204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The internationalization of competition law in recent decades has been very successful. A very large number of jurisdictions have now adopted competition laws and apply them in marked similarity. And yet, at times, these laws, despite the similarity in wording and theory, lead to substantial differences when enforced. Differences in the meaning attributed to various concepts, to the goals of competition laws and to the methods of implementation, may result in inconsistency in the enforcement. The Latin American experience reveals a certain level of mutation process from the model laws through the flexibilization in their competition law enforcement, influenced by their own social values and beliefs, as well as their economic, political, institutional, and legal cultures. These cultural challenges need to be solved internally in each jurisdiction to allow competition law enforcement to further develop. Those jurisdictions where competition law enforcement has evolved the most are those that have adapted their competition laws to their cultural realities, while at the same time learning from the international experience. An interdisciplinary debate, at the local and regional levels, has showed to be an essential tool to help find possible solutions to the different challenges Latin American enforcers face.
{"title":"Cultural challenges to competition law enforcement in Latin America","authors":"Julián Peña","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnad041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad041","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The internationalization of competition law in recent decades has been very successful. A very large number of jurisdictions have now adopted competition laws and apply them in marked similarity. And yet, at times, these laws, despite the similarity in wording and theory, lead to substantial differences when enforced. Differences in the meaning attributed to various concepts, to the goals of competition laws and to the methods of implementation, may result in inconsistency in the enforcement. The Latin American experience reveals a certain level of mutation process from the model laws through the flexibilization in their competition law enforcement, influenced by their own social values and beliefs, as well as their economic, political, institutional, and legal cultures. These cultural challenges need to be solved internally in each jurisdiction to allow competition law enforcement to further develop. Those jurisdictions where competition law enforcement has evolved the most are those that have adapted their competition laws to their cultural realities, while at the same time learning from the international experience. An interdisciplinary debate, at the local and regional levels, has showed to be an essential tool to help find possible solutions to the different challenges Latin American enforcers face.","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46071357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The Digital Markets Act (DMA) aims at promoting contestable and fair markets for core platform services by setting out obligations for designated gatekeepers. As the DMA does not clearly define these objectives, it comes into conflict with national legislation with overlapping objectives. This may include unfair competition laws and sector-specific regulation. Article 1(5) DMA addresses this conflict by stipulating that Member States may not impose further obligations on gatekeepers for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. The effect this has is that national provisions vis-à-vis gatekeepers may not be applicable anymore, and competences are centralized on the European level more broadly than potentially envisaged by the European legislature. This centralization of competences runs the risk of inadvertently privileging gatekeepers by blocking national laws that are, however, still applicable to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and other firms competing with gatekeepers. This article suggests solutions to mitigate such a risk.
{"title":"Gatekeeper’s potential privilege—the need to limit DMA centralization","authors":"Jörg Hoffmann, Liza Herrmann, Lukas Kestler","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnad040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad040","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The Digital Markets Act (DMA) aims at promoting contestable and fair markets for core platform services by setting out obligations for designated gatekeepers. As the DMA does not clearly define these objectives, it comes into conflict with national legislation with overlapping objectives. This may include unfair competition laws and sector-specific regulation. Article 1(5) DMA addresses this conflict by stipulating that Member States may not impose further obligations on gatekeepers for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. The effect this has is that national provisions vis-à-vis gatekeepers may not be applicable anymore, and competences are centralized on the European level more broadly than potentially envisaged by the European legislature. This centralization of competences runs the risk of inadvertently privileging gatekeepers by blocking national laws that are, however, still applicable to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and other firms competing with gatekeepers. This article suggests solutions to mitigate such a risk.","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135065527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Build, borrow, buy: the case for merger efficiencies","authors":"M. Ohlhausen, Taylor M Owings","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnad039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad039","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47028229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Section 5 in action: reinvigorating the FTC Act and the rule of law","authors":"Lina M. Khan","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnad026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad026","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42404040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Digital markets and ‘trends towards concentration’","authors":"Jonathan S Kanter","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnad030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad030","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136260588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction to: Contemporary Critique","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnad011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad011","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48890114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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