Pub Date : 2023-10-01DOI: 10.5406/19446489.18.3.01
Jihun Jeong
Nietzsche believes that the different human types should be allowed to thrive and not be reduced into uniformity, as he says “nothing should be banished more than . . . the approximation and reconciliation” of the different types (KSA 12:10[59]).1 He sees the approximation as a reflection of democratic values and monolithic morality that he opposes. Instead, he believes that humans should be naturalized and allowed to live in accordance with their own nature. To achieve this, Nietzsche proposed “the great politics,” which “makes physiology into the ruler over all other questions” to “breed humanity as a whole” so that “one affirms what one is, one denies what one is not” (KSA 13:25[1]). In this way, Nietzsche thinks the different types should live in accordance with their respective nature.In The Antichrist, Nietzsche argues that “every healthy society” consists of different physiological types.2 He repeatedly says that “Nature, not Manu,” separates these physiological types of the hierarchical order,3 which is “merely the sanction of a natural order, natural lawfulness of the first rank.” While each type has “its own hygiene, its own realm of work, its own feelings of perfection and mastery” (A 57), this rank order is “the sanctioning of a natural distance between several physiological types,” which are “determined and best developed for different activity,” like “division of labor” (KSA 13:14[221]). Therefore, Nietzsche describes the physiological types divided in a healthy society as “differently gravitating” and “mutually conditioning” types (A 57). In order for a society to be healthy as a whole, individuals should be neither uniform nor scattered, but should be in an organized structure together. This structure is “opposed to an atomistic anarchy.” A “human community is a unity [Einheit],” and “all unity is unity only as organization and co-operation.” In this way “a ruling structure,” which does not exist as one, “means one [Eins]” (KSA 12:2[87]).However, what is it that produces this unity? Nietzsche's envisioned “naturalization of human beings” (KSA 9:11[211]) involves a society where different types live actively in accordance with their nature or respective physiological constitution. However, the existence of different types does not ensure the formation of society as a whole. Individuals of different types with different power will not automatically gather to form a society if they remain merely as individuals. In other words, if there is no social character in nature itself, a society could be seen to be formed “by accident,” as Hobbes understands (42). What then is the basis that allows individuals to be incorporated into the social order? This article explores the social aspect of Nietzsche's understanding of nature, particularly with attention to his idea of affects, which will lead us to the idea of the affective foundation of society in his philosophy.4Nietzsche often describes nature as something chaotic that is elusive, uncer
{"title":"Affective Foundation of Society in Nietzsche's Philosophy","authors":"Jihun Jeong","doi":"10.5406/19446489.18.3.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/19446489.18.3.01","url":null,"abstract":"Nietzsche believes that the different human types should be allowed to thrive and not be reduced into uniformity, as he says “nothing should be banished more than . . . the approximation and reconciliation” of the different types (KSA 12:10[59]).1 He sees the approximation as a reflection of democratic values and monolithic morality that he opposes. Instead, he believes that humans should be naturalized and allowed to live in accordance with their own nature. To achieve this, Nietzsche proposed “the great politics,” which “makes physiology into the ruler over all other questions” to “breed humanity as a whole” so that “one affirms what one is, one denies what one is not” (KSA 13:25[1]). In this way, Nietzsche thinks the different types should live in accordance with their respective nature.In The Antichrist, Nietzsche argues that “every healthy society” consists of different physiological types.2 He repeatedly says that “Nature, not Manu,” separates these physiological types of the hierarchical order,3 which is “merely the sanction of a natural order, natural lawfulness of the first rank.” While each type has “its own hygiene, its own realm of work, its own feelings of perfection and mastery” (A 57), this rank order is “the sanctioning of a natural distance between several physiological types,” which are “determined and best developed for different activity,” like “division of labor” (KSA 13:14[221]). Therefore, Nietzsche describes the physiological types divided in a healthy society as “differently gravitating” and “mutually conditioning” types (A 57). In order for a society to be healthy as a whole, individuals should be neither uniform nor scattered, but should be in an organized structure together. This structure is “opposed to an atomistic anarchy.” A “human community is a unity [Einheit],” and “all unity is unity only as organization and co-operation.” In this way “a ruling structure,” which does not exist as one, “means one [Eins]” (KSA 12:2[87]).However, what is it that produces this unity? Nietzsche's envisioned “naturalization of human beings” (KSA 9:11[211]) involves a society where different types live actively in accordance with their nature or respective physiological constitution. However, the existence of different types does not ensure the formation of society as a whole. Individuals of different types with different power will not automatically gather to form a society if they remain merely as individuals. In other words, if there is no social character in nature itself, a society could be seen to be formed “by accident,” as Hobbes understands (42). What then is the basis that allows individuals to be incorporated into the social order? This article explores the social aspect of Nietzsche's understanding of nature, particularly with attention to his idea of affects, which will lead us to the idea of the affective foundation of society in his philosophy.4Nietzsche often describes nature as something chaotic that is elusive, uncer","PeriodicalId":42609,"journal":{"name":"Pluralist","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136203793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-01DOI: 10.5406/19446489.18.3.03
Duckkyun Lee
In this paper, I develop an account of slurs focusing on their two underappreciated features. The first underappreciated feature is what I call their “communal nature.” Slurs are communal. The meaning of a slur depends on the existence of a significant number of people who are bigoted against the target. When this condition is not satisfied, a slur loses its power to offend. This can be seen when we consider how philosophers choose examples of slurs to avoid offending people. For example, Williamson, in his essay “Reference, Inference and the Semantics of Pejoratives,” uses a slur for Germans as his main example. What makes the slur for Germans a safe example to use is the fact that there is no widespread bigotry against Germans in any Anglophone country. Had there been strong enmity between Germans and the people in the Anglophone countries, even if Williamson had chosen an outdated slur, his example would not have been such a safe choice. Slurs are words that bigots use to offend and harm the people they are bigoted against. When there are no bigots, neither are there slurs.The focus on the communal nature of slurs leads to the second underappreciated feature of slurs. A bigot does not use a slur just to express his beliefs or feelings, but to subordinate his target. To subordinate others, a bigot needs to cooperate and coordinate with other bigots. In this paper, I will propose a mechanism for how slurs work as a tool for coordinating subordination. To account for the communal and subordinating nature of slurs, I turn to speech act theory and explain what kind of illocutionary act is performed when one uses a slur.1My proposal is to understand utterances made using a slur, or slurring,2 as an act of casting a vote for ranking the target as socially inferior. On this view, a slur is a conventional tool used to cast a vote demanding the subordination of its target. The considerations that motivate this view are as follows: First, the uses of a slur are the results of consciously choosing it over its neutral counterpart. By explicitly avoiding a neutral counterpart term, one can show their support for fellow bigots and the willingness to participate in whatever activity they do. Second, the point of using a slur does not seem to be exhausted by its role of expressing the bigot's negative beliefs about the target. We can see this when we consider that the way to fight a slur is to impose strict prohibitions against its use, not by objecting to the content of the slurring utterance. This can be better explained when we understand the slur as a conventional tool for the performance of a certain type of action, rather than a word that has distinctive descriptive content different from the descriptive content of its neutral counterpart. Finally, the point of some speech acts is not just expressing the state of the mind of the speaker. The point of some speech acts is to change what is the case in society. To make an utterance using a slur seems to fal
{"title":"Casting a Vote for Subordination Using a Slur","authors":"Duckkyun Lee","doi":"10.5406/19446489.18.3.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/19446489.18.3.03","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I develop an account of slurs focusing on their two underappreciated features. The first underappreciated feature is what I call their “communal nature.” Slurs are communal. The meaning of a slur depends on the existence of a significant number of people who are bigoted against the target. When this condition is not satisfied, a slur loses its power to offend. This can be seen when we consider how philosophers choose examples of slurs to avoid offending people. For example, Williamson, in his essay “Reference, Inference and the Semantics of Pejoratives,” uses a slur for Germans as his main example. What makes the slur for Germans a safe example to use is the fact that there is no widespread bigotry against Germans in any Anglophone country. Had there been strong enmity between Germans and the people in the Anglophone countries, even if Williamson had chosen an outdated slur, his example would not have been such a safe choice. Slurs are words that bigots use to offend and harm the people they are bigoted against. When there are no bigots, neither are there slurs.The focus on the communal nature of slurs leads to the second underappreciated feature of slurs. A bigot does not use a slur just to express his beliefs or feelings, but to subordinate his target. To subordinate others, a bigot needs to cooperate and coordinate with other bigots. In this paper, I will propose a mechanism for how slurs work as a tool for coordinating subordination. To account for the communal and subordinating nature of slurs, I turn to speech act theory and explain what kind of illocutionary act is performed when one uses a slur.1My proposal is to understand utterances made using a slur, or slurring,2 as an act of casting a vote for ranking the target as socially inferior. On this view, a slur is a conventional tool used to cast a vote demanding the subordination of its target. The considerations that motivate this view are as follows: First, the uses of a slur are the results of consciously choosing it over its neutral counterpart. By explicitly avoiding a neutral counterpart term, one can show their support for fellow bigots and the willingness to participate in whatever activity they do. Second, the point of using a slur does not seem to be exhausted by its role of expressing the bigot's negative beliefs about the target. We can see this when we consider that the way to fight a slur is to impose strict prohibitions against its use, not by objecting to the content of the slurring utterance. This can be better explained when we understand the slur as a conventional tool for the performance of a certain type of action, rather than a word that has distinctive descriptive content different from the descriptive content of its neutral counterpart. Finally, the point of some speech acts is not just expressing the state of the mind of the speaker. The point of some speech acts is to change what is the case in society. To make an utterance using a slur seems to fal","PeriodicalId":42609,"journal":{"name":"Pluralist","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136203781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-01DOI: 10.5406/19446489.18.3.02
Joseph Gamache
This paper consists of an observation, a suggestion, and an illustration. First, the observation: in the English-language literature on the philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, there is, so far as I have discovered, a lack of attention paid to the relationship between Marcel and the British philosopher F. H. Bradley (1846–1924).1 Why might be this be? I speculate (this is not the suggestion previously advertised) that the following are possible reasons for this omission. First, Bradley's influence is neglected in favor of what some might regard as the more obvious influence of Josiah Royce (1855–1916). After all, Marcel wrote a series of articles on Royce early in his career that were subsequently published as a monograph and eventually translated into English as Royce's Metaphysics. Second, there is the confluence of narratives concerning Marcel's philosophical development and the dethronement of Bradley and of idealism by figures such as Russell and Moore. According to the former narrative, Marcel's idealist phase ends with the first part of the Metaphysical Journal (about 1915).2 Since Bradley is less widely read these days and is treated simply as one more (even if the chief) representative of British idealism, it is easy to infer that, when he shed his idealism, Marcel also shed any connection with Bradley.But all that I have achieved thus far is the articulation of two reasons why people interested in Marcel have not also been interested in Bradley. Are there any reasons to believe that Marcel was influenced by Bradley in a positive way? Here, we can do no better than to gather some selected texts. In his preface to the English translation of the Metaphysical Journal, Marcel writes: Meditations on the implications of the word “with” and on metaphysical fruitfulness must in my opinion be counted among the most valuable contributions of the Metaphysical Journal. Later, in the collected writings published under the title Du Refus à l'invocation [translated into English as Creative Fidelity], I was to submit to similar analyses the relations, or rather the super-relations, implies by the French word “chez.” Here, unless I am mistaken, I made use of the word super-relation for the first time. The vigorous criticism made by F. H. Bradley (in Appearance and Reality) of the current notion of relation—considered as a pure makeshift—is there extended, and I think I will be never be able to recognize too explicitly what I owe to that great thinker. (Marcel, Metaphysical Journal xii)In the foreword to his pre-Metaphysical Journal works published as Philosophical Fragments 1909–1914, Marcel writes of his early (idealist) phase: I find it hard to understand today how, during the years immediately following the reception of my aggregation degree, and even after having had the privilege of hearing Henri Bergson at the College de France, I could still feel the need to undertake a groping inquiry in such a rarefied atmosphere and with the help of tools borrowed fro
{"title":"The Dramatization of Absolute Idealism: Gabriel Marcel and F. H. Bradley","authors":"Joseph Gamache","doi":"10.5406/19446489.18.3.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/19446489.18.3.02","url":null,"abstract":"This paper consists of an observation, a suggestion, and an illustration. First, the observation: in the English-language literature on the philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, there is, so far as I have discovered, a lack of attention paid to the relationship between Marcel and the British philosopher F. H. Bradley (1846–1924).1 Why might be this be? I speculate (this is not the suggestion previously advertised) that the following are possible reasons for this omission. First, Bradley's influence is neglected in favor of what some might regard as the more obvious influence of Josiah Royce (1855–1916). After all, Marcel wrote a series of articles on Royce early in his career that were subsequently published as a monograph and eventually translated into English as Royce's Metaphysics. Second, there is the confluence of narratives concerning Marcel's philosophical development and the dethronement of Bradley and of idealism by figures such as Russell and Moore. According to the former narrative, Marcel's idealist phase ends with the first part of the Metaphysical Journal (about 1915).2 Since Bradley is less widely read these days and is treated simply as one more (even if the chief) representative of British idealism, it is easy to infer that, when he shed his idealism, Marcel also shed any connection with Bradley.But all that I have achieved thus far is the articulation of two reasons why people interested in Marcel have not also been interested in Bradley. Are there any reasons to believe that Marcel was influenced by Bradley in a positive way? Here, we can do no better than to gather some selected texts. In his preface to the English translation of the Metaphysical Journal, Marcel writes: Meditations on the implications of the word “with” and on metaphysical fruitfulness must in my opinion be counted among the most valuable contributions of the Metaphysical Journal. Later, in the collected writings published under the title Du Refus à l'invocation [translated into English as Creative Fidelity], I was to submit to similar analyses the relations, or rather the super-relations, implies by the French word “chez.” Here, unless I am mistaken, I made use of the word super-relation for the first time. The vigorous criticism made by F. H. Bradley (in Appearance and Reality) of the current notion of relation—considered as a pure makeshift—is there extended, and I think I will be never be able to recognize too explicitly what I owe to that great thinker. (Marcel, Metaphysical Journal xii)In the foreword to his pre-Metaphysical Journal works published as Philosophical Fragments 1909–1914, Marcel writes of his early (idealist) phase: I find it hard to understand today how, during the years immediately following the reception of my aggregation degree, and even after having had the privilege of hearing Henri Bergson at the College de France, I could still feel the need to undertake a groping inquiry in such a rarefied atmosphere and with the help of tools borrowed fro","PeriodicalId":42609,"journal":{"name":"Pluralist","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136206374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-01DOI: 10.5406/19446489.18.3.05
Kordell Dixon
Philosophy and the Modern African American Freedom Struggle begins with a clear and concise establishment of its aim: to analyze and expand upon those figures mentioned when discussing the academic project of studying black people. Neal broadens the account of black scholars examining racialized existence by centering his work on the modern era and its initiator W. E. B Du Bois. Neal develops an ethnic reflective canon that documents the long history of black thinkers attempting to define their blackness and advance the conception of freedom. This book does an excellent job of capturing the genealogical structure of the struggle for freedom. Within the work, Neal denotes that all relevant figures in this tradition are freedom gazers. These gazers are spectators of a radically imagined future liberated from the oppressive systems that encumber the persecuted. Du Bois's approach to freedom gazing uses academic training to examine his blackness and inevitably to solve the “race problem.” What Neal provides the reader is a road map of the intellectual work of black scholars. This road map details the common themes among black thinkers and how these themes relate to Du Bois. Neal's intricate network of philosophers uses their experience and their expertise to write about what is necessary for black people to obtain freedom. Neal composes a complex and remarkable catalog of black scholars that demonstrates the interconnectedness and progression of black thought on oppression and liberation.In the second chapter, Neal elucidates why Du Bois is chosen as the inaugurator of the modern era. As a formally educated black man, Du Bois questions his experience and what tethers him to oppression. Neal uses Du Bois as a focal point, not because Du Bois is the first black person to document their struggle with their racialized existence, but because he believes that Du Bois is the first scholar to analyze the black experience completely. The holistic nature of Du Bois's study of the existential conflict that race can manifest within its subjects allows Du Bois's analysis to be used as a tool to unify other works that discuss race and the struggle for freedom. Neal expresses how other scholars such as Frederick Douglass, Martin Delany, and Anna Julia Cooper all had work that takes up a similar task as Du Bois's but lacks the fullness of Du Bois's study. Here, Neal does not articulate clearly how these figures are inadequate with respect to their work. It could be argued that each scholar named could be said to have accomplished a task similar to that of Du Bois. However, how these figures are studied throughout different disciplines gives the impression that their examination of race and freedom is much more focused on one specific field. This point speaks to how we interpret the work of these scholars and not to these scholars’ work itself. Neal proceeds to describe Du Bois as a freedom gazer and explains how Du Bois's imagining of black persons as freed would al
{"title":"Philosophy and the Modern African American Freedom Struggle: A Freedom Gaze","authors":"Kordell Dixon","doi":"10.5406/19446489.18.3.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/19446489.18.3.05","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophy and the Modern African American Freedom Struggle begins with a clear and concise establishment of its aim: to analyze and expand upon those figures mentioned when discussing the academic project of studying black people. Neal broadens the account of black scholars examining racialized existence by centering his work on the modern era and its initiator W. E. B Du Bois. Neal develops an ethnic reflective canon that documents the long history of black thinkers attempting to define their blackness and advance the conception of freedom. This book does an excellent job of capturing the genealogical structure of the struggle for freedom. Within the work, Neal denotes that all relevant figures in this tradition are freedom gazers. These gazers are spectators of a radically imagined future liberated from the oppressive systems that encumber the persecuted. Du Bois's approach to freedom gazing uses academic training to examine his blackness and inevitably to solve the “race problem.” What Neal provides the reader is a road map of the intellectual work of black scholars. This road map details the common themes among black thinkers and how these themes relate to Du Bois. Neal's intricate network of philosophers uses their experience and their expertise to write about what is necessary for black people to obtain freedom. Neal composes a complex and remarkable catalog of black scholars that demonstrates the interconnectedness and progression of black thought on oppression and liberation.In the second chapter, Neal elucidates why Du Bois is chosen as the inaugurator of the modern era. As a formally educated black man, Du Bois questions his experience and what tethers him to oppression. Neal uses Du Bois as a focal point, not because Du Bois is the first black person to document their struggle with their racialized existence, but because he believes that Du Bois is the first scholar to analyze the black experience completely. The holistic nature of Du Bois's study of the existential conflict that race can manifest within its subjects allows Du Bois's analysis to be used as a tool to unify other works that discuss race and the struggle for freedom. Neal expresses how other scholars such as Frederick Douglass, Martin Delany, and Anna Julia Cooper all had work that takes up a similar task as Du Bois's but lacks the fullness of Du Bois's study. Here, Neal does not articulate clearly how these figures are inadequate with respect to their work. It could be argued that each scholar named could be said to have accomplished a task similar to that of Du Bois. However, how these figures are studied throughout different disciplines gives the impression that their examination of race and freedom is much more focused on one specific field. This point speaks to how we interpret the work of these scholars and not to these scholars’ work itself. Neal proceeds to describe Du Bois as a freedom gazer and explains how Du Bois's imagining of black persons as freed would al","PeriodicalId":42609,"journal":{"name":"Pluralist","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136203795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-01DOI: 10.5406/19446489.18.3.04
Ionut Untea
Studies in social psychology point out that feelings of guilt are more likely than feelings of regret to occur in an interpersonal context (Wagner et al. 1) marked by “interpersonal harm,” or harm done to others (Berndsen et al. 55, 66). In keeping with these studies, in social ontology, regret seems to involve an evaluation of the kind of wrongdoing that is out of someone's control (Konzelmann Ziv 488), while the feeling of guilt implies the self-attribution of blame over something that is connected, even in a loose manner, to a blameworthy action (Gilbert, “Group Wrongs” 65, 66n3).In order to advance the argument of the reasonableness of a person's feeling of guilt if that person is part of a group that has acted wrongfully, Margaret Gilbert distinguishes between feelings of personal guilt and feelings of collective guilt (“Group Wrongs” 76), with the latter still impacting on the individual feelings of guilt. From this point of view, a person may be “personally guiltless,” but can still reasonably feel guilt if that person's group behaves in a morally unacceptable way (“Group Wrongs” 66). By distinguishing between personal and collective guilt, Gilbert intends to give an “intelligible” dimension to what she calls Jaspers's “dilemma” (“Collective Guilt” 135, 136). She emphasizes Karl Jaspers's hesitation in categorizing his own feeling of guilt for what his people have done: “There is a way that he ‘cannot help feeling’ which is ‘rationally refutable’” (Gilbert “Collective Guilt” 135; Jaspers 74). As a philosopher, Gilbert argues, Jaspers finds this existential dilemma “extremely problematic” (“Collective Guilt” 135). Nonetheless, Gilbert also concedes that these two types of guilt may be difficult to distinguish in regard to their “phenomenological conditions” at the level of the “pangs and twinges” experienced by each person, but rather on the basis of the “judgment or thought” involved with that feeling (“Collective Guilt” 135).Gilbert argues that “it is indeed intelligible for group members to feel guilt over the action in question” by virtue of what she calls a “foundational joint commitment,” which brings together a number of people to “intend as a body” to carry out certain actions (“Collective Guilt” 136). Although not committed to the goal of showing the intelligibility of the feeling of membership guilt as is Gilbert, I favor the acceptance of a kind of reasonableness of such a feeling, even when it conserves its “rationally refutable” character. This even applies when membership guilt may not so easily be distinguished from personal guilt. Gilbert sees joint commitment as “authority-creating,” in the sense that “a person or body” may become “authorized” to apply the collective intention to the concrete settings. This is realized by making decisions for the entire group, thus bringing the collective intention into effect (“Collective Guilt” 136). This joint commitment becomes binding for individual members of the group since once they
社会心理学研究指出，在以“人际伤害”或对他人造成伤害为标志的人际环境中(Wagner et al. 1)，内疚感比后悔感更容易发生(Berndsen et al. 55,66)。与这些研究相一致的是，在社会本体论中，后悔似乎涉及对不受某人控制的不法行为的评估(Konzelmann Ziv 488)，而内疚的感觉意味着对与应受谴责的行为有关的事情的自我归因，即使是以一种松散的方式(Gilbert，“Group errors”65,66n3)。如果一个人是一个行为错误的群体的一部分，为了推进这个人的内疚感的合理性的论点，Margaret Gilbert区分了个人内疚感和集体内疚感(“group wrong76”)，后者仍然影响个人的内疚感。从这个角度来看，一个人可能是“个人无罪的”，但如果他所在的群体以一种道德上不可接受的方式行事，他仍然可以合理地感到内疚(“群体错误”66)。通过区分个人罪责和集体罪责，吉尔伯特打算给她所谓的雅斯贝尔斯的“困境”提供一个“可理解的”维度(“集体罪责”135,136)。她强调了卡尔·雅斯贝尔斯(Karl Jaspers)在对他自己对他的人民所做的事情的负罪感进行分类时的犹豫:“有一种方式是他‘无法控制的感觉’，这是‘理性地可以反驳的’”(吉尔伯特《集体内疚》135;雅斯贝尔斯74)。吉尔伯特认为，作为一名哲学家，雅斯贝尔斯发现这种存在主义困境“极其成问题”(“集体内疚”135页)。尽管如此，吉尔伯特也承认，这两种类型的罪恶感可能很难在每个人所经历的“痛苦和刺痛”层面上的“现象学条件”上加以区分，而是基于与这种感觉相关的“判断或思想”(“集体罪恶感”135)。吉尔伯特认为，由于她所说的“基本的共同承诺”，“群体成员对有问题的行为感到内疚确实是可以理解的”，这种承诺将一些人聚集在一起，“作为一个整体”来执行某些行为(“集体内疚”136页)。虽然我不像吉尔伯特那样致力于表明成员负罪感的可理解性，但我赞成接受这种感觉的一种合理性，即使它保留了“理性可辩驳”的特征。这甚至适用于成员内疚与个人内疚不那么容易区分的情况。吉尔伯特将共同承诺视为“创造权威”，在某种意义上，“一个人或一个身体”可能被“授权”将集体意图应用于具体环境。这是通过为整个群体做出决策来实现的，从而使集体意图生效(“集体内疚”136)。这种共同的承诺对团体的个体成员具有约束力，因为一旦他们对团体的意图作出承诺，“他们就不能单方面地改变集体的想法。”这不适用于“经双方同意可以这样做”的情况(“集体罪行”127)。关于吉尔伯特在成员罪疚的维度中参与“创造权威”(“集体罪疚”136)共同承诺的争论，我发现，它恰恰阻碍了对决定集体意图内容的权威的任何争论，除非这是通过“相互同意”完成的(“集体罪疚”127)。这使得集体成员相当被动，不愿意挑战通过他们参与共同承诺而产生的权威。一个集体的成员不愿挑战给予他们集体意图内容的权威，这在历史和当代政治权威的格局中很容易被发现，特别是在几十年来一直由威权领导人领导的国家。尽管他们的领导具有压迫性，但很少有人对这些意见提出异议，然后只有零星的声音，这些声音无法从其他小组成员那里产生连贯的长期承诺。从这个意义上说，吉尔伯特的论点假设，只有当那些零星的声音获得足够的吸引力，产生一种普遍的“相互同意”，剥夺特定的个人或掌权的群体的权威，并产生新的权威来取代旧的权威时，群体的“思想”才能改变(“集体内疚”127)。尽管如此，吉尔伯特并没有把重点放在从群体成员的被动到主动的共同协议来改变他们的统治权威的转变上，而是简单地指出这种转变确实发生了。事实上，她把这方面留给了社会在特定地理、文化和政治背景下的偶然性。 从长远来看，随着当权者在集体的制度和习惯纽带中巩固他们的影响力，个人的单纯怀疑将发展成为一种强烈的理性信念，即“主体在领导犯下的不法行为中缺乏影响力”(Konzelmann Ziv 490)。剩下的就是感谢领导人的行动，这些行动仍然服务于集体利益和保护的总体目标，同时将批评的声音保持在私下的嘀咕水平。对统治者在征服其他国家荣耀的道路上取得的伟大成就的敬畏之情，或对失去社会地位、财产、亲人或自己身体的恐惧和焦虑，可能会使道德悔恨的动机力量看起来完全是非理性的。在集体不愿反对现状的背景下，即使这不利于自己在社会群体中的地位，最终不利于整个群体，并且考虑到争论的明显非理性，社会群体的成员正在走向所谓的“自然主义谬误”。这种判断谬误被描述为“推理中的任何飞跃，其中一个人推断出一个应该”，也就是说，“关于事物应该如何的假设”，从“现状”，仅仅是对“事物存在的方式”的观察(Kay et al. 431)。如果现状对许多人来说是不公平的，他们可能会接受它，认为它是基于一个更高的集体意图的合理性，他们与这个意图有着不可救药的联系，而这个意图的内容是由那些拥有权威和权力的人赋予的。此外，对他人，甚至对自己的处境感到遗憾的动机力量，被当前制度使社会车轮转动和庞大的集体运动这一事实削弱了，这对个人或小群体来说可能是压倒性的。这可能并不意味着道德悔恨的动机力量完全消失了，而仅仅是点燃每个人心中潜伏的道德不满的火花消失了。只有当一个人或一小群人做了一些被认为是非理性的事情时，这种火花才会出现，这是一种高风险的行为，可能会给他们和他们的朋友和家人带来可怕的后果。然而，一旦这一行为被群体中的其他成员所知，它就会面对——并给大多数人心中根深蒂固的那种推理带来耻辱。这种明显不合理的姿态影响了集体对事物的理性认识，唤醒了一种道德感觉，即既定的生活方式存在严重的错误，这种生活方式要求牺牲少数人的利益来换取多数人的利益，而且，为了少数人的舒适而对多数人不公平。这种新情况唤醒了集体后悔的道德感觉，并将其扩大到更直观、更令人震惊的内疚动力。内疚的动力影响着那些意识到由于缺乏行动动力，他们已经容忍、鼓励和合法化了集体习俗和制度太久的人。这些给那些被认为太不同的人带来了难以想象的痛苦和折磨，比如种族、性别、宗教少数群体、原住民或非白人社区:简而言之，所有那些被当权者想象中的集体大厦视为不重要的部分。其他国家对荣誉的集体需要在很大程度上促成了成员国对其政权所犯下的社会不公正视而不见。正如彼得·福雷斯特所说，与荣耀感完全相反的是罪恶感(145)。无论这个建议是否正确，荣誉的论点确实被专制领导人用来影响集体的成员，使他们忽视个人和集体的罪恶问题，这些问题涉及社会中一些成员的边缘化或公开迫害，作为集体荣誉的代价。我反对把追求荣誉作为逃避罪恶感的工具的态度，我认为，通过集体接受罪恶感和由此产生的责任，可以在国家之间展示一种更清晰、更令人印象深刻的荣耀。这并不意味着罪恶感仅仅是一种非理性的、对个人幸福有潜在危险的感觉，而是与过去和现在的错误行为的集体责任联系在一起。这种由内疚感所孕育的集体责任决定了“情感主体作为负责任的主体参与情感内容”(Konzelmann Ziv 476)，然而，这种集体责任却被改变整个社区思维模式的火花点燃了。这种火花是非理性的，但却是非常令人向往的英雄主义行为。 为了扩展英雄行为对成员集体罪恶感的转化力量，它将消极的感觉转化为积极的感觉，旨在产生，而不是阻止，合作和相互同意之前的罪行，我将简要地批判性地讨论和发展
{"title":"Collective Regret and Guilt and Heroic Agency: A Pro-Existential Approach","authors":"Ionut Untea","doi":"10.5406/19446489.18.3.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/19446489.18.3.04","url":null,"abstract":"Studies in social psychology point out that feelings of guilt are more likely than feelings of regret to occur in an interpersonal context (Wagner et al. 1) marked by “interpersonal harm,” or harm done to others (Berndsen et al. 55, 66). In keeping with these studies, in social ontology, regret seems to involve an evaluation of the kind of wrongdoing that is out of someone's control (Konzelmann Ziv 488), while the feeling of guilt implies the self-attribution of blame over something that is connected, even in a loose manner, to a blameworthy action (Gilbert, “Group Wrongs” 65, 66n3).In order to advance the argument of the reasonableness of a person's feeling of guilt if that person is part of a group that has acted wrongfully, Margaret Gilbert distinguishes between feelings of personal guilt and feelings of collective guilt (“Group Wrongs” 76), with the latter still impacting on the individual feelings of guilt. From this point of view, a person may be “personally guiltless,” but can still reasonably feel guilt if that person's group behaves in a morally unacceptable way (“Group Wrongs” 66). By distinguishing between personal and collective guilt, Gilbert intends to give an “intelligible” dimension to what she calls Jaspers's “dilemma” (“Collective Guilt” 135, 136). She emphasizes Karl Jaspers's hesitation in categorizing his own feeling of guilt for what his people have done: “There is a way that he ‘cannot help feeling’ which is ‘rationally refutable’” (Gilbert “Collective Guilt” 135; Jaspers 74). As a philosopher, Gilbert argues, Jaspers finds this existential dilemma “extremely problematic” (“Collective Guilt” 135). Nonetheless, Gilbert also concedes that these two types of guilt may be difficult to distinguish in regard to their “phenomenological conditions” at the level of the “pangs and twinges” experienced by each person, but rather on the basis of the “judgment or thought” involved with that feeling (“Collective Guilt” 135).Gilbert argues that “it is indeed intelligible for group members to feel guilt over the action in question” by virtue of what she calls a “foundational joint commitment,” which brings together a number of people to “intend as a body” to carry out certain actions (“Collective Guilt” 136). Although not committed to the goal of showing the intelligibility of the feeling of membership guilt as is Gilbert, I favor the acceptance of a kind of reasonableness of such a feeling, even when it conserves its “rationally refutable” character. This even applies when membership guilt may not so easily be distinguished from personal guilt. Gilbert sees joint commitment as “authority-creating,” in the sense that “a person or body” may become “authorized” to apply the collective intention to the concrete settings. This is realized by making decisions for the entire group, thus bringing the collective intention into effect (“Collective Guilt” 136). This joint commitment becomes binding for individual members of the group since once they","PeriodicalId":42609,"journal":{"name":"Pluralist","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136206375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.5406/19446489.18.2.06
A. Wilson
{"title":"Peirce on Realism and Idealism","authors":"A. Wilson","doi":"10.5406/19446489.18.2.06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/19446489.18.2.06","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42609,"journal":{"name":"Pluralist","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42208444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-22DOI: 10.5406/19446489.18.2.07
F. Ryan
{"title":"Dewey and the Aesthetic Unconsciousness: The Vital Depths of Experience by Bethany Henning (review)","authors":"F. Ryan","doi":"10.5406/19446489.18.2.07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/19446489.18.2.07","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42609,"journal":{"name":"Pluralist","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45955400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-22DOI: 10.5406/19446489.18.2.04
Massimo Cisternino
siNCe its origiNs iN herbert spiegelberg’s 1960 Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, the question of the rapport between Royce and Husserl has been generally framed according to a perspective that is at once conceptual and methodological. More specifically, Spiegelberg’s attempt has been that of finding an equilibrium among this twofold perspective and Royce’s theory of meaning and social self:
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Pub Date : 2023-06-22DOI: 10.5406/19446489.18.2.05
Frank Martela
{"title":"Crisis of Meaning in Sartor Resartus—Thomas Carlyle's Pioneering Work in Articulating and Addressing the Existential Confrontation","authors":"Frank Martela","doi":"10.5406/19446489.18.2.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/19446489.18.2.05","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42609,"journal":{"name":"Pluralist","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45140854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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