Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2020.1767419
P. Aufderheide
Judge Pierre Leval’s commentary on the centrality of transformativeness in interpreting fair use decisively changed the way the copyright doctrine was interpreted. He leveraged the forum successful...
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Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2020.1766320
Erin K. Coyle
Scholarship often traces American privacy law to Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis’s influential 1890 Harvard Law Review article. The Warren and Brandeis article argues judges ought to protect a person’s thoughts, sensations and emotions against invasions by the press, photographers, distributors of portraits, and publishers of gossip. Warren and Brandeis connected the right of privacy to personal dignity and what Judge Thomas M. Cooley identified as a “right to be let alone.” Just over a century later, Professor Randall P. Bezanson revisited their article. He explained Warren and Brandeis’s conception of privacy was a response to nineteenth century social conditions and cultural values that were distinct from twentieth century social conditions and cultural values. Bezanson’s article demonstrates a legal concept can be better understood by exploring social and cultural history to analyze what a particular law was intended to protect. While some legal scholarship explores legislative histories of statutory laws and case law cited in judicial opinions, legal scholarship also may consider other factors that influenced calls
学者们经常把美国隐私法追溯到塞缪尔·d·沃伦和路易斯·d·布兰代斯1890年在《哈佛法律评论》上发表的一篇有影响力的文章。沃伦和布兰代斯的文章认为,法官应该保护一个人的思想、感觉和情感不受媒体、摄影师、肖像经销商和八卦出版商的侵犯。沃伦和布兰代斯将隐私权与个人尊严以及法官托马斯·m·库利(Thomas M. Cooley)所认定的“不受打扰的权利”联系起来。仅仅一个多世纪后,兰德尔·p·贝赞森教授重新审视了他们的文章。他解释说,沃伦和布兰代斯的隐私概念是对19世纪社会状况和文化价值观的回应,与20世纪的社会状况和文化价值观不同。贝赞森的文章表明,通过探索社会和文化历史来分析特定法律的保护目的,可以更好地理解法律概念。虽然一些法律学术研究司法意见中引用的成文法和判例法的立法历史,但法律学术研究也可能考虑影响申诉的其他因素
{"title":"Bezanson, Randall P. The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social Change, 1890-1990, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 1133 (1992)","authors":"Erin K. Coyle","doi":"10.1080/10811680.2020.1766320","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10811680.2020.1766320","url":null,"abstract":"Scholarship often traces American privacy law to Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis’s influential 1890 Harvard Law Review article. The Warren and Brandeis article argues judges ought to protect a person’s thoughts, sensations and emotions against invasions by the press, photographers, distributors of portraits, and publishers of gossip. Warren and Brandeis connected the right of privacy to personal dignity and what Judge Thomas M. Cooley identified as a “right to be let alone.” Just over a century later, Professor Randall P. Bezanson revisited their article. He explained Warren and Brandeis’s conception of privacy was a response to nineteenth century social conditions and cultural values that were distinct from twentieth century social conditions and cultural values. Bezanson’s article demonstrates a legal concept can be better understood by exploring social and cultural history to analyze what a particular law was intended to protect. While some legal scholarship explores legislative histories of statutory laws and case law cited in judicial opinions, legal scholarship also may consider other factors that influenced calls","PeriodicalId":42622,"journal":{"name":"Communication Law and Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10811680.2020.1766320","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42925770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2020.1766324
Dean C. Smith
Australian citizen Julian Assange is still locked up in Britain’s most notorious prison at the behest of the United States government with no end in sight. He faces no criminal charges in Britain, Australia or Sweden, but awaits a decision on whether he will be extradited to the United States on charges of espionage. He is held in solitary confinement twenty-three hours a day. He cannot contact family or friends and has little contact with lawyers. A special rapporteur for the United Nations has described his treatment as torture. A recent
{"title":"Blanchard, Margaret A. The Institutional Press and Its First Amendment Privileges, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 225","authors":"Dean C. Smith","doi":"10.1080/10811680.2020.1766324","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10811680.2020.1766324","url":null,"abstract":"Australian citizen Julian Assange is still locked up in Britain’s most notorious prison at the behest of the United States government with no end in sight. He faces no criminal charges in Britain, Australia or Sweden, but awaits a decision on whether he will be extradited to the United States on charges of espionage. He is held in solitary confinement twenty-three hours a day. He cannot contact family or friends and has little contact with lawyers. A special rapporteur for the United Nations has described his treatment as torture. A recent","PeriodicalId":42622,"journal":{"name":"Communication Law and Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10811680.2020.1766324","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48517047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2020.1766888
Nina Brown
Copyright law is under constant pressure to evolve. Since the Copyright Act of 1790, which protected only maps, charts and books from unauthorized copying, the law has grown to cover dramatic and audiovisual works, music, choreography, pictures, graphics, sculptures, architecture and more. As emerging technologies have created opportunities for new modes of creative expression and distribution, copyright law has been forced to respond. It may seem curious then, that a law review article written fifty years ago — and primarily about book publishing — could have continued relevance today. This is particularly true considering it was published before the Copyright Act of 1976, which remains the primary basis of copyright law in the United States. Yet “The Uneasy Case for Copyright” continues to have a lasting significance for copyright scholars. It was the first piece Justice Stephen Breyer — then an assistant professor at Harvard Law School working toward tenure — published
{"title":"Breyer, Stephen. The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281 (1970)","authors":"Nina Brown","doi":"10.1080/10811680.2020.1766888","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10811680.2020.1766888","url":null,"abstract":"Copyright law is under constant pressure to evolve. Since the Copyright Act of 1790, which protected only maps, charts and books from unauthorized copying, the law has grown to cover dramatic and audiovisual works, music, choreography, pictures, graphics, sculptures, architecture and more. As emerging technologies have created opportunities for new modes of creative expression and distribution, copyright law has been forced to respond. It may seem curious then, that a law review article written fifty years ago — and primarily about book publishing — could have continued relevance today. This is particularly true considering it was published before the Copyright Act of 1976, which remains the primary basis of copyright law in the United States. Yet “The Uneasy Case for Copyright” continues to have a lasting significance for copyright scholars. It was the first piece Justice Stephen Breyer — then an assistant professor at Harvard Law School working toward tenure — published","PeriodicalId":42622,"journal":{"name":"Communication Law and Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10811680.2020.1766888","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49669110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2020.1766876
Philip M. Napoli
In selecting my article, I pivoted at decision time from an article that was influential in my development as a scholar to one that has recently begun to strike me as particularly relevant to ongoing policy debates about social media platforms, despite falling a bit out of favor over the years. With that brief preface, I’ll begin my revisiting of Lee Bollinger’s 1976 article, and attempt to make the case that his defense of the regulatory distinctions that separate print and broadcast media in the United States may be useful in developing a regulatory framework for social media that is distinct from the rest of the Internet. Bollinger starts from the premise that there are both First Amendment benefits and costs associated with government intervention in the media sector. The benefits Bollinger focuses on are derived from the role that the government can play in ensuring “the widespread availability of opportunities for expression within the mass media.” Consequently, the partial regulatory system that emerged (with a regulated broadcast sector and unregulated print sector) is one that “captures the benefits of access regulation yet still minimizes its potential excesses.” Bollinger contends that, in upholding government intervention in the broadcast sector as constitutional, the Supreme Court of the United States “pursued the right path for the wrong reasons.” Specifically, the logic and rationality of this bifurcated regulatory framework did not have to be justified on the basis of any unique characteristics of broadcasting, such as spectrum scarcity (as it has been,
{"title":"Bollinger, L.C. Jr. Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1976)","authors":"Philip M. Napoli","doi":"10.1080/10811680.2020.1766876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10811680.2020.1766876","url":null,"abstract":"In selecting my article, I pivoted at decision time from an article that was influential in my development as a scholar to one that has recently begun to strike me as particularly relevant to ongoing policy debates about social media platforms, despite falling a bit out of favor over the years. With that brief preface, I’ll begin my revisiting of Lee Bollinger’s 1976 article, and attempt to make the case that his defense of the regulatory distinctions that separate print and broadcast media in the United States may be useful in developing a regulatory framework for social media that is distinct from the rest of the Internet. Bollinger starts from the premise that there are both First Amendment benefits and costs associated with government intervention in the media sector. The benefits Bollinger focuses on are derived from the role that the government can play in ensuring “the widespread availability of opportunities for expression within the mass media.” Consequently, the partial regulatory system that emerged (with a regulated broadcast sector and unregulated print sector) is one that “captures the benefits of access regulation yet still minimizes its potential excesses.” Bollinger contends that, in upholding government intervention in the broadcast sector as constitutional, the Supreme Court of the United States “pursued the right path for the wrong reasons.” Specifically, the logic and rationality of this bifurcated regulatory framework did not have to be justified on the basis of any unique characteristics of broadcasting, such as spectrum scarcity (as it has been,","PeriodicalId":42622,"journal":{"name":"Communication Law and Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10811680.2020.1766876","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43148076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2020.1765638
J. Kirtley
{"title":"Anderson, David A. Freedom of the Press, 80 Texas L. Rev. 429 (2002)","authors":"J. Kirtley","doi":"10.1080/10811680.2020.1765638","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10811680.2020.1765638","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42622,"journal":{"name":"Communication Law and Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10811680.2020.1765638","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42227302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2020.1766870
Samuel A. Terilli
Professor Vincent Blasi in The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory demonstrated not only his insightful knowledge of the Constitution, history and law, he also revealed his keen understanding of the power of rhetoric: “To become a vital part of the living Constitution, a value must have more than a strong historical and analytical foundation. The value must also succeed at the level of rhetoric; it must have its great quote.” Blasi identified that great quote for the checking value as he concluded the article with the stirring words of Justice Hugo Black’s opinion in New York Times v. United States, more commonly known as the Pentagon Papers case:
Vincent Blasi教授在《第一修正案理论中的价值制约》一书中不仅展示了他对宪法、历史和法律的深刻认识,他还透露了他对修辞力量的敏锐理解:“要成为现行宪法的重要组成部分,一种价值观必须有强大的历史和分析基础。这种价值观还必须在修辞层面上取得成功;它必须有伟大的引用。”。“Blasi在文章结尾引用了Hugo Black大法官在《纽约时报》诉美国案(通常称为五角大楼文件案)中的观点,这句话很有说服力:
{"title":"Blasi, Vincent. The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory. 3 A.B.A. Found. Res. J. 521 (1977)","authors":"Samuel A. Terilli","doi":"10.1080/10811680.2020.1766870","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10811680.2020.1766870","url":null,"abstract":"Professor Vincent Blasi in The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory demonstrated not only his insightful knowledge of the Constitution, history and law, he also revealed his keen understanding of the power of rhetoric: “To become a vital part of the living Constitution, a value must have more than a strong historical and analytical foundation. The value must also succeed at the level of rhetoric; it must have its great quote.” Blasi identified that great quote for the checking value as he concluded the article with the stirring words of Justice Hugo Black’s opinion in New York Times v. United States, more commonly known as the Pentagon Papers case:","PeriodicalId":42622,"journal":{"name":"Communication Law and Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10811680.2020.1766870","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45113314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2020.1766869
Gregory C. Lisby, Timothy Barouch
In Branzburg v. Hayes, 1 the Supreme Court of the United States determined that the First Amendment to the Constitution 2 does not protect privileged relationships between journalists and their sou...
{"title":"Blasi, Vince. The Newsman’s Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 229 (1971)","authors":"Gregory C. Lisby, Timothy Barouch","doi":"10.1080/10811680.2020.1766869","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10811680.2020.1766869","url":null,"abstract":"In Branzburg v. Hayes, 1 the Supreme Court of the United States determined that the First Amendment to the Constitution 2 does not protect privileged relationships between journalists and their sou...","PeriodicalId":42622,"journal":{"name":"Communication Law and Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10811680.2020.1766869","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48502302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2020.1766877
E. Ugland
To the extent that Judge Robert Bork lives on in the American consciousness, it is too often as a caricature. Many on the right lionize Bork as an ideological visionary, a cultural warrior, an arch...
{"title":"Bork, Robert H. Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L. J. 1 (1971)","authors":"E. Ugland","doi":"10.1080/10811680.2020.1766877","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10811680.2020.1766877","url":null,"abstract":"To the extent that Judge Robert Bork lives on in the American consciousness, it is too often as a caricature. Many on the right lionize Bork as an ideological visionary, a cultural warrior, an arch...","PeriodicalId":42622,"journal":{"name":"Communication Law and Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10811680.2020.1766877","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42905515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2020.1765641
Jared Schroeder
{"title":"Anderson, David A. The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 455 (1983)","authors":"Jared Schroeder","doi":"10.1080/10811680.2020.1765641","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10811680.2020.1765641","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42622,"journal":{"name":"Communication Law and Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10811680.2020.1765641","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47481814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}