Pub Date : 2019-06-11DOI: 10.1163/15730352-04402001
Paul Gragl
Seeing that a bilateral agreement between the EU and Russia on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project is highly unlikely to be concluded due to political considerations, this paper enquires which existing legal regime is applicable to the governing of this pipeline, especially in order to guarantee solidarity and security within the EU energy market through third-party access and unbundling requirements. The question is whether EU law in general (which the Council denies) or international law applies, and if the latter, which specific regime(s): the Energy Charter Treaty, wto law, the law of the sea, or a combination of regimes? Lastly, this paper also investigates whether and to what extent these international law regimes might guarantee the same solidarity and energy security standards as EU law.
鉴于欧盟和俄罗斯之间关于北溪2号管道项目的双边协议由于政治考虑极不可能达成，本文探讨了现有的法律制度适用于该管道的管理，特别是为了通过第三方准入和分拆要求来保证欧盟能源市场内的团结和安全。问题是，究竟是欧盟的一般法律(欧盟理事会对此予以否认)还是国际法适用?如果适用后者，应适用哪一种具体制度:《能源宪章条约》(Energy Charter Treaty)、世界贸易组织法(wto)、海洋法，还是多种制度的结合?最后，本文还探讨了这些国际法制度是否以及在多大程度上可以保证与欧盟法律相同的团结和能源安全标准。
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Pub Date : 2019-06-11DOI: 10.1163/15730352-04402005
Dovilė Pūraitė-Andrikienė
This article discusses the need, preconditions and possibilities for modifying the constitutionally consolidated regulation whereby the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania gives conclusions on the issues specified in the Constitution while, on the basis of its conclusions, the Seimas takes a final decision; in addition, the discussion looks at other issues that have emerged in the course of the lately adjudicated cases of the type in question and necessitate the modification of the consolidated legal regulation. These issues are examined in the context of powers conferred on constitutional justice institutions in other Central and Eastern European states, with a view to comparing the scope of powers vested with constitutional justice institutions in Lithuania and other states of this region in the area under discussion.
{"title":"The Legal Force of Conclusions by the Lithuanian Constitutional Court and the issue of their (Non-)finality: Has the Time Come to Amend the Constitution?","authors":"Dovilė Pūraitė-Andrikienė","doi":"10.1163/15730352-04402005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15730352-04402005","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses the need, preconditions and possibilities for modifying the constitutionally consolidated regulation whereby the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania gives conclusions on the issues specified in the Constitution while, on the basis of its conclusions, the Seimas takes a final decision; in addition, the discussion looks at other issues that have emerged in the course of the lately adjudicated cases of the type in question and necessitate the modification of the consolidated legal regulation. These issues are examined in the context of powers conferred on constitutional justice institutions in other Central and Eastern European states, with a view to comparing the scope of powers vested with constitutional justice institutions in Lithuania and other states of this region in the area under discussion.","PeriodicalId":42845,"journal":{"name":"Review of Central and East European Law","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90696761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-28DOI: 10.1163/15730352-04401004
B. Bowring
This article addresses a key contemporary problem confronting the Strasbourg Court. While it is well established that seeking the historical truth is an integral part of the right to freedom of expression, it cannot be the role of the Strasbourg Court to arbitrate underlying historical issues (Dzhugashvili v. Russia, 2014). Still less can it be for the Court to decide on individual or collective guilt for crimes of the past, rather than on violations of Convention rights. For example, the Court has found many violations of human rights in the more recent armed conflicts in Northern Ireland, South-East Turkey, Chechnya, or the Basque Country, but has never sought to pronounce on the legal or moral issues underlying these conflicts, or on their deep historical roots. However, the existence of the ussr for more than 70 years, and 12 years of Nazism in Germany, leading to wwii, dominated the 20th century in Europe. These have both been described as totalitarian regimes. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 followed by the collapse of the ussr in 1991 led to dramatic changes not only in statehood and political systems, but also a strong desire for states emerging from the ussr or Soviet domination to purge the past, and to identify and punish wrongdoers. Various forms of lustration have been a product of this desire, with the exception of the Russian Federation, where the characterization and proper evaluation of its Soviet past are questions still unresolved. Increasingly the Strasbourg Court has been called on to decide highly controversial cases, for example Ždanoka v. Latvia (2006), Vajnai v. Hungary (2008), Kononov v. Latvia (2010), Korobov v. Estonia (2013), Soro v. Estonia (2015). The author was counsel for the applicants in some of these cases. I ask: what are the dangers and challenges for the Strasbourg Court in adjudicating such cases, and how can it avoid the appearance of taking sides in bitter and intractable arguments?
本文论述了斯特拉斯堡法院面临的一个当代关键问题。虽然众所周知，寻求历史真相是言论自由权的一个组成部分，但斯特拉斯堡法院的作用不能是仲裁潜在的历史问题(Dzhugashvili v. Russia, 2014)。法院更不可能就个人或集体对过去罪行的罪行作出裁决，而只能就违反《公约》权利的行为作出裁决。例如，法院在北爱尔兰、土耳其东南部、车臣或巴斯克地区最近发生的武装冲突中发现了许多侵犯人权的行为，但从未试图就这些冲突背后的法律或道德问题或其深刻的历史根源发表意见。然而，苏联存在了70多年，德国纳粹主义持续了12年，导致了第二次世界大战，主宰了20世纪的欧洲。这两个国家都被描述为极权主义政权。1989年柏林墙倒塌，随后是1991年苏联解体，这不仅导致了国家地位和政治制度的巨大变化，也导致了从苏联或苏联统治下崛起的国家清理过去、识别和惩罚违法者的强烈愿望。各种形式的启示都是这种愿望的产物，但俄罗斯联邦除外，在那里，对其苏维埃历史的描述和适当评价仍然是尚未解决的问题。斯特拉斯堡法院越来越多地被要求裁决极具争议的案件，例如Ždanoka诉拉脱维亚案(2006年)、Vajnai诉匈牙利案(2008年)、Kononov诉拉脱维亚案(2010年)、Korobov诉爱沙尼亚案(2013年)、Soro诉爱沙尼亚案(2015年)。作者曾在其中一些案件中担任申请人的律师。我问:斯特拉斯堡法院在裁决此类案件时面临哪些危险和挑战?它如何才能避免在激烈而棘手的争论中站队?
{"title":"Twentieth Century Totalitarian Regimes, Lustration, and Guilt for Crimes of the Past: Challenges and Dangers for the Strasbourg Court","authors":"B. Bowring","doi":"10.1163/15730352-04401004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15730352-04401004","url":null,"abstract":"This article addresses a key contemporary problem confronting the Strasbourg Court. While it is well established that seeking the historical truth is an integral part of the right to freedom of expression, it cannot be the role of the Strasbourg Court to arbitrate underlying historical issues (Dzhugashvili v. Russia, 2014). Still less can it be for the Court to decide on individual or collective guilt for crimes of the past, rather than on violations of Convention rights. For example, the Court has found many violations of human rights in the more recent armed conflicts in Northern Ireland, South-East Turkey, Chechnya, or the Basque Country, but has never sought to pronounce on the legal or moral issues underlying these conflicts, or on their deep historical roots. However, the existence of the ussr for more than 70 years, and 12 years of Nazism in Germany, leading to wwii, dominated the 20th century in Europe. These have both been described as totalitarian regimes. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 followed by the collapse of the ussr in 1991 led to dramatic changes not only in statehood and political systems, but also a strong desire for states emerging from the ussr or Soviet domination to purge the past, and to identify and punish wrongdoers. Various forms of lustration have been a product of this desire, with the exception of the Russian Federation, where the characterization and proper evaluation of its Soviet past are questions still unresolved. Increasingly the Strasbourg Court has been called on to decide highly controversial cases, for example Ždanoka v. Latvia (2006), Vajnai v. Hungary (2008), Kononov v. Latvia (2010), Korobov v. Estonia (2013), Soro v. Estonia (2015). The author was counsel for the applicants in some of these cases. I ask: what are the dangers and challenges for the Strasbourg Court in adjudicating such cases, and how can it avoid the appearance of taking sides in bitter and intractable arguments?","PeriodicalId":42845,"journal":{"name":"Review of Central and East European Law","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85604553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-28DOI: 10.1163/15730352-04401001
Lucie Novotná Krtoušová
The aim of this contribution is to critically analyze the substance of the duty of loyalty imposed on a director of a company by the New Civil Code and the Business Corporation Act, which came into force in the Czech Republic on 1 January 2014, and consider the consequences of a breach thereof. The interpretation of recodified Czech private law is ambiguous and conflicting and there is neither consistent interpretation nor any case law, while at the moment it is not clear to what extent existing case law applies to these laws. This comparative analysis of the Czech and English concepts of the duty of loyalty aims to indicate a possible interpretation of the transplanted duty of loyalty and discuss theoretical issues connected with directors’ liabilty in recodified Czech private law.
{"title":"The Duty of Loyalty Imposed on a Company Director: A Comparison between Czech and English Law","authors":"Lucie Novotná Krtoušová","doi":"10.1163/15730352-04401001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15730352-04401001","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this contribution is to critically analyze the substance of the duty of loyalty imposed on a director of a company by the New Civil Code and the Business Corporation Act, which came into force in the Czech Republic on 1 January 2014, and consider the consequences of a breach thereof. The interpretation of recodified Czech private law is ambiguous and conflicting and there is neither consistent interpretation nor any case law, while at the moment it is not clear to what extent existing case law applies to these laws. This comparative analysis of the Czech and English concepts of the duty of loyalty aims to indicate a possible interpretation of the transplanted duty of loyalty and discuss theoretical issues connected with directors’ liabilty in recodified Czech private law.","PeriodicalId":42845,"journal":{"name":"Review of Central and East European Law","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88279711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-28DOI: 10.1163/15730352-04401002
Cornelia Klocker
Collective punishment describes the punishment of a group for an act allegedly committed by one or more of its members and is prohibited in times of armed conflict. It is not explicitly prohibited in situations outside of armed conflict governed by human rights law. This contribution centers on a case study on collective punishment in Chechnya from the two Chechen Wars up until today. Recent years have witnessed the destruction of family homes of alleged insurgents in Chechnya. As it is unclear whether the armed conflict in Chechnya is still ongoing, it is equally unclear whether the law of armed conflict and the explicit prohibition of collective punishment apply to those punitive house burnings. This contribution explores the relation between the law of armed conflict and human rights law regarding collective punishment and concludes that, theoretically, human rights law could encompass such a prohibition.
{"title":"Punitive House Burning in Chechnya: Is Collective Punishment Outside Armed Conflict Prohibited?","authors":"Cornelia Klocker","doi":"10.1163/15730352-04401002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15730352-04401002","url":null,"abstract":"Collective punishment describes the punishment of a group for an act allegedly committed by one or more of its members and is prohibited in times of armed conflict. It is not explicitly prohibited in situations outside of armed conflict governed by human rights law. This contribution centers on a case study on collective punishment in Chechnya from the two Chechen Wars up until today. Recent years have witnessed the destruction of family homes of alleged insurgents in Chechnya. As it is unclear whether the armed conflict in Chechnya is still ongoing, it is equally unclear whether the law of armed conflict and the explicit prohibition of collective punishment apply to those punitive house burnings. This contribution explores the relation between the law of armed conflict and human rights law regarding collective punishment and concludes that, theoretically, human rights law could encompass such a prohibition.","PeriodicalId":42845,"journal":{"name":"Review of Central and East European Law","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89723145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-28DOI: 10.1163/15730352-04401003
K. Beran, David Elischer
According to the new Civil Code, adopted in the Czech Republic in 2012 (“2012 Civil Code”), ‘strict liability’ (or ‘no-fault liability’) is no longer considered ‘liability’ in the traditional sense of the term. The declared concept of the Civil Code is based on the premise that the notion of ‘liability’ should be limited only to cases where a person can be held liable based on their culpability (fault). All other cases, denoted by the doctrine as the opposite to ‘fault-based liability’ (or more accurately, liability based on culpable conduct), that is, ‘no-fault’ or ‘strict’ liability, are – in actual fact – no longer conceived or designated by the Civil Code as ‘liability’ (in Czech: odpovědnost). They are rather constructed as a legal duty to compensate harm. This begs the question whether unlawfulness can be considered a prerequisite for the duty to compensate harm. The authors argue that the answer to this question depends on what the unlawfulness relates to – whether an unlawful act or an unlawful state of affairs. Their argument builds on the premise that unlawful acts are linked to an individual’s conduct, where both the reason and the will of the individual are present and, as a result, such unlawful acts are based on the individual’s culpability (fault). On the other hand, what is typical of an unlawful state of affairs is that the law has been violated, not because someone acted contrary to it, but rather because the rights of the aggrieved party were infringed. The authors conclude that an unlawful state of affairs is a general legal fact which covers all cases of ‘strict’ (or ‘no-fault’) liability and even a breach of contractual obligations. The authors develop their premise not only within Czech law, but also through comparison with other jurisdictions (France, Germany, and Austria), and analyze the potential of and limits to such approach.
{"title":"Has ‘Strict Liability’ Given Way to a General ‘Duty to Compensate Harm’ in Czech Law?","authors":"K. Beran, David Elischer","doi":"10.1163/15730352-04401003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15730352-04401003","url":null,"abstract":"According to the new Civil Code, adopted in the Czech Republic in 2012 (“2012 Civil Code”), ‘strict liability’ (or ‘no-fault liability’) is no longer considered ‘liability’ in the traditional sense of the term. The declared concept of the Civil Code is based on the premise that the notion of ‘liability’ should be limited only to cases where a person can be held liable based on their culpability (fault). All other cases, denoted by the doctrine as the opposite to ‘fault-based liability’ (or more accurately, liability based on culpable conduct), that is, ‘no-fault’ or ‘strict’ liability, are – in actual fact – no longer conceived or designated by the Civil Code as ‘liability’ (in Czech: odpovědnost). They are rather constructed as a legal duty to compensate harm. This begs the question whether unlawfulness can be considered a prerequisite for the duty to compensate harm. The authors argue that the answer to this question depends on what the unlawfulness relates to – whether an unlawful act or an unlawful state of affairs. Their argument builds on the premise that unlawful acts are linked to an individual’s conduct, where both the reason and the will of the individual are present and, as a result, such unlawful acts are based on the individual’s culpability (fault). On the other hand, what is typical of an unlawful state of affairs is that the law has been violated, not because someone acted contrary to it, but rather because the rights of the aggrieved party were infringed. The authors conclude that an unlawful state of affairs is a general legal fact which covers all cases of ‘strict’ (or ‘no-fault’) liability and even a breach of contractual obligations. The authors develop their premise not only within Czech law, but also through comparison with other jurisdictions (France, Germany, and Austria), and analyze the potential of and limits to such approach.","PeriodicalId":42845,"journal":{"name":"Review of Central and East European Law","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81495488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-11-17DOI: 10.1163/15730352-04304005
M. Antonov
Soviet law is often viewed as based on legal positivism, while its ideological background and the practices of political interference are considered in an extralegal (political) dimension. This logic prompts conclusions about the dual character of Soviet law where prerogative and normative dimensions constituted two parallel systems. Similar opinions are sometimes expressed about Russian law, which is a continuator of Soviet law both normatively and factually. The present paper analyzes this approach and suggests that the alleged dualism can be considered in the light of the basic presuppositions and methods of the Soviet (Russian) theory of law and state. This jurisprudence was and still is based on a combination of formalism and anti-formalism (realism) which provided a certain degree of unity and coherence of legal knowledge. After the end of Soviet rule, legal theory in Russia still orients itself to this symbiosis of positivism and realism which underlies legal education and legal scholarship. The paper addresses the philosophical and methodological origins of this Russian (Soviet) legal realism, and argues that the particular character of Russian (Soviet) law can be explained against the backdrop of this theoretical combination that combines conservative social philosophy, a Schmittean conception of exception, methods of legal positivism and the spirit of legal nihilism. These particularities and their methodological background are, in the author’s opinion, among the distinguishing features of Russian law and legal culture.
{"title":"Legal Realism in Soviet and Russian Jurisprudence","authors":"M. Antonov","doi":"10.1163/15730352-04304005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15730352-04304005","url":null,"abstract":"Soviet law is often viewed as based on legal positivism, while its ideological background and the practices of political interference are considered in an extralegal (political) dimension. This logic prompts conclusions about the dual character of Soviet law where prerogative and normative dimensions constituted two parallel systems. Similar opinions are sometimes expressed about Russian law, which is a continuator of Soviet law both normatively and factually. The present paper analyzes this approach and suggests that the alleged dualism can be considered in the light of the basic presuppositions and methods of the Soviet (Russian) theory of law and state. This jurisprudence was and still is based on a combination of formalism and anti-formalism (realism) which provided a certain degree of unity and coherence of legal knowledge. After the end of Soviet rule, legal theory in Russia still orients itself to this symbiosis of positivism and realism which underlies legal education and legal scholarship. The paper addresses the philosophical and methodological origins of this Russian (Soviet) legal realism, and argues that the particular character of Russian (Soviet) law can be explained against the backdrop of this theoretical combination that combines conservative social philosophy, a Schmittean conception of exception, methods of legal positivism and the spirit of legal nihilism. These particularities and their methodological background are, in the author’s opinion, among the distinguishing features of Russian law and legal culture.","PeriodicalId":42845,"journal":{"name":"Review of Central and East European Law","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80246459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-11-17DOI: 10.1163/15730352-04304007
{"title":"Contents – Volume 43, 2018 Review of Central and East European Law","authors":"","doi":"10.1163/15730352-04304007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15730352-04304007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42845,"journal":{"name":"Review of Central and East European Law","volume":"66 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83857969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-11-17DOI: 10.1163/15730352-04304004
Marko Kmezić
This article investigates persistent limitations to media freedom in Serbia, principally understood as the legal status of press freedom and how this is put into practice (or not). Critically reviewing the set of newly adopted media laws and features of the crisis of press freedom over the past five years, the article suggests that, despite constitutional guarantees, adoption of relevant legislation, and decriminalization of libel, media freedom in Serbia still remains deficient owing to shortfalls in norm implementation and the rise of new challenges such as internet censorship. The findings offer a fuller picture of how a lack of transparency in media funding and media ownership, strong economic dependence of media workers, lack of adequate protection for journalists, and pressure from interconnected political and business groups has led to creeping self-censorship in the Serbian media.
{"title":"Captured Media: Limitations and Structural Hindrances to Media Freedom in Serbia","authors":"Marko Kmezić","doi":"10.1163/15730352-04304004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15730352-04304004","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates persistent limitations to media freedom in Serbia, principally understood as the legal status of press freedom and how this is put into practice (or not). Critically reviewing the set of newly adopted media laws and features of the crisis of press freedom over the past five years, the article suggests that, despite constitutional guarantees, adoption of relevant legislation, and decriminalization of libel, media freedom in Serbia still remains deficient owing to shortfalls in norm implementation and the rise of new challenges such as internet censorship. The findings offer a fuller picture of how a lack of transparency in media funding and media ownership, strong economic dependence of media workers, lack of adequate protection for journalists, and pressure from interconnected political and business groups has led to creeping self-censorship in the Serbian media.","PeriodicalId":42845,"journal":{"name":"Review of Central and East European Law","volume":"80 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85930134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-11-17DOI: 10.1163/15730352-04304003
Zhenis Kembayev
This article aims at examining different stages of the development of Soviet federalism, distinguishing its major principles and characteristics and identifying the reasons for its failure. In doing so, it explains the Marxist background to the emergence of Soviet federalism and the vision of Lenin, the architect of the Soviet state, of building a federation as a transitory phase towards achieving proletarian unitarism. The article provides a background to the Constitutions of the ussr of 1924, 1936 and 1977 paying particular attention to the key terms of the federal structure and also the views of the respective subsequent Soviet leaders, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev, on the development of Soviet federalism. Further, it demonstrates the course of the constitutional reforms conducted by Gorbachev that eventually resulted in the collapse of the ussr. Finally, it draws some conclusions summarizing and demonstrating the major features of Soviet federalism and explaining why it failed.
{"title":"Development of Soviet Federalism from Lenin to Gorbachev: Major Characteristics and Reasons for Failure","authors":"Zhenis Kembayev","doi":"10.1163/15730352-04304003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15730352-04304003","url":null,"abstract":"This article aims at examining different stages of the development of Soviet federalism, distinguishing its major principles and characteristics and identifying the reasons for its failure. In doing so, it explains the Marxist background to the emergence of Soviet federalism and the vision of Lenin, the architect of the Soviet state, of building a federation as a transitory phase towards achieving proletarian unitarism. The article provides a background to the Constitutions of the ussr of 1924, 1936 and 1977 paying particular attention to the key terms of the federal structure and also the views of the respective subsequent Soviet leaders, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev, on the development of Soviet federalism. Further, it demonstrates the course of the constitutional reforms conducted by Gorbachev that eventually resulted in the collapse of the ussr. Finally, it draws some conclusions summarizing and demonstrating the major features of Soviet federalism and explaining why it failed.","PeriodicalId":42845,"journal":{"name":"Review of Central and East European Law","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77876367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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