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Is the syndicated loans market ready for distributed ledger technology? 银团贷款市场为分布式账本技术做好准备了吗?
Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-18 DOI: 10.1080/17521440.2023.2254523
Hüseyin Can Aksoy
ABSTRACTThe syndicated loan market has a centralised nature dominated by intermediaries. Such a structure not only requires manual labour and back-office workloads, but it is also prone to human error and fraud. Distributed ledger technology (DLT) and smart contracts are promising tools to overcome the factors which adversely affect the efficiency of the current and classical business model in the primary and secondary market of syndicated loans. DLT eliminates the need for intermediaries; provides transparency, accuracy, and authenticity; lowers transaction costs; makes it easier to comply with Know Your Customer obligations; and provides efficiency in the secondary market for syndicated loans. However, existing legal rules and institutions fail to create a predictable and legally safe environment for the spread of DLT in the syndicated loans market. Therefore, proper regulation is required for the widespread use of DLT technology in the syndicated loan market.KEYWORDS: Syndicated loansblockchaindistributed ledger technologysmart contractsregulation Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 D Petrov, ‘The Impact of Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technology’ [2019] International Scientific Journal Industry 4.0 88, at 90.2 For detailed information about this transaction, see L Gonzalez-Echenique, ‘Blockchain: The Future of Syndicated Lending?’ [2019] Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 326, 326.3 L Noonan, ‘Banks complete first syndicated loan on blockchain’ (Financial Tımes, 6 November 2018) accessed 28 January 2023.4 P Martino, Blockchain and Banking: How Technological Innovations Are Shaping the Banking Industry (Springer 2021) 41.5 K Simons, ‘Why Do Banks Syndicate Loans?’ [1993] New England Economic Review 45, 45; A Fight, Syndicated Lending (Elsevier 2004) 1; J Ho, ‘Chapter 2 – Basic Principles of Syndicated Lending: Financing Through the Risk Spectrum’ in A Shutter (ed), A Practitioner’s Guide to Syndicated Lending (Sweet & Maxwell 2017) 9.6 Fight (n 5) 2.7 W Wild, ‘The Economic Basis of Syndicated Lending’ (PhD thesis, Queensland University of Technology 2004) 1; CE Aster and MA Attaway, ‘Syndicated Construction Loans, Defaulting Lenders, and Equitable Remedies’ [2016] Texas Tech Law Review 853, 859.8 DZ Nirenberg, ‘International Loan Syndications: The Next Security’ [1984] Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 155, 159.9 ME Jones, ‘Bankers Beware: The Risks of Syndicated Credits’ [1999] North Carolina Banking Institute 169, 173.10 ibid 173.11 PR Pollock, ‘Notes Issued in Syndicated Loans – A New Test to Define Securities’ [1977] The Business Lawyer 537, 538.12 Wild (n 7) 25; GA Goodman, ‘Special Problems of Syndicated Loans’ (Dentons, 14 April 2014) 4 accessed 28 January 2023.13 MHughes, ‘Transferab
摘要银团贷款市场具有中介机构主导的集中化特征。这样的结构不仅需要体力劳动和后台工作负载,而且还容易出现人为错误和欺诈。分布式账本技术(DLT)和智能合约是有希望的工具,可以克服对银团贷款一级和二级市场中当前和经典商业模式效率产生不利影响的因素。DLT消除了对中介的需求;提供透明度,准确性和真实性;降低交易成本;更容易遵守“了解你的客户”的义务;并为银团贷款的二级市场提供效率。然而,现有的法律规则和制度未能为DLT在银团贷款市场的传播创造一个可预测和法律安全的环境。因此,DLT技术在银团贷款市场的广泛应用需要适当的监管。关键词:银团贷款、区块链、分布式账本技术、智能合约、监管披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。[1]张晓东,张晓东,张晓东,等。分布式账本技术对银团贷款的影响[j] [j]中国科技大学学报(自然科学版),2014,(5):559 - 559。[2019] L Noonan,“银行在b区块链上完成首次银团贷款”(Financial Tımes, 2018年11月6日)访问20223年1月28日。P Martino,区块链和银行业:技术创新如何塑造银行业(施普林格2021)。[1993]《新英格兰经济评论》第45期,45;A Fight, Syndicated Lending (Elsevier 2004);J Ho,“第二章-银团贷款的基本原则:通过风险谱融资”,A Shutter (ed),银团贷款从业者指南(Sweet & Maxwell 2017) 9.6 Fight (n 5) 2.7 W Wild,“银团贷款的经济基础”(博士论文,昆士兰科技大学2004)1;CE Aster和MA Attaway,“银团建设贷款、违约贷款人和公平救济”[2016]DZ Nirenberg,“国际银团贷款:下一个安全”[1984]哥伦比亚跨国法杂志155,159.9 ME Jones,“银行家注意:PR Pollock,“银团贷款发行的票据——证券定义的新测试”[1977]《商业律师》537,538.12 Wild (n 7) 25;GA Goodman,“银团贷款的特殊问题”(Dentons, 2014年4月14日)4,2023年1月28日访问;MHughes,“银团贷款的可转让性”[2007]法律与金融市场评论21,21.14;Wild (n 7) at 25.15; D Petrov,“金融的新数字时代:区块链和智能合约”[2020]Horizons:国际科学杂志7,9.16;I Callaghan,“第10章-贷款:银团贷款的理论和机制”在Shutter (n 5) 189.17; Simons (n 5) 45;LB Gutcho,“银团贷款:牵头银行和银团成员”[1994]国际商业律师131,第131页;琼斯(n 9) 177;陈晓明,“银团贷款”[2000]《金融管理》第4期,第6期;V Ivashina,孙忠,“贷款市场信息对机构股票交易的影响”[2011]金融经济研究,284,284.18 Nirenberg (n 8) 161;Goodman (n 12) 2.19 Simons (n 5) 45;Dennis and Mullineaux (n 17), 407;琼斯(第9次)177.20 Aster和Attaway(第7次)在858.21 Simons(第5次)在46.22 Fight(第5次)8.23 Nirenberg(第8次)161.24贷款市场协会,“LMA发布其成员调查结果:2021年银团贷款市场前景”访问2023.6月17日25 Petrov(第1次)88.26 Petrov(第15次)9。尽管区块链和分布式账本关系密切,但它们是不同的概念。实际上,区块链是一种分布式账本。它指的是存储和交换在数字链中相互连接的不同块中的数据的技术数据结构。它使用加密和复杂的数学算法来提供不可逆和同步的记录。M . Buitenhek,“区块链技术在银行业的理解与应用:进化还是革命?”[2016]数字银行学报(英文版),111,117;M Merike和A Steyn,“在银团贷款市场实施智能合约:采用问题”[2019]IEEE计算机学会39,40.31 Petrov (n 15) 11.32世界经济论坛,“金融的未来İnfrastructure”(世界经济论坛,2016年8月)70访问2023年1月29日。
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引用次数: 0
Regulation of the US credit rating industry and regulatory data disclosures 美国信用评级行业监管和监管数据披露
Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-18 DOI: 10.1080/17521440.2023.2254520
Jerry Lu, Gina Nicolosi, Lei Zhou
ABSTRACTThe Credit Rating Reform and Dodd-Frank Acts significantly increased US credit rating regulation, yet few academic studies have examined their impact or capitalized on the regulatory disclosure data. To facilitate research in the area, this paper outlines the evolution of credit rating industry regulations, describes the current regulatory environment, and reviews SEC enforcement actions in recent years. In addition, the paper summarizes the regulatory disclosure requirements, in particular the aggregate rating performance data and individual credit rating.KEYWORDS: Credit Rating Reform ActDodd-Frank Actcredit regulationSEC Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 L White, ‘Markets: The Credit Rating Agencies’ (2010) 24 Journal of Economic Perspectives 211.2 L White, ‘Credit Rating Agencies: An Overview’ (2013) 5 Annual Review of Financial Economics 593.3 NRSRO registration is voluntary; non-NRSRO CRAs can issue credit ratings without SEC regulation. For example, Rapid Rating International Inc. issues financial health ratings. CRAs discussed in this paper are those with NRSRO registration. See M Livingston, G Nicolosi and L Zhou, ‘A Bird’s-Eye View of the US Credit Rating Industry’ (2021) 31 Journal of Fixed Income 68.4 We are aware of only two published studies outside the law literature that examine the Dodd-Frank Act’s impact on credit ratings: V Dimitrov, D Palia, and L Tang, ‘Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on Credit Ratings’ (2015) 115 Journal of Financial Economics 505, and H Huang, J Svec, and E Wu, ‘The Game Changer: Regulatory Reform and Multiple Credit Ratings’ (2021) 133 Journal of Banking and Finance 106279.5 Google Scholar searches find just one published academic study utilizing data from the SEC Form NRSRO and two studies utilizing the rating history disclosure data under SEC Rule 17g-7: RP Baghai and B Becker, ‘Reputations and Credit Ratings: Evidence from Commercial Mortgage-backed Securities’ (2020) 135 Journal of Financial Economics 425; Livingston, Nicolosi and Zhou (n 3); N Qin and L Zhou, ‘Are Investor-paid Credit Ratings Superior?’ (2023) SSRN 4354204.6 D Weil and others, ‘The Effectiveness of Regulatory Disclosure Policies’ (2006) 25 Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 155.7 M Joffe and F Partnoy. 2018. ‘Making Credit Ratings Data Publicly Available’ (Oxford Business Law Blog, 2 March 2018) https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2018/03/making-credit-ratings-data-publicly-available.8 Similar regulatory reform in the European Union (EU) followed the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Studies that extensively review and analyze the EU credit rating industry regulation include R Jackson, ‘Europe’s Supervisory System for Rating Agencies After the Financial Crisis: Critical Review’ (2012) 11 Hibernian Law Journal 1; E Weemaels, ‘The Regulation of Rating Agencies in Europe’ (2013) 2 Dovenschmidt Quarterly 105; T Wittenberg, ‘Regulatory Evolution of the EU Credit Rat
摘要信用评级改革和多德-弗兰克法案显著增加了美国的信用评级监管,但很少有学术研究考察其影响或利用监管披露数据。为了促进该领域的研究,本文概述了信用评级行业法规的演变,描述了当前的监管环境,并回顾了美国证券交易委员会近年来的执法行动。此外,本文还总结了监管披露要求,特别是综合评级业绩数据和个人信用评级。关键词:信用评级改革法案多德-弗兰克法案信贷监管sec披露声明作者未报告潜在利益冲突。注1 L White,《市场:信用评级机构》(2010)24《经济展望》211.2 L White,《信用评级机构综述》(2013)5《金融经济学年鉴》593.3 NRSRO注册是自愿的;非nrsro评级机构可以在没有SEC监管的情况下发布信用评级。例如,Rapid Rating International Inc.发布财务健康评级。本文讨论的cra是指具有NRSRO注册的cra。参见M Livingston, G Nicolosi和L Zhou,“俯瞰美国信用评级行业”(2021)31 Journal of Fixed Income 68.4我们知道只有两篇在法律文献之外发表的研究考察了多德-弗兰克法案对信用评级的影响:V Dimitrov, D Palia和L Tang,“多德-弗兰克法案对信用评级的影响”(2015)115金融经济学杂志505,以及H Huang, J Svec和E Wu,“游戏规则改变者:《监管改革和多重信用评级》(2021)133《银行与金融杂志》106279.5谷歌学者搜索发现,只有一项已发表的学术研究利用了SEC表格NRSRO的数据,两项研究利用了SEC规则17g-7下的评级历史披露数据:RP Baghai和B Becker,“声誉和信用评级:来自商业抵押贷款支持证券的证据”(2020)135《金融经济学杂志》425;Livingston, Nicolosi和Zhou (n 3);秦宁、周磊:“投资者支付的信用评级是否优越?”魏晓东,“信息披露政策的有效性”(2006)25政策分析与管理[j]。“公开信用评级数据”(牛津商法博客,2018年3月2日)https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2018/03/making-credit-ratings-data-publicly-available.8 2008-2009年金融危机后,欧盟也进行了类似的监管改革。广泛回顾和分析欧盟信用评级行业监管的研究包括R Jackson,“金融危机后欧洲评级机构监管体系:关键评论”(2012)11 Hibernian Law Journal 1;E Weemaels,“欧洲评级机构的监管”(2013)2 Dovenschmidt Quarterly 105;T Wittenberg,“欧盟信用评级机构框架的监管演变”(2015)16欧洲商业组织法律评论669.9例如,F Partnoy,“信用评级(仍然)有什么问题?”(2017) 92《华盛顿法律评论》1407.10 R Cantor和F Packer,“信用评级行业”(1995)5《固定收益杂志》10.11关于基于债券评级的规则和法规列表见同上;F Partnoy,“金融市场的Siskel和Ebert:对信用评级机构的两个反对”(1999)77华盛顿大学法律季刊619;A Estrella,“信用评级和信用质量信息的补充来源”(2000)巴塞尔银行监管委员会工作文件,No.3.12 L White,“信用评级行业:产业组织分析”,R Levich, G Majnoni和C Reinhart(编辑)评级,评级机构和全球金融体系(Springer 2002) 41;白色(n 1)康托尔和帕克(n 10)。在2007年之前,NRSRO的地位是通过SEC的不采取行动信函程序授予的,SEC工作人员向合格的CRA发出不采取行动信函,声明如果CRA的评级被用于监管合规目的,SEC将不会采取执法行动白色(n 1);政府问责局,“证券交易委员会:改进评级机构注册计划和绩效相关披露所需的行动”(2010,GAO出版物No.10-782)贝克尔和米尔本:《竞争加剧如何影响债券评级?》(2011); Journal of Financial Economics;P Bolton, X Freixas和J Shapiro,“债券评级游戏”(2012)64 Finance Journal 85。对长期声誉的关注可能会减轻潜在的利益冲突:R . Smith和I . Walter,《评级机构:存在机构问题吗?》,见Levich, Majnoni and Reinhart (n 12) 289。 41政府问责局(第14号)Livingston, Nicolosi和Zhou (n 3)对Form NRSRO评级业绩披露进行了详细讨论,并对美国信用评级行业进行了调查参见证券交易委员会评级历史文件出版指南https://www.sec.gov/structureddata/rocr-publication-guide.html.44。市政财政中心已经开发了一个程序来解锁数据(Joffe和Partnoy (n 7))。我们对该程序的测试表明,它存在一些缺陷,导致观测结果缺失。此外,程序不会检索XML文件中包含的所有信息法人实体标识符是由全球LEI监管监督委员会或全球LEI基金会认可或以其他方式管理的公用事业机构颁发给法人实体的20个字符的字母数字ID。
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引用次数: 0
Revisiting the takeover efficiency argument and the role of the board 重新审视收购效率的争论和董事会的角色
Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-08-18 DOI: 10.1080/17521440.2023.2245578
Francis A. Okanigbuan
Despite the synergistic objective of takeovers, shareholders of acquiring companies can experience loss or limited gains when acquisitions are concluded with high takeover premiums. This article argues that, since takeover premiums are determined by acquiring management boards, and losses to shareholders are unlikely to be remedied via breach of directors ’ duty, it is desirable to challenge the discretionary role of managements. It suggests that managements should declare their acquisition objective, to enable shareholders to manage their expectations. If managerial objective is to obtain synergistic gains, they should be required to demonstrate the extent to which takeover premiums that are beyond certain premium threshold would yield synergistic gains, to obtain shareholder approval. Alternatively, if their immediate acquisition objective is to obtain the bene fi ts of controlling the target company, then the need for shareholder approval can be dispensed with, as long as the premium paid matches the assets of the target company.
尽管收购具有协同目标,但当收购以高收购溢价结束时,收购公司的股东可能会遭受损失或收益有限。本文认为,由于收购溢价是由收购管理委员会决定的,股东的损失不太可能通过违反董事职责来弥补,因此有必要挑战管理层的自由裁量权。它建议管理层应该宣布他们的收购目标,以使股东能够管理他们的期望。如果管理目标是获得协同收益,则应要求他们证明超过一定溢价阈值的收购溢价将在多大程度上产生协同收益,以获得股东批准。或者,如果他们的直接收购目标是获得控制目标公司的利益,那么只要支付的溢价与目标公司的资产相匹配,就可以不需要股东批准。
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引用次数: 0
Digital payments system and market disruption 数字支付系统与市场颠覆
Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-05-26 DOI: 10.1080/17521440.2023.2215481
A. Miglionico
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引用次数: 1
Central bank digital currencies: policy implications 央行数字货币:政策含义
Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2022-04-03 DOI: 10.1080/17521440.2023.2209294
Daniel Broby
ABSTRACT This paper lists fifteen key policy implications resulting from a decision to introduce retail and/or wholesale central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). It makes the distinction between ‘medium of exchange’ and the ‘exchange mechanism’. The former is one of the functions of money. The latter is a function of the technological approach in establishing the unit of account, store of value, and the payment protocol. Payments, transfers and settlement, are explored in respect of (i) wholesale CBDCs, (ii) retail CBDCs, (iii) digital payment platforms and, (iv) stablecoins. Each require distinct policy frameworks, and scholarly opinion on these are very diverse. Most academics agree on the privacy concerns related to account based digital money. The main areas of disagreement, however, are over which institutions/entities should be allowed to issue digital money, how such issuance should be supervised, and how decentralised digital tokens should be addressed from a policy perspective.
摘要本文列出了引入零售和/或批发央行数字货币(CBDC)的决定所带来的15个关键政策影响。它区分了“交换媒介”和“交换机制”。前者是货币的功能之一。后者是建立记账单位、价值存储和支付协议的技术方法的功能。支付、转账和结算涉及(i)批发CBDC、(ii)零售CBDCs、(iii)数字支付平台和(iv)稳定币。每一个都需要不同的政策框架,而学术界对这些框架的看法也非常不同。大多数学者都同意与基于账户的数字货币相关的隐私问题。然而,分歧的主要领域是,应该允许哪些机构/实体发行数字货币,应该如何监督这种发行,以及应该如何从政策角度解决去中心化的数字代币。
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引用次数: 1
Prospects for international financial deglobalisation and its potential impact on international financial regulation 国际金融去全球化的前景及其对国际金融监管的潜在影响
Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2022-04-03 DOI: 10.1080/17521440.2023.2204991
I. Chiu
ABSTRACT The prospects of deglobalisation have been discussed in relation to international trade and finance, and this article queries how recent geopolitical risks may affect the shape of international financial regulation. The article critically presents an examination of international financial globalisation that has already been chequered for a long time, and argues that there is a strong likelihood of no or incremental change to international financial regulation due to the chequered nature of financial globalisation it already supports. However, international financial regulatory bodies can be affected if individual jurisdictions that are members of international organisations make more pronounced political responses. Although the network of experts underlying international financial regulation have technocratised issues to a significant extent, the politicisation of issues has always persisted. The article therefore addresses the potential for scenarios of more dramatic and turbulent change in international financial regulation and sketches the broad contours of such possibilities.
摘要从国际贸易和金融的角度讨论了去全球化的前景,本文质疑最近的地缘政治风险如何影响国际金融监管的形态。这篇文章批判性地审视了长期以来一直处于动荡状态的国际金融全球化,并认为由于其已经支持的金融全球化的动荡性质,国际金融监管很有可能不会发生变化或逐渐发生变化。然而,如果作为国际组织成员的个别司法管辖区做出更明确的政治回应,国际金融监管机构可能会受到影响。尽管国际金融监管的专家网络在很大程度上对问题进行了技术化处理,但问题的政治化始终存在。因此,这篇文章探讨了国际金融监管发生更戏剧性和动荡变化的可能性,并概述了这种可能性的大致轮廓。
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引用次数: 1
Digitalising the state monetary system: national implementation model 数字化国家货币体系:国家实施模式
Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2022-04-03 DOI: 10.1080/17521440.2022.2150007
I. Tsindeliani, K. Anisina, Oksana Babayan, Inessa V. Bit-Shabo, Ekaterina G Kostikova, Elena Migacheva
ABSTRACT The purpose of the study is to identify the features of Russia’s monetary system digitalisation, including an analysis of the national model and approaches to the introduction of digital currency of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, against the background of existing global practices, the study of global experience in implementing digital technologies in the sphere of payments. The research provides for the development of proposals to improve legal regulation of social relations within the monetary system of the Russian Federation. As this study shows, the national model of digitalisation of the monetary system in Russia has specifics, and the implementation of this project will require further elaboration of its concept in order to identify possible risks and eliminate the shortcomings of the developed model. The implementation of the Russian model will require the formation of a legal framework for the issuance and circulation of the digital ruble.
摘要本研究旨在确定俄罗斯货币系统数字化的特点,包括在现有全球实践的背景下,分析俄罗斯联邦中央银行引入数字货币的国家模式和方法,研究在支付领域实施数字技术的全球经验。该研究为改进俄罗斯联邦货币体系内社会关系的法律监管提出了建议。正如这项研究所表明的,俄罗斯货币系统数字化的国家模式有其具体之处,该项目的实施需要进一步阐述其概念,以确定可能的风险并消除已开发模式的缺陷。俄罗斯模式的实施需要形成数字卢布发行和流通的法律框架。
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引用次数: 1
Public choice and private contracting in financial markets 金融市场中的公共选择与私人契约
Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2022-04-03 DOI: 10.1080/17521440.2023.2210722
M. K. Borowicz
ABSTRACT In this article, I propose that high levels of concentration in markets make the production of standardised contracts in those markets more likely to be captured by the dominant players creating opportunities for them to extract rents and further reduce competition through contract and market design. I examine how contracts produced by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) shaped the organisation and its activities. ISDA’s governance was dominated by a concentrated group of dealer banks who benefited from the opaque OTC market microstructure revolving around ISDA’s standardised contracts. The organisation’s activities, such as lobbying and data collection, were aimed in part at preserving that microstructure allowing dominant firms to extract rents and reduce competition. In the absence of policy interventions, standardised contracts produced by trade associations can become captured in ways not dissimilar to public regulation.
摘要在这篇文章中,我提出,市场的高度集中使这些市场中标准化合同的生产更有可能被占主导地位的参与者捕获,从而为他们创造机会,通过合同和市场设计来提取租金并进一步减少竞争。我研究了国际掉期和衍生品协会(ISDA)制定的合同是如何影响该组织及其活动的。ISDA的治理由一群集中的交易商银行主导,他们受益于围绕ISDA标准化合同的不透明场外交易市场微观结构。该组织的活动,如游说和数据收集,部分目的是保护这种微观结构,使占主导地位的公司能够提取租金并减少竞争。在没有政策干预的情况下,行业协会制定的标准化合同可以以与公共监管没有什么不同的方式获得。
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引用次数: 2
Tokenised funding and initial litigation offerings: the new kids putting third-party funding on the block 代币化融资和初始诉讼产品:新来者将第三方融资推向市场
Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2022-04-03 DOI: 10.1080/17521440.2022.2153609
J. Chaisse, Jamieson Kirkwood
ABSTRACT This article presents a critical assessment of how blockchain technology is disrupting the monetisation of litigation claims through tokenization – and consequently further shaking up a revolutionary area in litigation financing. The significance in litigation financing is chiefly because tokenization presents securities to the general public in a far more accessible way than was previously the case – and even might enable non-accredited investors to participate in certain litigation financing investments for the first time (or with reduced barriers to entry). The assessment also considers the implications of a litigation pool that was already growing towards USD 20 billion, potentially now getting even larger. We further consider the regulatory challenges and the new moral hazards created in this fast-moving space.
摘要本文对区块链技术如何通过标记化破坏诉讼索赔的货币化,从而进一步动摇诉讼融资的革命性领域进行了批判性评估。诉讼融资的重要性主要是因为代币化以一种比以前更容易获得的方式向公众提供证券,甚至可能使未经认证的投资者首次参与某些诉讼融资投资(或减少进入壁垒)。该评估还考虑了诉讼池的影响,该诉讼池已经增长到200亿美元,现在可能会变得更大。我们进一步考虑在这个快速发展的空间中产生的监管挑战和新的道德风险。
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引用次数: 1
A history of continuous power delegation: the establishment and further development of the European system of Financial Supervision 权力持续下放的历史:欧洲金融监管制度的建立与进一步发展
Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2022-04-03 DOI: 10.1080/17521440.2023.2181671
Beatriz Brunelli Zimmermann, C. Buttigieg
ABSTRACT International and Regional Regulatory Institutions (IRIs) have, throughout history, been created and reshaped by crises. This article argues that this phenomenon can be explained through rational choice neo-institutionalism, which argues that crises shift policy equilibrium and allow for greater political will towards solving the root causes of the crisis – in turn, this usually involves some degree of power delegation from the national to the supranational. This article applies this theory to the creation and further development of the European System of Financial Supervision in three cases: the post-2009 crisis; the post-sovereign debt crisis; and the European Union’s shortfall in anit-money laundering compliance and supervision. This article concludes that by delegating power after every crisis and debacle, countries attempt to solve cooperation, coordination, trust, and uncertainty problems. However, relying on crises to generate political will makes IRIs reactive not proactive – ultimately, this might have implications over global financial soundness, as exemplified by the case of crypto-assets.
摘要国际和区域监管机构(IRI)在历史上一直是由危机创建和重塑的。本文认为,这种现象可以通过理性选择新制度主义来解释,新制度主义认为,危机改变了政策平衡,并允许更大的政治意愿来解决危机的根源——反过来,这通常涉及从国家到超国家的某种程度的权力下放。本文将这一理论应用于三个案例中欧洲金融监管体系的创建和进一步发展:2009年后的危机;后主权债务危机;以及欧洲联盟在反洗钱合规和监督方面的不足。本文的结论是,通过在每次危机和崩溃后下放权力,各国试图解决合作、协调、信任和不确定性问题。然而,依赖危机产生政治意愿会使IRI被动而非主动——最终,这可能会对全球金融稳健性产生影响,加密资产就是一个例子。
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引用次数: 0
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