International Journal of Systematic Theology最新文献

Nicaea (both the 325 council and the creed that by 381 perfected its work) instantiates a structural principle for Christian doctrine, a principle called here the Nicene line. Its influence is evident in the main contours of doctrine, and it exerts continuing guidance for the teaching and research of individual theologians. The line that Nicaea draws is clearest in the second article of the Nicene Creed, which establishes the Son's particular filial identity with reference to his eternal relation to the Father before narrating his economic action of creation and of incarnation ‘for us and our salvation'. Construing the events of the New Testament as the disclosure of divine sonship, Nicaea thus draws a line between God and creation, locating the blessed Trinity above the line precisely in order to describe the divine work of transformatively blessing creatures below the line. This principle is classically elaborated in pro-Nicene theologies (illustrated here by Theodoret of Cyrrhus), and is already evident in Scripture (illustrated here by the argument of Ephesians).

Brevard Childs suggests that ‘one of the burning issues in theology lies in a search to recover a new understanding of the sensus literalis’. In this article, I retrieve and commend Thomas Aquinas's account of the literal sense, using Peter's Pentecost speech in Acts 2 as a way of testing Thomas's mettle. In so doing, I address key dimensions of Thomas's presentation, namely, divine authorship and intention, arguing that such emphases are profitable for understanding the priority and expansive character of the literal sense. I conclude by briefly discussing figural reading with reference to Ephraim Radner's Time and the Word.

This article argues that the distinction between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ elements of atonement fails to cohere with a vital historical and systematic point. In many modern analyses, ‘objective’ elements of atonement pertain to Christ's work on humans' behalf to meet the requirements of God's justice, whereas ‘subjective’ elements pertain to changes within individuals, such as a response of love. For historic theologies of atonement such as Abelard's and Augustine's, however, the distinction between what God does for humans to satisfy the requirements of justice and how humans change or respond to God breaks down, such that certain elements of atonement meet the prevailing criteria for ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ simultaneously. Because the typical paradigm can obscure such important points about atonement, including the extent of what God's justice requires and how God works within the human response, theologians should jettison the terms in favor of more precise language.

Several modern theologians affirm that doubt is compatible with faith, even as authoritative voices from the Christian tradition deny this. While Thomas Aquinas is often seen as an exemplar of the traditional view, few scholars have devoted serious attention to the nature of doubt in Thomas’ thought. In the present article, I address this lacuna by examining how Thomas defines ‘doubt’ in a variety of his writings. I then examine how he relates doubt to the act of faith. I conclude that while faith excludes doubt in most senses, Thomas articulates one sense of doubt that is compatible with faith and therefore may help resolve contemporary debates about faith, doubt, and unbelief.