Escaping Paternalism ’s critique of the rationality assumption vin-dicates von Mises’ distinction between egalitarian contracts and hierarchical commands, revealing “libertarian paternalism” as an oxymoron. Putting Escaping Paternalism in a zoological context lets us see in “contract and coordination” status acquired by freely given prestige and in “command and subordination” status acquired by forcefully extracted dominance. Libertarian paternalism is a form of dominance. Thus, the “zoological perspective in the social sciences” extends Rizzo and Whitman’s critique of rationality and helps clarify “expertism,” that is, the attempt to acquire “dominance” by leveraging “prestige.” Humans have both an apish disposition to create linear dominance hierarchies and a disposition to form reverse dominance hierarchies. It is undecided whether we can strengthen reverse dominance hierarchies enough to prevent the boots of the few forever stamping on the faces of the many. It is undecided whether the liberal vision of egalitarian cooperation can prevail. But it’s worth fighting for.
{"title":"Against Expertism","authors":"R. Koppl","doi":"10.1561/105.00000147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/105.00000147","url":null,"abstract":"Escaping Paternalism ’s critique of the rationality assumption vin-dicates von Mises’ distinction between egalitarian contracts and hierarchical commands, revealing “libertarian paternalism” as an oxymoron. Putting Escaping Paternalism in a zoological context lets us see in “contract and coordination” status acquired by freely given prestige and in “command and subordination” status acquired by forcefully extracted dominance. Libertarian paternalism is a form of dominance. Thus, the “zoological perspective in the social sciences” extends Rizzo and Whitman’s critique of rationality and helps clarify “expertism,” that is, the attempt to acquire “dominance” by leveraging “prestige.” Humans have both an apish disposition to create linear dominance hierarchies and a disposition to form reverse dominance hierarchies. It is undecided whether we can strengthen reverse dominance hierarchies enough to prevent the boots of the few forever stamping on the faces of the many. It is undecided whether the liberal vision of egalitarian cooperation can prevail. But it’s worth fighting for.","PeriodicalId":43339,"journal":{"name":"Review of Behavioral Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67075896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper discusses how counterfactual thinking can be incorporated into behavioral economics by relating it to a type of attribution substitution involved in choices people make in conditions of Knightian uncertainty. It draws on Byrne’s ‘rational imagination’ account of counterfactual thinking, evidence from cognitive science regarding the forms it takes, and identifies types of attribution substitution specific to economic behavior. This approach, which elucidates the reflective stage of causal reasoning, is relevant for the explanation of hypothetical causal rules suitable for diverse tasks such as planning, expectations and mental simulations and for behavioural change interventions, which take into account people’s social and institutional embeddedness. The paper closes with a discussion of how this implies a specifically social Homo sapiens individual conception.
{"title":"Counterfactual Thinking and Attribute Substitution in Economic Behavior","authors":"John B. Davis, Theodore Koutsobinas","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3757142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3757142","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses how counterfactual thinking can be incorporated into behavioral economics by relating it to a type of attribution substitution involved in choices people make in conditions of Knightian uncertainty. It draws on Byrne’s ‘rational imagination’ account of counterfactual thinking, evidence from cognitive science regarding the forms it takes, and identifies types of attribution substitution specific to economic behavior. This approach, which elucidates the reflective stage of causal reasoning, is relevant for the explanation of hypothetical causal rules suitable for diverse tasks such as planning, expectations and mental simulations and for behavioural change interventions, which take into account people’s social and institutional embeddedness. The paper closes with a discussion of how this implies a specifically social Homo sapiens individual conception.","PeriodicalId":43339,"journal":{"name":"Review of Behavioral Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68637276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Flow Theory posits that motivation is highest when individuals experience above average challenges and perform at above average skill. I use data from a short, repetitive online game to test this hypothesis and to explore the role of Flow Theory in motivation and game play. I also explore the relationship between Flow Theory and demand for commitment. For each player, the Flow-Theory channel in which they are most likely to continue playing the game is identified, and players are categorized into types accordingly. Control, Boredom and Relaxation types are most common. Flow types are among the least common, making up 12.6% of players. Flow types have the lowest skill level, but challenge themselves the most, and are most likely to make use of self-control devices available within the game. Control types play most frequently and over a longer period of weeks. Apathy types are high skill but seek out low challenges and are least likely to make use of self-control devices. Flow and control types are more likely to play during the workday. Relaxation, boredom and apathy types are more likely to play during workday evenings. I conclude that the principle hypothesis of Flow Theory does not explain my findings, but other aspects of Flow Theory are relevant to an understanding of motivation and self-control.
{"title":"An Investigation of Flow Theory in an Online Game","authors":"Dan Acland","doi":"10.1561/105.00000127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/105.00000127","url":null,"abstract":"Flow Theory posits that motivation is highest when individuals experience above average challenges and perform at above average skill. I use data from a short, repetitive online game to test this hypothesis and to explore the role of Flow Theory in motivation and game play. I also explore the relationship between Flow Theory and demand for commitment. For each player, the Flow-Theory channel in which they are most likely to continue playing the game is identified, and players are categorized into types accordingly. Control, Boredom and Relaxation types are most common. Flow types are among the least common, making up 12.6% of players. Flow types have the lowest skill level, but challenge themselves the most, and are most likely to make use of self-control devices available within the game. Control types play most frequently and over a longer period of weeks. Apathy types are high skill but seek out low challenges and are least likely to make use of self-control devices. Flow and control types are more likely to play during the workday. Relaxation, boredom and apathy types are more likely to play during workday evenings. I conclude that the principle hypothesis of Flow Theory does not explain my findings, but other aspects of Flow Theory are relevant to an understanding of motivation and self-control.","PeriodicalId":43339,"journal":{"name":"Review of Behavioral Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47960735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Falco, B. Magdalou, David Masclet, M. Villeval, M. Willinger
We study embezzlement when donations have to pass through intermediaries to reach recipients, by means of a sequential game tested in a laboratory experiment conducted in Tanzania. We investigate the impact on the amount embezzled of both the number of intermediaries in transfer chains and transparency about the donation. We show that donors are less generous in the presence of intermediaries. When transfer chains are shorter, aggregate embezzlement decreases when donations are transparent. At the individual level, intermediaries embezzle less, the longer the transfer chain; this is due to less embezzlement at the beginning of the chain. We fail finding significant positive effects of transparency on the honesty of individual transfers through social judgment.
{"title":"Can Shorter Transfer Chains and\u0000Transparency Reduce Embezzlement?","authors":"S. Falco, B. Magdalou, David Masclet, M. Villeval, M. Willinger","doi":"10.1561/105.00000119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/105.00000119","url":null,"abstract":"We study embezzlement when donations have to pass through intermediaries to reach recipients, by means of a sequential game tested in a laboratory experiment conducted in Tanzania. We investigate the impact on the amount embezzled of both the number of intermediaries in transfer chains and transparency about the donation. We show that donors are less generous in the presence of intermediaries. When transfer chains are shorter, aggregate embezzlement decreases when donations are transparent. At the individual level, intermediaries embezzle less, the longer the transfer chain; this is due to less embezzlement at the beginning of the chain. We fail finding significant positive effects of transparency on the honesty of individual transfers through social judgment.","PeriodicalId":43339,"journal":{"name":"Review of Behavioral Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/105.00000119","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47851017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}