Charity corruption scandals cause sharp declines in donations. When deciding about charitable contributions, donors are influenced by the actual share that ultimately goes to the intended recipients; however, they are also impacted by the potential veiled cost that may come from legitimate administration and advertisement costs or in some cases from unethical expenditures or corruption. Therefore, donors are confronted with a tradeoff between helping people in need and the possibility of being cheated. Individuals may justify not giving by using a self-serving biased belief that the fundraisers are corrupt. In a laboratory experiment, we find evidence that participants are more likely to exploit the shadow of fundraising cost to bias their belief and contribute less when the incentive for selfishness is greater. Further, the charitable contribution significantly increases when the moral excuse is removed by excluding the possibility of fundraisers’ manipulation of the costs.
{"title":"Shadow of a Doubt: Moral Excuse in Charitable Giving","authors":"M. Palma, Z. Xu","doi":"10.1561/105.00000102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/105.00000102","url":null,"abstract":"Charity corruption scandals cause sharp declines in donations. When deciding about charitable contributions, donors are influenced by the actual share that ultimately goes to the intended recipients; however, they are also impacted by the potential veiled cost that may come from legitimate administration and advertisement costs or in some cases from unethical expenditures or corruption. Therefore, donors are confronted with a tradeoff between helping people in need and the possibility of being cheated. Individuals may justify not giving by using a self-serving biased belief that the fundraisers are corrupt. In a laboratory experiment, we find evidence that participants are more likely to exploit the shadow of fundraising cost to bias their belief and contribute less when the incentive for selfishness is greater. Further, the charitable contribution significantly increases when the moral excuse is removed by excluding the possibility of fundraisers’ manipulation of the costs.","PeriodicalId":43339,"journal":{"name":"Review of Behavioral Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/105.00000102","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44742117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We argue that in the ultimatum game the effects of altruistic behavior and reciprocity vary more in the spectrum of positively compared to negatively-valenced relationships. Thus, we suggest that social distance effects are asymmetric. Our experimental results support this hypothesis; in the region of positively-valenced relationships, the proposers increase the percentage they offer as relationship quality increases more drastically compared to when the relationship is negatively-valenced, in which case they appear more invariant to relationship effects. Also, by eliciting a minimum share which the responder is willing to accept out of the total sum, we provide clearer results on the social distance and stakes effects on the latter’s behavior. We find a negative effect of relationship quality on the minimum acceptable share. This contradicts a strand of the literature which suggests that closer-“in-group†individuals may be punished more severely, so that cooperation in a group is maintained.
{"title":"Asymmetric Social Distance Effects\u0000 in the Ultimatum Game","authors":"Orestis Vravosinos, Kyriakos Konstantinou","doi":"10.1561/105.00000105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/105.00000105","url":null,"abstract":"We argue that in the ultimatum game the effects of altruistic behavior and reciprocity vary more in the spectrum of positively compared to negatively-valenced relationships. Thus, we suggest that social distance effects are asymmetric. Our experimental results support this hypothesis; in the region of positively-valenced relationships, the proposers increase the percentage they offer as relationship quality increases more drastically compared to when the relationship is negatively-valenced, in which case they appear more invariant to relationship effects. Also, by eliciting a minimum share which the responder is willing to accept out of the total sum, we provide clearer results on the social distance and stakes effects on the latter’s behavior. We find a negative effect of relationship quality on the minimum acceptable share. This contradicts a strand of the literature which suggests that closer-“in-group†individuals may be punished more severely, so that cooperation in a group is maintained.","PeriodicalId":43339,"journal":{"name":"Review of Behavioral Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/105.00000105","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44444811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Telling an Impossible Lie: Detecting\u0000 Individual Cheating in a\u0000 Die-under-the-Cup Task","authors":"Gideon Yaniv, D. Greenberg, Erez Siniver","doi":"10.1561/105.00000100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/105.00000100","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43339,"journal":{"name":"Review of Behavioral Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/105.00000100","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42968267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper demonstrates that the Self and Peer Assessment (SPA) method used in higher education, to map a group work mark to individual marks, can easily be modelled as a strategic form game. This modelling predicts students to report SPA following their dominant strategies. However, data of a real time SPA indicate that students may not report SPA by adopting dominant strategies. The findings are indicative of a mismatch between the game (SPA) designed by the tutor, and then played by students. The paper concludes that the interpretation of SPA is not possible, and statistics of SPA should not be relied upon to map a group mark to individual marks.
{"title":"Self and Peer Assessment of Group\u0000 Work in Higher Education: A Game\u0000 Theoretic Analysis","authors":"Mehdi Chowdhury","doi":"10.1561/105.00000104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/105.00000104","url":null,"abstract":"The paper demonstrates that the Self and Peer Assessment (SPA) method used in higher education, to map a group work mark to individual marks, can easily be modelled as a strategic form game. This modelling predicts students to report SPA following their dominant strategies. However, data of a real time SPA indicate that students may not report SPA by adopting dominant strategies. The findings are indicative of a mismatch between the game (SPA) designed by the tutor, and then played by students. The paper concludes that the interpretation of SPA is not possible, and statistics of SPA should not be relied upon to map a group mark to individual marks.","PeriodicalId":43339,"journal":{"name":"Review of Behavioral Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/105.00000104","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49256027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We experimentally study the role of punishment for cooperation in dynamic public-good problems where past payoffs determine present contribution capabilities. The beneficial role of punishment possibilities for cooperation is fragile: successful cooperation hinges on the presence of a common understanding of how punishment should be used. If high-contributors punish too readily, the group likely gets on a wasteful path of punishment and retaliation. If punishment is administered more patiently, even initially uncooperative groups thrive. Hence, when today’s punishment also determines tomorrow’s cooperation abilities, it seems crucial that groups agree on the right ‘dose’ of sanctions for punishment to support cooperation.
{"title":"The Dose Does it: Punishment and\u0000 Cooperation in Dynamic Public-Good\u0000 Games","authors":"B. Rockenbach, I. Wolff","doi":"10.1561/105.00000084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/105.00000084","url":null,"abstract":"We experimentally study the role of punishment for cooperation in dynamic public-good problems where past payoffs determine present contribution capabilities. The beneficial role of punishment possibilities for cooperation is fragile: successful cooperation hinges on the presence of a common understanding of how punishment should be used. If high-contributors punish too readily, the group likely gets on a wasteful path of punishment and retaliation. If punishment is administered more patiently, even initially uncooperative groups thrive. Hence, when today’s punishment also determines tomorrow’s cooperation abilities, it seems crucial that groups agree on the right ‘dose’ of sanctions for punishment to support cooperation.","PeriodicalId":43339,"journal":{"name":"Review of Behavioral Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/105.00000084","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49319775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Behavioural Finance Theory is a modern approach to finance theory – which, in turn has three wings in its standard versions: the theory of finance based on subjective expected utility theory, in conjunction with the efficient market hypothesis theory (with Bayes’s rule as an auxiliary assumption for updates); the Shafer-Vovk approach via the use of Ville’s arithmetic game version; and that which is based on the work of Bachelier, Osborne and Mandelbrot which is called the Econophysics vision. Dissatisfaction with the theoretical, empirical and experimental fundamentals of these three approaches has led, in the last quarter of a century, to the development of the field of modern behavioural finance theory. This is based on the early work of Thaler, Tversky and Kahneman. In this paper, this view is contrasted with the prior work of Herbert Simon, and is called Classical Behavioural Finance Theory.
{"title":"Classical Behavioural Finance Theory","authors":"K. Velupillai","doi":"10.1561/105.00000085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/105.00000085","url":null,"abstract":"Behavioural Finance Theory is a modern approach to finance theory – which, in turn has three wings in its standard versions: the theory of finance based on subjective expected utility theory, in conjunction with the efficient market hypothesis theory (with Bayes’s rule as an auxiliary assumption for updates); the Shafer-Vovk approach via the use of Ville’s arithmetic game version; and that which is based on the work of Bachelier, Osborne and Mandelbrot which is called the Econophysics vision. Dissatisfaction with the theoretical, empirical and experimental fundamentals of these three approaches has led, in the last quarter of a century, to the development of the field of modern behavioural finance theory. This is based on the early work of Thaler, Tversky and Kahneman. In this paper, this view is contrasted with the prior work of Herbert Simon, and is called Classical Behavioural Finance Theory.","PeriodicalId":43339,"journal":{"name":"Review of Behavioral Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/105.00000085","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49603619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Strong empirical evidence suggests that people infer prevailing proenvironmental norms based on the behavior of people they encounter and engage with. These norms seem to be adopted in response to both internal motivation and social pressure. To formalize such behavior, the economic literature has introduced theoretical models that include moral and social drivers. We complement this theoretical literature by analyzing the adoption of green behavior in presence of social networks. Leveraging insights from the network-science literature, we extend an existing model of socially contingent moral motivation to include characteristics of human social behavior that have been shown, empirically, to matter for green behavior, but which have been neglected by most theoretical models. Our network moral-motivation model leads naturally to spatial-heterogeneity in environmental norms. Consistent with nonnetwork models, we show that temporary subsidies can lead to stable equilibria with positive adoption, even when the subsidy is discontinued. In our model, however, regulators can achieve significant savings by targeting subsidies. With our computational exercises, using small semi-realistic networks, we quantify the gains of targeting subsidies, or social interventions, towards optimal seed groups. These gains may be large compared to widespread subsidies, or random selection of seed groups, and depend on the society’s structural characteristics. Hence, considering social networks may change radically the performance of initiatives aimed at promoting the adoption of green behavior.
{"title":"Short-term Interventions for\u0000 Long-term Change: Spreading Stable\u0000 Green Norms in Networks","authors":"Gwen Spencer, S. Carattini, R. Howarth","doi":"10.1561/105.00000095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/105.00000095","url":null,"abstract":"Strong empirical evidence suggests that people infer prevailing proenvironmental norms based on the behavior of people they encounter and engage with. These norms seem to be adopted in response to both internal motivation and social pressure. To formalize such behavior, the economic literature has introduced theoretical models that include moral and social drivers. We complement this theoretical literature by analyzing the adoption of green behavior in presence of social networks. Leveraging insights from the network-science literature, we extend an existing model of socially contingent moral motivation to include characteristics of human social behavior that have been shown, empirically, to matter for green behavior, but which have been neglected by most theoretical models. Our network moral-motivation model leads naturally to spatial-heterogeneity in environmental norms. Consistent with nonnetwork models, we show that temporary subsidies can lead to stable equilibria with positive adoption, even when the subsidy is discontinued. In our model, however, regulators can achieve significant savings by targeting subsidies. With our computational exercises, using small semi-realistic networks, we quantify the gains of targeting subsidies, or social interventions, towards optimal seed groups. These gains may be large compared to widespread subsidies, or random selection of seed groups, and depend on the society’s structural characteristics. Hence, considering social networks may change radically the performance of initiatives aimed at promoting the adoption of green behavior.","PeriodicalId":43339,"journal":{"name":"Review of Behavioral Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/105.00000095","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49146099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.1007/978-981-10-6439-5_12
M. Ogaki, Saori C. Tanaka
{"title":"Correction to: Behavioral Economics","authors":"M. Ogaki, Saori C. Tanaka","doi":"10.1007/978-981-10-6439-5_12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-6439-5_12","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43339,"journal":{"name":"Review of Behavioral Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78938229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economists and others have used the results from behavioral economics to justify paternalistic government policies, aimed at changing an individual’s behavior in the present so as to improve that individual’s well-being in the future. Examples include the automatic enrollment in pension schemes and anti-smoking measures, such as banning smoking in public places or proposals for a smoking license. But these - and the economic analyses underlying them – have been challenged on the grounds that they arbitrarily privilege one set of preferences over another. The privileged preferences include those of an ‘inner rational agent’ and those of the future over the present. This paper addresses this criticism and puts forward two new conceptions of - and justifications for – these kinds of policy.
{"title":"Future Imperfect: Behavioral\u0000 Economics and Government\u0000 Paternalism","authors":"J. Grand","doi":"10.1561/105.00000093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/105.00000093","url":null,"abstract":"Economists and others have used the results from behavioral economics to justify paternalistic government policies, aimed at changing an individual’s behavior in the present so as to improve that individual’s well-being in the future. Examples include the automatic enrollment in pension schemes and anti-smoking measures, such as banning smoking in public places or proposals for a smoking license. But these - and the economic analyses underlying them – have been challenged on the grounds that they arbitrarily privilege one set of preferences over another. The privileged preferences include those of an ‘inner rational agent’ and those of the future over the present. This paper addresses this criticism and puts forward two new conceptions of - and justifications for – these kinds of policy.","PeriodicalId":43339,"journal":{"name":"Review of Behavioral Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2018-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/105.00000093","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49569280","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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