Abstract Katja Langenbucher’s outstanding book seeks to address the question of why and in what ways have lawyers been importing economic theories into a legal environment, and how has this shaped scholarly research, judicial and legislative work? Since the financial crisis, corporate or capital markets law has been the focus of attention by academia and media. Formal modelling has been used to describe how capital markets work and, later, has been criticized for its abstract assumptions. Empirical legal studies and regulatory impact assessments offered different ways forward. This excellent book presents a new approach to the risks and benefits of interdisciplinary policy work. The benefits economic theory brings for reliable and tested lawmaking are contrasted with important challenges including the significant differences of research methodology, leading to misunderstandings and problems of efficient implementation of economic theory’s findings into the legal world. Katja Langenbucher’s innovative research scrutinizes the potential of economic theory to European legislators faced with a lack of democratic accountability.
{"title":"Do Lawyers Need Economists? Review of Katja Langenbucher, Economic Transplants: On Lawmaking for Corporations and Capital Markets (Cambridge U. Press, 2017)","authors":"R. Avi-Yonah","doi":"10.1515/ael-2020-0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2020-0018","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Katja Langenbucher’s outstanding book seeks to address the question of why and in what ways have lawyers been importing economic theories into a legal environment, and how has this shaped scholarly research, judicial and legislative work? Since the financial crisis, corporate or capital markets law has been the focus of attention by academia and media. Formal modelling has been used to describe how capital markets work and, later, has been criticized for its abstract assumptions. Empirical legal studies and regulatory impact assessments offered different ways forward. This excellent book presents a new approach to the risks and benefits of interdisciplinary policy work. The benefits economic theory brings for reliable and tested lawmaking are contrasted with important challenges including the significant differences of research methodology, leading to misunderstandings and problems of efficient implementation of economic theory’s findings into the legal world. Katja Langenbucher’s innovative research scrutinizes the potential of economic theory to European legislators faced with a lack of democratic accountability.","PeriodicalId":43657,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Economics and Law-A Convivium","volume":"2023 1","pages":"269 - 272"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86865533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Katharina Pistor’s book The code of capital – how the law creates wealth and inequality (Pistor, K. (2019). The code of capital – How the law creates wealth and inequality. Princeton: Princeton University Press) is an original and insightful intervention in the quest to understand both the rising inequality of the last 40 years, as well as the inner dynamics of capitalism, a social formation that has ruled in western societies for about 200 years now. Pistor shares many of the convictions of the publications in the journal Accounting, Economics and Law, such as the dangers to democracy inherent in the corporate form (Robé, J. P. (2011). The legal structure of the firm. Accounting, Economics and Law, 1(1). https://doi.org/10.2202/2152-2820.1001; Strasser, K., & Blumberg, P. (2011). Legal form and economic substance of enterprise groups: Implications for legal policy. Accounting, Economics and Law, 1(1). https://doi.org/10.2202/2152-2820.1000), the fact that firms and corporate form need to be distinguished (Y. Biondi, A. Canziani, & T. Kirat (Eds), (2007). The firm as an entity: Implications for economics, accounting and law. New York and London: Routledge) and that shareholders do not own corporations, but just their shares, it is only appropriate to discuss and present it to the wider audience of the journal, pointing to its fundamental insights and potential for follow-up research. The title of the book and its set-up evoke both Luhmann’s system theory with its penchant for binary code as well as Marx’s capital (Marx, K. (1955[1867]). Das Kapital. Berlin: Dietz Verlag, Vol. 1). Combining the coding of social systems and their relentless dynamic in innovating and generating new forms by recursively referring to established elements (Luhmann, N. (1984). Soziale Systeme. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag; Luhmann, N. (1995). Das Recht der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag) with Marx’s focus on the structuring effects capital has on society is making this a very inspiring book, which at the same time evokes many follow-up questions.
{"title":"The Political Economy of Private Law","authors":"M. Thiemann","doi":"10.1515/ael-2020-0077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2020-0077","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Katharina Pistor’s book The code of capital – how the law creates wealth and inequality (Pistor, K. (2019). The code of capital – How the law creates wealth and inequality. Princeton: Princeton University Press) is an original and insightful intervention in the quest to understand both the rising inequality of the last 40 years, as well as the inner dynamics of capitalism, a social formation that has ruled in western societies for about 200 years now. Pistor shares many of the convictions of the publications in the journal Accounting, Economics and Law, such as the dangers to democracy inherent in the corporate form (Robé, J. P. (2011). The legal structure of the firm. Accounting, Economics and Law, 1(1). https://doi.org/10.2202/2152-2820.1001; Strasser, K., & Blumberg, P. (2011). Legal form and economic substance of enterprise groups: Implications for legal policy. Accounting, Economics and Law, 1(1). https://doi.org/10.2202/2152-2820.1000), the fact that firms and corporate form need to be distinguished (Y. Biondi, A. Canziani, & T. Kirat (Eds), (2007). The firm as an entity: Implications for economics, accounting and law. New York and London: Routledge) and that shareholders do not own corporations, but just their shares, it is only appropriate to discuss and present it to the wider audience of the journal, pointing to its fundamental insights and potential for follow-up research. The title of the book and its set-up evoke both Luhmann’s system theory with its penchant for binary code as well as Marx’s capital (Marx, K. (1955[1867]). Das Kapital. Berlin: Dietz Verlag, Vol. 1). Combining the coding of social systems and their relentless dynamic in innovating and generating new forms by recursively referring to established elements (Luhmann, N. (1984). Soziale Systeme. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag; Luhmann, N. (1995). Das Recht der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag) with Marx’s focus on the structuring effects capital has on society is making this a very inspiring book, which at the same time evokes many follow-up questions.","PeriodicalId":43657,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Economics and Law-A Convivium","volume":"28 1","pages":"37 - 51"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81416804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Following modern worldwide trend of transparency, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, which were incorporated in UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The Convention on Transparency (the Mauritius Convention) adopted later was an attempt to resolve the situation with treaties, which were concluded prior to April 1, 2014. As soon as few previous studies covered this issue, the research is aimed to assess the extent to which the Rules on Transparency are applicable and inevitable. By way of qualitative analysis of documents covering the transparency issue in investor-state treaties and arbitration was revealed that like the treaties concluded after April 1, 2014, which were automatically covered by the scope of application, the treaties made prior to that date were dropped out of the Rules on Transparency and the parties thereto have to express an explicit will to apply the Rules on Transparency. The Mauritius Convention designated to resolve this problem still requires a member state to join the Convention to make the Rules applicable to all treaties with such member state. On the other hand, both discussed documents provide the parties with options to avoid transparency in arbitration. Thus, despite increasing mandatory transparency in national legislations, the transparency of investor-state arbitration proceedings remains the matter of a good will of the parties. This study provides the foundation for stakeholders to conduct investor-state agreements as well as arbitration processes in line with transparency. The issue of transparency in investor-state agreements and arbitration processes in different countries can be illustrated in the following studies based on this study.
{"title":"International Experience of Applying Transparency Rules in Arbitration Processes Between Investors and States","authors":"Ziad Kh. Al Enizi, W. F. Mahameed","doi":"10.1515/ael-2019-0072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2019-0072","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Following modern worldwide trend of transparency, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, which were incorporated in UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The Convention on Transparency (the Mauritius Convention) adopted later was an attempt to resolve the situation with treaties, which were concluded prior to April 1, 2014. As soon as few previous studies covered this issue, the research is aimed to assess the extent to which the Rules on Transparency are applicable and inevitable. By way of qualitative analysis of documents covering the transparency issue in investor-state treaties and arbitration was revealed that like the treaties concluded after April 1, 2014, which were automatically covered by the scope of application, the treaties made prior to that date were dropped out of the Rules on Transparency and the parties thereto have to express an explicit will to apply the Rules on Transparency. The Mauritius Convention designated to resolve this problem still requires a member state to join the Convention to make the Rules applicable to all treaties with such member state. On the other hand, both discussed documents provide the parties with options to avoid transparency in arbitration. Thus, despite increasing mandatory transparency in national legislations, the transparency of investor-state arbitration proceedings remains the matter of a good will of the parties. This study provides the foundation for stakeholders to conduct investor-state agreements as well as arbitration processes in line with transparency. The issue of transparency in investor-state agreements and arbitration processes in different countries can be illustrated in the following studies based on this study.","PeriodicalId":43657,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Economics and Law-A Convivium","volume":"1 1","pages":"1 - 19"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82611339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Katharina Pistor’s argument in The Code of Capital about the constitutive role of legal practice for the creation and distribution of wealth requires contextualization; her claims about the stand-alone role of law in determining the political economy of global capitalism are exaggerated. My first intervention concerns the concept of capital. Capital evidently is not just a legal code, but also constitutes a financial accounting entity that emerges from processes of investment, which are embedded in (economic, social, political) structures that are facilitative of unequal distributions of rewards and risks. Legal coding should be considered as part of such ‘capitalization’ and as becoming more critical in the contemporary economy, in which capitalization increasingly happens through financial engineering and through capturing rents from ‘intangible capital’. Secondly, we can only understand the distributional implications of legal coding if we recognize a) the importance of rent-seeking in secularly stagnating economies and b) the particular class configurations in what Milanovic, B. (2019). Capitalism, alone. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press calls ‘liberal meritocratic capitalism’. The consolidation of a capital-rich and hard-working upper class in such a capitalist formation (the extreme case being United States) not just indicates a close alliance or overlap between holders of wealth and the professions (fund managers, legal advisers etc.) that serve them. It also indicates that social class structures – the paths of socialization they reproduce; their in-built social sorting mechanisms; their close association with ideologies of legitimate privilege – play a key role in reproducing economic distributional outcomes.
Katharina Pistor在《资本法典》中关于法律实践对财富创造和分配的构成作用的论述需要语境化;她声称法律在决定全球资本主义政治经济方面的独立作用被夸大了。我的第一个干预是关于资本的概念。显然，资本不仅仅是一个法律准则，而且还构成了一个从投资过程中出现的财务会计实体，而投资过程嵌入(经济、社会、政治)结构中，这些结构助长了回报和风险的不平等分配。法律编码应该被视为这种“资本化”的一部分，并且在当代经济中变得越来越重要，在当代经济中，资本化越来越多地通过金融工程和从“无形资本”中获取租金来实现。其次，如果我们认识到a)在特别停滞的经济体中寻租的重要性，以及b) Milanovic, b .(2019)中特定的阶级配置，我们才能理解法律编码的分配含义。资本主义,一个人。剑桥，马萨诸塞州:哈佛大学出版社称之为“自由精英资本主义”。在这样一种资本主义形态下(美国是一个极端的例子)，一个资本丰富、勤奋工作的上层阶级的巩固，不仅表明了财富持有者和为他们服务的职业(基金经理、法律顾问等)之间的密切联盟或重叠。它还表明，社会阶级结构——它们再现的社会化路径;它们内置的社会分类机制;它们与合法特权的意识形态密切相关，在再现经济分配结果方面发挥了关键作用。
{"title":"Capitalization and its Legal Friends","authors":"Leon Wansleben","doi":"10.1515/ael-2020-0063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2020-0063","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Katharina Pistor’s argument in The Code of Capital about the constitutive role of legal practice for the creation and distribution of wealth requires contextualization; her claims about the stand-alone role of law in determining the political economy of global capitalism are exaggerated. My first intervention concerns the concept of capital. Capital evidently is not just a legal code, but also constitutes a financial accounting entity that emerges from processes of investment, which are embedded in (economic, social, political) structures that are facilitative of unequal distributions of rewards and risks. Legal coding should be considered as part of such ‘capitalization’ and as becoming more critical in the contemporary economy, in which capitalization increasingly happens through financial engineering and through capturing rents from ‘intangible capital’. Secondly, we can only understand the distributional implications of legal coding if we recognize a) the importance of rent-seeking in secularly stagnating economies and b) the particular class configurations in what Milanovic, B. (2019). Capitalism, alone. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press calls ‘liberal meritocratic capitalism’. The consolidation of a capital-rich and hard-working upper class in such a capitalist formation (the extreme case being United States) not just indicates a close alliance or overlap between holders of wealth and the professions (fund managers, legal advisers etc.) that serve them. It also indicates that social class structures – the paths of socialization they reproduce; their in-built social sorting mechanisms; their close association with ideologies of legitimate privilege – play a key role in reproducing economic distributional outcomes.","PeriodicalId":43657,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Economics and Law-A Convivium","volume":"347 1","pages":"53 - 64"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77784589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper focuses on the interplay between accounting standards and tax laws in the context of regulatory arbitrage by examining the development of synthetic leases especially in the USA. In a synthetic lease, the lease remains off balance sheet for financial reporting by the lessee, while depreciations and interest expenses can be deducted for tax purposes. Exploring the evolving structures of synthetic leases over the last 30 years, the paper demonstrates how financial engineers have been able to perpetually re-structure this sophisticated instrument to keep it off-balance sheet instrument notwithstanding regulatory changes. Specifically, it shows that the most recent revision of lease accounting standards in 2016 – that intended to mark the end of off-balance sheet leases under IFRS and US-GAAP – resulted in reviving the demand for synthetic leases as the tax benefits outweigh the structuring costs. Contributing to the debate on the shift towards international accounting convergence (including US-GAAP and IFRS), the paper argues that attempts to limit regulatory arbitrage may also consider the reciprocal linkages between accounting standards and tax laws. For instance, tax laws should be considered as a means to limit regulatory arbitrage in financial reporting.
{"title":"Regulatory Arbitrage in the Intersection of Accounting Standards and Tax Laws: The Case of Synthetic Leases","authors":"Jan Friedrich","doi":"10.1515/ael-2020-0098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2020-0098","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper focuses on the interplay between accounting standards and tax laws in the context of regulatory arbitrage by examining the development of synthetic leases especially in the USA. In a synthetic lease, the lease remains off balance sheet for financial reporting by the lessee, while depreciations and interest expenses can be deducted for tax purposes. Exploring the evolving structures of synthetic leases over the last 30 years, the paper demonstrates how financial engineers have been able to perpetually re-structure this sophisticated instrument to keep it off-balance sheet instrument notwithstanding regulatory changes. Specifically, it shows that the most recent revision of lease accounting standards in 2016 – that intended to mark the end of off-balance sheet leases under IFRS and US-GAAP – resulted in reviving the demand for synthetic leases as the tax benefits outweigh the structuring costs. Contributing to the debate on the shift towards international accounting convergence (including US-GAAP and IFRS), the paper argues that attempts to limit regulatory arbitrage may also consider the reciprocal linkages between accounting standards and tax laws. For instance, tax laws should be considered as a means to limit regulatory arbitrage in financial reporting.","PeriodicalId":43657,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Economics and Law-A Convivium","volume":"49 1","pages":"201 - 232"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89084003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Danger of “Economic Transplants”","authors":"M. Thiemann","doi":"10.1515/ael-2020-0032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2020-0032","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43657,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Economics and Law-A Convivium","volume":"95 1","pages":"273 - 279"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83586233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In honor of Lynn Stout’s efforts to better suit the business corporation for the pursuit of long-term, publicly-beneficial purposes, the present essay reviews critically the historical process by which the corporation’s tie to public purposes—a precondition of the earliest grants of corporate powers to business enterprisers—was slowly severed. And it explores a form of corporate control, once widespread in the U.S. and easily revivable, that could partially restore corporate emphasis on public benefits—the foundation-controlled corporation.
{"title":"How America’s Corporations Lost their Public Purpose, and How it Might be (Partially) Restored","authors":"David Ciepley","doi":"10.1515/ael-2019-0088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2019-0088","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In honor of Lynn Stout’s efforts to better suit the business corporation for the pursuit of long-term, publicly-beneficial purposes, the present essay reviews critically the historical process by which the corporation’s tie to public purposes—a precondition of the earliest grants of corporate powers to business enterprisers—was slowly severed. And it explores a form of corporate control, once widespread in the U.S. and easily revivable, that could partially restore corporate emphasis on public benefits—the foundation-controlled corporation.","PeriodicalId":43657,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Economics and Law-A Convivium","volume":"60 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74376518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper explores regulatory arbitrage from a legal point of view. I start from the assumption that legislators will sometimes wish to prevent regulatory arbitrage and examine legal tools available to this end. To back up the underlying assumption, I present two perspectives on the phenomenon of regulatory arbitrage. One perspective stresses its competitive element, the other one focuses on instances of arbitrage as unwanted avoidance of a legal regime. It is suggested that from both perspectives we will find that – at least sometimes – regulatory arbitrage is unwanted. I move on to illustrate how EU and U.S. legislators have dealt with an example of unwanted arbitrage. The main part of the paper then deals with legal tools to suppress arbitrage. The main focus is on legislative drafting techniques such as choosing a narrow wording, a broad wording, anti-evasion rules or the concept of abuse. I conclude with a glance at problems of regulatory arbitrage in a corporate setting.
{"title":"Regulatory Arbitrage: What’s Law Got To Do With It?","authors":"K. Langenbucher","doi":"10.1515/ael-2019-0054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2019-0054","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper explores regulatory arbitrage from a legal point of view. I start from the assumption that legislators will sometimes wish to prevent regulatory arbitrage and examine legal tools available to this end. To back up the underlying assumption, I present two perspectives on the phenomenon of regulatory arbitrage. One perspective stresses its competitive element, the other one focuses on instances of arbitrage as unwanted avoidance of a legal regime. It is suggested that from both perspectives we will find that – at least sometimes – regulatory arbitrage is unwanted. I move on to illustrate how EU and U.S. legislators have dealt with an example of unwanted arbitrage. The main part of the paper then deals with legal tools to suppress arbitrage. The main focus is on legislative drafting techniques such as choosing a narrow wording, a broad wording, anti-evasion rules or the concept of abuse. I conclude with a glance at problems of regulatory arbitrage in a corporate setting.","PeriodicalId":43657,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Economics and Law-A Convivium","volume":"85 1","pages":"91 - 117"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85987053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this brief essay, I want to call something Lynn Stout was passionate about: building a better account (both theoretical and empirical) of human nature and motivation. This was the subject of a book that extended well beyond the corporate world (Cultivating Conscience [2011]) and was implicit in her most complete set of thoughts about corporate governance, The Shareholder Value Myth (2012). Lynn understood that such a behavioral account was needed to support her theory of corporate purpose. The other CONVIVIUM contributions say little about this aspect of her work, so I am bringing her thoughts about human motivation frontstage.
{"title":"Lynn Stout, Pro-sociality, and the Campaign for Corporate Enlightenment","authors":"Donald C. Langevoort","doi":"10.1515/ael-2020-0067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2020-0067","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this brief essay, I want to call something Lynn Stout was passionate about: building a better account (both theoretical and empirical) of human nature and motivation. This was the subject of a book that extended well beyond the corporate world (Cultivating Conscience [2011]) and was implicit in her most complete set of thoughts about corporate governance, The Shareholder Value Myth (2012). Lynn understood that such a behavioral account was needed to support her theory of corporate purpose. The other CONVIVIUM contributions say little about this aspect of her work, so I am bringing her thoughts about human motivation frontstage.","PeriodicalId":43657,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Economics and Law-A Convivium","volume":"72 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86870880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The article introduces the thematic issue of Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium dedicated to the regulation of non-financial reporting. It provides the reader with an overview of the varying approaches and frameworks that have emerged over time in relation to the reporting of non-financial information. In particular, the article focuses on the European Non-Financial Reporting Directive. We maintain that to date this latter initiative has failed to deliver on its intended objectives. In the context of the ongoing revision process of this initiative, the present paper outlines five key areas to be improved drawing on the lessons learnt from the past as well as from key points raised by the papers in the present thematic issue. What emerges from this collective effort is a renewed agenda that highlights some of the structural failures of the current reporting regime and a blueprint for future reforms. The final section summarises the various contributions of articles included in this thematic issue.
{"title":"Rethinking Non-Financial Reporting: A Blueprint for Structural Regulatory Changes","authors":"David Monciardini, Jukka Mähönen, G. Tsagas","doi":"10.1515/ael-2020-0092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2020-0092","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The article introduces the thematic issue of Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium dedicated to the regulation of non-financial reporting. It provides the reader with an overview of the varying approaches and frameworks that have emerged over time in relation to the reporting of non-financial information. In particular, the article focuses on the European Non-Financial Reporting Directive. We maintain that to date this latter initiative has failed to deliver on its intended objectives. In the context of the ongoing revision process of this initiative, the present paper outlines five key areas to be improved drawing on the lessons learnt from the past as well as from key points raised by the papers in the present thematic issue. What emerges from this collective effort is a renewed agenda that highlights some of the structural failures of the current reporting regime and a blueprint for future reforms. The final section summarises the various contributions of articles included in this thematic issue.","PeriodicalId":43657,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Economics and Law-A Convivium","volume":"66 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84457574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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