State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) directly compete with private companies, including foreign investors. The scope of applicability of competition law towards SOEs constitutes one of the key features of national competition protection regimes. Two approaches (models) can be identified in this area: the equality approach (competition law applied in the same manner towards the public and the private sector; the model is based on the neutrality principle); and the differentiation approach (excluding fully the application of competition law on SOEs). The second model is usually justified by important social and economic goals, mainly by a necessity to provide highquality public services. However, the differentiation model may negatively affect both domestic competition and the investment atmosphere. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries adopted competition laws that generally put SOEs and the public sector in a broader sense out of scrutiny of competition law regime. The paper aims to check what reasons lie behind a rejection of the neutrality principle in GCC’s competition laws, specifically if competition protection regimes are patterned on antitrust laws from liberal economies. By identifying how the differentiation approach to addressees of competition laws is reflected at a legislative or practical level in most GCC’s countries, the article tends to assess the impact of national competition laws on Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in the Gulf region. competition law, Gulf States, neutrality principle, State-owned enterprises, foreign investments, national champions
{"title":"SOEs, Foreign Investments & Competition: A View from the Gulf States","authors":"N. Memeti, Agata Jurkowska-Gomułka","doi":"10.54648/woco2021027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021027","url":null,"abstract":"State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) directly compete with private companies, including foreign investors. The scope of applicability of competition law towards SOEs constitutes one of the key features of national competition protection regimes. Two approaches (models) can be identified in this area: the equality approach (competition law applied in the same manner towards the public and the private sector; the model is based on the neutrality principle); and the differentiation approach (excluding fully the application of competition law on SOEs). The second model is usually justified by important social and economic goals, mainly by a necessity to provide highquality public services. However, the differentiation model may negatively affect both domestic competition and the investment atmosphere.\u0000The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries adopted competition laws that generally put SOEs and the public sector in a broader sense out of scrutiny of competition law regime. The paper aims to check what reasons lie behind a rejection of the neutrality principle in GCC’s competition laws, specifically if competition protection regimes are patterned on antitrust laws from liberal economies. By identifying how the differentiation approach to addressees of competition laws is reflected at a legislative or practical level in most GCC’s countries, the article tends to assess the impact of national competition laws on Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in the Gulf region.\u0000competition law, Gulf States, neutrality principle, State-owned enterprises, foreign investments, national champions","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85790586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The problem-solving mechanism developed by Sparrow in the field of social regulation could also be implemented in competition law in order to prevent the recurrence of competition problems in a given industry. The aim of competition authorities (as a protection-type agency) is to create public value. This is measured in terms of their ability to solve social problems by preventing or controlling harms. In the case of competition authorities, public value is achieved by ensuring a competitive market environment through the curtailment of market power and the removal of barriers to entry. The public value of prevention is especially important when markets have a tendency to become concentrated. In order to achieve the maximum preventive effect, all prevention tools must be operated effectively. This includes imposing structural remedies or switching to ex-ante prevention (regulation) when ex-post enforcement proves ineffective. concentration, deterrence, divestitures, ex-ante regulation, prevention
{"title":"Creating More Public Value in the EU Competition Law by Reaching a Higher Level of Prevention in the Particular Context of the Digital Markets","authors":"A. Tóth","doi":"10.54648/woco2021024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021024","url":null,"abstract":"The problem-solving mechanism developed by Sparrow in the field of social regulation could also be implemented in competition law in order to prevent the recurrence of competition problems in a given industry. The aim of competition authorities (as a protection-type agency) is to create public value. This is measured in terms of their ability to solve social problems by preventing or controlling harms. In the case of competition authorities, public value is achieved by ensuring a competitive market environment through the curtailment of market power and the removal of barriers to entry. The public value of prevention is especially important when markets have a tendency to become concentrated. In order to achieve the maximum preventive effect, all prevention tools must be operated effectively. This includes imposing structural remedies or switching to ex-ante prevention (regulation) when ex-post enforcement proves ineffective.\u0000concentration, deterrence, divestitures, ex-ante regulation, prevention","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81874243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An unprecedented recalibration of the rules regulating the functioning of competition in the digital markets has catalysed diverse reactions among the main stakeholders. The proposed approach to regulating gatekeepers will have a paradigmatic impact on European consumers, businesses and public institutions. It will have equally significant implications for the theoretical foundations of competition law, economics and policy. While formally the Digital Markets Act (DMA) is complementing, not substituting, existing provisions of competition de lege lata, such a substantial extension of the rationale and instruments of competition policy is likely to have significant implications also for the application of ex-post rules. The entire apparatus of competition law will be extended by the new modality. Out of the wide spectrum of changes introduced by the DMA/DSA proposal, this article identifies and analyses one of the central – though not so commonly discussed – elements of the transformation. It asks a normative question about what kind of competition in the digital markets the European Union should seek to establish, and a methodological question about procedural and substantive legal mechanisms used for shaping such a new format. digital competition law, polycentric and dialectical approach to antitrust, competition law and the digital economy, goals of competition law, ex-ante and ex-post competition policy, Digital Markets Act – DMA, inter-platform competition, ecosystem competition, Digital Services Act – DSA.
{"title":"Shaping the New Modality of the Digital Markets: The Impact of the DSA/DMA Proposals on Inter-Platform Competition","authors":"Oles Andriychuk","doi":"10.54648/woco2021017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021017","url":null,"abstract":"An unprecedented recalibration of the rules regulating the functioning of competition in the digital markets has catalysed diverse reactions among the main stakeholders. The proposed approach to regulating gatekeepers will have a paradigmatic impact on European consumers, businesses and public institutions. It will have equally significant implications for the theoretical foundations of competition law, economics and policy. While formally the Digital Markets Act (DMA) is complementing, not substituting, existing provisions of competition de lege lata, such a substantial extension of the rationale and instruments of competition policy is likely to have significant implications also for the application of ex-post rules. The entire apparatus of competition law will be extended by the new modality. Out of the wide spectrum of changes introduced by the DMA/DSA proposal, this article identifies and analyses one of the central – though not so commonly discussed – elements of the transformation. It asks a normative question about what kind of competition in the digital markets the European Union should seek to establish, and a methodological question about procedural and substantive legal mechanisms used for shaping such a new format.\u0000digital competition law, polycentric and dialectical approach to antitrust, competition law and the digital economy, goals of competition law, ex-ante and ex-post competition policy, Digital Markets Act – DMA, inter-platform competition, ecosystem competition, Digital Services Act – DSA.","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75452261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"World Competition’s Editor, José Rivas, Interviews Mr Andreas Schwab, Rapporteur of the Digital Markets Act in the European Parliament","authors":"J. Rivas","doi":"10.54648/woco2021016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021016","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84252224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The incentives of pharmaceutical companies to innovate and how competition affects these incentives has been topical in recent years: for the general public, as evidenced by a patent race at an unprecedented pace during the ongoing Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic; and more specifically for competition authorities, as demonstrated for example by the role innovation played in the assessment of the Bayer/Monsanto (2018), Dow/DuPont (2017), and the Novartis/GSK (2015) mergers. This article contributes to the innovation debate, notably in the pharmaceutical industry, by giving an overview on firm and market-level incentives to carry out research and development (R&D). Understanding these innovation incentives is relevant for a proper competition assessment where the effect of a particular conduct or structural change on these incentives is considered, but also more generally in the context of public policy or regulatory questions. We review the fundamental elements driving innovation incentives and tentatively relate these to the development of new drugs for neurodegenerative diseases (NDD), in particular Parkinson’s disease (PD) and Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Health Economics, Pharmaceutical Products, Innovation, R&D, Information Asymmetry, Coase Conjecture, Replacement Effect, Patent Race, Neurodegenerative Diseases, Parkinson’s Disease, Alzheimer’s Disease
{"title":"Innovation Incentives in the Pharmaceutical Sector: Rethinking Competition and Public Policy?","authors":"Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, R. Lauer, Laura Robles","doi":"10.54648/woco2021019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021019","url":null,"abstract":"The incentives of pharmaceutical companies to innovate and how competition affects these incentives has been topical in recent years: for the general public, as evidenced by a patent race at an unprecedented pace during the ongoing Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic; and more specifically for competition authorities, as demonstrated for example by the role innovation played in the assessment of the Bayer/Monsanto (2018), Dow/DuPont (2017), and the Novartis/GSK (2015) mergers. This article contributes to the innovation debate, notably in the pharmaceutical industry, by giving an overview on firm and market-level incentives to carry out research and development (R&D). Understanding these innovation incentives is relevant for a proper competition assessment where the effect of a particular conduct or structural change on these incentives is considered, but also more generally in the context of public policy or regulatory questions. We review the fundamental elements driving innovation incentives and tentatively relate these to the development of new drugs for neurodegenerative diseases (NDD), in particular Parkinson’s disease (PD) and Alzheimer’s disease (AD).\u0000Health Economics, Pharmaceutical Products, Innovation, R&D, Information Asymmetry, Coase Conjecture, Replacement Effect, Patent Race, Neurodegenerative Diseases, Parkinson’s Disease, Alzheimer’s Disease","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73480861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Innovation is regarded as the spearhead of consumer benefit in a competitive market. However, a strategy of predatory innovation presents the innovator with a shower of opportunities to close down the market and drive out competitors, thereby directly affecting consumer sovereignty. An inquiry into the relationship between innovation and market structures is not only important to assess the impact of such forms of the market on innovative activities, but also for a well-founded and evidenced framing of principles of antitrust laws in respect of Intellectual Property Rights (‘IPRs’). Therefore, this article makes a case for the legal recognition, across jurisdictions including India, of predatory innovation in the context of high-tech markets to uphold the objectives of the antitrust regime, i.e., consumer welfare. The article traces the progressive steps taken by developed jurisdiction in this context and highlights how a similar approach could be adopted by India, fitting its current framework. This article, firstly, discusses the impact the market structure has on the motives and incentives for a manufacturer to innovate; secondly, brings forward the anti-competitive nature of predatory innovation in high tech markets; thirdly, advocates for the need for legal recognition of the conduct of Predatory Innovation while noting the counterarguments; lastly, concludes with identifying the effects of recognizing Predatory Innovation as anticompetitive conduct. Innovation, Predatory, Market Structures, Monopoly, Intellectual Property Rights, India, High-tech Markets, Interoperability, Platforms, Network Effects
{"title":"Innovation: An Antitrust Trojan Horse?","authors":"Shaurya Aron","doi":"10.54648/woco2021013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021013","url":null,"abstract":"Innovation is regarded as the spearhead of consumer benefit in a competitive market. However, a strategy of predatory innovation presents the innovator with a shower of opportunities to close down the market and drive out competitors, thereby directly affecting consumer sovereignty. An inquiry into the relationship between innovation and market structures is not only important to assess the impact of such forms of the market on innovative activities, but also for a well-founded and evidenced framing of principles of antitrust laws in respect of Intellectual Property Rights (‘IPRs’). Therefore, this article makes a case for the legal recognition, across jurisdictions including India, of predatory innovation in the context of high-tech markets to uphold the objectives of the antitrust regime, i.e., consumer welfare. The article traces the progressive steps taken by developed jurisdiction in this context and highlights how a similar approach could be adopted by India, fitting its current framework.\u0000This article, firstly, discusses the impact the market structure has on the motives and incentives for a manufacturer to innovate; secondly, brings forward the anti-competitive nature of predatory innovation in high tech markets; thirdly, advocates for the need for legal recognition of the conduct of Predatory Innovation while noting the counterarguments; lastly, concludes with identifying the effects of recognizing Predatory Innovation as anticompetitive conduct.\u0000Innovation, Predatory, Market Structures, Monopoly, Intellectual Property Rights, India, High-tech Markets, Interoperability, Platforms, Network Effects","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82078058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Book Review: Competition Law and Antitrust: A Global Guide, David J. Gerber. Oxford University Press. 2020.","authors":"Spencer Weber Waller","doi":"10.54648/woco2021015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021015","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84337146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ioannis P. Kokkoris, Garry A. Gabison, Nandini Pahari
The European Commission can consider ‘the economic and social context’ of cartel members when imposing fines. This article investigates the process behind the inability-to-pay fine reductions. These fine reductions are rare and its process opaque. This article looks at the European Commission opinions and the case law to shed some light on the process. This article also collects data on companies involved. We found that 18.3% of applicants were granted some reduction. Applicants behave as expected: companies that are more likely to become insolvent are more likely to apply for a fine reduction. But the European Commission does not grant fine reduction based on insolvency propensity. These results show the importance of transparency to avoid further waste of resources in applying and investigating fine reduction claims. Inability to Pay, Fine Reduction, Cartel, European Commission
{"title":"Inability-to-Pay Fine Reductions in European Cartel Cases","authors":"Ioannis P. Kokkoris, Garry A. Gabison, Nandini Pahari","doi":"10.54648/woco2021009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021009","url":null,"abstract":"The European Commission can consider ‘the economic and social context’ of cartel members when imposing fines. This article investigates the process behind the inability-to-pay fine reductions. These fine reductions are rare and its process opaque. This article looks at the European Commission opinions and the case law to shed some light on the process. This article also collects data on companies involved. We found that 18.3% of applicants were granted some reduction. Applicants behave as expected: companies that are more likely to become insolvent are more likely to apply for a fine reduction. But the European Commission does not grant fine reduction based on insolvency propensity. These results show the importance of transparency to avoid further waste of resources in applying and investigating fine reduction claims.\u0000Inability to Pay, Fine Reduction, Cartel, European Commission","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"128 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76919118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
European Union (EU) competition law and the protection of the environment may not be the most obvious bedfellows. Nonetheless, how the EU competition rules can contribute to the EU’s mission to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 is a subject of keen debate – both by the European Commission (EC) and at Member State level. It is submitted, however, that the manner in which Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR) are applied by the EC is unconducive to the achievement of the EU’s ambitious climate goals. As such, it requires adaptation. A principal, though not the only, stumbling block in this regard pertains to the EC’s insistence on the need to demonstrate economic ‘in-market’ efficiencies with a view to offsetting any alleged competition concerns. Environmental benefits, however, tend by definition to be ‘out-of-market’. Drawing upon recent developments at national level, in particular, this article therefore seeks to offer some food for thought on how the rules relating to Article 101(3) TFEU and the EUMR could be amended/ applied differently as a means of accommodating environmental benefits and supporting the 2050 climate neutrality objective. European Green Deal, Climate neutrality, Environment, Article 101(3) TFEU, EU Merger Regulation, In-market efficiencies, Out-of-market efficiencies, CECED, UK CMA, Netherlands ACM
{"title":"Think Green Before You Apply: EU Competition Law and Climate-Change Abatement","authors":"David Henry, Jacques Buhart","doi":"10.54648/woco2021010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021010","url":null,"abstract":"European Union (EU) competition law and the protection of the environment may not be the most obvious bedfellows. Nonetheless, how the EU competition rules can contribute to the EU’s mission to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 is a subject of keen debate – both by the European Commission (EC) and at Member State level. It is submitted, however, that the manner in which Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR) are applied by the EC is unconducive to the achievement of the EU’s ambitious climate goals. As such, it requires adaptation. A principal, though not the only, stumbling block in this regard pertains to the EC’s insistence on the need to demonstrate economic ‘in-market’ efficiencies with a view to offsetting any alleged competition concerns. Environmental benefits, however, tend by definition to be ‘out-of-market’. Drawing upon recent developments at national level, in particular, this article therefore seeks to offer some food for thought on how the rules relating to Article 101(3) TFEU and the EUMR could be amended/ applied differently as a means of accommodating environmental benefits and supporting the 2050 climate neutrality objective.\u0000European Green Deal, Climate neutrality, Environment, Article 101(3) TFEU, EU Merger Regulation, In-market efficiencies, Out-of-market efficiencies, CECED, UK CMA, Netherlands ACM","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72509269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Competition law has to adapt to the challenges of the digital era, not by changing its objectives but by changing its analytical tools. At a time where the Commission contemplates going back to using exploitative abuses under Article 102 (a) TFEU, an enquiry into the use of these quite unexplored abuses for prohibiting excessive data gathering seems necessary. Considering that online advertising is the financial lungs of the zero-price economy in which platforms operate, we will address the competitive problems of third-party data processing from the standpoint of online advertising. Thus, we will analyse the functioning of advertising markets, how they interact with the consumer-facing markets as regards data extraction and what competitive problems may arise out of this interaction. The framework being set, we will give a detailed analysis of the Facebook decision from the German Competition Authority (GCA) by which it sanctioned Facebook for abuse of dominant position for its extensive data collection policy. Considering the successes and pitfalls of this attempt, we will suggest an analytical framework for approaching third-party data gathering under European competition law and Article 102 (a) TFEU in particular, taking into account exclusionary effects on the advertising side of platforms. advertising market, Facebook case, abuse of dominance (exploitative), abuse of dominance (exclusionary), third-party data gathering, unfair trading conditions, GDPR, causal link, theory of harm, DMA
{"title":"Online Advertising and the Competition for Data: What Abuse are We Looking For?","authors":"Alexandre Köhler","doi":"10.54648/woco2021012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021012","url":null,"abstract":"Competition law has to adapt to the challenges of the digital era, not by changing its objectives but by changing its analytical tools. At a time where the Commission contemplates going back to using exploitative abuses under Article 102 (a) TFEU, an enquiry into the use of these quite unexplored abuses for prohibiting excessive data gathering seems necessary. Considering that online advertising is the financial lungs of the zero-price economy in which platforms operate, we will address the competitive problems of third-party data processing from the standpoint of online advertising. Thus, we will analyse the functioning of advertising markets, how they interact with the consumer-facing markets as regards data extraction and what competitive problems may arise out of this interaction. The framework being set, we will give a detailed analysis of the Facebook decision from the German Competition Authority (GCA) by which it sanctioned Facebook for abuse of dominant position for its extensive data collection policy. Considering the successes and pitfalls of this attempt, we will suggest an analytical framework for approaching third-party data gathering under European competition law and Article 102 (a) TFEU in particular, taking into account exclusionary effects on the advertising side of platforms.\u0000advertising market, Facebook case, abuse of dominance (exploitative), abuse of dominance (exclusionary), third-party data gathering, unfair trading conditions, GDPR, causal link, theory of harm, DMA","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88151251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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