News media businesses compete with search engines and social media networks for advertising revenue but at the same time depend on the latter to reach and interact with audiences. The Digital Platforms Inquiry (DPI) completed by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) found that media businesses’ dependency on digital platforms gives companies like Google and Facebook substantial bargaining power over Australian news media businesses. This development over the past decade has caused negative repercussions for the choice and quality of news available to Australians. In response to thegse findings, Australia’s News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code 2021 extends the application of competition law into digital news and advertising markets. The reform is intended to address the impact of digital platforms on the commercial viability of Australian news companies. In this article, we assess the application of competition law to the relationship between news media and digital platforms, including the strength of the DPI findings and the appropriateness of the resulting reforms. We argue that after decades of deregulation of the media sector in Australia the News Media Bargaining Code is a hybrid legislation, which introduces news media industry regulations under the guise of competition law. While we see a continued role for competition law in digital platform markets, this article indicates the challenges posed by digital platforms on media pluralism and the limitations of a market-driven approach to news media policy. news media businesses, digital platforms, advertising, regulation, media policy, Australian competition law, market power, media pluralism, Digital Platforms Inquiry, News Media Bargaining Code
{"title":"Digital Platforms and Journalism in Australia: Analysing the Role of Competition Law","authors":"B. Balasingham, T. Neilson","doi":"10.54648/woco2022011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2022011","url":null,"abstract":"News media businesses compete with search engines and social media networks for advertising revenue but at the same time depend on the latter to reach and interact with audiences. The Digital Platforms Inquiry (DPI) completed by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) found that media businesses’ dependency on digital platforms gives companies like Google and Facebook substantial bargaining power over Australian news media businesses. This development over the past decade has caused negative repercussions for the choice and quality of news available to Australians. In response to thegse findings, Australia’s News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code 2021 extends the application of competition law into digital news and advertising markets. The reform is intended to address the impact of digital platforms on the commercial viability of Australian news companies. In this article, we assess the application of competition law to the relationship between news media and digital platforms, including the strength of the DPI findings and the appropriateness of the resulting reforms. We argue that after decades of deregulation of the media sector in Australia the News Media Bargaining Code is a hybrid legislation, which introduces news media industry regulations under the guise of competition law. While we see a continued role for competition law in digital platform markets, this article indicates the challenges posed by digital platforms on media pluralism and the limitations of a market-driven approach to news media policy.\u0000news media businesses, digital platforms, advertising, regulation, media policy, Australian competition law, market power, media pluralism, Digital Platforms Inquiry, News Media Bargaining Code","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72503941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The case study methodology has proved to be a useful empirical tool for competition policy evaluation. However, as far as China’s Fair Competition Review System (FCRS) is concerned, empirical studies are scarce. This article aims to partly fill this gap by thoroughly studying the first litigation case in light of three questions: (1) does China’s FCRS contribute to a competitive market?; (2) does it face challenges regarding implementation, including judicial proceedings?; and (3) how to tackle these challenges? We find that China’s FCRS promotes a competitive market to some extent, but diverse issues need to be tackled in the coming years. Some policymakers still lack understanding of the system. Public antitrust enforcement also faces understanding and capability problems to fully implement the FCRS. The review standards are not specific enough. Regarding judicial scrutiny of the FCRS, we note that also judges lack knowledge of the FCRS, especially in primary courts. Court jurisdictions for filing administrative monopoly litigation are not of high enough rank. In addition, the nature of the FCRS brings up doubts when entering into litigation as the case has to be connected with the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML). Consequently, we formulate several suggestions for improvement: First, strengthening competition advocacy and FCRS training for policymakers, antitrust enforcement officials, and judges. Second, establishing disciplinary and incentive mechanisms. Third, increasing enforcement capacity. Fourth, specifying industry-specific review standards. In terms of judicial scrutiny, in addition to the training for judges, we also propose to reform the administrative proceeding system, adding corresponding clauses connected to Chapter V of the AML and the FCRS into the Administrative Procedure Law. Abstract administrative actions should also have the possibility to initiate litigation in the near future, and administrative monopoly cases should be filed at least to an intermediate court or intellectual property court, rather than to a primary court. The establishment of a dedicated competition court could also add value. Last, we recommend upgrading the FCRS to proper law. China, Fair Competition Review System, Evaluation, Case study, Administrative monopoly
{"title":"China’s Fair Competition Review System: A Single Case Study","authors":"Shuping Lyu, C. Buts, M. Jegers","doi":"10.54648/woco2022005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2022005","url":null,"abstract":"The case study methodology has proved to be a useful empirical tool for competition policy evaluation. However, as far as China’s Fair Competition Review System (FCRS) is concerned, empirical studies are scarce. This article aims to partly fill this gap by thoroughly studying the first litigation case in light of three questions: (1) does China’s FCRS contribute to a competitive market?; (2) does it face challenges regarding implementation, including judicial proceedings?; and (3) how to tackle these challenges? We find that China’s FCRS promotes a competitive market to some extent, but diverse issues need to be tackled in the coming years. Some policymakers still lack understanding of the system. Public antitrust enforcement also faces understanding and capability problems to fully implement the FCRS. The review standards are not specific enough. Regarding judicial scrutiny of the FCRS, we note that also judges lack knowledge of the FCRS, especially in primary courts. Court jurisdictions for filing administrative monopoly litigation are not of high enough rank. In addition, the nature of the FCRS brings up doubts when entering into litigation as the case has to be connected with the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML). Consequently, we formulate several suggestions for improvement: First, strengthening competition advocacy and FCRS training for policymakers, antitrust enforcement officials, and judges. Second, establishing disciplinary and incentive mechanisms. Third, increasing enforcement capacity. Fourth, specifying industry-specific review standards. In terms of judicial scrutiny, in addition to the training for judges, we also propose to reform the administrative proceeding system, adding corresponding clauses connected to Chapter V of the AML and the FCRS into the Administrative Procedure Law. Abstract administrative actions should also have the possibility to initiate litigation in the near future, and administrative monopoly cases should be filed at least to an intermediate court or intellectual property court, rather than to a primary court. The establishment of a dedicated competition court could also add value. Last, we recommend upgrading the FCRS to proper law.\u0000China, Fair Competition Review System, Evaluation, Case study, Administrative monopoly","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87349448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Greater antitrust enforcement is argued to have positive correlations with the promotion of international trade. By 2019, the US, the EU and China, as global trade powers, have formed and strengthened bilateral antitrust cooperation to seek greater enforcement. However, the impact of such development on international trade has remained underexamined. The article argues that irrespective of their different legal forces, the US-EU, US-China and EU-China antitrust cooperation share convergences at the optimum and minimum levels. Based on the case study of the US, the EU and China’s regulations of the international Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) panel cartel, the article illustrates that as the effects doctrine continues to serve as the main normative value underpinning antitrust cooperation, matured competition regimes lack the incentive to share information with new regimes, competition regimes converge to apply comity restrictively and the consultation mechanism plays a limited role in holding the sides accountable under bilateral cooperation. Consequently, international antitrust remains fragmented, positing restraints to trade. The article calls for reconsideration of the effects doctrine as part of the transnational normative repertoire shaping bilateral antitrust cooperation and for devising policy tools to guarantee minimum information exchange among agencies. US, EU, China, International Antitrust, Bilateral Cooperation, Exchange of Information, Confidentiality, Comity, Consultation
{"title":"Two Steps Forward and One Step Back?: US, EU and China’s Bilateral Antitrust Cooperation and International Trade","authors":"Xiaoye Wang, Qianlan Wu","doi":"10.54648/woco2022003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2022003","url":null,"abstract":"Greater antitrust enforcement is argued to have positive correlations with the promotion of international trade. By 2019, the US, the EU and China, as global trade powers, have formed and strengthened bilateral antitrust cooperation to seek greater enforcement. However, the impact of such development on international trade has remained underexamined. The article argues that irrespective of their different legal forces, the US-EU, US-China and EU-China antitrust cooperation share convergences at the optimum and minimum levels. Based on the case study of the US, the EU and China’s regulations of the international Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) panel cartel, the article illustrates that as the effects doctrine continues to serve as the main normative value underpinning antitrust cooperation, matured competition regimes lack the incentive to share information with new regimes, competition regimes converge to apply comity restrictively and the consultation mechanism plays a limited role in holding the sides accountable under bilateral cooperation. Consequently, international antitrust remains fragmented, positing restraints to trade. The article calls for reconsideration of the effects doctrine as part of the transnational normative repertoire shaping bilateral antitrust cooperation and for devising policy tools to guarantee minimum information exchange among agencies.\u0000US, EU, China, International Antitrust, Bilateral Cooperation, Exchange of Information, Confidentiality, Comity, Consultation","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82143080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
China’s Anti-Monopoly Act (AML) incorporated key antitrust provisions inspired by EU antitrust concepts into China’s law in 2007. By analysing leading post-2007 antitrust cases heard before China’s courts taken by private parties challenging State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) anti-competitive activities, the authors argue in this significant and original contribution that, despite the AML's enactment, China’s Judiciary has not accepted antitrust Legitimacy. Leading antitrust cases challenging SOEs anti-competitive activities, taken by either consumers or enterprises are analysed, highlighting the contrast with how EU antitrust jurisprudence deals with similar matters. The analysis illustrates how China’s courts have applied key antitrust concepts (such as abuse of dominant position, prohibition of market-sharing; price-fixing; etc.) in a questionable manner. Given that the understanding of such concepts are accepted in over 125 jurisdictions, this raises major questions about the Legitimacy and Effectiveness of antitrust principles in the legal system of the world’s most dynamic economy. That there is an antitrust Legitimacy and Effectiveness problem to be addressed has been recently partially recognized by the State in China, with the putting forward of reform proposals by its antitrust regulator (the State Administration of Markets Regulator (SAMR)) in 2020 in an effort to get major State agencies to recognize the primacy of antitrust. However, these reform proposals omitted reference to the Judiciary’s role in antitrust enforcement against SOEs, even though they play a large role in the economy. The article demonstrates how the reform proposals, which appeared in October 2021 in the AML Amendment Bill 2021, will not solve the private antitrust enforcement Legitimacy problems identified by the authors in cases involving SOEs. Several suggestions to overcome judicial deference to SOEs’ overly robust anti-competitive practices are proposed by the authors, including soft measures that in the long run may be more effective than legislative change. The article also discusses the need for the AML to incorporate a single economic entity test and a collective dominance test in order to give the courts dealing with allegations of SOE anti-competitive behaviour a more comprehensive conceptual toolbox to assist the courts make findings of dominance. Without movement also on the judicial side, the authors conclude that the Legitimacy of antitrust principles will continue to be in question inside China’s legal framework, and consequently the Effectiveness of private antitrust remedies will continue to be weak in one of the world’s largest economies. * Anti-Monopoly Act 2007, Competition Law, China Antitrust, Abuse of Dominance, Price-Fixing, SAMR, SOEs, private antitrust enforcement, Court of Justice, Anti-Monopoly Amendment Bill
{"title":"Addressing Legitimacy Concerns in Antitrust Private Litigation Involving China’s State-Owned Enterprises","authors":"D. Cahill, Jing Wang","doi":"10.54648/woco2022004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2022004","url":null,"abstract":"China’s Anti-Monopoly Act (AML) incorporated key antitrust provisions inspired by EU antitrust concepts into China’s law in 2007. By analysing leading post-2007 antitrust cases heard before China’s courts taken by private parties challenging State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) anti-competitive activities, the authors argue in this significant and original contribution that, despite the AML's enactment, China’s Judiciary has not accepted antitrust Legitimacy. Leading antitrust cases challenging SOEs anti-competitive activities, taken by either consumers or enterprises are analysed, highlighting the contrast with how EU antitrust jurisprudence deals with similar matters. The analysis illustrates how China’s courts have applied key antitrust concepts (such as abuse of dominant position, prohibition of market-sharing; price-fixing; etc.) in a questionable manner. Given that the understanding of such concepts are accepted in over 125 jurisdictions, this raises major questions about the Legitimacy and Effectiveness of antitrust principles in the legal system of the world’s most dynamic economy.\u0000That there is an antitrust Legitimacy and Effectiveness problem to be addressed has been recently partially recognized by the State in China, with the putting forward of reform proposals by its antitrust regulator (the State Administration of Markets Regulator (SAMR)) in 2020 in an effort to get major State agencies to recognize the primacy of antitrust. However, these reform proposals omitted reference to the Judiciary’s role in antitrust enforcement against SOEs, even though they play a large role in the economy. The article demonstrates how the reform proposals, which appeared in October 2021 in the AML Amendment Bill 2021, will not solve the private antitrust enforcement Legitimacy problems identified by the authors in cases involving SOEs. Several suggestions to overcome judicial deference to SOEs’ overly robust anti-competitive practices are proposed by the authors, including soft measures that in the long run may be more effective than legislative change. The article also discusses the need for the AML to incorporate a single economic entity test and a collective dominance test in order to give the courts dealing with allegations of SOE anti-competitive behaviour a more comprehensive conceptual toolbox to assist the courts make findings of dominance. Without movement also on the judicial side, the authors conclude that the Legitimacy of antitrust principles will continue to be in question inside China’s legal framework, and consequently the Effectiveness of private antitrust remedies will continue to be weak in one of the world’s largest economies. *\u0000Anti-Monopoly Act 2007, Competition Law, China Antitrust, Abuse of Dominance, Price-Fixing, SAMR, SOEs, private antitrust enforcement, Court of Justice, Anti-Monopoly Amendment Bill","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"364 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74169518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Book Review: Barry C. Lynn, Liberty from All Masters: The New American Aristocracy v. The Will of the People, St. Martin’s Press. New York. 2020","authors":"Spencer Weber Waller","doi":"10.54648/woco2021028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021028","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"63 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80179784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article explores the law and economics of brand bidding restraints which constitute the most novel type of vertical restraints imposed by brand owners on their distributors in digital markets. The article tests and critically reflects on the restrictive approach European competition watchdogs have recently adopted towards these brand bidding restraints. It contends that this harsh antitrust treatment of brand bidding restraints is not sufficiently grounded in the economic analysis of vertical restraints. In proposing a comprehensive framework for the legal and economic analysis of brand bidding restraints, the article makes three principal contributions. First, it asserts that brand bidding restraints can have a number of procompetitive effects by internalizing advertising-related externalities, addressing free-riding on display and traditional advertising and facilitating fixed cost recovery through price discrimination. Second, the paper considers different ways through which brand bidding restraints may harm competition and consumer welfare when they disproportionately affect infra-marginal consumers, prevent meaningful intra- and inter-brand comparisons or result in price discrimination on the basis of search costs rather than brand preferences. Moreover, brand bidding restraints are of particular concern when adopted in the context of dual distribution systems where vertically integrated brand owners have an incentive to raise their retailers’ costs to prevent them from cannibalizing on their own sales channel. Third, the article explore various filters that may inform an effects-based analysis of brand bidding restraints. In this respect, the article makes a number of policy recommendations for the future antitrust analysis of brand bidding restraints. These proposals could also inform the ongoing revision of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (VBER) and Vertical Guidelines in the EU and in the UK. brand bidding restraints, vertical online search advertising restraints, digital vertical restraints, e-commerce sector inquiry, B2-98/11 Asics, Case COMP/AT.40428 Guess, vertical restraints, Vertical Guidelines, Vertical Block Exemption Regulation
本文探讨了品牌竞标约束的法律和经济学，它构成了品牌所有者在数字市场上对其分销商施加的最新颖的垂直约束。本文测试并批判性地反思了欧洲竞争监管机构最近对这些品牌竞标限制所采取的限制性方法。它认为，这种对品牌竞标限制的严厉反垄断处理没有充分基于对垂直限制的经济分析。在为品牌投标限制的法律和经济分析提出一个全面的框架时，本文做出了三个主要贡献。首先，它断言品牌投标限制可以通过内部化广告相关的外部性，解决免费利用展示和传统广告以及通过价格歧视促进固定成本回收的问题，从而产生一系列促进竞争的影响。其次，本文考虑了不同的方式，通过品牌竞价限制可能损害竞争和消费者福利，当他们不成比例地影响超边际消费者，阻止有意义的品牌内部和品牌之间的比较，或导致基于搜索成本而不是品牌偏好的价格歧视。此外，在采用双重分销系统的情况下，品牌出价限制尤其值得关注，因为垂直整合的品牌所有者有动机提高零售商的成本，以防止他们侵占自己的销售渠道。第三，本文探讨了各种过滤器，可以为基于效果的品牌竞标限制分析提供信息。在这方面，本文对未来反垄断分析品牌竞价约束提出了若干政策建议。这些建议还可以为欧盟和英国正在进行的垂直块豁免条例(VBER)和垂直指南的修订提供信息。品牌竞价约束，垂直在线搜索广告约束，数字垂直约束，电子商务行业查询，02 -98/11 Asics, Case COMP/AT.40428猜，垂直限制，垂直指南，垂直块豁免规则
{"title":"Brand Bidding Restraints Revisited: What Is the Appropriate Economic and Legal Framework for the Antitrust Analysis of Vertical Online Search Advertising Restraints?","authors":"Elias Deutscher","doi":"10.54648/woco2021022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021022","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the law and economics of brand bidding restraints which constitute the most novel type of vertical restraints imposed by brand owners on their distributors in digital markets. The article tests and critically reflects on the restrictive approach European competition watchdogs have recently adopted towards these brand bidding restraints. It contends that this harsh antitrust treatment of brand bidding restraints is not sufficiently grounded in the economic analysis of vertical restraints. In proposing a comprehensive framework for the legal and economic analysis of brand bidding restraints, the article makes three principal contributions. First, it asserts that brand bidding restraints can have a number of procompetitive effects by internalizing advertising-related externalities, addressing free-riding on display and traditional advertising and facilitating fixed cost recovery through price discrimination. Second, the paper considers different ways through which brand bidding restraints may harm competition and consumer welfare when they disproportionately affect infra-marginal consumers, prevent meaningful intra- and inter-brand comparisons or result in price discrimination on the basis of search costs rather than brand preferences. Moreover, brand bidding restraints are of particular concern when adopted in the context of dual distribution systems where vertically integrated brand owners have an incentive to raise their retailers’ costs to prevent them from cannibalizing on their own sales channel. Third, the article explore various filters that may inform an effects-based analysis of brand bidding restraints. In this respect, the article makes a number of policy recommendations for the future antitrust analysis of brand bidding restraints. These proposals could also inform the ongoing revision of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (VBER) and Vertical Guidelines in the EU and in the UK.\u0000brand bidding restraints, vertical online search advertising restraints, digital vertical restraints, e-commerce sector inquiry, B2-98/11 Asics, Case COMP/AT.40428 Guess, vertical restraints, Vertical Guidelines, Vertical Block Exemption Regulation","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86618230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Section F of the UN Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices (‘UN Set’) deals with international measures, including consultations and co-operation among competition authorities for enforcement against anti-competitive practices, particularly for developing countries’ benefit. The 2020 Eighth Review Conference on the UN Set adopted Guiding Policies and Procedures under section F (‘GPP’). While it contains few norms, this non-binding instrument provides principles and a pedagogical guide for enforcement co-operation, encourages positive responses to co-operation requests, and strengthens the consultations mechanism and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) secretariat’s supporting role. The GPP’s siting within the UNCTAD and UN Set contexts provides legitimacy, inclusivity, mandates, resources, a secretariat – and thus the best available multilateral framework for developing and transition countries to mobilize publicity, dialogue, and persuasion to strengthen enforcement co-operation in this area for their benefit. The GPP therefore constitutes a breakthrough, while how far or when its potential will be fulfilled will depend upon the building-up of shared perceptions of common interest, mutual trust and mutual benefit among competition authorities- something which UNCTAD could promote through action at the national and international levels. Initial signs provide hope that good progress can be achieved. UN Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles, Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, enforcement against anti-competitive practices, UN 2020 Eighth Review Conference, Guiding Policies and Procedures, UNCTAD, multilateral framework, vertical restraints, enforcement cooperation, developing countries
{"title":"International Co-operation on Competition Law Enforcement: A Breakthrough?","authors":"R. Dhanjee","doi":"10.54648/woco2021025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021025","url":null,"abstract":"Section F of the UN Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices (‘UN Set’) deals with international measures, including consultations and co-operation among competition authorities for enforcement against anti-competitive practices, particularly for developing countries’ benefit. The 2020 Eighth Review Conference on the UN Set adopted Guiding Policies and Procedures under section F (‘GPP’). While it contains few norms, this non-binding instrument provides principles and a pedagogical guide for enforcement co-operation, encourages positive responses to co-operation requests, and strengthens the consultations mechanism and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) secretariat’s supporting role. The GPP’s siting within the UNCTAD and UN Set contexts provides legitimacy, inclusivity, mandates, resources, a secretariat – and thus the best available multilateral framework for developing and transition countries to mobilize publicity, dialogue, and persuasion to strengthen enforcement co-operation in this area for their benefit. The GPP therefore constitutes a breakthrough, while how far or when its potential will be fulfilled will depend upon the building-up of shared perceptions of common interest, mutual trust and mutual benefit among competition authorities- something which UNCTAD could promote through action at the national and international levels. Initial signs provide hope that good progress can be achieved.\u0000UN Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles, Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, enforcement against anti-competitive practices, UN 2020 Eighth Review Conference, Guiding Policies and Procedures, UNCTAD, multilateral framework, vertical restraints, enforcement cooperation, developing countries","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"49 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78146739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Interview With Ms Cani Fernández, Chairwoman of the Spanish National Commission of Markets and Competition (CNMC)","authors":"","doi":"10.54648/woco2021020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021020","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"57 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75561821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The proposed changes to the way the United States handle antitrust policy enshrined in the July 2021 Executive Order (EO) issued by President Biden implies significant financial and strategic implications for corporates and their executives not seen since the 1980s. Changes to merger control policy, actions against price agreements as well measures to raise wage growth are all part of the EO and will likely be a legacy of the Biden Presidency for years to come. Among the more than seventy policy changes initiated by the EO, this article evaluates the probability of policy implementation of these policy initiatives and provides a series of options as to how companies could respond. Non-market strategy, public policy, Antitrust, corporate political activity, strategic posture
{"title":"President Biden’s Antitrust Counterrevolution: Implications for Business","authors":"Yusaf H. Akbar","doi":"10.54648/woco2021026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021026","url":null,"abstract":"The proposed changes to the way the United States handle antitrust policy enshrined in the July 2021 Executive Order (EO) issued by President Biden implies significant financial and strategic implications for corporates and their executives not seen since the 1980s. Changes to merger control policy, actions against price agreements as well measures to raise wage growth are all part of the EO and will likely be a legacy of the Biden Presidency for years to come. Among the more than seventy policy changes initiated by the EO, this article evaluates the probability of policy implementation of these policy initiatives and provides a series of options as to how companies could respond.\u0000Non-market strategy, public policy, Antitrust, corporate political activity, strategic posture","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79921321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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