The increasing collection of personal data by online platforms causes concerns among regulators and consumers. Due to privacy-related market failures in multi-sided markets, the question of possible remedies arises. This article aims to determine if a contribution of competition law is needed to enhance data protection rules. The first part will discuss the possible types of datarelated abuses of dominance in the context of the pioneering attempt of the German competition authority. The second part will analyse the drawbacks of the German Facebook case and possibilities to reconcile it with EU competition law. In addition, the article will analyse other ways to tackle privacy issues, including the proposal for a Digital Markets Act (DMA). It is suggested that an intervention of competition law in data protection matters is unnecessary. We argue that it may prevent the emergence of innovative products and services, ultimately harm consumer welfare and competition, as well as put an undue burden on dominant undertakings. It is submitted that a coherent regulation allowing for legal certainty could serve the objective of consumer welfare while preserving the interests of undertakings. Article 102 TFEU, data protection law, personal data, privacy, GDPR, exploitative abuse, unfair trading conditions, German competition law, Digital Markets Act, exclusionary abuse, Facebook case
{"title":"Can Competition Protect Privacy? An Analysis Based on the German Facebook Case","authors":"Dzhuliia Lypalo","doi":"10.54648/woco2021011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021011","url":null,"abstract":"The increasing collection of personal data by online platforms causes concerns among regulators and consumers. Due to privacy-related market failures in multi-sided markets, the question of possible remedies arises. This article aims to determine if a contribution of competition law is needed to enhance data protection rules. The first part will discuss the possible types of datarelated abuses of dominance in the context of the pioneering attempt of the German competition authority. The second part will analyse the drawbacks of the German Facebook case and possibilities to reconcile it with EU competition law. In addition, the article will analyse other ways to tackle privacy issues, including the proposal for a Digital Markets Act (DMA). It is suggested that an intervention of competition law in data protection matters is unnecessary. We argue that it may prevent the emergence of innovative products and services, ultimately harm consumer welfare and competition, as well as put an undue burden on dominant undertakings. It is submitted that a coherent regulation allowing for legal certainty could serve the objective of consumer welfare while preserving the interests of undertakings.\u0000Article 102 TFEU, data protection law, personal data, privacy, GDPR, exploitative abuse, unfair trading conditions, German competition law, Digital Markets Act, exclusionary abuse, Facebook case","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84173533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Book Review: Competition Law in Developing Countries, Thomas Cheng. Oxford University Press. Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, UK 2020.","authors":"M. Gal","doi":"10.54648/woco2021014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021014","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78535931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Predatory pricing has been a concern since the inception of competition policy. Scholars from different schools have large disagreements about it, with some arguing that predation does not exist to others considering it a legitimate threat to competition. As predatory pricing theory is largely concerned with price cost test, the issue is further complicated while looking at two sided platforms. Due to network effects, the value of the platform for the users changes with the number of users on the network. Therefore, the price of services is influenced by multiplicity of factors rather than just the cost of the service.The aim of the paper is to note such economic theory and apply this in the Indian jurisprudence on predatory pricing. Part I of the paper provides a non-technical introduction to the economics of two-sided platforms. It explains the rationale behind below cost pricing and critiques the usage of a price cost test for determining predation in case of two-sided platforms. Part II touches on the international regulation of predatory pricing and establishes the context for the Indian jurisprudence. Part III discusses the Indian jurisprudence surrounding predatory pricing. This elaborates on the legislative history and the judicial decisions concerning predatory pricing and platform competition in India. This part argues that the Indian jurisprudence has completely disregarded the economic theory of predation in case of two-sided platforms and the adjudications are merely based on a price cost test. Predatory Pricing, India, CCI, Competition Law, Chicago School, Game Theory, Uber, Deep Discounting, Predatory Pricing Theory, Abuse of Dominance
{"title":"Predatory Pricing and Platform Competition in India","authors":"Akanshha Agrawal","doi":"10.54648/woco2021006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021006","url":null,"abstract":"Predatory pricing has been a concern since the inception of competition policy. Scholars from different schools have large disagreements about it, with some arguing that predation does not exist to others considering it a legitimate threat to competition. As predatory pricing theory is largely concerned with price cost test, the issue is further complicated while looking at two sided platforms. Due to network effects, the value of the platform for the users changes with the number of users on the network. Therefore, the price of services is influenced by multiplicity of factors rather than just the cost of the service.The aim of the paper is to note such economic theory and apply this in the Indian jurisprudence on predatory pricing. Part I of the paper provides a non-technical introduction to the economics of two-sided platforms. It explains the rationale behind below cost pricing and critiques the usage of a price cost test for determining predation in case of two-sided platforms. Part II touches on the international regulation of predatory pricing and establishes the context for the Indian jurisprudence. Part III discusses the Indian jurisprudence surrounding predatory pricing. This elaborates on the legislative history and the judicial decisions concerning predatory pricing and platform competition in India. This part argues that the Indian jurisprudence has completely disregarded the economic theory of predation in case of two-sided platforms and the adjudications are merely based on a price cost test.\u0000Predatory Pricing, India, CCI, Competition Law, Chicago School, Game Theory, Uber, Deep Discounting, Predatory Pricing Theory, Abuse of Dominance","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84972349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article provides a critical analysis of the German Facebook case and stresses the limits of competition law. Facebook’s terms and conditions regarding the use of Off-Facebook data were qualified as an exploitative abuse at various stages of the German Facebook proceedings. However, it is far from certain that Facebook would have written its terms any different if it was operating on a competitive market. From an economic viewpoint the market failure at hand is a pervasive information asymmetry rather than market power. Therefore, it is doubtful that the correct response lies within competition law. If competition rules must be rewritten in order to cope with market failures in digital markets, there is a serious risk that the abuse found is not an abuse of market power but an abuse of the market power provisions in competition law. Alternative routes that can be found in consumer contract, unfair competition or data protection laws might be viable options. The latter rules can be applied without a complicated finding of causality between market dominance and the use of ‘unfair’ contract terms. Admittedly, also the information paradigm can be called into question but amending rules of contract law avoids Herculean interpretations of competition law that go against a broadly supported ‘more economic approach’. Abusing competition law or enhancing contract law to improve the efficiency of digital markets, that is the question. Facebook case, goals of competition law, market failures, data law, information disclosure, consent, signing-without-reading problem, abuse of dominance, unfair contract terms, unfair commercial practice
{"title":"The German Facebook Saga: Abuse of Dominance or Abuse of Competition Law?","authors":"Franziska Weber, R. van den Bergh","doi":"10.54648/woco2021003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021003","url":null,"abstract":"This article provides a critical analysis of the German Facebook case and stresses the limits of competition law. Facebook’s terms and conditions regarding the use of Off-Facebook data were qualified as an exploitative abuse at various stages of the German Facebook proceedings. However, it is far from certain that Facebook would have written its terms any different if it was operating on a competitive market. From an economic viewpoint the market failure at hand is a pervasive information asymmetry rather than market power. Therefore, it is doubtful that the correct response lies within competition law. If competition rules must be rewritten in order to cope with market failures in digital markets, there is a serious risk that the abuse found is not an abuse of market power but an abuse of the market power provisions in competition law. Alternative routes that can be found in consumer contract, unfair competition or data protection laws might be viable options. The latter rules can be applied without a complicated finding of causality between market dominance and the use of ‘unfair’ contract terms. Admittedly, also the information paradigm can be called into question but amending rules of contract law avoids Herculean interpretations of competition law that go against a broadly supported ‘more economic approach’. Abusing competition law or enhancing contract law to improve the efficiency of digital markets, that is the question.\u0000Facebook case, goals of competition law, market failures, data law, information disclosure, consent, signing-without-reading problem, abuse of dominance, unfair contract terms, unfair commercial practice","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"67 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85839509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Book Review: Interaction Between Competition Law and Corporate Governance: Opening the ‘Black Box’, Florence Thépot. Cambridge University Press. 2019","authors":"Spencer Weber Waller","doi":"10.54648/woco2021007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"77 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73758887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The holder of a Standard Essential Patent (SEP) is usually required to license its patent to any licensee on the basis of Fair and Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms. In their recent judgments in Unwired Planet and Sisvel v. Haier, the UK Supreme Court and the German Bundesgerichtshof ruled that a ‘range’, rather than a ‘single’ royalty rate, may be considered compatible with the FRAND commitment. On the other hand, a royalty rate ‘beyond the outer boundary of the range’ would not be FRAND. In addition, an ‘unfair’ royalty rate might also be regarded as an abuse of dominant position by the SEP holder, in breach of Article 102(a) Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The paper analyses whether and under what circumstances Article 102(a) TFEU could be relied on by a competition authority in Europe to sanction a case of ‘unfair’ royalty rate requested by the SEP holder to its licensees. In particular, the paper assesses ‘when’ competition policy should sanction an unfair royalty rate requested by the SEP holder, ‘how’ a competition agency should analyse the case in accordance with the case law of the EU Court of Justice concerning Article 102(a) TFEU and, eventually, ‘what’ remedies the competition authority could adopt. Standard Essential Patent; royalty rate; Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory terms; unfair pricing; Article 102(a) TFEU; EU Court of Justice; United Brands test; benchmarking methods; efficiency defence; competition law remedies
{"title":"The Challenge of Sanctioning Unfair Royalty Rate by the SEP Holder: ‘When’, ‘How’ and ‘What’","authors":"M. Botta","doi":"10.54648/woco2021002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021002","url":null,"abstract":"The holder of a Standard Essential Patent (SEP) is usually required to license its patent to any licensee on the basis of Fair and Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms. In their recent judgments in Unwired Planet and Sisvel v. Haier, the UK Supreme Court and the German Bundesgerichtshof ruled that a ‘range’, rather than a ‘single’ royalty rate, may be considered compatible with the FRAND commitment. On the other hand, a royalty rate ‘beyond the outer boundary of the range’ would not be FRAND. In addition, an ‘unfair’ royalty rate might also be regarded as an abuse of dominant position by the SEP holder, in breach of Article 102(a) Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).\u0000The paper analyses whether and under what circumstances Article 102(a) TFEU could be relied on by a competition authority in Europe to sanction a case of ‘unfair’ royalty rate requested by the SEP holder to its licensees. In particular, the paper assesses ‘when’ competition policy should sanction an unfair royalty rate requested by the SEP holder, ‘how’ a competition agency should analyse the case in accordance with the case law of the EU Court of Justice concerning Article 102(a) TFEU and, eventually, ‘what’ remedies the competition authority could adopt.\u0000Standard Essential Patent; royalty rate; Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory terms; unfair pricing; Article 102(a) TFEU; EU Court of Justice; United Brands test; benchmarking methods; efficiency defence; competition law remedies","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"49 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90228051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since the failure of the Havana Charter in 1950, it has not been possible to agree upon a binding competition law at the global level. However, following the fiasco of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Cancún in 2003, the number of bilateral and regional trade agreements containing competition law chapters, or at least competition-related rules, has increased noteworthy. This reflects that trade and competition are closely intertwined. In an ever more integrated, globalized, and digitized economy, the competition law framework needs to be internationalized. If a binding competition law is not possible at the global level, it is only logical that bilateral and regional trade agreements fill the gap. This article questions the extent to which these agreements contribute to the convergence of competition law. In this context, the development in Northeast Asia seems promising and may provide a guidepost for establishing international standards of competition law cooperation and enforcement. Presented here is the idea of localized harmonization, which takes advantage of closer affinity between bilateral and regional partners. With a sufficient degree of convergence, it is not excluded that efforts towards a multilateral competition agreement could be relaunched one day. competition law, world trade law, WTO, free trade agreement, regional trade agreement, bilateral cooperation, convergence, localized harmonization, Asian competition law, digital economy
{"title":"Competition and Trade: The Rise of Competition Law in Trade Agreements and Its Implications for the World Trading System","authors":"A. Heinemann, Yo Sop Choi","doi":"10.5167/UZH-196346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5167/UZH-196346","url":null,"abstract":"Since the failure of the Havana Charter in 1950, it has not been possible to agree upon a binding competition law at the global level. However, following the fiasco of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Cancún in 2003, the number of bilateral and regional trade agreements containing competition law chapters, or at least competition-related rules, has increased noteworthy. This reflects that trade and competition are closely intertwined. In an ever more integrated, globalized, and digitized economy, the competition law framework needs to be internationalized. If a binding competition law is not possible at the global level, it is only logical that bilateral and regional trade agreements fill the gap. This article questions the extent to which these agreements contribute to the convergence of competition law. In this context, the development in Northeast Asia seems promising and may provide a guidepost for establishing international standards of competition law cooperation and enforcement. Presented here is the idea of localized harmonization, which takes advantage of closer affinity between bilateral and regional partners. With a sufficient degree of convergence, it is not excluded that efforts towards a multilateral competition agreement could be relaunched one day.\u0000competition law, world trade law, WTO, free trade agreement, regional trade agreement, bilateral cooperation, convergence, localized harmonization, Asian competition law, digital economy","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"49 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85860948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Competition concerns arising from the seeking of injunctions by FRAND-encumbered (fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory) standard essential patent (SEP) owners have become a contentious issue. This issue has attracted the attention of many competition enforcement authorities and no consensus is reached as to the compatibility of such injunctive relief with competition law. This is also a hard and challenging problem faced by China. A coherent and balanced response is urgently needed under current China’s legal framework. Therefore, this article proposes that a basic regulating approach should be established first to treat the seeking of injunctions by FRAND-encumbered SEP owners as an independent anti-competitive practice prohibited by the Anti-monopoly Law. Then, an analysis framework should be established to consider the circumstances in which and the extent to which such seeking of injunctions should be limited from the perspective of competition enforcement. The behaviour of both SEP owners and SEP users should be properly examined. standard, standard essential patent (SEP), injunctive relief, injunction, competition, antitrust, Anti-monopoly law, competition law, fair, reasonable and non- discriminatory (FRAND), reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND).
{"title":"The Regulation of Injunctive Relief on Standard Essential Patents Within China’s Anti-monopoly Law","authors":"Yuting Wang","doi":"10.54648/woco2020025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2020025","url":null,"abstract":"Competition concerns arising from the seeking of injunctions by FRAND-encumbered (fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory) standard essential patent (SEP) owners have become a contentious issue. This issue has attracted the attention of many competition enforcement authorities and no consensus is reached as to the compatibility of such injunctive relief with competition law. This is also a hard and challenging problem faced by China. A coherent and balanced response is urgently needed under current China’s legal framework. Therefore, this article proposes that a basic regulating approach should be established first to treat the seeking of injunctions by FRAND-encumbered SEP owners as an independent anti-competitive practice prohibited by the Anti-monopoly Law. Then, an analysis framework should be established to consider the circumstances in which and the extent to which such seeking of injunctions should be limited from the perspective of competition enforcement. The behaviour of both SEP owners and SEP users should be properly examined.\u0000standard, standard essential patent (SEP), injunctive relief, injunction, competition, antitrust, Anti-monopoly law, competition law, fair, reasonable and non- discriminatory (FRAND), reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND).","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72694628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The US appears to lean towards the model of unconcentrated and distributed competition regulation agencies, instead of a single concentrated one. Aside from the states and private litigants, in practice, this model mainly runs through the Department of Justice (DOJ), via its Antitrust Division, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)’s enforcement. Traditionally, under developments of the regulatory approach, the ‘quasi-judicial’ FTC could be understood to be a cornerstone of US antitrust law, particularly in its practical enforcement. However, it appears that the DOJ contributes far more policies on the specific regulation of mergers as well as consumption of merger remedies. By analysing the US model of ‘inter-agency competition’ under perspectives of merger control, this writing leads to proof that the DOJ is a dominant actor to some extent. More significantly, the DOJ’s performances partially bring the FTC and others to the uniformity of stipulated mergers as well as approved remedy fashions. Merger regulation, merger remedies, merger guidelines, DOJ, FTC, clearance process, Sherman Act, Clayton Act, HSR Act, US antitrust.
{"title":"Who Is the Dominant Actor Under the US Merger Regulation?","authors":"H. Truong","doi":"10.54648/woco2020024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2020024","url":null,"abstract":"The US appears to lean towards the model of unconcentrated and distributed competition regulation agencies, instead of a single concentrated one. Aside from the states and private litigants, in practice, this model mainly runs through the Department of Justice (DOJ), via its Antitrust Division, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)’s enforcement. Traditionally, under developments of the regulatory approach, the ‘quasi-judicial’ FTC could be understood to be a cornerstone of US antitrust law, particularly in its practical enforcement. However, it appears that the DOJ contributes far more policies on the specific regulation of mergers as well as consumption of merger remedies. By analysing the US model of ‘inter-agency competition’ under perspectives of merger control, this writing leads to proof that the DOJ is a dominant actor to some extent. More significantly, the DOJ’s performances partially bring the FTC and others to the uniformity of stipulated mergers as well as approved remedy fashions.\u0000Merger regulation, merger remedies, merger guidelines, DOJ, FTC, clearance process, Sherman Act, Clayton Act, HSR Act, US antitrust.","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84713543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The General Court’s judgment in CK Telecoms is of major importance. On matters of substance, the Court explains for the first time how to apply the substantial impediment of effective competition (SIEC) test to mergers which do not create or strengthen a dominant position. The judgment calls into question certain aspects of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. On matters of procedure, the Court sets out the standard of proof in merger control and reveals itself willing to examine the Commission decision in depth. However, it is argued that the Court’s disagreement with the decision is not always expressed convincingly. This episode reveals the need for the Commission to explain its theory of harm more clearly and the need for the General Court to explain its conclusions more fully. The legislator may see this episode as an occasion to consider the suitability of assessing mergers based on the application of ever more complex economic analysis. EU Merger Regulation, judicial review, SIEC test, close competitors, standard of proof, efficiency, telecommunications, more economic approach, UPP test, oligopoly.
{"title":"EU Merger Control After CK Telecoms UK Investments v. Commission","authors":"G. Monti","doi":"10.54648/woco2020023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2020023","url":null,"abstract":"The General Court’s judgment in CK Telecoms is of major importance. On matters of substance, the Court explains for the first time how to apply the substantial impediment of effective competition (SIEC) test to mergers which do not create or strengthen a dominant position. The judgment calls into question certain aspects of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. On matters of procedure, the Court sets out the standard of proof in merger control and reveals itself willing to examine the Commission decision in depth. However, it is argued that the Court’s disagreement with the decision is not always expressed convincingly. This episode reveals the need for the Commission to explain its theory of harm more clearly and the need for the General Court to explain its conclusions more fully. The legislator may see this episode as an occasion to consider the suitability of assessing mergers based on the application of ever more complex economic analysis.\u0000EU Merger Regulation, judicial review, SIEC test, close competitors, standard of proof, efficiency, telecommunications, more economic approach, UPP test, oligopoly.","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"538 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78164160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：