This paper investigates whether and how financial and administrative controllers of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MOSAL) decrease agency costs in consumer cooperative societies (co-ops) in Kuwait. It hypothesizes that MOSAL controllers are effective monitors in reducing agency costs. The study employs a multivariate regression model and calculates the t-values using Roger’s robust standard errors, correcting for co-op clusters due to the potential cross-sectional correlation and autocorrelation of the error terms to test a sample of 929 observations for 59 consumer cooperative societies from 2000–2018. The empirical results support the hypothesis. Further tests show that low-performing co-ops have lower agency costs. However, the presence of the financial and administrative controllers has no effect on agency costs in high-performing co-ops. Also, the effect that MOSAL controllers have on agency costs varies among co-ops. This study complements a line of research on co-op governance and adds to the empirical evidence on the association of corporate governance and agency costs. It also helps understand how regulators influence management and board discretion to safeguard co-op shareholder rights. Further, it explores an important sector and analyzes a unique, comprehensive, and rarely tested dataset.