EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW最新文献

In general, to modify the human germline is prohibited. However, regulating the use of HHGE might be a more efficient method than the actual ban. Indeed, when genome editing is safe for introduction in clinical practices, it is frequently proposed that the prohibition is lifted solely for therapeutic purposes, i.e., to eliminate serious genetic diseases. Definitions of the concepts of health and disease are controversial and may only be reached by adopting a value-laden approach, which may rise concerns about legal certainty and have possible discriminatory effects. Nor the threshold of the seriousness of the disease might be used to solve these issues. A different model might then be adopted for the assessment of the permissibility of HHGE, i.e., the PGD model. However, such model should not be implemented as the only criterion, but should rather be a "minimum threshold": HHGE should be allowed whenever used to correct a genetic defect for which PGD is possible.

This paper explores the application of EU Competition Law to the exploitation of human genome editing technology. Holders of key patents in the sector have applied different methods for disseminating the technology, such as different forms of licensing agreement and patent pools. It is found that that the competition rules are ill-suited to assess some of the licensing arrangements applied, which give rise to legal uncertainty. Accordingly, holders of patents on human genome editing technology may be discouraged to apply efficient methods for disseminating the technology. This may delay or obstruct some of the benefits the technology is supposed to deliver to the market, maker actors and consumers.

Both Artificial Intelligence ('AI') and genome editing are technologies that on their own promise to revolutionise healthcare. But their common application can facilitate progress in the field even more. Multiplied benefits go along with increased risks. In this article, I identify and analyse legal challenges associated with applying AI facilities in medicinal products based on somatic genome editing. These challenges are caused by several factors. First, the two technologies share the characteristics that create and facilitate common risks. Second, each of the technologies is subject to very complex regulatory frameworks. These frameworks are not substantially connected to control the safety and quality of the common product. The main argument of this paper is that the management of common risks is only possible through common procedures. I discover the gaps in the current legislation that prevent from establishing these common procedures and provide recommendations to fill them in.

With the technical possibility of genome editing, we have reached a new phase of transforming human beings and even altering our genetic legacy. Genome editing constitutes new responsibilities in many fields. Science and society have never been as dependent on each other as they are today. We must also learn from the past episodes of eugenics and we need to investigate fraudulent practices and cases of failure in scientific research that have often occurred due to merciless scientific competition, profit-seeking commercial interests, or individual pride. Genome editing raises numerous legal questions, such as: Would it be possible to make a legal difference between specific versions of gene editing? Who decides on what is considered a disease or an anomaly, a condition, or a variation? Which diseases are worth being corrected or treated and which ones are not? What kinds of social implications will gene editing bring about when it becomes widely available? Some normative distinctions have already been made in the case of gene therapy: separating somatic from germline interventions. But this distinction has not yet been analyzed in the light of the most recent editing practices. Genome editing also realigns the structure of ethical debates. It makes us rethink the concept of discrimination and scrutinize its cases in the field of assisted reproductive procedures. It revolutionizes the concept of medical treatment. It may increase or reduce inequalities based on health conditions. It may lead to numerous new rights in the field of genetics. Good genome editing practice can only be achieved through the close cooperation between the natural and social sciences. The present paper will endeavor to examine this new form of dialogue.

This article is about how somatic gene therapy can be legally regulated and risk assessed as medical treatment when taking the following international human rights conventions into consideration: the right to life in Article 2 of the ECHR and the right to health in Article 12 of ICESCR. The right to life can involve both protection against risky genetic methods and access to necessary health care. In this context, human rights can be a basis for identifying interests that must be considered in a rapid technological development. Focusing mainly on human rights to life and to health, it is argued (1) against a total ban or general moratoriums on gene editing; (2) that regulations should be based on international cooperation and consensus; and that (3) rights to health may involve obligations to provide access to genetic methods.

The present study was designed to compare the ultrastructure of early endothelial progenitor cells (EPCs) derived from rabbit peripheral blood (PB-EPCs) and bone marrow (BM-EPCs). After the cells had been isolated and cultivated up to passage 3, microphotographs obtained from transmission electron microscope were evaluated from qualitative and quantitative (unbiased stereological approaches) points of view. Our results revealed that both cell populations displayed almost identical ultrastructural characteristics represented by abundant cellular organelles dispersed in the cytoplasm. Moreover, the presence of very occasionally occurring mature endothelial-specific Weibel–Palade bodies (WPBs) confirmed their endothelial lineage origin. The more advanced stage of their differentiation was also demonstrated by the relatively low nucleus/cytoplasm (N/C) ratios (0.41 ± 0.19 in PB-EPCs; 0.37 ± 0.25 in BM-EPCs). Between PB-EPCs and BM-EPCs, no differences in proportions of cells occupied by nucleus (28.13 ± 8.97 versus 25.10 ± 11.48%), mitochondria (3.71 ± 1.33 versus 4.23 ± 1.00%), and lipid droplets (0.65 ± 1.01 versus 0.36 ± 0.40%), as well as in estimations of the organelles surface densities were found. The data provide the first quantitative evaluation of the organelles of interest in PB-EPCs and BM-EPCs, and they can serve as a research framework for understanding cellular function.