Dan Garber’s paper provides materials permitting to reply to an objection frequently made to the idea that the Novum Organum is a book of logic, as the allusion to Aristotle’s Organon included in the very title of this book shows it is. How can Bacon actually build a logic, considering his repeated claims that he desires to base natural philosophy directly on observation and experiment? Garber shows that in the Novum Organum access to experience is always mediated by particular questions and settings. If there is no direct access to observation and experience, then there is no point in equating Bacon’s focus on experience in the Novum Organum with a rejection of discursive issues. On the contrary, these are two sides of the same coin. Bacon’s articulation of rules for the building of scientific reasoning in connection with the way the world is, illustrates his massive concern with the relation between reality, thinking and language. This concern is essential in the field of logic as it is constructed in the Early Modern period.
{"title":"Bacon’s Novum organum","authors":"E. Cassan","doi":"10.5840/eps202158341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202158341","url":null,"abstract":"Dan Garber’s paper provides materials permitting to reply to an objection frequently made to the idea that the Novum Organum is a book of logic, as the allusion to Aristotle’s Organon included in the very title of this book shows it is. How can Bacon actually build a logic, considering his repeated claims that he desires to base natural philosophy directly on observation and experiment? Garber shows that in the Novum Organum access to experience is always mediated by particular questions and settings. If there is no direct access to observation and experience, then there is no point in equating Bacon’s focus on experience in the Novum Organum with a rejection of discursive issues. On the contrary, these are two sides of the same coin. Bacon’s articulation of rules for the building of scientific reasoning in connection with the way the world is, illustrates his massive concern with the relation between reality, thinking and language. This concern is essential in the field of logic as it is constructed in the Early Modern period.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47002466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Garber demonstrates the shortcomings of a popular and idealised version of Baconian scientific method set against his close reading of Bacon’s Novum Organum II. The results of Garber’s analysis show that Bacon had not one but two philosophies, both of which were informed by his matter theory and speculative cosmology. This paper draws out the implications of Garber’s reading of Baconian induction in physics transferred to the natural sciences, and draws attention to the ultimate aim of Bacon’s philosophical programme as the prolongation of life.
{"title":"Self-preservation and the Transformation of Nature","authors":"Dolores Iorizzo","doi":"10.5840/eps202158342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202158342","url":null,"abstract":"Garber demonstrates the shortcomings of a popular and idealised version of Baconian scientific method set against his close reading of Bacon’s Novum Organum II. The results of Garber’s analysis show that Bacon had not one but two philosophies, both of which were informed by his matter theory and speculative cosmology. This paper draws out the implications of Garber’s reading of Baconian induction in physics transferred to the natural sciences, and draws attention to the ultimate aim of Bacon’s philosophical programme as the prolongation of life.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48816563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It has been widely noted that rules for scientific method fail to produce results consistent with those rules. Daniel Garber goes further by showing not only that there is a gap between Francis Bacon’s methodological rules, outlined in the Novum organum, and his natural philosophical conclusions, but that his conception of natural forms informs the method in the first place. What needs further examination is why Bacon’s application of his method manifestly violates his rules. Garber appeals to the spirit of Bacon’s method, rather its letter, which allows him to reconcile an appreciation of Bacon’s impact on modern science with a contextualist approach to the history of philosophy. A better approach looks at the larger significance of mythological accounts of scientific method, that understand seventeenthcentury methodological doctrines as ideologies naturalizing scientific culture and outlining news ambitions for the control of nature. By examining Bacon’s followers in the Royal Society, we can see how Bacon’s “temporary” use of hypotheses helped secure support with the promise of future utility. The history of philosophy of science should focus on the conditions leading to emergence of certain kinds of distinctively modern discourses, practices, and ambitions going beyond the internal history of science.
{"title":"Method and Control","authors":"William T. Lynch","doi":"10.5840/eps202158344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202158344","url":null,"abstract":"It has been widely noted that rules for scientific method fail to produce results consistent with those rules. Daniel Garber goes further by showing not only that there is a gap between Francis Bacon’s methodological rules, outlined in the Novum organum, and his natural philosophical conclusions, but that his conception of natural forms informs the method in the first place. What needs further examination is why Bacon’s application of his method manifestly violates his rules. Garber appeals to the spirit of Bacon’s method, rather its letter, which allows him to reconcile an appreciation of Bacon’s impact on modern science with a contextualist approach to the history of philosophy. A better approach looks at the larger significance of mythological accounts of scientific method, that understand seventeenthcentury methodological doctrines as ideologies naturalizing scientific culture and outlining news ambitions for the control of nature. By examining Bacon’s followers in the Royal Society, we can see how Bacon’s “temporary” use of hypotheses helped secure support with the promise of future utility. The history of philosophy of science should focus on the conditions leading to emergence of certain kinds of distinctively modern discourses, practices, and ambitions going beyond the internal history of science.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45318651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The author considers some methodological problems of contemporary psychological research in the context of the concept of cultural-historical epistemology, as it is represented in the paper by B.I. Pruzhinin and T.G. Shchedrina. The author claims that the key problem of the modern science lies not in the question of how to conduct research correctly, but how to express the results so that another scientist can reproduce them. What are the criteria for their validity and reliability? With this problem in the background, it becomes obvious that there is a fundamental gap between the theoretical and methodological part of a particular study and the description of the selection and methods, the organizing procedure for empirical research, and the analysis of the results. Scientists’ attention is focused on the development and implementation of empirical research, while the actual production and reproduction of knowledge happen to be outside the scope of solving research problems. In the latter case, we mean the entire procedure for the reproduction of knowledge, including the theoretical and methodological substantiation of the novelty and relevance of the research, the empirical part of the scientific work itself, and, of course, the cultural-historical interpretation of the results, or, more correctly, their reasonable explanation. The problem of psychological knowledge replication is considered in the article. Also, the criteria for the replication of knowledge at various points of scientific and psychological research are discussed, in particular – the criteria of constancy and renewal of knowledge in experimental situations, which presuppose the conceptual setting of the studied phenomena, and of the facts’ correlation from different experiments (including the conceptualization of their continuity with the historical tradition of psychological science). Considerable attention is paid to the specific object field of psychological science and, thereby, to the analysis of such scientific procedures as description, interpretation and explanation. Especially, the methodological arguments are analyzed which make it possible to introduce the procedure for explaining scientific data into the criteria system for the replication of psychic phenomena.
{"title":"Criteria for Replication of Psychological Knowledge in the Context of the Cultural-Historical Epistemology","authors":"N. Kharlamenkova","doi":"10.5840/EPS202158227","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/EPS202158227","url":null,"abstract":"The author considers some methodological problems of contemporary psychological research in the context of the concept of cultural-historical epistemology, as it is represented in the paper by B.I. Pruzhinin and T.G. Shchedrina. The author claims that the key problem of the modern science lies not in the question of how to conduct research correctly, but how to express the results so that another scientist can reproduce them. What are the criteria for their validity and reliability? With this problem in the background, it becomes obvious that there is a fundamental gap between the theoretical and methodological part of a particular study and the description of the selection and methods, the organizing procedure for empirical research, and the analysis of the results. Scientists’ attention is focused on the development and implementation of empirical research, while the actual production and reproduction of knowledge happen to be outside the scope of solving research problems. In the latter case, we mean the entire procedure for the reproduction of knowledge, including the theoretical and methodological substantiation of the novelty and relevance of the research, the empirical part of the scientific work itself, and, of course, the cultural-historical interpretation of the results, or, more correctly, their reasonable explanation. The problem of psychological knowledge replication is considered in the article. Also, the criteria for the replication of knowledge at various points of scientific and psychological research are discussed, in particular – the criteria of constancy and renewal of knowledge in experimental situations, which presuppose the conceptual setting of the studied phenomena, and of the facts’ correlation from different experiments (including the conceptualization of their continuity with the historical tradition of psychological science). Considerable attention is paid to the specific object field of psychological science and, thereby, to the analysis of such scientific procedures as description, interpretation and explanation. Especially, the methodological arguments are analyzed which make it possible to introduce the procedure for explaining scientific data into the criteria system for the replication of psychic phenomena.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46394007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Контроверза реализма и конструктивизма в теории познания и соответствующих исследовательских программ в философии науки продолжает привлекать внимание исследователей. В статье обосновывается гипотеза о том, что преодолеть данную контроверзу можно с помощью идей трансцендентализма. Рассматривается один из путей развития кантовского трансцендентализма, связанный с семиотической интерпретацией, предложенной К.-О. Апелем. Я обосновываю новую интерпретацию трансцендентализма, согласно которой трансцендентальное существует в виде прото-нормы, которая представляет собой спонтанный акт, который придаёт данному предмету либо статус знака, который отсылает к некоему значению, либо статус значения, который отсылает к некоему выражению (знаку). В связи с этим в статье развивается понятие смысла, предложенное Г. Фреге, и обосновывается идея о существовании двух видов смысла (смысл-1 и смысл-2), которые коррелятивны двум фундаментальным характеристикам сознания: интенциональности и респонсивности. Трансцендентальный акт генерирует или интенциональный, или респонсивный смыслы данной действительности. Предлагаемая в статье символическая интерпретация трансцендентализма позволяет объяснить возникновение позиций реализма и конструктивизма как семиотических типов культур и таким образом преодолеть контроверзу между ними.Показывается, что версия символического трансцендентализма является продуктивной в объяснении природы абсолютных существований в физических теориях, как классической, так и неклассической физики. Рассматриваются примеры таких существований, как абсолютное пространство и абсолютное время в механике Ньютона и абсолютные эталоны в теории калибровочных полей Г. Вейля. Эти трансцендентальные существования не могут интерпретироваться как реальные физические объекты, и в то же время они необходимы для интерпретации результатов физических экспериментов. Трансцендентализм рассматривается как перспективная программа развития философии науки, содержанием которой является изучение нормативного слоя мышления, знаково-символических структур познавательного процесса и форм бытия знания.
{"title":"Transcendentalism as a Program for the Development of Epistemology","authors":"I. Nevvazhay","doi":"10.5840/EPS202158230","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/EPS202158230","url":null,"abstract":"Контроверза реализма и конструктивизма в теории познания и соответствующих исследовательских программ в философии науки продолжает привлекать внимание исследователей. В статье обосновывается гипотеза о том, что преодолеть данную контроверзу можно с помощью идей трансцендентализма. Рассматривается один из путей развития кантовского трансцендентализма, связанный с семиотической интерпретацией, предложенной К.-О. Апелем. Я обосновываю новую интерпретацию трансцендентализма, согласно которой трансцендентальное существует в виде прото-нормы, которая представляет собой спонтанный акт, который придаёт данному предмету либо статус знака, который отсылает к некоему значению, либо статус значения, который отсылает к некоему выражению (знаку). В связи с этим в статье развивается понятие смысла, предложенное Г. Фреге, и обосновывается идея о существовании двух видов смысла (смысл-1 и смысл-2), которые коррелятивны двум фундаментальным характеристикам сознания: интенциональности и респонсивности. Трансцендентальный акт генерирует или интенциональный, или респонсивный смыслы данной действительности. Предлагаемая в статье символическая интерпретация трансцендентализма позволяет объяснить возникновение позиций реализма и конструктивизма как семиотических типов культур и таким образом преодолеть контроверзу между ними.Показывается, что версия символического трансцендентализма является продуктивной в объяснении природы абсолютных существований в физических теориях, как классической, так и неклассической физики. Рассматриваются примеры таких существований, как абсолютное пространство и абсолютное время в механике Ньютона и абсолютные эталоны в теории калибровочных полей Г. Вейля. Эти трансцендентальные существования не могут интерпретироваться как реальные физические объекты, и в то же время они необходимы для интерпретации результатов физических экспериментов. Трансцендентализм рассматривается как перспективная программа развития философии науки, содержанием которой является изучение нормативного слоя мышления, знаково-символических структур познавательного процесса и форм бытия знания.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44358479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the article the thoughts about science as a creative process are presented in the context of the historical-cultural epistemology, specificity of which is presented in the material by B.I. Pruzhinin and T.G. Shchedrina. Tendencies in the modern world's development – social, economic, political, communication – do not give rise to doubts about the presence of a paradox: the more globalized the world becomes, the more science gravitates towards the status of applied – this determines its effectiveness. Nonetheless, what is lost when emphasizing efficiency? To answer this question is worth remembering that the intellectual revolution in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries was based not only on the works of Bacon, Descartes, and Newton but also on the radical position expressed in Machiavelli's "Sovereign" who placed utility above virtue. As soon as science becomes a pragmatic business, prestige, fame, safety, and comfort begin to depend on its success. Knowledge is power, but in the new political and social realities, the main thing is practical, utilitarian, and effective. By becoming disciplinary, technical, science gains power – but is this power not limited to its own constructions? Paradoxically, science, performing a service function, begins to lose the status of an instance of meaning. Serving society, it, nevertheless, is not a connecting force in society – they resort to it for recipes and solutions, but they do not consider it as a common cause, and as a platform for social interaction, they expect a product from science, but not meanings and values, benefit, but not virtues. However, what is a product of science? How is its performance measured? And who determines the effectiveness? This article attempts to partially illuminate these issues, including in the field of their consideration existentially loaded aspects of the scientific community's creativity – aesthetic, technical-digital, including computer games. Collective intuition as the acquisition of new experience, as the creation of previously nonexistent contexts in which new objects, events, and phenomena are placed – all these are key conditions for a world of uncertainty in which science is already required not only objective results but also involvement in the joint comprehension of existential projects. Truth there is not always the result, but rather a beginning, which requires, among other things, the derivation of all scientific consequences for which other forms of habitation of experience are open – aesthetic, playful, performative.
{"title":"Sociocultural Landmarks of Cognition and Problems of Scientific Creativity in the Media World","authors":"V. Savchuk, K. Ocheretyany","doi":"10.5840/EPS202158226","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/EPS202158226","url":null,"abstract":"In the article the thoughts about science as a creative process are presented in the context of the historical-cultural epistemology, specificity of which is presented in the material by B.I. Pruzhinin and T.G. Shchedrina. Tendencies in the modern world's development – social, economic, political, communication – do not give rise to doubts about the presence of a paradox: the more globalized the world becomes, the more science gravitates towards the status of applied – this determines its effectiveness. Nonetheless, what is lost when emphasizing efficiency? To answer this question is worth remembering that the intellectual revolution in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries was based not only on the works of Bacon, Descartes, and Newton but also on the radical position expressed in Machiavelli's \"Sovereign\" who placed utility above virtue. As soon as science becomes a pragmatic business, prestige, fame, safety, and comfort begin to depend on its success. Knowledge is power, but in the new political and social realities, the main thing is practical, utilitarian, and effective. By becoming disciplinary, technical, science gains power – but is this power not limited to its own constructions? Paradoxically, science, performing a service function, begins to lose the status of an instance of meaning. Serving society, it, nevertheless, is not a connecting force in society – they resort to it for recipes and solutions, but they do not consider it as a common cause, and as a platform for social interaction, they expect a product from science, but not meanings and values, benefit, but not virtues. However, what is a product of science? How is its performance measured? And who determines the effectiveness? This article attempts to partially illuminate these issues, including in the field of their consideration existentially loaded aspects of the scientific community's creativity – aesthetic, technical-digital, including computer games. Collective intuition as the acquisition of new experience, as the creation of previously nonexistent contexts in which new objects, events, and phenomena are placed – all these are key conditions for a world of uncertainty in which science is already required not only objective results but also involvement in the joint comprehension of existential projects. Truth there is not always the result, but rather a beginning, which requires, among other things, the derivation of all scientific consequences for which other forms of habitation of experience are open – aesthetic, playful, performative.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44901160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cultural and historical epistemology is not only a special branch of philosophical researches of science, but also the base of reform of a system of the epistemological categories expressing the purposes and values of scientific knowledge. Its need follows from the nature of development of modern science. Preservation of the traditional epistemological categories applied to the analysis of this development results in rough relativism. This danger can be eliminated, having developed the holistic system of epistemological values proceeding from the principle of historicism and "collective" understanding of the subject of scientific knowledge. Both of these bases allow to disclose historical and cultural conditionality of processes of scientific research and broadcast of their results. Such purposes and values of science as the truth and the objectivity of knowledge have historical measurement: they exist only in the course of continuous emergence and destruction, being affected by cultural factors. The collectivity of the subject of scientific knowledge is defined together with concepts of a "transcendental" and "individual and empirical" subject according to the principle of complementarity (N. Bohr) finding an epistemological transcription. The possibilities of political subjectivity of science in connection with the epistemological investigations from participation of scientific communities in political structures and movements are considered.
{"title":"Towards the Reform of the System of Epistemological Goals and Values","authors":"V. Porus","doi":"10.5840/EPS202158225","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/EPS202158225","url":null,"abstract":"Cultural and historical epistemology is not only a special branch of philosophical researches of science, but also the base of reform of a system of the epistemological categories expressing the purposes and values of scientific knowledge. Its need follows from the nature of development of modern science. Preservation of the traditional epistemological categories applied to the analysis of this development results in rough relativism. This danger can be eliminated, having developed the holistic system of epistemological values proceeding from the principle of historicism and \"collective\" understanding of the subject of scientific knowledge. Both of these bases allow to disclose historical and cultural conditionality of processes of scientific research and broadcast of their results. Such purposes and values of science as the truth and the objectivity of knowledge have historical measurement: they exist only in the course of continuous emergence and destruction, being affected by cultural factors. The collectivity of the subject of scientific knowledge is defined together with concepts of a \"transcendental\" and \"individual and empirical\" subject according to the principle of complementarity (N. Bohr) finding an epistemological transcription. The possibilities of political subjectivity of science in connection with the epistemological investigations from participation of scientific communities in political structures and movements are considered.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49021808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This review article reveals the structural components of the chess metaphor, which represent in an unusual perspective the properties of a linguistic sign and its connection with mental processes. Strict rule-following and the conventionality of the material plane of expression turn chess into a convenient illustration of a universal linguistic structure. Particular attention is paid to the computer profile of the chess metaphor, since it reflects a whole complex of philosophical problems of computer science about mind, thinking and intelligence. In the proposed paper, the presentation of most of the material is based on the works of F. de Saussure, L. Hjelmslev, L. Wittgenstein and their interpreters, in whose texts an obvious important place is occupied by chess analogies and theoretical conclusions initiated by them. First we investigate chess metaphor in the context of language and speech structures. Next, we analyze the "chess track" in the problem of individual language and the rule-following problem. The final part is devoted to the technical elements of computer chess and the influence of this area of computer science on some of the points of cognitive theories of language and mind. The author of the article emphasizes a non-trivial transformation of the conceptual content of the chess metaphor, which indicates the evolution of computational tendencies in modern theories about language and mind. The article substantiates the thesis that the traditional chess metaphor used in the XX century in the philosophical investigation of language and mind, today it takes on a realization in the framework of computer models of the chess game. Machine deep learning can significantly expand the horizon of computability. Game interaction makes it possible to ascribe the elements of intentional content to machine functions. Nevertheless, all the argumentation in the work is aimed at proving that the rules governing language and mind are rules different from the rules of computer intelligence.
{"title":"Трудные места шахматной метафоры в учениях о языке и сознании","authors":"П. Н. Барышников","doi":"10.5840/EPS2021582301","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/EPS2021582301","url":null,"abstract":"This review article reveals the structural components of the chess metaphor, which represent in an unusual perspective the properties of a linguistic sign and its connection with mental processes. Strict rule-following and the conventionality of the material plane of expression turn chess into a convenient illustration of a universal linguistic structure. Particular attention is paid to the computer profile of the chess metaphor, since it reflects a whole complex of philosophical problems of computer science about mind, thinking and intelligence. In the proposed paper, the presentation of most of the material is based on the works of F. de Saussure, L. Hjelmslev, L. Wittgenstein and their interpreters, in whose texts an obvious important place is occupied by chess analogies and theoretical conclusions initiated by them. First we investigate chess metaphor in the context of language and speech structures. Next, we analyze the \"chess track\" in the problem of individual language and the rule-following problem. The final part is devoted to the technical elements of computer chess and the influence of this area of computer science on some of the points of cognitive theories of language and mind. The author of the article emphasizes a non-trivial transformation of the conceptual content of the chess metaphor, which indicates the evolution of computational tendencies in modern theories about language and mind. The article substantiates the thesis that the traditional chess metaphor used in the XX century in the philosophical investigation of language and mind, today it takes on a realization in the framework of computer models of the chess game. Machine deep learning can significantly expand the horizon of computability. Game interaction makes it possible to ascribe the elements of intentional content to machine functions. Nevertheless, all the argumentation in the work is aimed at proving that the rules governing language and mind are rules different from the rules of computer intelligence.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46214059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A. Besedin, D. B. Volkov, Anton Kuznetsov, E. Loginov, Andrey V. Mertsalov
The article is a review of the philosophical problems of introspection as a method of cognition that are actively discussed in the contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. The article is the result of discussions that were held during the Summer School “Consciousness and Introspection” organized in July 2020 by the Moscow Center for Consciousness Studies and led by Professor D. Stoljar, one of the top experts in this field. The purpose of the article is to describe to readers the current state of affairs in the English language research in this area. Modern theories of introspection have been formed as a result of discussions in the philosophy of mind and epistemology in the XX century. One of them is S. Shoemaker’s critique of the perceptual model of introspection and the related problem of self-blindness. Another topic is the transparency of experience (G.E. Moore, G. Evans). Finally, D. Dretske offered an influential critique of introspection in general. The discussion of these topics led to the arising of various modern theories: rationalistic (A. Byrne, D. Stoljar), acquaintance theories (B. Gertler, D. Chalmers), constitutive (S. Shoemaker), simple (D. Smithies), and others. An important area in which introspection finds their application is the philosophy of consciousness. The article considers the thesis of revelation, according to which the conscious state reveals its essence in introspection: the relation of this thesis to folk psychology is analyzed (D. Lewis, D. Stoljar), arguments against physicalism based on it are considered (P. Goff). Finally, the authors consider illusionist approaches to introspection based on the understanding of introspection as a representative system (D. Dennett, K. Frankish). Proponents of these approaches suggest the most acute criticism of introspection, pointing out its unreliability as a method of cognition, and, accordingly, the inapplicability of introspection in the philosophy of consciousness. Objections to this position are represented by M. Nida-Rumelin. This work does not pretend to consider all the existing theories of introspection and related problems. However, this review can give an idea of the main positions and problems in this area and assess the prospects for its development.
本文回顾了当代精神分析哲学中积极讨论的内省作为一种认知方法的哲学问题。这篇文章是在2020年7月由莫斯科意识研究中心组织的暑期学校“意识与内省”期间进行的讨论的结果，该研究由该领域的顶级专家之一D. Stoljar教授领导。本文的目的是向读者描述这一领域英语语言研究的现状。现代内省理论是二十世纪心灵哲学和认识论讨论的结果。其中之一是S.舒梅克对内省的知觉模型和相关的自我盲目性问题的批判。另一个主题是经验的透明度(G.E. Moore, G. Evans)。最后，德雷茨克对一般的内省提出了有影响力的批评。对这些话题的讨论导致了各种现代理论的产生:理性理论(A. Byrne, D. Stoljar)，熟人理论(B. Gertler, D. Chalmers)，构成理论(S. Shoemaker)，简单理论(D. Smithies)等等。内省的一个重要应用领域是意识哲学。本文考察了意识状态在内省中揭示其本质的启示命题，分析了这一命题与民间心理学的关系(D. Lewis, D. Stoljar)，并在此基础上讨论了反对物理主义的论点(P. Goff)。最后，作者考虑了基于内省作为一种代表性系统的理解的幻觉主义内省方法(D. Dennett, K. Frankish)。这些方法的支持者对内省提出了最尖锐的批评，指出它作为一种认知方法的不可靠性，因此，内省在意识哲学中的不适用性。Nida-Rumelin先生代表反对这一立场。这项工作并没有假装考虑所有现有的内省理论和相关问题。然而，通过对这一领域的主要立场和问题的回顾，可以对其发展前景进行评估。
{"title":"Introspection","authors":"A. Besedin, D. B. Volkov, Anton Kuznetsov, E. Loginov, Andrey V. Mertsalov","doi":"10.5840/EPS202158236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/EPS202158236","url":null,"abstract":"The article is a review of the philosophical problems of introspection as a method of cognition that are actively discussed in the contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. The article is the result of discussions that were held during the Summer School “Consciousness and Introspection” organized in July 2020 by the Moscow Center for Consciousness Studies and led by Professor D. Stoljar, one of the top experts in this field. The purpose of the article is to describe to readers the current state of affairs in the English language research in this area. Modern theories of introspection have been formed as a result of discussions in the philosophy of mind and epistemology in the XX century. One of them is S. Shoemaker’s critique of the perceptual model of introspection and the related problem of self-blindness. Another topic is the transparency of experience (G.E. Moore, G. Evans). Finally, D. Dretske offered an influential critique of introspection in general. The discussion of these topics led to the arising of various modern theories: rationalistic (A. Byrne, D. Stoljar), acquaintance theories (B. Gertler, D. Chalmers), constitutive (S. Shoemaker), simple (D. Smithies), and others. An important area in which introspection finds their application is the philosophy of consciousness. The article considers the thesis of revelation, according to which the conscious state reveals its essence in introspection: the relation of this thesis to folk psychology is analyzed (D. Lewis, D. Stoljar), arguments against physicalism based on it are considered (P. Goff). Finally, the authors consider illusionist approaches to introspection based on the understanding of introspection as a representative system (D. Dennett, K. Frankish). Proponents of these approaches suggest the most acute criticism of introspection, pointing out its unreliability as a method of cognition, and, accordingly, the inapplicability of introspection in the philosophy of consciousness. Objections to this position are represented by M. Nida-Rumelin. This work does not pretend to consider all the existing theories of introspection and related problems. However, this review can give an idea of the main positions and problems in this area and assess the prospects for its development.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48843556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"“There Is No Royal Way in Philosophy…”. Historical Reply to Critics","authors":"B. Pruzhinin, T. Shchedrina","doi":"10.5840/EPS202158229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/EPS202158229","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47946226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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