This contribution examines the status of the rhetoric of science in two contexts. The first one is the effect that the changing interpretation of logic (the changing 'image of logic') has had on the status of the rhetoric of science. The second is the role that imagery has in scientific discourse. It is argued that the very possibility of a rhetorical interpretation of science depends on how the logic of science is understood. Informal logic, which acts here as a variant of argumentation theory or a logic of argumentation, is proposed as such a logic. This leads to a revision of the nature of justification in science in general, the substitution of apodictic logic for a logic of argumentation as a principal tool, and the consideration of strict formal ways of material implication-based justification as mere individual cases of a logic of argumentation. The role of imagery in scientific discourse is analysed. It is demonstrated that the situation of rhetoric and perception of imagery is paradoxical: although using rhetorical mechanisms in scientific communication is unavoidable, rhetoric has been criticised for many centuries. It is shown that the negative attitude to using rhetorical elements in scientific texts has long historical roots going back to ancient philosophical thought, namely, Socrates's criticism of eloquence and sophistic rhetoric. Analysis of the functions of imagery in scientific discourse suggests that imagery is an inalienable mechanism of both professional communication and the creation of theoretical models of knowledge.
{"title":"Rhetoric of Science","authors":"I. Griftsova, N. Y. Kozlova","doi":"10.5840/EPS202158233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/EPS202158233","url":null,"abstract":"This contribution examines the status of the rhetoric of science in two contexts. The first one is the effect that the changing interpretation of logic (the changing 'image of logic') has had on the status of the rhetoric of science. The second is the role that imagery has in scientific discourse. It is argued that the very possibility of a rhetorical interpretation of science depends on how the logic of science is understood. Informal logic, which acts here as a variant of argumentation theory or a logic of argumentation, is proposed as such a logic. This leads to a revision of the nature of justification in science in general, the substitution of apodictic logic for a logic of argumentation as a principal tool, and the consideration of strict formal ways of material implication-based justification as mere individual cases of a logic of argumentation. The role of imagery in scientific discourse is analysed. It is demonstrated that the situation of rhetoric and perception of imagery is paradoxical: although using rhetorical mechanisms in scientific communication is unavoidable, rhetoric has been criticised for many centuries. It is shown that the negative attitude to using rhetorical elements in scientific texts has long historical roots going back to ancient philosophical thought, namely, Socrates's criticism of eloquence and sophistic rhetoric. Analysis of the functions of imagery in scientific discourse suggests that imagery is an inalienable mechanism of both professional communication and the creation of theoretical models of knowledge.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44493762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article focuses on analyzing the changes that have occurred in the procedures for assessing scientific knowledge during the period of their massive introduction into the economy, politics and everyday life, as well as the formation of a new social position of the expert. Up to this point, the assessment of scientific knowledge often took place within the scientific community. In that case, a special role was played by “authority” able to evaluate projects basing on criteria intrinsic to the scientific ethos. The active introduction of scientific knowledge into the social life encouraged the emergence of a new expert’s social position differing from an intrascientific “authority”. In their work, they have to evaluate projects that involve large financial resources and contribute to changes in social and economic life, and therefore, in addition to scientific criteria, such experts consider any possible economic, political and social consequences of the project implementation. Along with it, the formation of the new expert’s social position and its active use by scientists leads to several problems. First, the expertise and expert practices are beginning to be used by scientists to legitimize their own position in science and fight rival groups. Second, these processes can provoke a decrease in diversity both within science itself and in the number of cognitive practices; also they can limit the emergence of new approaches to the analysis of technological, economic, political and social innovations.
{"title":"Social Position of an Expert as a New Element of Science","authors":"Evgeny V. Maslanov","doi":"10.5840/EPS202158232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/EPS202158232","url":null,"abstract":"The article focuses on analyzing the changes that have occurred in the procedures for assessing scientific knowledge during the period of their massive introduction into the economy, politics and everyday life, as well as the formation of a new social position of the expert. Up to this point, the assessment of scientific knowledge often took place within the scientific community. In that case, a special role was played by “authority” able to evaluate projects basing on criteria intrinsic to the scientific ethos. The active introduction of scientific knowledge into the social life encouraged the emergence of a new expert’s social position differing from an intrascientific “authority”. In their work, they have to evaluate projects that involve large financial resources and contribute to changes in social and economic life, and therefore, in addition to scientific criteria, such experts consider any possible economic, political and social consequences of the project implementation. Along with it, the formation of the new expert’s social position and its active use by scientists leads to several problems. First, the expertise and expert practices are beginning to be used by scientists to legitimize their own position in science and fight rival groups. Second, these processes can provoke a decrease in diversity both within science itself and in the number of cognitive practices; also they can limit the emergence of new approaches to the analysis of technological, economic, political and social innovations.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48720591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article deals with the problem of the return of metaphysics within the framework of the ontological turn of philosophy and the situation of post-metaphysical thinking. The conditions for the possibility of modern metaphysical discourse in the projects of empirical metaphysics and historical ontology are revealed. Historical ontology as a meta-reflexion of philosophy over its own historical foundations is able to bridge the gap between the epistemological static nature of transcendental subjectivity and the ontological dynamism of the growth of scientific knowledge about reality by comprehending the conditions of interaction between science and metaphysics in conditions of post-metaphysical thinking and realistic reversal of ontology. Philosophical knowledge in the context of the ontological turn and the associated return of metaphysics becomes focused not so much on the sharp demarcation of science and metaphysics and postulating the incommensurability of their ontologies, but on identifying mutually enriching areas of research that could give a new impetus to their development.
{"title":"Metaphysics and Realism","authors":"V. Kosykhin, S. Malkina","doi":"10.5840/EPS202158237","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/EPS202158237","url":null,"abstract":"The article deals with the problem of the return of metaphysics within the framework of the ontological turn of philosophy and the situation of post-metaphysical thinking. The conditions for the possibility of modern metaphysical discourse in the projects of empirical metaphysics and historical ontology are revealed. Historical ontology as a meta-reflexion of philosophy over its own historical foundations is able to bridge the gap between the epistemological static nature of transcendental subjectivity and the ontological dynamism of the growth of scientific knowledge about reality by comprehending the conditions of interaction between science and metaphysics in conditions of post-metaphysical thinking and realistic reversal of ontology. Philosophical knowledge in the context of the ontological turn and the associated return of metaphysics becomes focused not so much on the sharp demarcation of science and metaphysics and postulating the incommensurability of their ontologies, but on identifying mutually enriching areas of research that could give a new impetus to their development.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47436013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, I consider the influence of the ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and above all the ideas of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus on the philosophy of logical positivism. Agreeing that the question of such an influence is not a self-evident one, I clarify at first the concept of logical positivism and then turn to the evidence of the leading logical positivists about the influence of Wittgenstein upon them. An analysis of recollections of Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, Friedrich Waismann, and Alfred Ayer suggests that at least these thinkers themselves considered such an influence as very significant.
{"title":"On Wittgenstein’s Influence on the Logical Positivists","authors":"V. Vasilyev","doi":"10.5840/EPS20215815","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/EPS20215815","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I consider the influence of the ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and above all the ideas of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus on the philosophy of logical positivism. Agreeing that the question of such an influence is not a self-evident one, I clarify at first the concept of logical positivism and then turn to the evidence of the leading logical positivists about the influence of Wittgenstein upon them. An analysis of recollections of Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, Friedrich Waismann, and Alfred Ayer suggests that at least these thinkers themselves considered such an influence as very significant.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44028408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The notion of Ausersein/outbeing, proposed by Alexius Meinong, was for a long time in the shadow of the principle of the Ausersein of a pure object, which made it possible to make non-existent objects part of a judgment. This principle was adopted by many followers of Meinong within the framework of analytical philosophy, but the very concept of Ausersein was almost totally ignored. When it’s become an object of research, there appeared several interpretations of it. It was interpreted either as a way of describing the ontological status of non-existent objects, or as a basic property of all objects without exception. Dale Jacquette suggests interpreting Ausersein as extraontology, i.e. a metasemantic category that includes all items. In this article, we will analyse the arguments of modern interpreters of this notion and try to find out which interpretation is most correct.
{"title":"Alexius Meinong's Extraontology","authors":"V. Seliverstov","doi":"10.5840/EPS202158119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/EPS202158119","url":null,"abstract":"The notion of Ausersein/outbeing, proposed by Alexius Meinong, was for a long time in the shadow of the principle of the Ausersein of a pure object, which made it possible to make non-existent objects part of a judgment. This principle was adopted by many followers of Meinong within the framework of analytical philosophy, but the very concept of Ausersein was almost totally ignored. When it’s become an object of research, there appeared several interpretations of it. It was interpreted either as a way of describing the ontological status of non-existent objects, or as a basic property of all objects without exception. Dale Jacquette suggests interpreting Ausersein as extraontology, i.e. a metasemantic category that includes all items. In this article, we will analyse the arguments of modern interpreters of this notion and try to find out which interpretation is most correct.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46255313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The idea of the multiverse, likely difficult to prove in traditional scientific ways, may be bolstered by two arguments from the field of logic. This article, contextualized by the metaphorical, non-logical approaches to the multiverse and situating itself within the history of astronomy, explicates these two arguments from logic. The first argument relates to the implicit illogical vanity in the assumption that our presently-known universe is special. In other words, it may be somewhat logical to embrace the history of deanthropomorphism more fully in the light of the Big Bang and the theory of cosmic inflation. The second argument suggests resolution to the long-standing philosophical and logical mysteries associated with the anthropic principle, as well as the attendant use of Ockham’s razor as a logical tool. The problem of evidence and falsifiability is briefly implicated, as well as some consequences for apologetics.
{"title":"The Inherent Logic in the Idea of the Multiverse","authors":"Nick Overduin","doi":"10.5840/EPS202158118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/EPS202158118","url":null,"abstract":"The idea of the multiverse, likely difficult to prove in traditional scientific ways, may be bolstered by two arguments from the field of logic. This article, contextualized by the metaphorical, non-logical approaches to the multiverse and situating itself within the history of astronomy, explicates these two arguments from logic. The first argument relates to the implicit illogical vanity in the assumption that our presently-known universe is special. In other words, it may be somewhat logical to embrace the history of deanthropomorphism more fully in the light of the Big Bang and the theory of cosmic inflation. The second argument suggests resolution to the long-standing philosophical and logical mysteries associated with the anthropic principle, as well as the attendant use of Ockham’s razor as a logical tool. The problem of evidence and falsifiability is briefly implicated, as well as some consequences for apologetics.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44909888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The purpose of the article is to study the influence of Nazi experiments on the formation of ideas about the ethos of science in the field of biomedicine. It is shown that the idea of discrediting a value-neutral science was often confronted with the resistance of the scientists themselves, who, in different contexts of condemning Nazi crimes, appealed to the fact that they acted for the good of science, and even of all mankind. The article discusses the strategy of American lawyers adopted at the Nuremberg Trials aimed at demonstrating the perversity of Nazi crimes in the field of biomedicine both ethically and scientifically. In addition, an analysis of individual materials of the Nuremberg process was carried out, which made it possible to give an idea of the scientific and linguistic design of the human body (name correction strategy) as a “correct” scientific object with desired properties. The article considers the influence of the data obtained on Nazi crimes on the formation of the content of the Nuremberg Code and the design of the principle of informed consent in biomedicine. Ethical aspects related to the further use of Nazi scientific data are also considered. In conclusion, the problem of the formation of scientific knowledge in non-violence mode is articulated.
{"title":"Body As an Object of Experimentation and the Emergence of Biomedicine Ethos","authors":"O. Popova","doi":"10.5840/EPS202158114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/EPS202158114","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of the article is to study the influence of Nazi experiments on the formation of ideas about the ethos of science in the field of biomedicine. It is shown that the idea of discrediting a value-neutral science was often confronted with the resistance of the scientists themselves, who, in different contexts of condemning Nazi crimes, appealed to the fact that they acted for the good of science, and even of all mankind. The article discusses the strategy of American lawyers adopted at the Nuremberg Trials aimed at demonstrating the perversity of Nazi crimes in the field of biomedicine both ethically and scientifically. In addition, an analysis of individual materials of the Nuremberg process was carried out, which made it possible to give an idea of the scientific and linguistic design of the human body (name correction strategy) as a “correct” scientific object with desired properties. The article considers the influence of the data obtained on Nazi crimes on the formation of the content of the Nuremberg Code and the design of the principle of informed consent in biomedicine. Ethical aspects related to the further use of Nazi scientific data are also considered. In conclusion, the problem of the formation of scientific knowledge in non-violence mode is articulated.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41778477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper focuses on the review of current literature on formal philosophy. Special attention is paid to the review of the book «Introduction to Formal Philosophy» [Hansson, Hendricks, 2018]. The book is a consistent introduction to the problems of formal philosophy, a research tradition that relies on the precise mathematical tools in order to study traditional philosophical problems. The methods of formal philosophy are successfully applied not only to the problems of ontology, epistemology and philosophy of language but also relevant for the problems of ethics, axiology and social philosophy. The book demonstrates that it is not correct to identify formal philosophy with another area of study – philosophical logic, since formal philosophy uses not only logical methods of analysis, but also uses the tools of game theory, decision theory, probability theory, Bayesian statistics, and other theories. Although the book has a propaedeutic character, it also contains some open problems. These problems include the aggregation of the opinions of the group under the condition of a conflicting base of premises in the theory of public choice, there are still open problems in the interpretation of Arrow’s impossibility theorem and others. Certainly, formalization in itself is not a general solution to the particular philosophical problem, but only a tool that allows to formulate a problem in a more rigorous and precise way, which sometimes allows to reveal some unexpected consequences, some implicit contradictions and new solutions. Despite the importance of the concept of coherence in ethics, decision theory, philosophy of law, Bayesian epistemology, philosophy of science, the existing formalizations of the concept of coherence are highly specialized for epistemology, researchers recognize the lack of the relevant explanatory models. Overall, the book is an excellent introduction in to the field of formal philosophy, which provides a general overview of different aspects of formal philosophy and the opportunity to study particular research topics by means of an extensive bibliography accompanying each of the chapters.
{"title":"What Is Formal Philosophy?","authors":"Vitaly V. Dolgorukov, Vera Shumilina","doi":"10.5840/EPS202158120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/EPS202158120","url":null,"abstract":"The paper focuses on the review of current literature on formal philosophy. Special attention is paid to the review of the book «Introduction to Formal Philosophy» [Hansson, Hendricks, 2018]. The book is a consistent introduction to the problems of formal philosophy, a research tradition that relies on the precise mathematical tools in order to study traditional philosophical problems. The methods of formal philosophy are successfully applied not only to the problems of ontology, epistemology and philosophy of language but also relevant for the problems of ethics, axiology and social philosophy. The book demonstrates that it is not correct to identify formal philosophy with another area of study – philosophical logic, since formal philosophy uses not only logical methods of analysis, but also uses the tools of game theory, decision theory, probability theory, Bayesian statistics, and other theories. Although the book has a propaedeutic character, it also contains some open problems. These problems include the aggregation of the opinions of the group under the condition of a conflicting base of premises in the theory of public choice, there are still open problems in the interpretation of Arrow’s impossibility theorem and others. Certainly, formalization in itself is not a general solution to the particular philosophical problem, but only a tool that allows to formulate a problem in a more rigorous and precise way, which sometimes allows to reveal some unexpected consequences, some implicit contradictions and new solutions. Despite the importance of the concept of coherence in ethics, decision theory, philosophy of law, Bayesian epistemology, philosophy of science, the existing formalizations of the concept of coherence are highly specialized for epistemology, researchers recognize the lack of the relevant explanatory models. Overall, the book is an excellent introduction in to the field of formal philosophy, which provides a general overview of different aspects of formal philosophy and the opportunity to study particular research topics by means of an extensive bibliography accompanying each of the chapters.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45315073","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
During its hundred-year history, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus has undergone a variety of interpretations and explanations. But the significance of this work cannot be limited to an assessment of whether it had an impact on the development of logical positivism or not. Similarly, the reading of Tractatus cannot be reduced to just an ethical or some other readings. This article proposes to study a possible reading of “Tractatus” in terms of legal philosophy, which is based on the relation between facts, values and norms, as well as on how interesting it could be (or would be) for legal philosophy.
{"title":"Logical Positivism, Values, and Norms","authors":"V. Ogleznev","doi":"10.5840/EPS20215816","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/EPS20215816","url":null,"abstract":"During its hundred-year history, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus has undergone a variety of interpretations and explanations. But the significance of this work cannot be limited to an assessment of whether it had an impact on the development of logical positivism or not. Similarly, the reading of Tractatus cannot be reduced to just an ethical or some other readings. This article proposes to study a possible reading of “Tractatus” in terms of legal philosophy, which is based on the relation between facts, values and norms, as well as on how interesting it could be (or would be) for legal philosophy.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41464186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Beliefs are commonly attributed to groups or collective entities. But what is the nature of group belief? Summativism and nonsummativism are two main rival views regarding the nature of group belief. On the one hand, summativism holds that, necessarily, a group g has a belief B only if at least one individual i is both a member of g and has B. On the other hand, non-summativism holds that it is possible for a group g to have a belief B even if no member of g has B. My aim in this paper is to consider whether divergence arguments for non-summativism and against summativism about group belief are sound. Such divergence arguments aim to show that there can be a divergence between belief at the group level and the corresponding belief at the individual level. I will argue that these divergence arguments do not decisively defeat a minimal version of summativism. In order to accomplish this goal, I have the following plan: In section 2, I will analyze the structure of two important counterexamples against the summativist view, which are based on divergence arguments. Such counterexamples are based on the idea that a group decides to adopt a particular group belief, even if none of its members holds the belief in question. However, in section 3, I will show that these counterexamples fail, because they can be explained without the need to posit group beliefs. More specifically, I argue that in these apparent counterexamples, we have only a ‘group acceptance’ phenomenon and not a ‘group belief’ phenomenon. For this conclusion, I advance two arguments: in subsection 3.1, I formulate an argument from doxastic involuntarism, and in subsection 3.2, I develop an argument from truth connection. Thus, summativism is not defeated by divergence arguments. Lastly, in section 4, I will conclude with some advantages of summativism.
信仰通常归因于群体或集体实体。但是群体信仰的本质是什么呢?总结主义和非总结主义是关于群体信仰本质的两种主要对立观点。summativism认为,一方面,一群g的信念只有如果至少有一个人我是一个成员的g和B .另一方面,non-summativism认为,有可能一个g组信念B g B我即使没有成员本文目的是考虑是否分歧参数对non-summativism和summativism群体信仰的声音。这种分歧论点旨在表明，在群体层面的信念和相应的个人层面的信念之间可能存在分歧。我将论证，这些分歧论证并不能决定性地击败最小版本的总结主义。为了实现这一目标，我有以下计划:在第2节中，我将分析两个重要的反例的结构，反对总结主义的观点，这是基于分歧的论点。这些反例是基于这样一种观点，即一个群体决定采用一种特定的群体信仰，即使它的成员中没有人持有这种信仰。然而，在第3节中，我将说明这些反例是失败的，因为它们可以在不需要假定群体信念的情况下进行解释。更具体地说，我认为在这些明显的反例中，我们只有“群体接受”现象，而不是“群体信仰”现象。对于这个结论，我提出了两个论点:在第3.1节中，我从悖论不自主主义中提出了一个论点，在第3.2节中，我从真理联系中提出了一个论点。因此，总结论并没有被分歧论证打败。最后，在第4节中，我将总结总结主义的一些优点。
{"title":"Group Belief","authors":"Domingos Faria","doi":"10.5840/EPS202158111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/EPS202158111","url":null,"abstract":"Beliefs are commonly attributed to groups or collective entities. But what is the nature of group belief? Summativism and nonsummativism are two main rival views regarding the nature of group belief. On the one hand, summativism holds that, necessarily, a group g has a belief B only if at least one individual i is both a member of g and has B. On the other hand, non-summativism holds that it is possible for a group g to have a belief B even if no member of g has B. My aim in this paper is to consider whether divergence arguments for non-summativism and against summativism about group belief are sound. Such divergence arguments aim to show that there can be a divergence between belief at the group level and the corresponding belief at the individual level. I will argue that these divergence arguments do not decisively defeat a minimal version of summativism. In order to accomplish this goal, I have the following plan: In section 2, I will analyze the structure of two important counterexamples against the summativist view, which are based on divergence arguments. Such counterexamples are based on the idea that a group decides to adopt a particular group belief, even if none of its members holds the belief in question. However, in section 3, I will show that these counterexamples fail, because they can be explained without the need to posit group beliefs. More specifically, I argue that in these apparent counterexamples, we have only a ‘group acceptance’ phenomenon and not a ‘group belief’ phenomenon. For this conclusion, I advance two arguments: in subsection 3.1, I formulate an argument from doxastic involuntarism, and in subsection 3.2, I develop an argument from truth connection. Thus, summativism is not defeated by divergence arguments. Lastly, in section 4, I will conclude with some advantages of summativism.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43071247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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