Pub Date : 2023-02-01DOI: 10.1177/17550882221148910
A. Lang
A brief introduction to the roundtable on William Bain, Political Theology of International Order.
威廉·贝恩圆桌会议简介，《国际秩序政治神学》。
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Pub Date : 2023-02-01DOI: 10.1177/17550882221144472
C. Navari
Some of the themes found in William Bain’s book, Political Theolog of International Order, were prefigured in his chapter on Hedley Bull’s The Anarchical Society. This article looks back to that earlier chapter and draws on some of the themes while providing a critical reading of them and Bain’s larger project.
威廉·贝恩（William Bain）的《国际秩序的政治神学》（Political Theolog of International Order）一书中的一些主题，在他关于赫德利·布尔（Hedley Bull）的《无政府社会》（the Anarchical Society）一章中就有预先设想。本文回顾了前一章，借鉴了其中的一些主题，同时对它们和贝恩的更大项目进行了批判性解读。
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Pub Date : 2023-01-16DOI: 10.1177/17550882221144643
B. Schmidt, C. Wight
The commitment to the rational actor model of state behavior is said to be a core assumption of realist theory. This assumption is listed in most textbook accounts of realism. Yet is rationality a core supposition of realist theory, and if so, what kind of rationality is implied in these claims? Debate on the relationship between realism, and what is often labeled as rationality is replete with misunderstandings. Authors deploy terms such as rationality, rationalism, and rational actor in diverse and contradictory ways. This article aims to cut through this confusion and provide an account of the different ways in which these terms are used in the field of International Relations (IR). We argue that much of the confusion surrounding rationalism/rationality in IR arises due to a failure to distinguish between rationalism as an epistemological position (the observer rationality assumption) and rationality as an ontological position (the rational actor assumption). We use this distinction to examine carefully the relationship between the concepts of rationalism/rationality in realist theory.
{"title":"Rationalism and the “rational actor assumption” in realist international relations theory","authors":"B. Schmidt, C. Wight","doi":"10.1177/17550882221144643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17550882221144643","url":null,"abstract":"The commitment to the rational actor model of state behavior is said to be a core assumption of realist theory. This assumption is listed in most textbook accounts of realism. Yet is rationality a core supposition of realist theory, and if so, what kind of rationality is implied in these claims? Debate on the relationship between realism, and what is often labeled as rationality is replete with misunderstandings. Authors deploy terms such as rationality, rationalism, and rational actor in diverse and contradictory ways. This article aims to cut through this confusion and provide an account of the different ways in which these terms are used in the field of International Relations (IR). We argue that much of the confusion surrounding rationalism/rationality in IR arises due to a failure to distinguish between rationalism as an epistemological position (the observer rationality assumption) and rationality as an ontological position (the rational actor assumption). We use this distinction to examine carefully the relationship between the concepts of rationalism/rationality in realist theory.","PeriodicalId":44237,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Political Theory","volume":"19 1","pages":"158 - 182"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48679875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-09DOI: 10.1177/17550882221134959
Charlotta Friedner Parrat
This article is a reply to Bevir and Hall, who recently argued in this journal that the English School needs to reflect more on its philosophy. They are right. Yet, their preferred distinction between a structural and an interpretivist strand of the School is not a constructive way forward. This is because their distinction between a structural and an interpretivist strand of the school is too stark, their chosen dimensions for sorting through the School are arguably not the most fruitful, and the inclusion of the English School’s normative agenda must remain independent of whether one is inclined to start from structure or from agency. After elaborating these points, the article moves on to suggesting a number of other philosophical issues which would be more relevant for the English School to work through. It ends with an empirical illustration of what an integrated English School approach, inspired by structuration, could look like.
{"title":"Interpretivists in the English School: Aren’t we all?","authors":"Charlotta Friedner Parrat","doi":"10.1177/17550882221134959","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17550882221134959","url":null,"abstract":"This article is a reply to Bevir and Hall, who recently argued in this journal that the English School needs to reflect more on its philosophy. They are right. Yet, their preferred distinction between a structural and an interpretivist strand of the School is not a constructive way forward. This is because their distinction between a structural and an interpretivist strand of the school is too stark, their chosen dimensions for sorting through the School are arguably not the most fruitful, and the inclusion of the English School’s normative agenda must remain independent of whether one is inclined to start from structure or from agency. After elaborating these points, the article moves on to suggesting a number of other philosophical issues which would be more relevant for the English School to work through. It ends with an empirical illustration of what an integrated English School approach, inspired by structuration, could look like.","PeriodicalId":44237,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Political Theory","volume":"19 1","pages":"221 - 241"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47708017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01Epub Date: 2021-08-06DOI: 10.1177/17550882211036635
Catherine Frost, Rebekah K Pullen
Emer de Vattel's argument that states should be understood as free and independent bodies operating as moral persons in the international sphere is credited with launching a doctrine of sovereignty that hardened national borders against external interference or obligation. It also helped launch one of the world's first modern states through its influence on the American founding. Vattel's theory rests upon the critical role of judgment, specifically, the judgment of interests. That doctrine requires that states must always think for themselves, but not only about themselves. Offering some justification for international action, even in the midst of disagreement or war, is what separates civilized from villainous nations for Vattel, and this grounds interests in the communicative habits of an international community. Because the judgment of interests incorporates a communicative element, Vattelian internationalism cannot become exclusively self-regarding, and state interests cannot be entirely contained within national borders. Instead, Vattel's distinctive combination of independence and interests is set within a global community that makes the fate of outsiders the business of every state.
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Pub Date : 2022-09-03DOI: 10.1177/17550882221121972
Jared Keyel
War is cruel. Its purpose is to cause suffering. American wars create survivors and victims who confront us with the penetrating gaze of those who demand justice. Their presence implores Americans to make ourselves responsible for the pain we have caused them. Meeting the obligation demanded of us by the millions of individuals we have caused to suffer requires developing a liberatory anti-war praxis informed by distinct ethical and political commitments. While neither exhaustive nor exclusive of other potentially complementary orientations and activities, I ground liberatory anti-war praxis in: (1) Commitment to praxis as a route to liberation; (2) Perpetual unsettledness toward the cruelties of war; (3) Ethical sensitivity to the victims of empire; (4) Dedication to facilitating liberatory peace; (5) Engagement with questions of pacifism, nonviolence, and liberatory self-defense. I locate liberatory anti-war praxis in the pacifist tradition, however anti-war praxis need not commit to absolute nonviolence. Each context is unique, and it is the prerogative of those suffering cruelty to pursue their own strategies and tactics of liberation.
{"title":"A world waiting to be born: Charting a liberatory anti-war praxis","authors":"Jared Keyel","doi":"10.1177/17550882221121972","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17550882221121972","url":null,"abstract":"War is cruel. Its purpose is to cause suffering. American wars create survivors and victims who confront us with the penetrating gaze of those who demand justice. Their presence implores Americans to make ourselves responsible for the pain we have caused them. Meeting the obligation demanded of us by the millions of individuals we have caused to suffer requires developing a liberatory anti-war praxis informed by distinct ethical and political commitments. While neither exhaustive nor exclusive of other potentially complementary orientations and activities, I ground liberatory anti-war praxis in: (1) Commitment to praxis as a route to liberation; (2) Perpetual unsettledness toward the cruelties of war; (3) Ethical sensitivity to the victims of empire; (4) Dedication to facilitating liberatory peace; (5) Engagement with questions of pacifism, nonviolence, and liberatory self-defense. I locate liberatory anti-war praxis in the pacifist tradition, however anti-war praxis need not commit to absolute nonviolence. Each context is unique, and it is the prerogative of those suffering cruelty to pursue their own strategies and tactics of liberation.","PeriodicalId":44237,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Political Theory","volume":"19 1","pages":"269 - 291"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48455467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-23DOI: 10.1177/17550882221115456
R. Hjorth
This paper shows that while there seems to be more or less a general acceptance for plurality as a condition of world politics and at least a vague commitment to a pluralist ideal, the challenge remains to formulate a fruitful account of international pluralism. While dominating approaches to international theory present international pluralism as essentially a by-product and instrumental, this paper suggest an alternative way to conceive of international pluralism when defending the ancient concept variety as a better guide to approach both the understanding of plurality as the human condition and the notion of international pluralism. The paper concludes that it is preferable to accept a variety of pluralist conceptions rather than go on searching for a theoretical conception standing above the controversy; accepting pluralism in a sense involves rejecting just one version of pluralism.
{"title":"Varieties of international pluralism","authors":"R. Hjorth","doi":"10.1177/17550882221115456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17550882221115456","url":null,"abstract":"This paper shows that while there seems to be more or less a general acceptance for plurality as a condition of world politics and at least a vague commitment to a pluralist ideal, the challenge remains to formulate a fruitful account of international pluralism. While dominating approaches to international theory present international pluralism as essentially a by-product and instrumental, this paper suggest an alternative way to conceive of international pluralism when defending the ancient concept variety as a better guide to approach both the understanding of plurality as the human condition and the notion of international pluralism. The paper concludes that it is preferable to accept a variety of pluralist conceptions rather than go on searching for a theoretical conception standing above the controversy; accepting pluralism in a sense involves rejecting just one version of pluralism.","PeriodicalId":44237,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Political Theory","volume":"19 1","pages":"183 - 199"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43903256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-23DOI: 10.1177/17550882221116924
Janne Mende
International studies investigate the governance authority of state versus non-state actors in terms of their public or private authority. However, the public–private distinction does not sufficiently capture the variety of governance actors, or the forms of their authority, beyond that distinction. Focussing on businesses, this paper argues that certain governance actors assume public and private roles, as well as a third category of roles it calls ‘societal’ that transcend notions of public and private. To understand these roles and how they affect governance authority, this paper treats the public–private relationship as mediated and extends it with the ‘societal’ category, then translates it into the concept of business authority, which constitutes a particular form of governance authority alongside public and private authority. It does so by operationalising governance authority as a triadic concept composed of power, legitimacy and a connection to public interests. In all three components, business authority escapes the binary distinction between public and private without simply merging the two.
{"title":"Business authority in global governance: Companies beyond public and private roles","authors":"Janne Mende","doi":"10.1177/17550882221116924","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17550882221116924","url":null,"abstract":"International studies investigate the governance authority of state versus non-state actors in terms of their public or private authority. However, the public–private distinction does not sufficiently capture the variety of governance actors, or the forms of their authority, beyond that distinction. Focussing on businesses, this paper argues that certain governance actors assume public and private roles, as well as a third category of roles it calls ‘societal’ that transcend notions of public and private. To understand these roles and how they affect governance authority, this paper treats the public–private relationship as mediated and extends it with the ‘societal’ category, then translates it into the concept of business authority, which constitutes a particular form of governance authority alongside public and private authority. It does so by operationalising governance authority as a triadic concept composed of power, legitimacy and a connection to public interests. In all three components, business authority escapes the binary distinction between public and private without simply merging the two.","PeriodicalId":44237,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Political Theory","volume":"19 1","pages":"200 - 220"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42632687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-01DOI: 10.1177/17550882221111195
John Williams
Through interaction with decolonial IR this paper develops a research agenda extending recent English School (ES) work engaging a Global IR agenda. It argues recent developments in ES work that look to world history and which substantially improve ES accounts of “primary institutions” of international society can be further enhanced by decolonial concepts and methods. By focusing on war as a major primary institution of international society, and specifically Counterinsurgency and Counter-Terrorism, the paper shows how “worlding” as a decolonial approach can extend ES theory’s critical reach. Key benefits include enriching its account of political space and identifying ways to open research to perspectives and insights from marginalized populations with deep knowledge and understanding of war through lived experience. Decolonial research methods and associated distinctive ontological and epistemological claims can open ES research to additional world histories its present methods close, further invigorating the principal sociological approach to theorizing international relations.
{"title":"Worlding war as a primary institution of international society","authors":"John Williams","doi":"10.1177/17550882221111195","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17550882221111195","url":null,"abstract":"Through interaction with decolonial IR this paper develops a research agenda extending recent English School (ES) work engaging a Global IR agenda. It argues recent developments in ES work that look to world history and which substantially improve ES accounts of “primary institutions” of international society can be further enhanced by decolonial concepts and methods. By focusing on war as a major primary institution of international society, and specifically Counterinsurgency and Counter-Terrorism, the paper shows how “worlding” as a decolonial approach can extend ES theory’s critical reach. Key benefits include enriching its account of political space and identifying ways to open research to perspectives and insights from marginalized populations with deep knowledge and understanding of war through lived experience. Decolonial research methods and associated distinctive ontological and epistemological claims can open ES research to additional world histories its present methods close, further invigorating the principal sociological approach to theorizing international relations.","PeriodicalId":44237,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Political Theory","volume":"19 1","pages":"87 - 107"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41479032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-09DOI: 10.1177/17550882221103900
G. Brown, Joshua Hobbs
It is often argued that cosmopolitanism faces unique motivational constraints, asking more of individuals than they are able to give. This ‘motivational problem’ is held to pose a significant challenge to cosmopolitanism, as it appears unable to transform its moral demands into motivated political action. This article develops a novel response to the motivational problem facing cosmopolitanism, arguing that self-interest, alongside appeals to sentiment, can play a vital and neglected, transitional role in moving towards an expanded cosmopolitical condition. The article explicates the ‘motivational problem’, analyses the relationship between self-interest and sentimental cosmopolitanism in addressing it, and develops a series of claims that self-interest can be one important component in what we label as ‘transitional cosmopolitanism’. In doing so, we argue that self-interested motivations can be compatible with sentiment-based approaches, rendering them more plausible. In addition, two expected critiques of self-interested ‘transitional cosmopolitanism’ are tackled: (A) That it cannot address feasibility constraints, and (B) That self-interested motivations cannot meet what an ‘authentic’ cosmopolitanism entails. We refute and challenge these critiques and outline three conditions in which self-interest can advance a transitional form of cosmopolitanism, while also being compatible with cosmopolitanism writ large.
{"title":"Self-interest, transitional cosmopolitanism and the motivational problem","authors":"G. Brown, Joshua Hobbs","doi":"10.1177/17550882221103900","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17550882221103900","url":null,"abstract":"It is often argued that cosmopolitanism faces unique motivational constraints, asking more of individuals than they are able to give. This ‘motivational problem’ is held to pose a significant challenge to cosmopolitanism, as it appears unable to transform its moral demands into motivated political action. This article develops a novel response to the motivational problem facing cosmopolitanism, arguing that self-interest, alongside appeals to sentiment, can play a vital and neglected, transitional role in moving towards an expanded cosmopolitical condition. The article explicates the ‘motivational problem’, analyses the relationship between self-interest and sentimental cosmopolitanism in addressing it, and develops a series of claims that self-interest can be one important component in what we label as ‘transitional cosmopolitanism’. In doing so, we argue that self-interested motivations can be compatible with sentiment-based approaches, rendering them more plausible. In addition, two expected critiques of self-interested ‘transitional cosmopolitanism’ are tackled: (A) That it cannot address feasibility constraints, and (B) That self-interested motivations cannot meet what an ‘authentic’ cosmopolitanism entails. We refute and challenge these critiques and outline three conditions in which self-interest can advance a transitional form of cosmopolitanism, while also being compatible with cosmopolitanism writ large.","PeriodicalId":44237,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Political Theory","volume":"19 1","pages":"64 - 86"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44098240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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