Pub Date : 2022-10-19DOI: 10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.8.4
Patrícia Dudíková
{"title":"(Post)človek (post)človeku vlkom: Problémy priateľstva ako kohézneho prvku v spoločnosti postľudí","authors":"Patrícia Dudíková","doi":"10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.8.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.8.4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44340,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFIA","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49230346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-19DOI: 10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.8.2
Lukáš H. Zámečník
The paper investigates possible forms of explanatory monism for the cases of non-causal explanations (primarily Reutlinger 2018; Woodward 2018). In the conceptual analysis, the advantages and weaknesses of the counterfactual view of explanation are examined. Although this conception of explanation provides a common explanatory framework, it cannot sufficiently take into account the specificity of individual nomic generalizations and, in the non-causal case, it is difficult to construct a non-interventionist form of counterfactual. Therefore, the paper offers a return to the unificacionist view of explanation (primarily Kitcher 1981), which is a type of explanatory monism, does not suffer from the men-tioned problems, and also offers a solution to the problem of asymmetry of non-causal explanations.
{"title":"Explanační monismus u nekauzálních vysvětlení","authors":"Lukáš H. Zámečník","doi":"10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.8.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.8.2","url":null,"abstract":"The paper investigates possible forms of explanatory monism for the cases of non-causal explanations (primarily Reutlinger 2018; Woodward 2018). In the conceptual analysis, the advantages and weaknesses of the counterfactual view of explanation are examined. Although this conception of explanation provides a common explanatory framework, it cannot sufficiently take into account the specificity of individual nomic generalizations and, in the non-causal case, it is difficult to construct a non-interventionist form of counterfactual. Therefore, the paper offers a return to the unificacionist view of explanation (primarily Kitcher 1981), which is a type of explanatory monism, does not suffer from the men-tioned problems, and also offers a solution to the problem of asymmetry of non-causal explanations.","PeriodicalId":44340,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFIA","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44367018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-19DOI: 10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.8.3
Mohammad Sobhan Jalilian
In this paper, I try to offer a full-fledged defense of principle-based ethics against moral particularism. My discussions not only refute particularists’ allegations against moral generalism but also provide a positive rationale for a principle-based approach in ethics. By borrowing insights from Brandom’s and Peregrin’s normative pragmatism, I describe the fundamental roles of moral principles. In my view, moral principles constitute morality, and they can function as default reasons in our moral deliberations. Moreover, I argue that my principle-based conception of ethics has advantages over particularism since it explains the phenomenological experience and covers basic intuitions in the moral domain that particularists have difficulty explaining.
{"title":"A Full-Fledged Defense of Principle-Based Ethics against Moral Particularism","authors":"Mohammad Sobhan Jalilian","doi":"10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.8.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.8.3","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I try to offer a full-fledged defense of principle-based ethics against moral particularism. My discussions not only refute particularists’ allegations against moral generalism but also provide a positive rationale for a principle-based approach in ethics. By borrowing insights from Brandom’s and Peregrin’s normative pragmatism, I describe the fundamental roles of moral principles. In my view, moral principles constitute morality, and they can function as default reasons in our moral deliberations. Moreover, I argue that my principle-based conception of ethics has advantages over particularism since it explains the phenomenological experience and covers basic intuitions in the moral domain that particularists have difficulty explaining.","PeriodicalId":44340,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFIA","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43506668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-17DOI: 10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.7.7
T. Sedová
{"title":"Normatívnosť ako kľúč k človeku: medzi darvinovskou evolúciou a normativitou – nad knihou Jaroslava Peregrina: Člověk jako normativní tvor","authors":"T. Sedová","doi":"10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.7.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.7.7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44340,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFIA","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43684068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-17DOI: 10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.7.4
Dalibor Makovník
Is Euler’s Explanation of the Non-traversability of Königs-berg’s Bridges Symmetric or Asymmetric? 77, 2022, No 7, pp. 531 – 544 In this article I will focus on the analysis of a scientific explanation of an empi-rical event that has at least three different incompatible interpretations / recon-structions. This example in philosophical and scientific literature is known as Euler's explanation. However, this work will only follow the differences be-tween Reutlinger’s and Lange’s and Woodwardʼs reconstruction. The paper at-tempts to show that Euler’s explanation can only by reconstructed as an asym-metric non-causal explanation. It does so with the help of Lange’s and Wood-ward’s main key ideas of their theories of explanation. Subsequently these ideas are put up against Reutlinger’s conclusion that Euler’s explanation constitutes a symmetric non-causal explanation. In the end the paper argues that ultimately this is a wrong conclusion because Reutlinger’s account omitted certain aspects of Euler’s explanation.
{"title":"Je Eulerova explanácia nemožnosti prechodu kráľoveckých mostov symetrická alebo asymetrická?","authors":"Dalibor Makovník","doi":"10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.7.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.7.4","url":null,"abstract":"Is Euler’s Explanation of the Non-traversability of Königs-berg’s Bridges Symmetric or Asymmetric? 77, 2022, No 7, pp. 531 – 544 In this article I will focus on the analysis of a scientific explanation of an empi-rical event that has at least three different incompatible interpretations / recon-structions. This example in philosophical and scientific literature is known as Euler's explanation. However, this work will only follow the differences be-tween Reutlinger’s and Lange’s and Woodwardʼs reconstruction. The paper at-tempts to show that Euler’s explanation can only by reconstructed as an asym-metric non-causal explanation. It does so with the help of Lange’s and Wood-ward’s main key ideas of their theories of explanation. Subsequently these ideas are put up against Reutlinger’s conclusion that Euler’s explanation constitutes a symmetric non-causal explanation. In the end the paper argues that ultimately this is a wrong conclusion because Reutlinger’s account omitted certain aspects of Euler’s explanation.","PeriodicalId":44340,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFIA","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45056499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-17DOI: 10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.7.6
Zlatica Plašienková, Michal Bizoň
{"title":"Obzretie za životom a dielom Teodora Münza","authors":"Zlatica Plašienková, Michal Bizoň","doi":"10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.7.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.7.6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44340,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFIA","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43155176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-17DOI: 10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.7.1
Lukáš Bielik
{"title":"Argument a jeho podoby vo filozofii vedy","authors":"Lukáš Bielik","doi":"10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.7.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.7.1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44340,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFIA","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43197603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-17DOI: 10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.7.3
Dominik Sadloň
The presented paper advocates the unified account of semantic information, misinformation, and disinformation (3I) which uses “semantic correspondence” and “intention” understood as their main distinctive features. It is argued that the pro-posed approach is neutral about the misleadingness of messages and their meaning and about the evaluation of truthfulness of factual sentences. The suggested model also comprises a wider variety of language expressions than existing conceptions while securing a simple, intuitive but subtle explanation of its individual compo-nents and related issues. Primarily, it leaves enough space for the distinction be-tween 1) “relativistic” approach to 3I, which mainly focuses on pragmatic aspects of communication in dynamic multi-agent systems, and 2) special epistemological procedures, which often do not presuppose such a multi-agent environment and work with 3I in “absolute” terms.
{"title":"Sémantická informácia, misinformácia a dezinformácia","authors":"Dominik Sadloň","doi":"10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.7.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.7.3","url":null,"abstract":"The presented paper advocates the unified account of semantic information, misinformation, and disinformation (3I) which uses “semantic correspondence” and “intention” understood as their main distinctive features. It is argued that the pro-posed approach is neutral about the misleadingness of messages and their meaning and about the evaluation of truthfulness of factual sentences. The suggested model also comprises a wider variety of language expressions than existing conceptions while securing a simple, intuitive but subtle explanation of its individual compo-nents and related issues. Primarily, it leaves enough space for the distinction be-tween 1) “relativistic” approach to 3I, which mainly focuses on pragmatic aspects of communication in dynamic multi-agent systems, and 2) special epistemological procedures, which often do not presuppose such a multi-agent environment and work with 3I in “absolute” terms.","PeriodicalId":44340,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFIA","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70010372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-17DOI: 10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.7.2
T. Sedová
The study investigates the problems of the nature of concepts in social sciences and humanities. It is based on Gallieʼs thesis that these are essentially contested concepts that immanently include a value aspect, which makes them different from the concepts of natural sciences. Based on the characteristics of such concepts and their exemplification (capital, culture, human nature, human dignity), their cona-tive, normative aspect is emphasized, which makes them significantly different from the concepts of empirical natural sciences. The article explores the open tex-ture of empirical concepts and outlines the role of fictions. The conclusion provides a critical reflection of the trend of naturalization of concepts and its consequences for this area of knowledge.
{"title":"K otázke povahy pojmov v sociálnom a humanitnom poznaní","authors":"T. Sedová","doi":"10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.7.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.7.2","url":null,"abstract":"The study investigates the problems of the nature of concepts in social sciences and humanities. It is based on Gallieʼs thesis that these are essentially contested concepts that immanently include a value aspect, which makes them different from the concepts of natural sciences. Based on the characteristics of such concepts and their exemplification (capital, culture, human nature, human dignity), their cona-tive, normative aspect is emphasized, which makes them significantly different from the concepts of empirical natural sciences. The article explores the open tex-ture of empirical concepts and outlines the role of fictions. The conclusion provides a critical reflection of the trend of naturalization of concepts and its consequences for this area of knowledge.","PeriodicalId":44340,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFIA","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43800603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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