Pub Date : 2022-07-20DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2022.2101134
Sidra Shahid
ABSTRACT Contemporary accounts of evil attempt to identify features or properties that transform an act of wrongdoing into an act of evil. What is missing from the discussion, however, is a phenomenology of evil that engages with the standpoint of the subject that undergoes evil. This paper discusses basic themes for a phenomenology of evil through a critical comparison between Hannah Arendt and Jean Améry’s respective conceptions of evil. Central for this discussion is a claim Arendt and Améry share: evil destroys subjectivity and undermines trust in the world. Furthermore, both argue that the perpetrators of evil inhabit a distorted moral framework. They differ, however, insofar as Améry foregrounds the subject that undergoes evil, a standpoint that remains tacit in Arendt’s account. Recounting his torture by the Gestapo, Améry reveals how embodied subjects experiences evil and how it is in light of these experiences that perpetrators of evil should be understood.
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Pub Date : 2022-07-05DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2022.2090264
Aengus Daly
ABSTRACT This paper explores the relation between philosophy and politics in Being and Time (1927) starting from Heidegger’s suggestion that we can understand some of the linguistic and conceptual difficulties in his investigation by comparing Thucydides’ narrative prose with two texts by Plato and Aristotle. Far from simply signalling Heidegger’s proximity to Plato and Aristotle and an apolitical disdain for human affairs, carrying out and contextualizing this exercise within his interpretations of ancient philosophy shows the difficulties lie in formulating an ontology of historical, political existence. I then argue that Heidegger’s reference in Plato’s Sophist (1924-5) to a political speech in Thucydides elucidates the kind of existentiell situations underlying his understanding of authentic historicality. Situating this reference within Heidegger’s discussions of the possibilities of political speech reveals marked similarities to both phenomena thematized existentially in Being and Time and the most violent expressions of his völkisch politics in the 1930s.
{"title":"Deciding the Fate of the State: Heidegger, Thucydides and the Boden of Ontology","authors":"Aengus Daly","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2022.2090264","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2022.2090264","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper explores the relation between philosophy and politics in Being and Time (1927) starting from Heidegger’s suggestion that we can understand some of the linguistic and conceptual difficulties in his investigation by comparing Thucydides’ narrative prose with two texts by Plato and Aristotle. Far from simply signalling Heidegger’s proximity to Plato and Aristotle and an apolitical disdain for human affairs, carrying out and contextualizing this exercise within his interpretations of ancient philosophy shows the difficulties lie in formulating an ontology of historical, political existence. I then argue that Heidegger’s reference in Plato’s Sophist (1924-5) to a political speech in Thucydides elucidates the kind of existentiell situations underlying his understanding of authentic historicality. Situating this reference within Heidegger’s discussions of the possibilities of political speech reveals marked similarities to both phenomena thematized existentially in Being and Time and the most violent expressions of his völkisch politics in the 1930s.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"53 1","pages":"440 - 454"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43403870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-16DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2022.2085520
Magnus Ferguson
ABSTRACT Although Arendt is widely cited as an early proponent of what is sometimes called “forward-looking” or “future-looking” responsibility, scholars have not dwelled at length on Arendt’s claim that the experience of thaumazein – in her view, a form of wonder intermixed with horror – can serve as the impetus for taking on expansive political responsibilities. This article has two principal aims: first, to reconstruct an implicit theory of wonder from Arendt’s numerous references to thaumazein, and second, to further develop an account of thaumazein as an affective, enabling condition for revising the scope of one’s responsibilities. Connecting Arendtian thaumazein to contemporary scholarship on the role of wonder and emotion in politics, I argue that thaumazein is a distinctive emotion with both political and existential salience, and that it can prompt those who experience it to scrutinize and reimagine inherited conceptual and political frameworks, including moral and legal frameworks for responsibility.
{"title":"‘Wonder at What Is as It Is’: Arendtian Wonder as the Occasion for Political Responsibility","authors":"Magnus Ferguson","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2022.2085520","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2022.2085520","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Although Arendt is widely cited as an early proponent of what is sometimes called “forward-looking” or “future-looking” responsibility, scholars have not dwelled at length on Arendt’s claim that the experience of thaumazein – in her view, a form of wonder intermixed with horror – can serve as the impetus for taking on expansive political responsibilities. This article has two principal aims: first, to reconstruct an implicit theory of wonder from Arendt’s numerous references to thaumazein, and second, to further develop an account of thaumazein as an affective, enabling condition for revising the scope of one’s responsibilities. Connecting Arendtian thaumazein to contemporary scholarship on the role of wonder and emotion in politics, I argue that thaumazein is a distinctive emotion with both political and existential salience, and that it can prompt those who experience it to scrutinize and reimagine inherited conceptual and political frameworks, including moral and legal frameworks for responsibility.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"53 1","pages":"261 - 275"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46984447","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-14DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2022.2087032
Keith Crome, D. Meacham
We are pleased to publish in this issue of the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology two articles submitted to the first Wolfe Mays Essay Prize competition – the winning article and a runner-up – alongside an introduction from Jessie Stainer to the theme of the 2021 competition: “engaged phenomenology”. The award is named in memory of Wolfe Mays who was an original member of the British Society for Phenomenology (established in 1967), and the founding editor of the Society’s journal which he began in 1970, and which he continued to edit until his death in 2005. Through his devotion to the Society and its journal, Wolfe made a remarkable contribution to the establishment of and development of phenomenology — and continental philosophy more broadly — in Britain. Without his efforts, phenomenology would not have the vital presence it has in the UK. Above all, Wolfe was concerned with the furtherance of the study of phenomenology and its continued development and enrichment as a way of approaching the deepest and most enduring problems of human existence. The Wolfe Mays Essay Prize is awarded to an outstanding submission on a topic chosen annually by the awarding committee. It is open to PhD students and Early Career Researchers who are members of the BSP. The prize marks not just Wolfe Mays’ contribution to the Society, but also, by recognizing the work of new scholars, reflects Wolf’s indefatigable commitment to the future of phenomenology as a discipline. The winning essay is “Overcoming Hermeneutical Injustice in Mental Health: A Role for Critical Phenomenology” by Rosa Ritunnano, and the runner up “‘Wonder at what is as it is’: Arendtian Wonder as the Occasion for Political Responsibility” by Magnus Ferguson. Both essays provide compelling, though different, articulations of the idea of engaged phenomenology. We are also pleased to take this occasion to announcement the theme of the next iteration of the competition: “collective memory”. We welcome submissions from early career researchers (currently working towards of within 5 years of finishing a PhD) that address this theme from within the scope of the journal. The deadline for submission is March 30th 2023.
{"title":"Editor’s Introduction","authors":"Keith Crome, D. Meacham","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2022.2087032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2022.2087032","url":null,"abstract":"We are pleased to publish in this issue of the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology two articles submitted to the first Wolfe Mays Essay Prize competition – the winning article and a runner-up – alongside an introduction from Jessie Stainer to the theme of the 2021 competition: “engaged phenomenology”. The award is named in memory of Wolfe Mays who was an original member of the British Society for Phenomenology (established in 1967), and the founding editor of the Society’s journal which he began in 1970, and which he continued to edit until his death in 2005. Through his devotion to the Society and its journal, Wolfe made a remarkable contribution to the establishment of and development of phenomenology — and continental philosophy more broadly — in Britain. Without his efforts, phenomenology would not have the vital presence it has in the UK. Above all, Wolfe was concerned with the furtherance of the study of phenomenology and its continued development and enrichment as a way of approaching the deepest and most enduring problems of human existence. The Wolfe Mays Essay Prize is awarded to an outstanding submission on a topic chosen annually by the awarding committee. It is open to PhD students and Early Career Researchers who are members of the BSP. The prize marks not just Wolfe Mays’ contribution to the Society, but also, by recognizing the work of new scholars, reflects Wolf’s indefatigable commitment to the future of phenomenology as a discipline. The winning essay is “Overcoming Hermeneutical Injustice in Mental Health: A Role for Critical Phenomenology” by Rosa Ritunnano, and the runner up “‘Wonder at what is as it is’: Arendtian Wonder as the Occasion for Political Responsibility” by Magnus Ferguson. Both essays provide compelling, though different, articulations of the idea of engaged phenomenology. We are also pleased to take this occasion to announcement the theme of the next iteration of the competition: “collective memory”. We welcome submissions from early career researchers (currently working towards of within 5 years of finishing a PhD) that address this theme from within the scope of the journal. The deadline for submission is March 30th 2023.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"53 1","pages":"225 - 225"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48346328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-15DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2022.2076136
Jan Halák
ABSTRACT This study aims to corroborate Merleau-Ponty’s interpretations of fundamental ideas from Saussure’s linguistics by linking them to works that were independently elaborated by Jan Mukařovský, Czech structuralist aesthetician and literary theorist. I provide a comparative analysis of the two authors’ theories of language and their interpretations of thought as fundamentally determined by language. On this basis, I investigate how they conceive linguistic innovation and its translation into changes in the constituted language and other social codes and institutions. I explain how they elaborate on Saussure’s idea of language as a system of oppositions by interpreting cultural innovation as a systematic variation of pre-established social norms and, similarly, linguistic innovation as gesturing within language. Connectedly, I show how Mukařovský’s works help clarify Merleau-Ponty’s focus on the gestural dimension of language. By discussing the two thinkers’ arguments in favour of linguistic innovation, I explore what could be called phenomenological limits of structuralism.
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Pub Date : 2022-05-13DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2021.1997551
Panagiotis Thanassas
ABSTRACT When Gadamer elaborates his conception of philosophical hermeneutics as a transcendental inquiry, he appeals to Aristotle’s practical philosophy as a “model”, which can elucidate his own conceptualization of understanding as intrinsically bound to the specific circumstances of every interpretation. The explicit formulation of the analogy between Aristotelian ethics and philosophical hermeneutics provides a framework that clarifies Gadamer’s principal intention; it also reveals some of the crucial tensions inherent in the Aristotelian conception of practical philosophy and its relation to praxis and phronêsis. In the 1970s, however, Gadamer suggests a practical transformation of hermeneutics, claiming for it the role of an “heir of the older tradition of practical philosophy”. Against Gadamer’s late “turn”, construed as a deviation from the initial analogy, I defend Aristotle’s practical philosophy as an exemplary model for philosophical hermeneutics, but I also maintain that the two projects pursue distinct epistemic goals.
{"title":"Gadamer and Aristotle. Problems of a Hermeneutic Appropriation","authors":"Panagiotis Thanassas","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2021.1997551","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2021.1997551","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 When Gadamer elaborates his conception of philosophical hermeneutics as a transcendental inquiry, he appeals to Aristotle’s practical philosophy as a “model”, which can elucidate his own conceptualization of understanding as intrinsically bound to the specific circumstances of every interpretation. The explicit formulation of the analogy between Aristotelian ethics and philosophical hermeneutics provides a framework that clarifies Gadamer’s principal intention; it also reveals some of the crucial tensions inherent in the Aristotelian conception of practical philosophy and its relation to praxis and phronêsis. In the 1970s, however, Gadamer suggests a practical transformation of hermeneutics, claiming for it the role of an “heir of the older tradition of practical philosophy”. Against Gadamer’s late “turn”, construed as a deviation from the initial analogy, I defend Aristotle’s practical philosophy as an exemplary model for philosophical hermeneutics, but I also maintain that the two projects pursue distinct epistemic goals.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"53 1","pages":"335 - 351"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46233113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-09DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2022.2073247
Daniil Koloskov
ABSTRACT In this article, I will argue that while Marion’s criticism of Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology is in many ways sound, Marion remains bound to the conceptual opposition that existential phenomenology has successfully overcome. Namely, I will argue that Marion remains dependent upon the transcendental dilemma according to which we must rely on the strict differentiation between explanans and explanandum. Marion sees no way of departing from Heidegger’s project other than reversing the order of explanation and switching the places of the explanans and explanandum, which means that phenomena start appearing as explanans. I will demonstrate how existential phenomenology has overcome this conceptual dilemma, and then I will argue that we could make a much better account of saturated phenomena, if we ground our insights in the idea of being-in-the-world.
{"title":"Fundamental Ontology, Saturated Phenomena and Transcendental Dilemma","authors":"Daniil Koloskov","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2022.2073247","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2022.2073247","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this article, I will argue that while Marion’s criticism of Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology is in many ways sound, Marion remains bound to the conceptual opposition that existential phenomenology has successfully overcome. Namely, I will argue that Marion remains dependent upon the transcendental dilemma according to which we must rely on the strict differentiation between explanans and explanandum. Marion sees no way of departing from Heidegger’s project other than reversing the order of explanation and switching the places of the explanans and explanandum, which means that phenomena start appearing as explanans. I will demonstrate how existential phenomenology has overcome this conceptual dilemma, and then I will argue that we could make a much better account of saturated phenomena, if we ground our insights in the idea of being-in-the-world.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"53 1","pages":"395 - 414"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42581828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-06DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2022.2066969
Jennifer Allender
{"title":"Beyond the Anthropological Difference","authors":"Jennifer Allender","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2022.2066969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2022.2066969","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"53 1","pages":"505 - 507"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45084039","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2022.2055519
Line Ryberg Ingerslev, Karl Mertens
How do actions and intentions come into being and how are they shaped over time? These questions entail an implicit critique of those theories of action that downplay or overlook the processual aspects of actions, such as in cases where our knowledge of our intentions might not or not yet be fully formed. By focusing on this aspect, in particular, this special issue attends to contemporary insights that shed light on the existing theoretical debate on action. According to Elisabeth Anscombe and Donald Davidson, intentions play the decisive role in two respects when it comes to deciding whether something is an action. First, intentions are the hallmark of the description-dependent determination of a behaviour as an action. Actions are events that are “intentional under some description”. Whereas an action can have many descriptions, it is important to Anscombe and Davidson that the agent is aware of some such description that makes her or his doing intentional: “to say that a man knows he is doing X is to give a description of what he is doing under which he knows it”. Second, intentions are the reference point in the rationalization of action. In stating intentions, agents respond to the question: what did you do? Accordingly, intentions function as reasons for actions in the sense that an agent refers to intentions when asked the question “why did you do X?”. Typically, forms of comportment such as bodily reflexes and automatic behaviour are not considered actions, as they are not intentional under any description. When the why-question finds no application, we no longer speak of intentional action. A third reason why intentions are of central importance in the theory of action can be added. According to the standard theory of action, intentions, practical reasoning, and the interpretative principle of charity help us account for the generation of actions. Larger contexts of extended actions can be individualized and understood as units with the help of overarching intentions. In this way, intentions can be used, on the one hand, to constitute actions that have not yet been completed. Thus, I can mark out the unity of an action by saying, for example, “I intend to tidy up my room”. Similarly, we refer prospectively (ex ante) to future units of action, as when we plan to take a trip to Italy, study philosophy, etc. On the other hand, intentions also serve ex post attributions of complex courses of action, such as when we talk about Röntgen discovering Xrays or person A planning to murder and murdering person B, etc. To summarize, according to the standard theory: (i) actions are characterized as doings that are
{"title":"Shaping Actions and Intentions – Introduction","authors":"Line Ryberg Ingerslev, Karl Mertens","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2022.2055519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2022.2055519","url":null,"abstract":"How do actions and intentions come into being and how are they shaped over time? These questions entail an implicit critique of those theories of action that downplay or overlook the processual aspects of actions, such as in cases where our knowledge of our intentions might not or not yet be fully formed. By focusing on this aspect, in particular, this special issue attends to contemporary insights that shed light on the existing theoretical debate on action. According to Elisabeth Anscombe and Donald Davidson, intentions play the decisive role in two respects when it comes to deciding whether something is an action. First, intentions are the hallmark of the description-dependent determination of a behaviour as an action. Actions are events that are “intentional under some description”. Whereas an action can have many descriptions, it is important to Anscombe and Davidson that the agent is aware of some such description that makes her or his doing intentional: “to say that a man knows he is doing X is to give a description of what he is doing under which he knows it”. Second, intentions are the reference point in the rationalization of action. In stating intentions, agents respond to the question: what did you do? Accordingly, intentions function as reasons for actions in the sense that an agent refers to intentions when asked the question “why did you do X?”. Typically, forms of comportment such as bodily reflexes and automatic behaviour are not considered actions, as they are not intentional under any description. When the why-question finds no application, we no longer speak of intentional action. A third reason why intentions are of central importance in the theory of action can be added. According to the standard theory of action, intentions, practical reasoning, and the interpretative principle of charity help us account for the generation of actions. Larger contexts of extended actions can be individualized and understood as units with the help of overarching intentions. In this way, intentions can be used, on the one hand, to constitute actions that have not yet been completed. Thus, I can mark out the unity of an action by saying, for example, “I intend to tidy up my room”. Similarly, we refer prospectively (ex ante) to future units of action, as when we plan to take a trip to Italy, study philosophy, etc. On the other hand, intentions also serve ex post attributions of complex courses of action, such as when we talk about Röntgen discovering Xrays or person A planning to murder and murdering person B, etc. To summarize, according to the standard theory: (i) actions are characterized as doings that are","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"53 1","pages":"111 - 117"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48240235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2022.2055790
Stefano Micali
ABSTRACT This paper addresses the transformation of subjectivity in trauma by considering recent psychopathological research, especially in relation to the works of Judith Herman and Bessel van der Kolk. It particularly focus on the omnipresent character of trauma in distinguishing two forms of dissociation, a primary and a secondary one. The analysis of this omnipresent character sheds light on the crucial therapeutic question concerning the integration of a traumatic event into the symbolic order.
{"title":"Being Acted Upon by a Traumatic Event: A Phenomenological Description of Altered Temporality","authors":"Stefano Micali","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2022.2055790","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2022.2055790","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper addresses the transformation of subjectivity in trauma by considering recent psychopathological research, especially in relation to the works of Judith Herman and Bessel van der Kolk. It particularly focus on the omnipresent character of trauma in distinguishing two forms of dissociation, a primary and a secondary one. The analysis of this omnipresent character sheds light on the crucial therapeutic question concerning the integration of a traumatic event into the symbolic order.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"53 1","pages":"210 - 224"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41684426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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