Pub Date : 2020-10-15DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2020.1834334
S. Geniusas
ABSTRACT As a phenomenological concept, absorption refers to the ego's capacity to experience the world from a displaced standpoint. The paper traces the emergence and development of this concept in Husserl's and Fink's writings and demonstrates that while Fink conceived of absorption as a class of intuitive re-presentations, Husserl transformed it into a limit phenomenon, whose analysis calls for a new method. A careful study of absorption compels us to rethink fundamental themes in phenomenology: it forces us to broaden our understanding of sensuous intuition, reconceptualize the nature of self-awareness, stretch the limits of intuitive re-presentations, and rethink the portrayal of phenomenology as a metaphysics of presence. The paper demonstrates that absorbed experiences are characterized by a specific form of self-awareness, that they constitute a distinct type of intuitive re-presentations, that a new method is needed to investigate them, and that their analysis leads towards a phenomenology of the unconscious.
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Pub Date : 2020-10-11DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2020.1829639
Andrew Inkpin
Although it was never the central focus of his philosophical interests, Merleau-Ponty is one of few philosophers to conceive painting as having an exemplary role not merely as a form of art but mor...
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Pub Date : 2020-09-30DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2020.1821579
D. Moran
ABSTRACT I document Husserl’s growing interest in the foundational character of Greek philosophy for Western culture and show what is unique about Husserl’s appropriation of certain Greek thinkers and concepts. Specifically, I explain Husserl’s idiosyncratic appropriation of key Greek terms as original building blocks to articulate his own intuitive insights and review critically Husserl’s original appropriation of the history of Greek philosophy as a way of situating his transcendental phenomenology within the Western (“European”) intellectual tradition. Husserl adopted a consistent view of Greek philosophy throughout his life but deepened his engagement in later years. Initially little interested in the history of philosophy as such, he came to see the “breakthrough” into the theoretical attitude as decisive for the development of Western culture. The Skeptics’ epoché is revitalized by Husserl as a permanent way of challenging the dogmatic naivete of life in the natural attitude, motivating the transformation to theoria.
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Pub Date : 2020-09-18DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2020.1823058
I. Moore
{"title":"Review of Ilit Ferber, Language Pangs: On Pain and the Origin of Language","authors":"I. Moore","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2020.1823058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2020.1823058","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"52 1","pages":"258 - 260"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00071773.2020.1823058","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44976715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-14DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2020.1819166
J. Kowalewski
ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to defend the thesis, found across the works of Edmund Husserl, that the most fundamental level of subjectivity – the so-called absolute consciousness – is given in time as an immediate unity. In order to do so, I first consider Martin Hägglund’s critique of the Husserlian absolute consciousness. My subsequent answer to Hägglund has two parts: firstly, I argue that Hägglund’s own account of subjectivity is contradictory; secondly, I offer a model of absolute consciousness impervious to Hägglund’s critique. Drawing on Husserl’s “Bernau Manuscripts,” I demonstrate that time is, in fact, compatible with the notions of immediacy and unity, and that a correct account of the Husserlian absolute consciousness recognizes the latter to be given as a temporally differentiated immediate unity.
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Pub Date : 2020-09-10DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2020.1814678
G. Petropoulos
ABSTRACT I wish to show that Heidegger’s contradictory accounts of Plato are not the result of a confusion on Heidegger’s part, but a showcase of his complex relation to Plato. I attempt to prove my point by focusing on Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato’s allegory of the cave in his 1942 essay “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth”, and his lecture courses during the 30’s. I argue that whereas the former work emphasizes the way in which Plato prefigures a forgetfulness of an original relation between truth and Being, the latter show signs of a positive appropriation of Plato’s work. By the end of this paper I hope to have shown that Heidegger’s reading of Plato cannot be reduced to a critique or condemnation. I argue, rather, that Plato is for Heidegger a transitional thinker who is situated at the centre of a struggle between an originary and a derivative conception of truth.
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Pub Date : 2020-08-18DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2020.1806688
J. Bagby
ABSTRACT In “Bergson and Intensive Magnitude: Dismantling his Critique”, Florian Vermeiren argues that Bergson’s critique of intensive magnitude in Time and Free Will is inconsistent with his later philosophy, and even inconsistent with the role of a “difference in degrees of freedom” in Time and Free Will. I argue that it is rather Vermeiren’s analysis which mischaracterizes Bergson’s critique and therefore the interpretation of an inconsistency cannot stand. In the first two sections I reevaluate Bergson’s critique, showing what, according to Bergson, are the good and bad senses of intensity, and how this critique allowed Bergson to institute a new conception of difference as expressed in concrete continuity. In the final section I examine the importance of infinitesimal thought in Bergson’s good sense of intensity.
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Pub Date : 2020-07-30DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2020.1799544
Yusuk
ABSTRACT The phenomenological vision, particularly, Husserl’s idea of critique as an infinite vocational theoria and Patočka’s as an enduring programme, view Platonic logic and Socratic act as the paradigms for a normative justification of the idea of universal science and philosophy. In light of that, the Thrasymachus-Socrates debate is interpreted as a case to testify the critical power of philosophy successfully exercised over sophistic tyrannical non-philosophy. This paper criticizes the phenomenological idealization of the Socratic victory as an ethico-teleologically anticipated success of philosophy and rewrites the defeat of Thrasymachus as a political failure in warring with philosophy during which Thrasymachus questions the legitimacy of the act of philosophizing to decide its legitimacy and thereby exposes the politics played out in that act.
{"title":"The Wrath of Thrasymachus: A Thought on the Politics of Philosophical Praxis based on a Counter-Phenomenological Reinvestigation of the Thrasymachus-Socrates Debate in Plato’s Republic","authors":"Yusuk","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2020.1799544","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2020.1799544","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The phenomenological vision, particularly, Husserl’s idea of critique as an infinite vocational theoria and Patočka’s as an enduring programme, view Platonic logic and Socratic act as the paradigms for a normative justification of the idea of universal science and philosophy. In light of that, the Thrasymachus-Socrates debate is interpreted as a case to testify the critical power of philosophy successfully exercised over sophistic tyrannical non-philosophy. This paper criticizes the phenomenological idealization of the Socratic victory as an ethico-teleologically anticipated success of philosophy and rewrites the defeat of Thrasymachus as a political failure in warring with philosophy during which Thrasymachus questions the legitimacy of the act of philosophizing to decide its legitimacy and thereby exposes the politics played out in that act.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"52 1","pages":"203 - 222"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00071773.2020.1799544","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48860754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-28DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2020.1796514
Mahon O’Brien
ABSTRACT Luce Irigaray has devoted considerable energy to wrestling with some key figures in twentieth-century phenomenology. Since the topic for this special issue is the relationship between phenomenology and ancient philosophy, I plan in the following to look at Irigaray’s reading of Plato, given the centrality of carnality, sexuation and embodiment, not just to her own project, but the manner in which she invokes the same notions as part of her critique of Plato along with a number of twentieth-century phenomenologists.
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Pub Date : 2020-07-27DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2020.1796515
John Russon
ABSTRACT I begin by highlighting central texts from Aristotle that demonstrate both an appreciation of the rich coupling of subject and object that has been the subject of much of the most exciting and innovative phenomenological work and a fundamental methodological commitment to answering to the terms of experience. I then turn to Plato’s dramatic portrayals of Socrates’ distinctive practice—the “Socratic method”—first to document the subtlety that Socrates displays in his dialogical embrace of the description of lived experience and then, with him, to see the depths of existential change that are integral to the commitment to this method.
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