Pub Date : 2022-03-08DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2022.2048958
L. Irarrázaval
ABSTRACT Going beyond the scope of psychiatric diagnoses, this study introduces the concept of human vulnerability as a means of linking the phenomenological approach—focusing on the patient’s experience—with psychotherapeutic treatment. To this end, it applies Karl Jaspers’ concept of “limit situation” to the existential vulnerability in the manifestation of mental illness and the ontological vulnerability in schizophrenia. From a psychological or empathic standpoint, vulnerability, as experienced in different cases of mental illness, refers to the condition of being confronted with disturbing meaningful social encounters with others. In these social encounters, existential meanings acquire disturbing qualities for a person’s integrity, giving rise to various psychopathological phenomena. This study incorporates the practice of psychotherapy and empirical research to suggest that the experience of vulnerability is crucial not only in understanding the manifestation of mental illness but also a key element of phenomenological psychotherapeutic treatment, and it uses schizophrenia as an example.
{"title":"Human Vulnerability: A Phenomenological Approach to the Manifestation and Treatment of Mental Illness","authors":"L. Irarrázaval","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2022.2048958","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2022.2048958","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Going beyond the scope of psychiatric diagnoses, this study introduces the concept of human vulnerability as a means of linking the phenomenological approach—focusing on the patient’s experience—with psychotherapeutic treatment. To this end, it applies Karl Jaspers’ concept of “limit situation” to the existential vulnerability in the manifestation of mental illness and the ontological vulnerability in schizophrenia. From a psychological or empathic standpoint, vulnerability, as experienced in different cases of mental illness, refers to the condition of being confronted with disturbing meaningful social encounters with others. In these social encounters, existential meanings acquire disturbing qualities for a person’s integrity, giving rise to various psychopathological phenomena. This study incorporates the practice of psychotherapy and empirical research to suggest that the experience of vulnerability is crucial not only in understanding the manifestation of mental illness but also a key element of phenomenological psychotherapeutic treatment, and it uses schizophrenia as an example.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"53 1","pages":"384 - 394"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41409133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-23DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2022.2044731
Giulio Marchegiani
{"title":"Husserl’s Phenomenology between Physics and Metaphysics","authors":"Giulio Marchegiani","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2022.2044731","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2022.2044731","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"53 1","pages":"504 - 505"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48442601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-31DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2022.2031234
R. Ritunnano
ABSTRACT The significance of critical phenomenology for psychiatric praxis has yet to be expounded. In this paper, I argue that the adoption of a critical phenomenological stance can remedy localised instances of hermeneutical injustice, which may arise in the encounter between clinicians and patients with psychosis. In this context, what is communicated is often deemed to lack meaning or to be difficult to understand. While a degree of un-shareability is inherent to subjective life, I argue that issues of unintelligibility can be addressed by shifting from individualistic conceptions of understanding to an interactionist view. This takes into account the contextual, historical and relational background within which meaning is co-constituted. I conclude by providing a corrective for hermeneutical injustice, which entails a specific attentiveness towards the person’s subjectivity, a careful sensitivity to contingent meaning-generating structures, and a degree of hermeneutical flexibility as an attitude of openness towards alternative horizons of possibility.
{"title":"Overcoming Hermeneutical Injustice in Mental Health: A Role for Critical Phenomenology","authors":"R. Ritunnano","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2022.2031234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2022.2031234","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The significance of critical phenomenology for psychiatric praxis has yet to be expounded. In this paper, I argue that the adoption of a critical phenomenological stance can remedy localised instances of hermeneutical injustice, which may arise in the encounter between clinicians and patients with psychosis. In this context, what is communicated is often deemed to lack meaning or to be difficult to understand. While a degree of un-shareability is inherent to subjective life, I argue that issues of unintelligibility can be addressed by shifting from individualistic conceptions of understanding to an interactionist view. This takes into account the contextual, historical and relational background within which meaning is co-constituted. I conclude by providing a corrective for hermeneutical injustice, which entails a specific attentiveness towards the person’s subjectivity, a careful sensitivity to contingent meaning-generating structures, and a degree of hermeneutical flexibility as an attitude of openness towards alternative horizons of possibility.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"53 1","pages":"243 - 260"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43447663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-12DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2021.2020596
Diego D’Angelo
ABSTRACT This paper addresses three main concerns about William James’s understanding of attention. In the first section, I will consider the question whether or not James’s famous claim that “every one knows what attention is” should be understood as implying that his theory is a folk psychological theory of attention. After arguing against this interpretation, the second part of the paper spells out four main tenets in James’s theory: attention is presented as transcendental, active, structuring, and embodied. Particular emphasis will be laid on the key role of bodily movements. The third and final section draws some conclusions concerning the intentionality of agency. According to James, the genesis of the intentions to act has to be located in attentional movements and comportments towards the surrounding world. At variance with some readings of James as a full-fledged phenomenologist, I suggest to complement his essentially pragmatist approach with the aid of phenomenology as providing useful input for further inquiries.
{"title":"William James on Attention. Folk Psychology, Actions, and Intentions","authors":"Diego D’Angelo","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2021.2020596","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2021.2020596","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper addresses three main concerns about William James’s understanding of attention. In the first section, I will consider the question whether or not James’s famous claim that “every one knows what attention is” should be understood as implying that his theory is a folk psychological theory of attention. After arguing against this interpretation, the second part of the paper spells out four main tenets in James’s theory: attention is presented as transcendental, active, structuring, and embodied. Particular emphasis will be laid on the key role of bodily movements. The third and final section draws some conclusions concerning the intentionality of agency. According to James, the genesis of the intentions to act has to be located in attentional movements and comportments towards the surrounding world. At variance with some readings of James as a full-fledged phenomenologist, I suggest to complement his essentially pragmatist approach with the aid of phenomenology as providing useful input for further inquiries.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"53 1","pages":"163 - 176"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48598408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2021.2021375
Antoine Pageau-St-Hilaire
ABSTRACT This paper addresses the question of the function of genre in Gadamer’s hermeneutics by examining his treatment of Plato’s political writings in the context of the “utopian genre.” I argue that Gadamer’s reading of Plato informs us on the hermeneutics of genre, which is otherwise undiscussed in Truth and Method. First, I reconstruct the utopian genre as Gadamer treats it in a 1983 lecture hitherto neglected. Second, I expand Gadamer’s “logic of question and answer” by drawing on the notion of genre as articulated by E.D. Hirsch and show that attention to genre is not only compatible with Gadamerian hermeneutics, but also productive. Finally, I demonstrate that an application of this concept of genre to the case of Plato’s political philosophy reveals a problem in Gadamer’s interpretation, namely a certain confusion between dialogue and utopia, and propose two ways of explaining this confusion and thus of resolving the aporia.
{"title":"Gadamer’s Hermeneutics and the Concept of Genre: The Case of the Utopian Genre in Plato","authors":"Antoine Pageau-St-Hilaire","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2021.2021375","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2021.2021375","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper addresses the question of the function of genre in Gadamer’s hermeneutics by examining his treatment of Plato’s political writings in the context of the “utopian genre.” I argue that Gadamer’s reading of Plato informs us on the hermeneutics of genre, which is otherwise undiscussed in Truth and Method. First, I reconstruct the utopian genre as Gadamer treats it in a 1983 lecture hitherto neglected. Second, I expand Gadamer’s “logic of question and answer” by drawing on the notion of genre as articulated by E.D. Hirsch and show that attention to genre is not only compatible with Gadamerian hermeneutics, but also productive. Finally, I demonstrate that an application of this concept of genre to the case of Plato’s political philosophy reveals a problem in Gadamer’s interpretation, namely a certain confusion between dialogue and utopia, and propose two ways of explaining this confusion and thus of resolving the aporia.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"53 1","pages":"352 - 369"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45243045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-15DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2021.2002423
Juliette Christine Gruner
{"title":"Phenomenal Gender: What Transgender Experience Discloses","authors":"Juliette Christine Gruner","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2021.2002423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2021.2002423","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"53 1","pages":"332 - 333"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47066593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-18DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2021.1991236
Zhida Luo
ABSTRACT It is well-known that Husserl denies bodily behaviour as expressive in the I. Logical Investigation but he dramatically changes his view and holds that bodily behaviour is essentially expressive in works such as Ideas II. A mainstream explanation of the change is that Husserl develops a more cogent conception of embodiment such that he can ultimately include bodily behaviour into the category of expressive phenomena. In this paper, I explore another source of this change by examining the by and large overlooked “1914 texts.” I argue that the change is significantly informed by Husserl’s revised conception of indication, such that he can offer a proper account of the intimate relation between the body and the spirit and, eventually, opt for a new view of bodily expressivity. By doing so, I also elucidate some intrinsic characteristics of bodily expressivity, such as its demand feature and its twofold unity.
{"title":"Husserl’s Theory of Bodily Expressivity and its Revision: In View of the “1914 Texts”","authors":"Zhida Luo","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2021.1991236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2021.1991236","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT It is well-known that Husserl denies bodily behaviour as expressive in the I. Logical Investigation but he dramatically changes his view and holds that bodily behaviour is essentially expressive in works such as Ideas II. A mainstream explanation of the change is that Husserl develops a more cogent conception of embodiment such that he can ultimately include bodily behaviour into the category of expressive phenomena. In this paper, I explore another source of this change by examining the by and large overlooked “1914 texts.” I argue that the change is significantly informed by Husserl’s revised conception of indication, such that he can offer a proper account of the intimate relation between the body and the spirit and, eventually, opt for a new view of bodily expressivity. By doing so, I also elucidate some intrinsic characteristics of bodily expressivity, such as its demand feature and its twofold unity.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"53 1","pages":"315 - 331"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45203500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2021.1964167
C. Welz
It is not a coincidence that we often use acoustic metaphors in order to describe the relation between interiority and exteriority. The sense of hearing can be understood as the door to the soul, but it is also essential for a human being’s openness to the external world. Moreover, there is an obvious phonetic connection between Vernunft (the German word for “reason”) and Vernehmen (the German word for “hearing” or “perceiving a sound”), which implies that thinking is particularly related to listening. While Derrida’s criticism of logoand phonocentrism assumes an underlying “metaphysics of the logos, of presence and consciousness” where “thinking to oneself”means “hearing oneself speak” (and thus ignoring the trace of absence in the chain of signification), the contributors to this special issue explore listening as the bond between impression and expression, between call and response, and as one’s link par excellence to the Other— thereby concentrating on what eludes the apparent identity between reason, language, and reality. The collection of articles in this issue originated in a series of lectures and research seminars that I organized at the Center for the Study of Jewish Thought in Modern Culture, University of Copenhagen, in connection with my “Semper Ardens” Fellowship within the Humanities and Social Sciences, sponsored by the Danish Carlsberg Foundation (grant CF16-0517). In these events, which took place in 2017-2018, a multi-disciplinary approach to a phenomenology of listening was developed with a special emphasis on the foreignness of the word, voice, or speech experienced by a person who becomes moved and de-centered by more or less harmonious or conflictual events of resonance in-between subjectivity and alterity. The articles in this special issue focus on various aspects of a phenomenology of listening. Thematically and in terms of the disciplines involved, this special issue can be divided in two parts: the first three contributions in Part I address hermeneutical, theological, and anthropological aspects of listening; the last three contributions in Part II combine existential philosophy, ethics and poetry, while also addressing psycho(patho)logical issues.
{"title":"Editorial to JBSP Special Issue on the Phenomenology of Listening (52:4) Phenomenology of Listening","authors":"C. Welz","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2021.1964167","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2021.1964167","url":null,"abstract":"It is not a coincidence that we often use acoustic metaphors in order to describe the relation between interiority and exteriority. The sense of hearing can be understood as the door to the soul, but it is also essential for a human being’s openness to the external world. Moreover, there is an obvious phonetic connection between Vernunft (the German word for “reason”) and Vernehmen (the German word for “hearing” or “perceiving a sound”), which implies that thinking is particularly related to listening. While Derrida’s criticism of logoand phonocentrism assumes an underlying “metaphysics of the logos, of presence and consciousness” where “thinking to oneself”means “hearing oneself speak” (and thus ignoring the trace of absence in the chain of signification), the contributors to this special issue explore listening as the bond between impression and expression, between call and response, and as one’s link par excellence to the Other— thereby concentrating on what eludes the apparent identity between reason, language, and reality. The collection of articles in this issue originated in a series of lectures and research seminars that I organized at the Center for the Study of Jewish Thought in Modern Culture, University of Copenhagen, in connection with my “Semper Ardens” Fellowship within the Humanities and Social Sciences, sponsored by the Danish Carlsberg Foundation (grant CF16-0517). In these events, which took place in 2017-2018, a multi-disciplinary approach to a phenomenology of listening was developed with a special emphasis on the foreignness of the word, voice, or speech experienced by a person who becomes moved and de-centered by more or less harmonious or conflictual events of resonance in-between subjectivity and alterity. The articles in this special issue focus on various aspects of a phenomenology of listening. Thematically and in terms of the disciplines involved, this special issue can be divided in two parts: the first three contributions in Part I address hermeneutical, theological, and anthropological aspects of listening; the last three contributions in Part II combine existential philosophy, ethics and poetry, while also addressing psycho(patho)logical issues.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"52 1","pages":"265 - 269"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45067632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-26DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2021.1977092
John J. Drummond
ABSTRACT This paper provides a phenomenological account of the intentional structure of action. To establish the context, I first distinguish (a) physiological changes and the bodily motions manifesting them that one passively undergoes in response to external causes from (b) actions as such. With respect to actions, I further distinguish among what I call incomplete actions, voluntary actions, and chosen actions. I shall frame my discussion in terms of three similar distinctions, although my position will intersect but not coincide with any of them. The three distinctions are Edmund Husserl’s distinction between action-will and decision-will, John Searle’s distinction, as amended by John McDowell, between intention in action and a prior intention-to-do, and Aristotle’s distinction between voluntary and chosen action. The paper concludes with a discussion of a particular instance of chosen action that I call “resolve” and its relation to personal identity.
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Pub Date : 2021-09-15DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2021.1977090
Min Seol
ABSTRACT Heidegger’s Being and Time has been criticized for its lack of moral concern toward others. I address this problem by reviewing and developing several revisionist interpretations. I call these the historicist, sympathy-oriented, and ontological approaches to the moral problem of others. First, I develop the ontological approach and propose to reinterpret being authentic as proper to our essence. Second, I use Heidegger’s idea in Being and Time that our essence lies in disclosure to suggest that we comprehend resoluteness as being proper to both world- and self-disclosure. Then I revise Heidegger’s definition of resoluteness to argue that our world-disclosure requires us to help others recover their authentic selves, and that this is what Heidegger is gesturing toward when he writes about “leaping ahead”. Third, I briefly assess the ethical implications of “leaping ahead” and conclude that it does not allow us to treat others as mere objects.
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