INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE SEMIOTICS OF LAW-REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SEMIOTIQUE JURIDIQUE最新文献

Being built on the ground of mutual effect, facing the current state-isolation, international law is losing its grip on efficiency. This makes some of us to question (1) If law is not working, do we still need law? If we would say no, the history shows that such is the path to the state-suicide. As Smithian mutual benefits is the assurance of the individual benefits, we need international relationships to create the benefits for the individual states, hence international law, Yet the current one is certainly not working, then, the question, (2) What should the international law be? The enforcement of the international law could be accomplished through the blockchain. As blockchain "went bypass" the national law, and simply negated it, yet it is still not immune to the scope of international jurisdiction. We also argue that the blockchain' smart contract is not sufficient enough to operate smoothly. Human brain is structured as the mirror rather than a glass and transferring the law interpretation to the machine would not work, hence, we designed the formula of langue and parole, blockchain multiseg operating under the semiotics of the international law. Here the language learning is modelled with the supervisory and reinforcing algorithms, with supervisory predetermined with bias X,Y towards the values of law. Sort of form of constant repetends of Heidegger's hermeneutics circle. The most important part in this paper is written with the purpose to explain that international law is at the same struggle that Kafka had. Carrying the weight of both, the clothed façade and true self, first being the morality guide and later the states will, and not being neither, international law is self-isolated from the real world, as Gregor Samsa was. Hence, this is not the paper of secularization, no customs, no higher purpose, nothing except the will of states, that can be constantly renewed with the signifier and signified being linked and re-linked.

The effects of climate change and increasing environmental pollution have clearly shown the vulnerability of individuals, local communities, and the natural environment, even in the Western context. However, despite such unquestionable data, International Law is still struggling to find adequate, unambiguous, effective solutions to the issue. Even the 'human right to a healthy environment', recognised by the UN General Assembly in 2022, is permeated by an anthropocentric idea of the world, which prevents it from fully dealing with ecosystem issues so as to protect any living and non-living being. The paper starts by exploring the historical relevance of the concept of limit and the lack of boundaries in contemporary society, aiming to show that new semantics are needed, in order to overcome contemporary extractivism. An analysis of international legislation and jurisprudence will investigate the role that the concept of ecosystem vulnerability might play in the implementation of both human rights and the rights of nature.

This article concerns the conflict between copyright and museums' digitisation and online sharing of collections. This issue has recently become particularly important in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic. The authors outline the concept of a virtual museum and present the most important copyright provisions in EU law that may create obstacles for cultural institutions in realising virtual counterparts. To perceive copyright as the main obstacle in the process of digitisation and online sharing of collections is not unusual. Hence, the article briefly presents legal framework of the European copyright applicable to such situations. The authors argue that although copyright offers a range of possibilities for museums interested in digitising their collections, at the same time it is responsible for a chilling effect, resulting in fear of potential infringement and liability. The authors conclude that the EU's development of new legislation, coinciding with the need for digitisation and online sharing of cultural heritage caused by the pandemic, has favoured public interest at the expense of creators' rights, but still lacks satisfactory legal tools for effectively allowing cultural institutions to digitise and share their collections.

The COVID-19 pandemic has forced libraries to shift their service-delivery model online, infiltrating countless interactions-from storytime to reference questions to social groups-into digital mediation, typically by third-party platforms outside the library's control, generating mineable, persistent digital traces. One community particularly vulnerable to the impacts of surveillance is the queer community, where an outing, at least in the United States, imposes a potential loss of housing and employment and may subject the outed person to violence. Libraries-particularly public and school libraries-have once again become sites of conflict and resistance, with queer people and materials increasingly coming under attack both physically and legally. A primary shield by which libraries try to protect their patrons from such attacks is "privacy." Librarians, as professionals, proclaim a commitment to privacy embedded in such documents as the American Library Association's Library Bill of Rights and the International Federation of Library Associations and Institution's Statement on Privacy in the Library Environment. However, these ideals exist in broader systems-including legal and cultural structures-which constrain and complicate abstract commitments to privacy. This article examines the challenges of queer digital privacy within libraries in the United States, focusing on the polysemous, boundary-crossing nature of queerness, the digital and the material, privacy, and libraries (as both concepts and institutions). In particular, this article demonstrates how binary-bound, individual-rights-oriented legal approaches to privacy have arisen, and been mediated, by cis-heteronormative patriarchal values and how the sociotechnical materialities in which they occurred (such as paper-based recordkeeping) are fundamentally incompatible with queer privacy needs.

Children's and young persons' rights have received increasing been focus in recent decades, due in a significant degree to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. In Sweden, compulsory care in the social-services system is disputed, not least for the forceful measures that facility personnel have at their disposal to control children in certain conflict situations. The general aim of this article is to examine how the increased emphasis in Sweden on children's rights is promoting resilience for children and youth in youth compulsory secure-care settings. A more general question is whether the child-rights discourse leads in practice to increased resilience for children and youth in this setting, or even in general. The empirical material shows that children and young people's perceptions of care and treatment are strongly linked to their interactions with staff and how the staff use restrictive measures. Applying Martha Fineman's vulnerability theory in this context means that achieving resilience demands an analysis of the institutional settings in which children and young persons live their day-to-day lives, including their relationships in this setting. Comparing the legal possibilities of physical constraint with interviews of children and personnel reveals that relevant legislative frameworks and children's-rights discourse should serve as a protection mechanism for children and youths, but in real life, these seem to have limited effect.

This paper argues that while regulatory frameworks in aged care authorise restraints to protect vulnerable persons living with dementia from harm, they also serve as normalising practices to control challenging monstrous Others. This argument emerges out of an observed unease in aged care discourse where older people living with dementia are described as 'vulnerable', while dementia behaviours are described as 'challenging'. Using narrative analysis on a case study from the Final Report of the Australian Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety (RCAC), this paper investigates how the RCAC (re)produced constructions of persons with dementia as 'vulnerable monsters'. Drawing upon monstrous theory about 'unruly and leaky' bodies, extracts from the case study reveal how the RCAC repeated and reinforced monstrous constructions of dementia. Dementia behaviours, particularly 'wandering', were constructed through a dehumanising crisis frame that produced 'challenging' bodies and legitimised 'last resort' normalising practices, such as physical and chemical restraints. In failing to resist monstrous constructions of dementia behaviours, the RCAC accepted and authorised a regime of scaled responses leading to restrictive practices for control of challenging bodies in aged care. Although dementia care and restrictive practices received substantial attention in the RCAC, this paper reveals a missed opportunity for deeper review of institutionalised use of restraints that has relevance for ongoing reform of Australian aged care following conclusion of the RCAC.

Freedom of expression is a fundamental part of living in a free and open society and, above all, a basic need of every human being and a requirement to attain happiness. Its absence has relevant consequences, not only for individuals but also for the whole social community. This might explain why freedom of expression was, along with other freedoms (conscience and religion; thought, belief, opinion, including that of the press and other media of communication; peaceful assembly; and association), at the core of liberal constitutionalism, and constitutes, since the Second World War, an essential element of constitutional democracies. In a democracy, people should be allowed to express themselves to others freely. The paper, which is divided into five sections, points out that states are obliged to protect the exercise of that freedom not only because its very purpose is the common good and welfare of society but also because it is a requirement of any constitutional democracy. Otherwise, when people cannot express themselves, perhaps out of fear (not from 'war' but from different kinds of social pressure or 'violence' exerted by some lobbies, mass media, or governmental policies that are at odds with respect for the plurality of opinions), vulnerability arises. This weakens not only those individuals that are not allowed to express their thoughts but also those who do not dare to do it - or even not to think for themselves - under certain environmental pressures (exerted by states, international organizations, social media, or financial groups, lobbies, etc.). In the end, the decline of freedom of expression makes most people more vulnerable and jeopardizes the whole democratic system.

In Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd v Voller ('Voller') the Australian High Court held that media companies maintaining Facebook comment pages could be liable for the defamatory posts of commenters on those sites. The decision focussed entirely on whether, by maintaining the Facebook page, the companies had 'published' the statements of commenters. Hearings on other aspects of the tort litigation continue. This paper considers the implications of the tort of defamation on public participation on political will formation where, as is increasingly the case, the participation occurs virtually. Australian law has already tackled the law of defamation as a threat to freedom of political communication; Voller continues the jurisprudence by considering whether hosting an online forum for debate amounts to publication. The more recent High Court judgment in Google LLC v Defteros demonstrated the necessity of the law to align the 'acts' necessary to found legal action with the new environment of automated search engines. The troubled intersection of dematerialised practices of political and cultural discourse and jurisdictionally bound laws of defamation challenges participatory governance as tribes form and dissolve and shift between geographical interests. Defamation in Australia is a tort of strict liability; and, absenting applicable defences, any participation in communication is sufficient to make that participant a publisher and a party to the defamation. The online environment stretches words across geographical and jurisdictional boundaries, but it also stretches and contorts concepts of fault and responsibility. Participatory digital cultural practices integrating users in the creation of cultural heritage simultaneously draw participants into transgressions, both cultural and legal, which are amplified by the medium. Questions of collective guilt, 'shades' of moral responsibility and disproportionality between blameworthiness and legal liability challenge laws formulated for the printing press but now deployed in the online environment. In this way the digitized participatory environment presents deep challenges to law and legal systems, which are chained to geography. This paper considers the concept of innocent publication in the context of the digitized participatory environment and the way in which the virtual experience is dissolving concepts of geographically defined jurisdictions.

This contribution focuses on legal issues raised by the audiovisual broadcasting of performing arts, which has significantly increased due to the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. First, we contextualize this practice and briefly present the emergence and evolution of the practice of "filmed theater", as well as any other form of performances (e.g., concert, ballet, opera) originally conceived for the stage but subsequently diffused through other channels. Secondly, we address the current legal issues that have arisen because of the increase of such practice due to the containment measures taken by government. Two axes are of particular attention: the matter of copyrights and related rights, on the one hand, and the question of public financing, on the other. Concerning intellectual property, audiovisual broadcasting leads to several legal consequences and issues: effectiveness of related rights, emergence of new modes of exploitation and new authors, recognition of the recording as an original work, etc. This new practice is, moreover, likely to disrupt the categories established by public funding legal mechanisms, which are often poorly adapted to hybrid artistic objects. The objective of this part is therefore to analyze the new legal issues raised by the audiovisual distribution of performances. Finally, we go beyond exclusively legal issues to examine the very specificities of performing arts and, more specifically, the possible loss that would result from a fixation of a production on a reproducible medium, making its diffusion possible beyond the stage.