International Journal of Health Economics and Management最新文献

Medicare has increased the use of performance pay incentives for hospitals, with the goal of increasing care coordination across providers, reducing market frictions, and ultimately to improve quality of care. This paper provides new empirical evidence by using novel operations and claims data from a large, independent home health care firm with the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) penalty on hospitals providing identifying variation. We find that the penalty incentive to reduce re-hospitalizations passed through from hospitals to the firm for at least some types of patients, since it provided more care inputs for heart disease patients discharged from hospitals at greater penalty risk and that contributed more patients to the firm. This evidence suggests that HRRP helped increase coordination between hospitals and home health firms without formal integration. Greater home health effort does not appear to have led to lower patient readmissions.

Exploiting a rich data set on the Dutch market for home help services, we find that larger providers obtain a higher price than do small providers. However, compared to other studies on market power in care markets this price difference is considered small to moderate. Our identification strategy relies on the exogenous variation in market shares in January'07, the very first month after home help was decentralized to municipalities. Zooming in on our main outcome, we obtain that the small but significant effect of market size on price is merely driven by the pricing behavior of for-profit providers.

Physicians interact and exchange information through various social networks. Understanding peer effects through different networks can help accelerate new medical technology and innovative treatment adoption. In this research, we measure the influence of strong-tie and weak-tie connections on new drug adoption and study the overlap between advice-discussion and patient-sharing network. We construct two physician networks with strong and weak ties from peer nomination surveys and commercial medical claims data. We design a dynamic system to define peer adoption status and build patient-level hierarchical logistic models to measure the peer influence on new product adoption for treating new-to-therapy patients. Our results show that A strong-tie early adoption peer has six times more influence on new drug adoption than a weak-tie peer. Weak tie peers collectively exert as much or higher influence than strong-tie peers because of the larger network size. In the case of inaccessibility to strong-tie data, researchers can still reliably use the influence of the weak tie data only even though they will lose the effect of the omitted strong ties.

Increasing expenditures on retail pharmaceuticals bring a critical challenge to the financial stability of healthcare systems worldwide. Policy makers have reacted by introducing a range of measures to control the growth of public pharmaceutical expenditure (PPE). Using panel data on European and non-European OECD member countries from 1990 to 2015, we evaluate the effectiveness of six types of demand-side expenditure control measures including physician-level behaviour measures, system-level price-control measures and substitution measures, alongside a proxy for cost-sharing and add a new dimension to the existing empirical evidence hitherto based on national-level and meta-studies. We use the weighted-average least squares regression framework adapted for estimation with panel-corrected standard errors. Our empirical analysis suggests that direct patient cost-sharing and some-but not all-demand-side measures successfully dampened PPE growth in the past. Cost-sharing schemes stand out as a powerful mechanism to curb PPE growth, but bear a high risk of adverse effects. Other demand-side measures are more limited in effect, though may be more equitable. Due to limitations inherent in the study approach and the data, the results are only explorative.

Performance-based financing (PBF) is advocated as an effective means to improve the quality of care by changing healthcare providers' behavior. However, there is limited evidence on its effectiveness in low- and middle-income countries and on its implementation in primary care settings. Evidence on the effect of discontinuing PBF is even more limited than that of introducing PBF schemes. We estimate the effects of discontinuing PBF in Egypt on family planning, maternal health, and child health outcomes. We use a difference-in-differences (DiD) model with fixed effects, exploiting a unique dataset of six waves of spatially constructed facility-level health outcomes. We find that discontinuing performance-based incentives to providers had a negative effect on the knowledge of contraceptive methods, iron supplementation during pregnancy, the prevalence of childhood acute respiratory infection, and, more importantly, under-five child mortality, all of which were indirectly targeted by the PBF scheme. No significant effects are reported for directly targeted outcomes. Our findings suggest that PBF can induce permanent changes in providers' behavior, but this may come at the expense of non-contracted outcomes.

Health expenditure can be substantial, especially in countries without national health insurance schemes, and it can negatively affect people's welfare. This study uses recent data to evaluate the extent to which Nigerian households suffer from catastrophic health expenditure (CHE) and evaluates its determinants. We used the Living Standards Survey 2018-2019 to estimate the headcount of Nigerian households that experience CHE-the proportion of health expenditures exceeding a certain ratio of such expenditures to non-food expenditures. To evaluate the determinants of CHE, we used ordinary least square regression with state fixed effects. The total sample was 22,110 nationally representative households. Many households, especially poorer ones, do not have any health care expenses; only 60.6% of the poorest households had some health-related expenditure. Even with the limited health-seeking behaviors in this demographic, the percentage of households that suffered from CHE was very high: with a 15% cutoff for CHE thresholds, 34.9 to 44.2% of households experienced CHE. Lower education, higher non-food consumption, and rural residence were correlated with higher amounts of health expenditure and higher odds of CHE. Health-seeking behaviors such as clinic visits for sickness treatment and prevention are limited, especially among the poorer households. Even so, the headcount of households experiencing CHE is very high in Nigeria. Advancing the implementation of national health insurance scheme is important to reduce the burden of health expenditure, especially among the poor, as well as to remove financial barriers to their seeking adequate health services.

Despite subsidized health insurance has long been proclaimed by many countries including Indonesia, the variety of evaluation results showing that the optimization of benefits obtained by recipients is still questionable. The objective of this study is to analyze the impact of subsidized health insurance programs (ASKESKIN and JAMKESMAS) on the utilization of healthcare facilities in Indonesia. Data from two waves longitudinal data, the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS), were analyzed using the propensity score matching method. This study found that in general, ASKESKIN and JAMKESMAS had very small impacts on the utility of healthcare facilities measured by outpatient and inpatient visits by program's beneficiaries. It implies that being subsidized health insurance holders does not necessarily encourage them to visit formal healthcare facilities. In addition, the comparison of average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) between ASKESKIN and JAMKESMAS also did not show any significant improvement even though the program had tried to be improved. The results of this study provide the basis for advising policy makers that there needs to revisit the effectiveness of subsidized health insurance program implementation.

In October 2015, the Guangdong government of China enacted a so-called unified medical insurance payment for patients residing in Guangdong province, which fundamentally simplifies reimbursement procedures of medical insurance for the involved cross-city in-patients. Using a unique confidential dataset from 2013 to 2018 on hemorrhoid treatments at a renowned hospital in Guangzhou, the provincial capital of Guangdong, and exploiting difference-in-differences estimations based on the abovementioned policy, we document that the physicians' incentives are a negative externality of the full medical insurance policy for cross-city in-patients and account for a 49% probability increase in improper treatments; and neither increasing the communication between physicians and patients nor enhancing the education level of patients reduces the physician-induced demand for improper treatments. A series of robustness tests indicate our findings are solid. In summary, we highlight the substantial roles of medical insurance as a driver of physician-induced demand in an emerging economy such as China.

Using panel data of administrative claims spanning 36 months (2017-2019) and an instrumental variable method, this study examines whether physician-induced demand for hypertension disease care exists in Ghana's healthcare system where price is regulated, and there is no co-payment. We find that an increase in competition-measured as a high doctor-to-population ratio at the district level-leads to an increase in the number of physician visits, suggesting physician-induced demand exists, and that effects are greater for large hospitals and public health providers. This result is further supported by alternative measures and specifications showing that physicians' revenue from medication and gross revenue increase as the physician density increases. These pattern suggest that physicians in high density areas, faced with a decrease in number of patients per physician, make up for the decline in income by inducing more patient visits.

Abrupt jumps in reimbursement tariffs have been shown to lead to unintended effects in physicians' behavior. A sudden change in tariffs at a pre-defined point in the treatment can incentivize health care providers to prolong treatment to reach the higher tariff, and then to discharge patients once the higher tariff is reached. The Dutch reimbursement schedule in hospital rehabilitation care follows a two-threshold stepwise-function based on treatment duration. We investigated the prevalence of strategic discharges around the first threshold and assessed whether their share varies by provider type. Our findings suggest moderate response to incentives by traditional care providers (general and academic hospitals, rehabilitation centers and multicategorical providers), and strong response by profit-oriented independent treatment centers. When examining the variation in response based on the financial position of the organization, we found a higher probability of manipulation among providers in financial distress. Our findings provide multiple insights and possible indicators to identify provider types that may be more prone to strategic behavior.