Res Philosophica最新文献

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Scientific Epistemology: Exploring the Primacy of Science in the Writing of Gaston Bachelard 科学认识论：从巴切拉德的写作中探索科学的本质

IF 0.5 3区哲学 Q2 Arts and Humanities

Res Philosophica

Pub Date : 2021-06-25 DOI: 10.11612/resphil.2060

Michael Granado

引用次数: 0

In Pursuit of the World's Creator: Fakhr al-Din al-Razi on the Origins of theUniverse in emph{al-Matalib al-`Aliya} 追寻世界的创造者:法克尔·丁·拉兹论宇宙的起源，摘自emph{《al- matalib al- ' Aliya》}

IF 0.5 3区哲学 Q2 Arts and Humanities

Res Philosophica

Pub Date : 2021-04-05 DOI: 10.11612/RESPHIL.2042

Laura Hassan

引用次数: 0

Ontological Pluralism and Divine Naming: Insights from Avicenna 本体多元论与神性命名:来自阿维森纳的见解

IF 0.5 3区哲学 Q2 Arts and Humanities

Res Philosophica

Pub Date : 2021-04-05 DOI: 10.11612/RESPHIL.2040

Joshua Harris

引用次数: 0

Nominalism and Material Plenitude 唯名论与物质丰裕

IF 0.5 3区哲学 Q2 Arts and Humanities

Res Philosophica

Pub Date : 2021-01-07 DOI: 10.11612/resphil.2046

Uriah Kriegel

:: The idea of “material plenitude” has been gaining traction in recent discussions of the metaphysics of material objects. My main goal here is to show that this idea may have important dialectical implications for the metaphysics of properties – more specifically, that it provides nominalists with new resources in their attempt to reject an ontology of universals. I will recapitulate one of the main arguments against nominalism – due to David Armstrong – and show how plenitude helps the nominalist overcome the argument.

在最近关于物质对象的形而上学的讨论中，“物质丰富”的概念越来越受到关注。我在这里的主要目的是要表明，这个观点可能对属性形而上学具有重要的辩证意义——更具体地说，它为唯名论者提供了新的资源，以试图拒绝共相本体论。我将概括David Armstrong提出的反对唯名论的主要论点之一，并展示丰富性是如何帮助唯名论克服这一论点的。

引用次数: 1

Reflections on McGowan's Just Words 对麦高恩《公正的话语》的反思

IF 0.5 3区哲学 Q2 Arts and Humanities

Res Philosophica

Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.11612/resphil.2044

Luvell Anderson

引用次数: 0

Why Future-Bias Isnât Rationally Evaluable 为什么未来偏差不能合理评估

IF 0.5 3区哲学 Q2 Arts and Humanities

Res Philosophica

Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.11612/resphil.2143

Callie K. Phillips

Future-bias is preferring some lesser future good to a greater past good because it is in the future, or preferring some greater past pain to some lesser future pain because it is in the past. Most of us think that this bias is rational. I argue that no agents have futurebiased preferences that are rationally evaluable—that is, evaluable as rational or irrational. Given certain plausible assumptions about rational evaluability, either we must find a new conception of future-bias that avoids the difficulties I raise, or we must conclude that future-biased preferences are not subject to rational evaluation. Future-bias is typically thought to be rational, often obviously rational.1 Parfit (1984) offers this now familiar example. I am in some hospital to have some kind of surgery. Since this is completely safe, and always successful, I have no fears about the effects. The surgery may be brief, or it may instead take a long time. Because I have to cooperate with the surgeon, I cannot have anesthetics. I have had this surgery once before, and I can remember how painful it is. Under a new policy, because the operation is so painful, patients are now afterwards made to forget it. Some drug removes their memories of the last few hours. I have just woken up. I cannot remember going to sleep. I ask my nurse if it has been decided when my operation is to be, and how long it must take. She says that she knows the facts about both me and another patient, but that she cannot remember which facts apply to whom. She can tell me only that the following is true. I may be the patient who had his operation yesterday. In that case, my operation was the longest ever performed, lasting ten hours. I may instead be the patient who is to have a short operation later today. It is either true that I did suffer for ten hours, or true that I shall suffer for one hour. 1 Others have called this ‘bias against the past’ or ‘past discounting.’ Res Philosophica, Vol. 98, No. 4, October 2021, pp. 573–596 https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2143 © 2021 Callie K. Phillips • © 2021 Res Philosophica 574 Callie K. Phillips I ask the nurse to find out which is true. While she is away, it is clear to me which I prefer to be true. If I learn that the first is true, I shall be greatly relieved. (165–166) It seems rational to prefer to be in the first situation in such cases despite the fact that this preference involves preferring to be in a situation that has a greater total amount of pain for you in the overall course of your life. In fact, many philosophers take it to be obvious that this preference is rational and without need of defense. Prior (1959), Craig (1999), Zimmerman (2005), Heathwood (2008), Hare (2007, 2009), and Kauppinen (2018) all claim that this bias is at least rationally permissible, if not rationally required. However, a handful of philosophers—including Moller (2002), Brink (2011), Sullivan and Greene (2015), Dougherty (2015)—raise difficulties for defending the rational

未来偏见是指人们更喜欢未来较小的好处而不是过去较大的好处，因为它是未来的，或者更喜欢过去较大的痛苦而不是未来较小的痛苦，因为它是过去的。我们大多数人认为这种偏见是理性的。我认为，没有任何行为体具有可理性评估的未来偏好，也就是说，可理性或非理性评估。考虑到关于理性可评估性的某些貌似合理的假设，我们要么必须找到一个新的未来偏见概念，以避免我提出的困难，要么我们必须得出结论，未来偏见偏好不受理性评估的影响。对未来的偏见通常被认为是理性的，而且往往是明显理性的帕菲特(Parfit, 1984)提供了这个我们现在熟悉的例子。我在医院做手术。因为这是完全安全的，而且总是成功的，所以我不担心它的影响。手术可能很短，也可能需要很长时间。因为我必须配合外科医生，所以我不能使用麻醉剂。我以前做过一次这样的手术，我还记得有多痛。在一项新政策下，由于手术非常痛苦，病人现在被要求在手术后忘记它。某种药物能消除他们过去几个小时的记忆。我刚醒。我不记得是怎么睡着的。我问护士我的手术时间是否已经决定了，手术需要多长时间。她说她知道我和另一个病人的情况，但她不记得哪些情况适用于谁。她只能告诉我以下是真实的。我可能就是昨天做手术的那个病人。在这种情况下，我的手术是有史以来最长的，持续了10个小时。我可能是今天晚些时候要做一个简短手术的病人。要么我确实挨了十个小时的苦，要么我还将挨一个小时的苦。另一些人称之为“对过去的偏见”或“对过去的贴现”。《Res Philosophica》，第98卷，第4期，2021年10月，第573-596页https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2143©2021 Callie K. Phillips•©2021 Res Philosophica 574 Callie K. Phillips我请护士找出哪个是真的。她不在的时候，我很清楚我更愿意诚实。如果我知道第一个是真的，我就放心了。(165-166)在这种情况下，宁愿处于第一种情况似乎是理性的，尽管事实上，这种偏好涉及到在你的整个生命过程中更愿意处于一种总痛苦更大的情况。事实上，许多哲学家认为，这种偏好显然是理性的，无需为之辩护。Prior(1959年)、Craig(1999年)、Zimmerman(2005年)、Heathwood(2008年)、Hare(2007年、2009年)和Kauppinen(2018年)都声称，这种偏见即使不是理性需要，至少也是理性允许的。然而，少数哲学家——包括Moller(2002)、Brink(2011)、Sullivan and Greene(2015)、Dougherty(2015)——为捍卫这种偏见的合理性提出了困难。在这篇文章中，我提出了一个论点，这意味着所有这些作者都错了。对未来有偏见的偏好甚至不能被理性地评估——也就是说，不能被理性或非理性地评估。在确定代理人是否具有未来偏见时，我将使用Sullivan和Greene(2015)提供的定义。对于两种独特的体验，E1和E2, agent S对快乐有[未来偏见]，E1至少和E2一样快乐，S更喜欢E2，因为它是现在或未来的快乐，而不是过去的. . . .对于两种不同的经历，E1和E2, agent S对痛苦有[未来偏见]，其中E2最多和E1一样痛苦，S更喜欢E1，因为它是过去的痛苦，而不是现在或未来的痛苦。(949)如果行为体对快乐、痛苦或两者都有未来偏见，我就称其为“未来偏见”。如果一个偏好符合其中一个双条件条件右边的描述，我就说这个偏好是未来偏向偏好。在这篇文章中，我认为我们必须拒绝一个关于理性可评估性的貌似合理的假设，找到一个避免我提出的困难的未来偏见的新概念，或者得出未来偏见偏好不受理性评估影响的结论。不存在可理性评估的未来偏好的结论令人惊讶，也违反直觉，但它有一个实质性的理论优势，使这个被忽视的观点值得我们关注。如果一个人愿意接受“未来偏向偏好无法理性评估”这一结论，那么他就不必再去解释另一种普遍存在的时间偏向——即“近似偏向”——的非理性。自从帕菲特在《理性与人格》(1984)一书中首次提出这些偏见之间的紧张关系以来，哲学家们就一直在逃避这种负担。粗略地说，“近偏倚”是指更喜欢不太愉快的经历，因为它们在时间上更接近，或者反过来说，“为什么未来偏倚不是理性可评估的”。575更喜欢更痛苦的经历，而不是不那么痛苦的经历，因为那些更痛苦的经历在时间上更接近。在著名的斯坦福棉花糖实验中发现了一个流行的近似偏差的例子。这项研究试图通过一个实验来衡量孩子们的自我控制能力，在这个实验中，一些孩子被告知他们可以现在吃一个棉花糖，或者等15分钟再吃两个棉花糖。那些没有等15分钟就得到两个棉花糖的孩子被认为是近乎偏见的——他们更喜欢现在的小好处，而不是未来的大好处“近似偏见”是非理性的说法似乎很难站得住脚但帕菲特(1984)令人信服地指出，很难有理由宣称近期偏见是非理性的，而未来偏见是理性的。简而言之，论证“近似偏差”是不合理的方式，就是声称事情发生的时间差异并不影响其价值。但如果我们这么说，我们也应该认为未来偏见是非理性的。过去的经历不应该影响它对我们的价值。帕菲特考虑了对这一论点可能的回答，但似乎没有一个经得起推敲。例如，你可能会认为未来偏见与近期偏见有很大不同，因为我们无法改变过去。如果我们不能改变过去，那么我们就不那么关注它是有道理的然而，即使未来的经历无法改变，我们似乎仍然表现出对未来的偏见。如果你确定今天下午晚些时候会受到折磨，你仍然会更关心未来的痛苦经历，而不是过去已经发生的痛苦经历。帕菲特考虑并驳回了近期偏见和未来偏见的合理性中不对称的其他可能的辩护。在我看来，这些论点还没有被成功地挑战。因此，重要的是找到一种方法来解释或2米歇尔等人。1972。值得注意的是，在我们感兴趣的意义上，现在有疑问的是，研究中的孩子们在接近偏见的意义上(也就是说，有疑问的是，他们更喜欢暂时更近的棉花糖吃体验，只是因为它暂时更近)。延迟满足，等待收到两个棉花糖与经济和社会劣势有很大关系(Watts et al. 2018)。似乎没有等待的孩子，通常来自资源贫乏的环境，怀疑未来是否会有棉花糖，或者至少认为它的概率较低。如果较晚的结果比较近的结果的概率更低，那么选择较近的结果往往是理性的。这突出了对近偏差和未来偏差进行实证调查的一个困难。仅仅基于事件发生的时间位置(近或远，过去或未来)，我们很难创造出能够清楚地证明一种体验优于另一种体验的条件，因为我们很难创造出这些体验发生的可能性相同的条件。至少对哲学家和普通的观察者来说是这样。在经济学家和心理学家中，“近似偏差”的非理性更具争议性，他们更倾向于认为，只有偏好的结构性约束与偏好是否理性有关。Suhler和Callender(2012)以及Dyke和Maclaurin(2002)都采用了这种策略来解释为什么未来偏见是理性的，而近期偏见是非理性的。Latham等人(2021)从经验上调查了未来偏见偏好的原因，发现过去实际上是无关紧要的信念发挥了作用，但也发现即使代理人认为他们可以因果影响过去，他们仍然表现出未来偏见。Callie K. Phillips避免了这些时间偏差的合理性的不对称性。如果一个人接受我

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引用次数: 4

McPherson on Virtue and Meaning 麦克弗森论美德与意义

IF 0.5 3区哲学 Q2 Arts and Humanities

Res Philosophica

Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.11612/resphil.2100

Christian B. Miller

引用次数: 0

Recovering a Role for Moral Character and Ascetic Practice in Religious Epistemology 道德品格与禁欲实践在宗教认识论中的地位恢复

IF 0.5 3区哲学 Q2 Arts and Humanities

Res Philosophica

Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.11612/RESPHIL.2039

T. Byerly

: Moral character and ascetic practice have not been major themes in contemporary analytic religious epistemology. But they have been major themes in the religious epistemologies of several influential historical figures, including the medieval Islamic philosopher al-Ghazâlî. This paper will be concerned with the place of moral character and ascetic practice in both al-Ghazâlî’s religious epistemology and in contemporary analytic religious epistemology. By reading al-Ghazâlî alongside contemporary work, I aim to highlight some fruitful ideas about how moral character and ascetic practice could play important roles in religious epistemology. I argue that the exploration of these ideas may be enriched via engagement with recent developments in mainstream epistemology and virtue theory, pointing toward future avenues for such work.

道德品格和苦行修行在当代分析性宗教认识论中并不是主要主题。但它们一直是几个有影响力的历史人物的宗教认识论的主要主题，其中包括中世纪的伊斯兰哲学家al-Ghazâlî。本文将探讨道德品格和禁欲实践在al-Ghazâlî宗教认识论和当代分析宗教认识论中的地位。通过阅读al-Ghazâlî和当代作品，我的目的是强调一些关于道德品质和禁欲实践如何在宗教认识论中发挥重要作用的富有成效的想法。我认为，通过参与主流认识论和美德理论的最新发展，可以丰富这些思想的探索，为此类工作指明未来的道路。

引用次数: 0

New Applications, Hepeating, and Discrimination: Response to Anderson, Horisk, and Watson 新应用、heating和Discrimination:对Anderson、Horisk和Watson的回应

IF 0.5 3区哲学 Q2 Arts and Humanities

Res Philosophica

Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.11612/resphil.2071

M. Mcgowan

引用次数: 1

IF 0.5 3区哲学 Q2 Arts and Humanities

Res Philosophica

Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.11612/resphil.2128

David Mcpherson

引用次数: 0

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