Matthew E. K. Hall, Gary E. Hollibaugh, Jonathan Klingler, Adam J. Ramey
In another article in this issue, Black et al. discuss their preferred approach to estimating Supreme Court justices’ Big Five personality traits from written text and provide several critiques of the approach of Hall et al. In this rejoinder, we show that Black et al.’s critiques are substantially without merit, their preferred approach suffers from many of the same drawbacks that they project onto our approach, their specific method of implementing their preferred approach runs afoul of many contemporary social scientific norms, our use of concurrences to estimate personality traits is far more justifiable than they suggest (especially in contrast to their use of lower court opinions), and their substantive critiques reflect a potential misunderstanding of the nature of conscientiousness. Nonetheless, we also acknowledge their broader point regarding the state-of-the-art textual analysis methodology vis-à-vis the estimation of personality traits, and we provide some constructive suggestions for the path forward.
{"title":"Considerations in Personality Measurement","authors":"Matthew E. K. Hall, Gary E. Hollibaugh, Jonathan Klingler, Adam J. Ramey","doi":"10.1086/715464","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/715464","url":null,"abstract":"In another article in this issue, Black et al. discuss their preferred approach to estimating Supreme Court justices’ Big Five personality traits from written text and provide several critiques of the approach of Hall et al. In this rejoinder, we show that Black et al.’s critiques are substantially without merit, their preferred approach suffers from many of the same drawbacks that they project onto our approach, their specific method of implementing their preferred approach runs afoul of many contemporary social scientific norms, our use of concurrences to estimate personality traits is far more justifiable than they suggest (especially in contrast to their use of lower court opinions), and their substantive critiques reflect a potential misunderstanding of the nature of conscientiousness. Nonetheless, we also acknowledge their broader point regarding the state-of-the-art textual analysis methodology vis-à-vis the estimation of personality traits, and we provide some constructive suggestions for the path forward.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"9 1","pages":"397 - 405"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45259827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This issue of the Journal of Law and Courts features articles devoted to measuring the personality traits of US Supreme Court justices. In this brief comment, I attempt to do the following. First, I briefly summarize Hall et al. (2021) and Black et al. (2021). Here I pay special attention to some of the methodological issues that give rise to the disagreement between these authors. Second, I provide some general thoughts on the enterprise of attempting to measure personality traits of US Supreme Court justices. While I am generally skeptical of the utility of such an enterprise, I could be convinced of its value. Accordingly, I attempt to lay out what a skeptic like myself would like to see in order to be convinced of the intellectual value added of work in this area.
这一期的《法律与法院杂志》刊载了专门测量美国最高法院法官性格特征的文章。在这篇简短的评论中，我试图做到以下几点。首先，我简要总结了Hall et al.(2021)和Black et al.(2021)。在这里，我特别注意引起这些作者之间分歧的一些方法论问题。其次，我就试图衡量美国最高法院法官的人格特征这一事业提供了一些总体思路。虽然我通常对这种企业的效用持怀疑态度，但我可以确信它的价值。因此，我试图列出像我这样的怀疑论者希望看到的东西，以便确信这一领域的工作具有智力附加值。
{"title":"Introduction to the Symposium","authors":"Kevin Quinn","doi":"10.1086/715210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/715210","url":null,"abstract":"This issue of the Journal of Law and Courts features articles devoted to measuring the personality traits of US Supreme Court justices. In this brief comment, I attempt to do the following. First, I briefly summarize Hall et al. (2021) and Black et al. (2021). Here I pay special attention to some of the methodological issues that give rise to the disagreement between these authors. Second, I provide some general thoughts on the enterprise of attempting to measure personality traits of US Supreme Court justices. While I am generally skeptical of the utility of such an enterprise, I could be convinced of its value. Accordingly, I attempt to lay out what a skeptic like myself would like to see in order to be convinced of the intellectual value added of work in this area.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"9 1","pages":"337 - 343"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/715210","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44203406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate when district judges stay litigation pending the resolution of parallel administrative proceedings. Leveraging unique aspects of patent litigation to create a robust test of the proposition, we consider how ideology conditions judicial behavior on this procedural judgment. We find that legal considerations guide stay decisions and that there is also an ideological dimension to that choice. Conservative district judges approach motions to stay consistent with conservative concerns regarding frivolous litigation even as they are influenced by case characteristics. This suggests a role for judicial discretion and implies that ideology’s influence in the district courts may be greater than frequently thought.
{"title":"To Stay or Not to Stay","authors":"Banks Miller, Brett Curry","doi":"10.1086/715157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/715157","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate when district judges stay litigation pending the resolution of parallel administrative proceedings. Leveraging unique aspects of patent litigation to create a robust test of the proposition, we consider how ideology conditions judicial behavior on this procedural judgment. We find that legal considerations guide stay decisions and that there is also an ideological dimension to that choice. Conservative district judges approach motions to stay consistent with conservative concerns regarding frivolous litigation even as they are influenced by case characteristics. This suggests a role for judicial discretion and implies that ideology’s influence in the district courts may be greater than frequently thought.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"10 1","pages":"167 - 188"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47115163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ryan C. Black, Ryan J. Owens, Justin Wedeking, Patrick C. Wohlfarth
Psychological scholarship on personality is uniting with political science to redefine existing theories. This is clearly the case with research on judicial behavior and the US Supreme Court. But if this new approach is to survive and thrive, it must employ measures equal to the task. We show that Supreme Court Individual Personality Estimates, which seek to estimate justices’ personalities by examining their concurring opinions, suffer from a number of important methodological deficits that critically limit their usefulness. We briefly discuss what kinds of improved personality measures scholars should use instead and offer an improved set of estimates for one trait with an application that demonstrates our cautionary tale.
{"title":"On Estimating Personality Traits of US Supreme Court Justices","authors":"Ryan C. Black, Ryan J. Owens, Justin Wedeking, Patrick C. Wohlfarth","doi":"10.1086/714888","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/714888","url":null,"abstract":"Psychological scholarship on personality is uniting with political science to redefine existing theories. This is clearly the case with research on judicial behavior and the US Supreme Court. But if this new approach is to survive and thrive, it must employ measures equal to the task. We show that Supreme Court Individual Personality Estimates, which seek to estimate justices’ personalities by examining their concurring opinions, suffer from a number of important methodological deficits that critically limit their usefulness. We briefly discuss what kinds of improved personality measures scholars should use instead and offer an improved set of estimates for one trait with an application that demonstrates our cautionary tale.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"9 1","pages":"371 - 396"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/714888","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41657153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The federal judicial system is a hierarchy with district courts at the bottom, courts of appeals in the middle, and the Supreme Court at the top. A second, less visible, judicial hierarchy exists within district courts, with magistrate judges situated below district judges. Existing scholarship largely ignores magistrate judges, assuming they are agents tasked with procedural matters with little independent effect on federal courts adjudication. Using a combination of national administrative data (2000–2016) and original case-level data from nine district courts (1997–2014), we find that district courts not only grant meaningful responsibility and discretion to magistrate judges but do so in ways that vary substantially across and within districts. The effects of this judicial delegation extend from procedural rulings to substantive outcomes. Our findings provide evidence that a complete understanding of federal judicial decision making accounts for the roles—procedural and substantive—that magistrate judges perform.
{"title":"The Emerging Authority of Magistrate Judges within US District Courts","authors":"C. L. Boyd, Tracey E. George, Albert H. Yoon","doi":"10.1086/714576","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/714576","url":null,"abstract":"The federal judicial system is a hierarchy with district courts at the bottom, courts of appeals in the middle, and the Supreme Court at the top. A second, less visible, judicial hierarchy exists within district courts, with magistrate judges situated below district judges. Existing scholarship largely ignores magistrate judges, assuming they are agents tasked with procedural matters with little independent effect on federal courts adjudication. Using a combination of national administrative data (2000–2016) and original case-level data from nine district courts (1997–2014), we find that district courts not only grant meaningful responsibility and discretion to magistrate judges but do so in ways that vary substantially across and within districts. The effects of this judicial delegation extend from procedural rulings to substantive outcomes. Our findings provide evidence that a complete understanding of federal judicial decision making accounts for the roles—procedural and substantive—that magistrate judges perform.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"10 1","pages":"37 - 60"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/714576","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41395316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite our understanding that the US Supreme Court influences lower courts in a top-down fashion, we examine whether state courts influence Supreme Court work, namely, its majority opinions. This study of lower court influence on Supreme Court opinion writing investigates whether and when justices borrow language from state court opinions. While our fundamental interest is in whether the writings of state court judges are influential in Supreme Court opinions, we further investigate whether justices’ biases against elected judiciaries and favor for appointed systems play a role here. Our original data set includes Supreme Court cases reviewing state court decisions from 1995 to 2015. Results show that the potential for lower court influence differs for appointed versus elected state court judges, lending valuable insight into the discussion of judicial power and institutional design. Meanwhile, state courts play an important role in the development of law at the Supreme Court.
{"title":"State Court Influence on US Supreme Court Opinions","authors":"J. Bowie, Elisha C. Savchak","doi":"10.1086/714758","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/714758","url":null,"abstract":"Despite our understanding that the US Supreme Court influences lower courts in a top-down fashion, we examine whether state courts influence Supreme Court work, namely, its majority opinions. This study of lower court influence on Supreme Court opinion writing investigates whether and when justices borrow language from state court opinions. While our fundamental interest is in whether the writings of state court judges are influential in Supreme Court opinions, we further investigate whether justices’ biases against elected judiciaries and favor for appointed systems play a role here. Our original data set includes Supreme Court cases reviewing state court decisions from 1995 to 2015. Results show that the potential for lower court influence differs for appointed versus elected state court judges, lending valuable insight into the discussion of judicial power and institutional design. Meanwhile, state courts play an important role in the development of law at the Supreme Court.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"10 1","pages":"139 - 165"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/714758","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48212491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We exploit the nonhierarchical nature of the European Union legal system to investigate the effect of negative feedback on intercourt cooperation. We argue that, in the context of a nonhierarchical referral system, formal dismissals expose shirking, which the principal, the referral court, has no formal power to curb. Yet we find that when referring courts have experienced a formal dismissal, they are not only more likely to resubmit but also more likely to see their references accepted. This effect increases with the number of formal dismissals previously experienced. Our findings suggest that referring courts expect significant benefits from cooperation that the referral court is able to leverage to ameliorate the quality of the referring judges’ work.
{"title":"Chilling or Learning?","authors":"A. Dyevre, Nicolas Lampach, Monika Glavina","doi":"10.1086/714704","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/714704","url":null,"abstract":"We exploit the nonhierarchical nature of the European Union legal system to investigate the effect of negative feedback on intercourt cooperation. We argue that, in the context of a nonhierarchical referral system, formal dismissals expose shirking, which the principal, the referral court, has no formal power to curb. Yet we find that when referring courts have experienced a formal dismissal, they are not only more likely to resubmit but also more likely to see their references accepted. This effect increases with the number of formal dismissals previously experienced. Our findings suggest that referring courts expect significant benefits from cooperation that the referral court is able to leverage to ameliorate the quality of the referring judges’ work.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"10 1","pages":"87 - 112"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/714704","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48872373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Human capital theory suggests that work experience acquired through on-the-job-training primes people to be more successful. Empirical validations of this hypothesis are numerous, but limited evidence of the relevance of human capital for courtroom advocacy exists. We examine whether the outcomes obtained by experienced attorneys are significantly better than the outcomes they would have obtained as novices. Adopting a strategy for credible causal inference that could be applied to almost any peak court, the analysis shows that attorneys with experience, relative to first timers, are significantly and consistently more likely to win their cases and capture the votes of judges.
{"title":"Human Capital in Court","authors":"M. J. Nelson, L. Epstein","doi":"10.1086/714577","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/714577","url":null,"abstract":"Human capital theory suggests that work experience acquired through on-the-job-training primes people to be more successful. Empirical validations of this hypothesis are numerous, but limited evidence of the relevance of human capital for courtroom advocacy exists. We examine whether the outcomes obtained by experienced attorneys are significantly better than the outcomes they would have obtained as novices. Adopting a strategy for credible causal inference that could be applied to almost any peak court, the analysis shows that attorneys with experience, relative to first timers, are significantly and consistently more likely to win their cases and capture the votes of judges.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"10 1","pages":"61 - 85"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/714577","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46331640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since the end of the 1980s the Supreme Court has cut its caseload nearly in half. While this decrease has not gone unnoticed, researchers have largely focused their explanations on institutional factors, such as changes in personnel, creation of the certiorari pool, or an increase in the amount of discretion justices have to set their agenda. Most existing work fails to consider how the preferences of members of Congress and the president also contribute to this staggering decrease. I provide the first systematic examination of how extrainstitutional influences affect the size of the Court’s caseload. I examine the 1951–2016 terms of the Court to reveal that a constraining political environment significantly reduces the number of cases the justices agree to hear each term. These results suggest that the justices consider the preferences of actors in the other branches of government much earlier than their decisions on the merits.
{"title":"A Separation-of-Powers Approach to the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Caseload","authors":"Elizabeth A. Lane","doi":"10.1086/714086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/714086","url":null,"abstract":"Since the end of the 1980s the Supreme Court has cut its caseload nearly in half. While this decrease has not gone unnoticed, researchers have largely focused their explanations on institutional factors, such as changes in personnel, creation of the certiorari pool, or an increase in the amount of discretion justices have to set their agenda. Most existing work fails to consider how the preferences of members of Congress and the president also contribute to this staggering decrease. I provide the first systematic examination of how extrainstitutional influences affect the size of the Court’s caseload. I examine the 1951–2016 terms of the Court to reveal that a constraining political environment significantly reduces the number of cases the justices agree to hear each term. These results suggest that the justices consider the preferences of actors in the other branches of government much earlier than their decisions on the merits.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"10 1","pages":"1 - 12"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/714086","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42026762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As the chief litigator for the US government, the solicitor general plays a crucial role in the Supreme Court decision-making process. The justices and solicitor general share a mutually beneficial relationship that is reinforced by the solicitor general’s willingness to provide legal advice when asked. In this article, we examine whether and how this relationship changes when the solicitor general files a formal “confession of error.” Using data on confessions filed between the 1979 and 2014 terms, we find the justices are significantly less likely to support the solicitor general’s position at multiple stages of the Court’s decision-making process if the solicitor general confesses error in light of a policy change. This punishment is harshest when the solicitor general provides advice as an amicus curiae participant, but it is only temporary. These results provide new insight into the scope and limitations of benefits allotted to the Court’s “tenth justice.”
{"title":"Confessions at the Supreme Court","authors":"Jessica A. Schoenherr, Nicholas W. Waterbury","doi":"10.1086/714087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/714087","url":null,"abstract":"As the chief litigator for the US government, the solicitor general plays a crucial role in the Supreme Court decision-making process. The justices and solicitor general share a mutually beneficial relationship that is reinforced by the solicitor general’s willingness to provide legal advice when asked. In this article, we examine whether and how this relationship changes when the solicitor general files a formal “confession of error.” Using data on confessions filed between the 1979 and 2014 terms, we find the justices are significantly less likely to support the solicitor general’s position at multiple stages of the Court’s decision-making process if the solicitor general confesses error in light of a policy change. This punishment is harshest when the solicitor general provides advice as an amicus curiae participant, but it is only temporary. These results provide new insight into the scope and limitations of benefits allotted to the Court’s “tenth justice.”","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"10 1","pages":"13 - 36"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/714087","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45180343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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