We seek to measure the impact of decisions issued by the US Supreme Court on public awareness of its cases. We use a quasi-experimental design with the Court decisions as the stimulus of hypothesized public awareness change. We find that public awareness of cases varies according to individual differences: more educated, knowledgeable, and informationally motivated citizens are more likely to report awareness. Further, decision announcements increase awareness more generally, especially in cases of moderate salience. In contrast, for a very high salience case, awareness is high before and after the decision is announced, while, for a case fabricated by the investigators, “awareness” is not affected by the Court’s activities. The results suggest that while the public may eventually respond to the behavior of national institutions, this response is likely first filtered through an elite subset of the population.
{"title":"Justice Speaks, but Who’s Listening? Mass Public Awareness of US Supreme Court Cases","authors":"Matthew P. Hitt, Kyle L. Saunders, K. M. Scott","doi":"10.1086/701131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/701131","url":null,"abstract":"We seek to measure the impact of decisions issued by the US Supreme Court on public awareness of its cases. We use a quasi-experimental design with the Court decisions as the stimulus of hypothesized public awareness change. We find that public awareness of cases varies according to individual differences: more educated, knowledgeable, and informationally motivated citizens are more likely to report awareness. Further, decision announcements increase awareness more generally, especially in cases of moderate salience. In contrast, for a very high salience case, awareness is high before and after the decision is announced, while, for a case fabricated by the investigators, “awareness” is not affected by the Court’s activities. The results suggest that while the public may eventually respond to the behavior of national institutions, this response is likely first filtered through an elite subset of the population.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"7 1","pages":"29 - 52"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/701131","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45530453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A rapidly burgeoning literature in judicial politics concerns the variation in elements of writing style such as reading difficulty, cognitive complexity, affective language, and informality in judicial opinions. Some of these studies argue that judges strategically alter their writing style in anticipation of reactions from other actors. Others indicate that writing style is a function of judge characteristics as well as case-related factors. We investigate the correlates of writing style in US Circuit Courts of Appeals by analyzing a stratified random sample consisting of 11,771 opinions. Construing style broadly to encompass several dimensions suggested by prior work, we find that case and judge characteristics explain substantially more variance in writing style than do strategic considerations.
{"title":"Determinants of Writing Style on the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals","authors":"J. Budziak, Matthew P. Hitt, D. Lempert","doi":"10.1086/701128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/701128","url":null,"abstract":"A rapidly burgeoning literature in judicial politics concerns the variation in elements of writing style such as reading difficulty, cognitive complexity, affective language, and informality in judicial opinions. Some of these studies argue that judges strategically alter their writing style in anticipation of reactions from other actors. Others indicate that writing style is a function of judge characteristics as well as case-related factors. We investigate the correlates of writing style in US Circuit Courts of Appeals by analyzing a stratified random sample consisting of 11,771 opinions. Construing style broadly to encompass several dimensions suggested by prior work, we find that case and judge characteristics explain substantially more variance in writing style than do strategic considerations.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"7 1","pages":"1 - 28"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/701128","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44304997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite being a dominant explanation of judicial independence in democracies for over a decade, the “insurance” model has received little systematic attention. I argue that how we conceptualize democracy is especially important for analyses of judicial independence employing this insurance framework, demanding more careful attention from scholars. I illustrate that empirical results are contingent on specific conceptualizations by replicating the single existing study examining the insurance model across democracies globally. In doing so, I demonstrate that existing findings are largely driven by classifying electoral authoritarian regimes like Kazakhstan and Russia as democracies.
{"title":"(Re)examining the Insurance Model of Judicial Independence across Democracies","authors":"Brad Epperly","doi":"10.1086/698534","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/698534","url":null,"abstract":"Despite being a dominant explanation of judicial independence in democracies for over a decade, the “insurance” model has received little systematic attention. I argue that how we conceptualize democracy is especially important for analyses of judicial independence employing this insurance framework, demanding more careful attention from scholars. I illustrate that empirical results are contingent on specific conceptualizations by replicating the single existing study examining the insurance model across democracies globally. In doing so, I demonstrate that existing findings are largely driven by classifying electoral authoritarian regimes like Kazakhstan and Russia as democracies.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"6 1","pages":"405 - 419"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2018-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/698534","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44265742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While many scholars have focused on the relationship shared between the Supreme Court and lower courts, fewer have studied how those outside the judicial branch implement court policy. This study examines how police implemented a major shift in vehicle search law after the Supreme Court placed limits on search incident to arrest. Comprehensive traffic-stop data from two states are relied upon for time series intervention analyses to test the decision’s impact. Evidence of the Court’s influence is found in seriously limiting searches incident to arrest and expanding the use of alternative searches as a means to circumvent the ruling.
{"title":"The Implementation of Supreme Court Precedent: The Impact of Arizona v. Gant on Police Searches","authors":"Ethan D. Boldt, M. Gizzi","doi":"10.1086/698535","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/698535","url":null,"abstract":"While many scholars have focused on the relationship shared between the Supreme Court and lower courts, fewer have studied how those outside the judicial branch implement court policy. This study examines how police implemented a major shift in vehicle search law after the Supreme Court placed limits on search incident to arrest. Comprehensive traffic-stop data from two states are relied upon for time series intervention analyses to test the decision’s impact. Evidence of the Court’s influence is found in seriously limiting searches incident to arrest and expanding the use of alternative searches as a means to circumvent the ruling.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"6 1","pages":"355 - 378"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2018-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/698535","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48580757","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Judicial empowerment is often cited as a driver of transnational governance, particularly in the European Union. In this view, lower national courts enthusiastically began referring cases to the European Court of Justice to acquire new powers of judicial review. Revisiting this argument, I argue that path dependent, everyday practices within domestic judiciaries stemming from insufficient training in European Union law, workload pressures, and cultural aversions to judicial review can resist Europeanization even when it would lead to empowerment. The argument is evaluated via a critical case study of judicial practice in Italy that is placed in a broader comparative context.
{"title":"Revisiting Judicial Empowerment in the European Union: Limits of Empowerment, Logics of Resistance","authors":"T. Pavone","doi":"10.1086/697371","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/697371","url":null,"abstract":"Judicial empowerment is often cited as a driver of transnational governance, particularly in the European Union. In this view, lower national courts enthusiastically began referring cases to the European Court of Justice to acquire new powers of judicial review. Revisiting this argument, I argue that path dependent, everyday practices within domestic judiciaries stemming from insufficient training in European Union law, workload pressures, and cultural aversions to judicial review can resist Europeanization even when it would lead to empowerment. The argument is evaluated via a critical case study of judicial practice in Italy that is placed in a broader comparative context.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"6 1","pages":"303 - 331"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2018-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/697371","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42743693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A significant undiscussed problem with the leading conceptualization of ideologically based judicial behavior, Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth’s attitudinal model, is its lack of theory. This problem leads to circular reasoning, ad hoc coding adjustments, and inaccurate characterizations and explanations of case outcomes, judicial votes and ideologies, and trends in judicial behavior. A values-based theory of ideology, such as the cultural theory pioneered by Mary Douglas, Michael Thompson, Aaron Wildavsky, and others, can help remedy this problem. Applying this cultural theory to First Amendment cases, we find that political cultures valuing equality, order, and liberty provide a more accurate account of judicial decisions than labeling them liberal or conservative.
{"title":"Beyond Liberal and Conservative: Advancing the Study of Judicial Behavior with a Cultural Theory of Political Values","authors":"R. Robinson, B. Swedlow","doi":"10.1086/697459","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/697459","url":null,"abstract":"A significant undiscussed problem with the leading conceptualization of ideologically based judicial behavior, Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth’s attitudinal model, is its lack of theory. This problem leads to circular reasoning, ad hoc coding adjustments, and inaccurate characterizations and explanations of case outcomes, judicial votes and ideologies, and trends in judicial behavior. A values-based theory of ideology, such as the cultural theory pioneered by Mary Douglas, Michael Thompson, Aaron Wildavsky, and others, can help remedy this problem. Applying this cultural theory to First Amendment cases, we find that political cultures valuing equality, order, and liberty provide a more accurate account of judicial decisions than labeling them liberal or conservative.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"6 1","pages":"263 - 302"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2018-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/697459","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47484906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For decades now, experiments have revealed that we humans tend to evaluate the views or activities of our own group and its members more favorably than those of outsiders. To assess convergence between experimental and observational results, we explore whether US Supreme Court justices fall prey to in-group bias in freedom-of-expression cases. A two-level hierarchical model of all votes cast between the 1953 and 2014 terms confirms that they do. Although liberal justices are (overall) more supportive of free-speech claims than conservative justices, the votes of both liberal and conservative justices tend to reflect their preferences toward the speech’s ideological grouping and not solely an underlying taste for (or against) greater protection for expression. These results suggest the importance of new research programs aimed at evaluating how other cognitive biases identified in experimental work may influence judicial behavior in actual court decisions.
{"title":"Do Justices Defend the Speech They Hate? An Analysis of In-Group Bias on the US Supreme Court","authors":"L. Epstein, Christopher M. Parker, J. Segal","doi":"10.1086/697118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/697118","url":null,"abstract":"For decades now, experiments have revealed that we humans tend to evaluate the views or activities of our own group and its members more favorably than those of outsiders. To assess convergence between experimental and observational results, we explore whether US Supreme Court justices fall prey to in-group bias in freedom-of-expression cases. A two-level hierarchical model of all votes cast between the 1953 and 2014 terms confirms that they do. Although liberal justices are (overall) more supportive of free-speech claims than conservative justices, the votes of both liberal and conservative justices tend to reflect their preferences toward the speech’s ideological grouping and not solely an underlying taste for (or against) greater protection for expression. These results suggest the importance of new research programs aimed at evaluating how other cognitive biases identified in experimental work may influence judicial behavior in actual court decisions.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"6 1","pages":"237 - 262"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2018-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/697118","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42406494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 2006, the Bush administration directed nine US attorneys to resign. This decision was a partial cause of the attorney general’s departure from the administration, and it prompted investigations and congressional hearings. Seen as largely ad hoc, we argue that theory predicts a more systematic decision-making process. We investigate this empirically and find, consistent with literature on principal-agent theories and bureaucracy, that performance on easily monitored metrics and adverse-selection concerns predict the firings. We explore the implications of these findings for efforts to centralize decision-making in the Department of Justice and to exert political control over US attorneys.
{"title":"Haphazard, Systematic, or Both? An Empirical Investigation of the US Attorney Firings in 2006","authors":"Banks Miller, Brett Curry","doi":"10.1086/696858","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/696858","url":null,"abstract":"In 2006, the Bush administration directed nine US attorneys to resign. This decision was a partial cause of the attorney general’s departure from the administration, and it prompted investigations and congressional hearings. Seen as largely ad hoc, we argue that theory predicts a more systematic decision-making process. We investigate this empirically and find, consistent with literature on principal-agent theories and bureaucracy, that performance on easily monitored metrics and adverse-selection concerns predict the firings. We explore the implications of these findings for efforts to centralize decision-making in the Department of Justice and to exert political control over US attorneys.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"6 1","pages":"379 - 403"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2018-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/696858","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46524829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The legislature wields multiple tools to limit judicial power, but scholars have little information about how judges interpret variant threats and which they find most concerning. To provide insight, we conduct original interviews regarding legislative threats to courts with over two dozen sitting federal judges, representing all tiers of the federal judiciary. We find that judges have a nuanced understanding of threats and tend to identify components of legislative proposals that threaten formal institutional powers as more concerning than those challenging policy set by judges. This distinction has broad implications for our understanding of judicial behavior at the federal level.
{"title":"Blurring Institutional Boundaries: Judges’ Perceptions of Threats to Judicial Independence","authors":"Alyx Mark, Michael A. Zilis","doi":"10.1086/695743","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/695743","url":null,"abstract":"The legislature wields multiple tools to limit judicial power, but scholars have little information about how judges interpret variant threats and which they find most concerning. To provide insight, we conduct original interviews regarding legislative threats to courts with over two dozen sitting federal judges, representing all tiers of the federal judiciary. We find that judges have a nuanced understanding of threats and tend to identify components of legislative proposals that threaten formal institutional powers as more concerning than those challenging policy set by judges. This distinction has broad implications for our understanding of judicial behavior at the federal level.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"6 1","pages":"333 - 353"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2018-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/695743","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41772673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sergio A. Muro, Alejandro Chehtman, Jorge Luis Silva Méndez, N. Durán
Even if party capability theory has been well documented, parsing out the reasons why “haves” come out ahead has been challenging. Our study takes advantage of the Argentine Supreme Court’s power to dismiss appeals because they contain formal errors to ascertain the existence of representational advantage. We show that representational advantage plays a significant role, as individual appellants represent a larger proportion of appeals rejected on formal grounds than of those analyzed on their merits. In addition, certain areas of law where asymmetrical capability is prevalent and consistent, particularly labor law, are significantly overrepresented in appeals rejected on formal grounds.
{"title":"Testing Representational Advantage in the Argentine Supreme Court","authors":"Sergio A. Muro, Alejandro Chehtman, Jorge Luis Silva Méndez, N. Durán","doi":"10.1086/695564","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/695564","url":null,"abstract":"Even if party capability theory has been well documented, parsing out the reasons why “haves” come out ahead has been challenging. Our study takes advantage of the Argentine Supreme Court’s power to dismiss appeals because they contain formal errors to ascertain the existence of representational advantage. We show that representational advantage plays a significant role, as individual appellants represent a larger proportion of appeals rejected on formal grounds than of those analyzed on their merits. In addition, certain areas of law where asymmetrical capability is prevalent and consistent, particularly labor law, are significantly overrepresented in appeals rejected on formal grounds.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"6 1","pages":"1 - 23"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/695564","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46516956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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