International Journal of Economic Theory最新文献

We develop a two-country, two-sector model of trade, and assume that the differences between two countries are not only the diversities of human capital distributions but also relative production technologies. We find that, in addition to the diversity effect, both the terms of trade effect and the relative technology effect can also matter for the pattern of trade. We prove that, unlike previous results, if combination of the terms of trade effect and the relative technology effect dominates the diversity effect, then a country with more diverse human capital will export goods produced by supermodular technology.

We show that the long-term properties of price and cost in Chamberlin's monopolistic competition model can be reproduced with a soft capacity constrained price competition oligopoly model for a homogeneous good with free entry.

This study attempts to investigate the impact of downstream foreign licensing on upstream privatization policy in a vertically related market, in which a public firm and a domestic private firm supply exclusively to downstream domestic and foreign firms, respectively. We show that downstream licensing occurs when the cost differential between downstream duopolists is small, and the optimal strategy under licensing is upstream partial privatization. In addition, downstream foreign licensing facilitates upstream privatization. We further show that downstream licensing improves (reduces) local welfare when the cost differential is large (small).

Consider two downstream firms that each can either produce an input in-house or purchase it from an upstream supplier. We show that depending on the difference between the supplier's and the downstream firms' in-house production costs, outsourcing by both firms could help them achieve a Pareto improvement or leave them trapped in a prisoner's dilemma. Furthermore, we find that two downstream firms may play a chicken game in which each makes a sourcing decision different from its rival if the input supplier is not as efficient as in the previous cases. The welfare implications of various sourcing outcomes are explored.

We investigate the upstream public firm's desirable option of production timing in the vertically related upstream market. We find that multiple equilibria may exist, including the Cournot-type and Stackelberg-type, with different degrees of privatization in the presence of upstream firms' efficiency gap. These equilibrium outcomes are also influenced by the intensity of downstream market competition. We further show the corresponding optimal degree of privatization in different phases of gradual privatization.

We compare Cournot and Bertrand competitions with R&D investment under output versus R&D subsidy policies. We demonstrate that Cournot firms invest more (less) in R&D and the government grants more (less) subsidies than for Bertrand firms with output (R&D) subsidies. We also find that both competition modes yield the same welfare with output subsidy, while Bertrand yields higher welfare than Cournot with R&D subsidy. Finally, firms' profits and welfare in Cournot are higher under output subsidies, while they can be higher in Bertrand under R&D subsidies if the product substitutability is high and the firm's R&D investment is efficient.

It is well recognized that there emerged a trend of inward-looking trade policies even before the COVID pandemic crippled the world. These were reflected in both BREXIT and US-China trade conflicts. As countries become inward-oriented, usually local prices start rising. With this backdrop, this paper explores how rising local prices are likely to affect employment in the short and long runs when we accommodate for the finite change in a general equilibrium structure whereby sectors not only contract but might also close down altogether due to the capital reallocation effect following a price incentive.

We construct a game-theoretic model in which there are multiple countries with their own languages and each citizen can gain from additional communication in her secondarily acquired language. We demonstrate that in any equilibrium, a hegemonic language, which is a language that all citizens in other countries want to study, emerges. Such an equilibrium is more likely to exist if the size of the population of a country that is not the largest increases, or if the ratio of the gain from the additional communication in the second language to the cost of acquisition increases.