Abstract I model a competitive labor market in which agents of different skill levels decide whether to enter the market as a manager or as a worker. After roles are chosen, a two-sided matching market is realized and a cooperative assignment game occurs. There exists a unique rational expectations equilibrium that induces a stable many-to-one matching and wage structure. Positive assortative matching occurs if and only if the production function exhibits a condition that I call role supermodularity, which is stronger than the strict supermodularity condition commonly used in the matching literature because a high skilled agent with a role choice is only willing to enter the market as a worker if she expects that it is more profitable to cluster with only other high skilled agents than to exclusively manage. The wage structure in equilibrium is consistent with empirical evidence that the wage gap is driven both by increased within-firm positive sorting as well as between-firm segregation.
{"title":"Choosing Sides in a Two-Sided Matching Market","authors":"Kit Zhou","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2022-0126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2022-0126","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I model a competitive labor market in which agents of different skill levels decide whether to enter the market as a manager or as a worker. After roles are chosen, a two-sided matching market is realized and a cooperative assignment game occurs. There exists a unique rational expectations equilibrium that induces a stable many-to-one matching and wage structure. Positive assortative matching occurs if and only if the production function exhibits a condition that I call role supermodularity, which is stronger than the strict supermodularity condition commonly used in the matching literature because a high skilled agent with a role choice is only willing to enter the market as a worker if she expects that it is more profitable to cluster with only other high skilled agents than to exclusively manage. The wage structure in equilibrium is consistent with empirical evidence that the wage gap is driven both by increased within-firm positive sorting as well as between-firm segregation.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"23 1","pages":"781 - 807"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48641298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Inspired by Zhao, J. 1996. “The Hybrid Equilibria and Core Selection in Exchange Economies with Externalities.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 26 (4): 387–407, Askoura, Y. 2011. “The Weak-Core of a Game in Normal Form with a Continuum of Players.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 47: 43–7, Askoura, Y. 2017. “On the Core of Normal Form Games with a Continuum of Players.” Mathematical Social Sciences 89: 32–42, Yang, Z. 2020. “The Weak α-core of Exchange Economies with a Continuum of Players and Pseudo-utilities.” Journal of Mathematical Economies 91: 43–50 and Yang, Z., and X. Zhang. 2021. “A Weak α-core Existence Theorem of Games with Nonordered Preferences and a Continuum of Agents.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 94: 102464, we establish an exchange economy with externalities and a continuum of agents. We define the weak hybrid equilibrium in this model and prove the existence theorem under the regular conditions. Furthermore, we analyze the relation between the set of hybrid equilibria and the set of competitive equilibria in an exchange economy without externalities and with a continuum of agents.
{"title":"The Weak Hybrid Equilibria of an Exchange Economy with a Continuum of Agents and Externalities","authors":"Zhe Yang","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2021-0098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2021-0098","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Inspired by Zhao, J. 1996. “The Hybrid Equilibria and Core Selection in Exchange Economies with Externalities.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 26 (4): 387–407, Askoura, Y. 2011. “The Weak-Core of a Game in Normal Form with a Continuum of Players.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 47: 43–7, Askoura, Y. 2017. “On the Core of Normal Form Games with a Continuum of Players.” Mathematical Social Sciences 89: 32–42, Yang, Z. 2020. “The Weak α-core of Exchange Economies with a Continuum of Players and Pseudo-utilities.” Journal of Mathematical Economies 91: 43–50 and Yang, Z., and X. Zhang. 2021. “A Weak α-core Existence Theorem of Games with Nonordered Preferences and a Continuum of Agents.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 94: 102464, we establish an exchange economy with externalities and a continuum of agents. We define the weak hybrid equilibrium in this model and prove the existence theorem under the regular conditions. Furthermore, we analyze the relation between the set of hybrid equilibria and the set of competitive equilibria in an exchange economy without externalities and with a continuum of agents.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"23 1","pages":"757 - 780"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44639493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper introduces a family of domains of bargaining problems allowing for non-convexity. For each domain in this family, single-valued bargaining solutions satisfying the Nash axioms are explicitly characterized as solutions of the iterated maximization of Nash products weighted by the row vectors of the associated bargaining weight matrices. This paper also introduces a simple procedure to standardize bargaining weight matrices for each solution into an equivalent triangular bargaining weight matrix, which is simplified and easy to use for applications. Furthermore, the standardized bargaining weight matrix can be recovered from bargaining solutions of simple problems. This recovering result provides an empirical framework for determining the bargaining weights.
{"title":"On Iterated Nash Bargaining Solutions","authors":"C. Qin, G. Tan, A. C. L. Wong","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2022-0095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2022-0095","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper introduces a family of domains of bargaining problems allowing for non-convexity. For each domain in this family, single-valued bargaining solutions satisfying the Nash axioms are explicitly characterized as solutions of the iterated maximization of Nash products weighted by the row vectors of the associated bargaining weight matrices. This paper also introduces a simple procedure to standardize bargaining weight matrices for each solution into an equivalent triangular bargaining weight matrix, which is simplified and easy to use for applications. Furthermore, the standardized bargaining weight matrix can be recovered from bargaining solutions of simple problems. This recovering result provides an empirical framework for determining the bargaining weights.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"23 1","pages":"697 - 721"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45439614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We propose a model where two sports leagues compete for sporting talent, and at the same time consider the competitive balance in their domestic championships. The allocation of broadcasting revenues by the league-governing body acts as an incentive for teams to invest in talent. We derive a strategic league authority’s optimal sharing rule of broadcasting revenues across teams in the league. While a weighted form of performance-based sharing is the best way of attracting talent, cross-subsidization from high- to low-payroll teams is required to improve competitive balance. The optimal sharing rule is then a combination of these two “sub-rules”. We show that the distribution of broadcasting revenues in two first divisions in European men’s football, the English Premier League (EPL) and the French Ligue 1 (L1), corresponds to the optimal sharing rule we discuss. We propose a new method to assess empirically the cross-subsidization impact of the sharing formula. As the impact of cross-subsidization is greater in the EPL than L1, we conclude that ensuring domestic competitive balance seems to be a more important target for the EPL than for L1.
{"title":"Inter-league Competition and the Optimal Broadcasting Revenue-Sharing Rule","authors":"Yvon Rocaboy","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2022-0042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2022-0042","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We propose a model where two sports leagues compete for sporting talent, and at the same time consider the competitive balance in their domestic championships. The allocation of broadcasting revenues by the league-governing body acts as an incentive for teams to invest in talent. We derive a strategic league authority’s optimal sharing rule of broadcasting revenues across teams in the league. While a weighted form of performance-based sharing is the best way of attracting talent, cross-subsidization from high- to low-payroll teams is required to improve competitive balance. The optimal sharing rule is then a combination of these two “sub-rules”. We show that the distribution of broadcasting revenues in two first divisions in European men’s football, the English Premier League (EPL) and the French Ligue 1 (L1), corresponds to the optimal sharing rule we discuss. We propose a new method to assess empirically the cross-subsidization impact of the sharing formula. As the impact of cross-subsidization is greater in the EPL than L1, we conclude that ensuring domestic competitive balance seems to be a more important target for the EPL than for L1.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"23 1","pages":"723 - 756"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47506079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This study demonstrates why traditional “cost-saving” technical progress fails in an economy where consumption is time-constrained. In such a case, introducing “time-saving” technical progress establishes a new consumption-production equilibrium characterized by higher per-capita consumption and real income, lower prices, and, a higher scale of production for surviving producers. Nonetheless, since there is a limit to how much time can be saved by technological advances, the model also suggests an alternative solution in the form of a rising labor force (say via immigration) to close the production-consumption gap. This solution generates an unambiguous increase in welfare, vis-à-vis cost-reducing or time-saving technical progress.
{"title":"Cost-Reducing Technologies and Labor Supply in a Krugman-type Model where Consumption is Time-Constrained: Some New Results","authors":"M. Pant, Sugandha Huria","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2022-0067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2022-0067","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This study demonstrates why traditional “cost-saving” technical progress fails in an economy where consumption is time-constrained. In such a case, introducing “time-saving” technical progress establishes a new consumption-production equilibrium characterized by higher per-capita consumption and real income, lower prices, and, a higher scale of production for surviving producers. Nonetheless, since there is a limit to how much time can be saved by technological advances, the model also suggests an alternative solution in the form of a rising labor force (say via immigration) to close the production-consumption gap. This solution generates an unambiguous increase in welfare, vis-à-vis cost-reducing or time-saving technical progress.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"23 1","pages":"823 - 836"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48379709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper extends the findings of Liu, Wang, and Lee (2015. “Strategic Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility in a Differentiated Duopoly Market.” Economics Letters 129: 108–11), along two dimensions. First, we consider the case of endogenous market structure a la Singh and Vives (1984. “Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly.” The RAND Journal of Economics: 546–54). Second, we refine the ECSR certification standards in differentiated duopoly with analysis of both uniform and discriminating standards. We find that NGO certifier will set the ECSR standards below the optimal level. We show that given the ECSR certification standards, there is a possibility of both price and quantity contracts choices by the firms in endogenous market structure. Additionally, we highlight the market structures emerging due to uniform and discriminating ECSR standards.
本文扩展了Liu, Wang, and Lee(2015)的研究结果。“差异化双寡头市场中的战略性环境企业社会责任”。经济学快报129:108-11)，沿着两个维度。首先，我们考虑内生市场结构的案例(Singh和Vives, 1984)。差异化双头垄断中的价格与数量竞争兰德经济杂志:546-54)。其次，通过对统一标准和区别标准的分析，细化了差异化双寡头环境下的ECSR认证标准。我们发现，NGO认证机构会将ECSR标准设定在最优水平以下。研究表明，在给定ECSR认证标准的情况下，企业内生市场结构中存在价格合同选择和数量合同选择的可能性。此外，我们强调了由于统一和歧视性的ECSR标准而出现的市场结构。
{"title":"Strategic Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR) Certification and Endogenous Market Structure","authors":"Ajay Sharma, Siddhartha K. Rastogi","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2022-0139","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2022-0139","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper extends the findings of Liu, Wang, and Lee (2015. “Strategic Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility in a Differentiated Duopoly Market.” Economics Letters 129: 108–11), along two dimensions. First, we consider the case of endogenous market structure a la Singh and Vives (1984. “Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly.” The RAND Journal of Economics: 546–54). Second, we refine the ECSR certification standards in differentiated duopoly with analysis of both uniform and discriminating standards. We find that NGO certifier will set the ECSR standards below the optimal level. We show that given the ECSR certification standards, there is a possibility of both price and quantity contracts choices by the firms in endogenous market structure. Additionally, we highlight the market structures emerging due to uniform and discriminating ECSR standards.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43357086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We study the connection between risk aversion, the number of consumers, and the uniqueness of equilibrium. We consider an economy with two goods and I impatience types, where each type has additive separable preferences with HARA Bernoulli utility function, u H ( x ) ≔ γ 1 − γ b + a γ x 1 − γ ${u}_{text{H}}(x) := frac{gamma }{1-gamma }{left(b+frac{a}{gamma }xright)}^{1-gamma }$ . We show that if γ ∈ 1 , I I − 1 $gamma in left(1,frac{I}{I-1}right]$ , the economy has a unique regular equilibrium. Moreover, the methods used, including Newton’s symmetric polynomials and Descartes’ rule of signs, enable us to offer new sufficient conditions for uniqueness in a closed-form expression that highlight the role played by endowments, patience, and specific HARA parameters. Finally, we derive new necessary and sufficient conditions that ensure uniqueness for the particular case of CRRA Bernoulli utility functions with γ = 3.
{"title":"Risk Aversion and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Economies with Two Goods and Arbitrary Endowments","authors":"A. Loi, Stefano Matta","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2021-0150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2021-0150","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study the connection between risk aversion, the number of consumers, and the uniqueness of equilibrium. We consider an economy with two goods and I impatience types, where each type has additive separable preferences with HARA Bernoulli utility function, u H ( x ) ≔ γ 1 − γ b + a γ x 1 − γ ${u}_{text{H}}(x) := frac{gamma }{1-gamma }{left(b+frac{a}{gamma }xright)}^{1-gamma }$ . We show that if γ ∈ 1 , I I − 1 $gamma in left(1,frac{I}{I-1}right]$ , the economy has a unique regular equilibrium. Moreover, the methods used, including Newton’s symmetric polynomials and Descartes’ rule of signs, enable us to offer new sufficient conditions for uniqueness in a closed-form expression that highlight the role played by endowments, patience, and specific HARA parameters. Finally, we derive new necessary and sufficient conditions that ensure uniqueness for the particular case of CRRA Bernoulli utility functions with γ = 3.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"23 1","pages":"679 - 696"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49562276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper introduces the impact of online competition to analysis of the urban configuration of a small open city, which was first developed by Alonso (1964. Location and Land Use. Cambridge: Harvard University Press), Mills (1967. “An Aggregative Model of Resource Allocation in a Metropolitan Area.” The American Economic Review 57 (2): 197–210), and Muth (1969. Cities and Housing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press) (AMM hereafter). In comparison to a revised AMM model in Lai and Tsai (2008. “Simplified Alonso-Mills-Muth Model with a Monopoly Vendor.” Journal of Urban Economics 63 (2): 536–43) which assumed a monopoly vendor, the present paper’s online entry brings competition, eventually causes price reduction, city expansion, and asymmetrically ascending land rent, and makes the incumbent vendor relocate to a more remote city boundary. When the disadvantage of online purchasing is not large, the urban configuration demonstrates that most residents purchase online, and only the residents living near the physical vendor make shopping trips. Finally, the benefit of city expansion from online competition eventually goes to the absentee landowners by way of the raised land rents.
{"title":"An Urban Configuration with Online Competition","authors":"Fu-Chuan Lai","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2022-0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2022-0017","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper introduces the impact of online competition to analysis of the urban configuration of a small open city, which was first developed by Alonso (1964. Location and Land Use. Cambridge: Harvard University Press), Mills (1967. “An Aggregative Model of Resource Allocation in a Metropolitan Area.” The American Economic Review 57 (2): 197–210), and Muth (1969. Cities and Housing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press) (AMM hereafter). In comparison to a revised AMM model in Lai and Tsai (2008. “Simplified Alonso-Mills-Muth Model with a Monopoly Vendor.” Journal of Urban Economics 63 (2): 536–43) which assumed a monopoly vendor, the present paper’s online entry brings competition, eventually causes price reduction, city expansion, and asymmetrically ascending land rent, and makes the incumbent vendor relocate to a more remote city boundary. When the disadvantage of online purchasing is not large, the urban configuration demonstrates that most residents purchase online, and only the residents living near the physical vendor make shopping trips. Finally, the benefit of city expansion from online competition eventually goes to the absentee landowners by way of the raised land rents.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"23 1","pages":"639 - 662"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44159681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article extends the cost-reducing R&D model with spillovers by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988. “Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers.” The American Economic Review 78: 1133–7, 1990. “Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers: Erratum.” The American Economic Review 80: 641–2) to allow quantity-setting firms (Cournot rivalry) to play the non-cooperative R&D investment decision game with horizontal product differentiation. Unlike Bacchiega, Lambertini, and Mantovani (2010. “R&D-hindering Collusion.” The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 10 (Topics): 66), who identify a parametric region (defined by the extent of technological spillovers and the efficiency of R&D activity), in which the game is a prisoner’s dilemma (self-interest and mutual benefit of cost-reducing innovation conflict), this work shows that product differentiation changes the game into a deadlock (self-interest and mutual benefit do not conflict), regardless of the parameter scale (i.e. also in the absence of spill-over effects). Then investing in R&D challenges the improvement of interventions aimed at favouring product differentiation. This is because social welfare when firms invest in cost-reducing R&D is greater than when firms do not invest in R&D. Alternatively, R&D subsidies can be used as a social welfare maximising tool also in the absence of R&D spillovers. These results also hold for price-setting firms (Bertrand rivalry).
{"title":"The R&D Investment Decision Game with Product Differentiation","authors":"D. Buccella, L. Fanti, L. Gori","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2021-0129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2021-0129","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article extends the cost-reducing R&D model with spillovers by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988. “Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers.” The American Economic Review 78: 1133–7, 1990. “Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers: Erratum.” The American Economic Review 80: 641–2) to allow quantity-setting firms (Cournot rivalry) to play the non-cooperative R&D investment decision game with horizontal product differentiation. Unlike Bacchiega, Lambertini, and Mantovani (2010. “R&D-hindering Collusion.” The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 10 (Topics): 66), who identify a parametric region (defined by the extent of technological spillovers and the efficiency of R&D activity), in which the game is a prisoner’s dilemma (self-interest and mutual benefit of cost-reducing innovation conflict), this work shows that product differentiation changes the game into a deadlock (self-interest and mutual benefit do not conflict), regardless of the parameter scale (i.e. also in the absence of spill-over effects). Then investing in R&D challenges the improvement of interventions aimed at favouring product differentiation. This is because social welfare when firms invest in cost-reducing R&D is greater than when firms do not invest in R&D. Alternatively, R&D subsidies can be used as a social welfare maximising tool also in the absence of R&D spillovers. These results also hold for price-setting firms (Bertrand rivalry).","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"23 1","pages":"601 - 637"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48883758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract It is a well-established property that more precise private information leads to lower non-fundamental volatility in a coordination economy with dispersed information. In this note, we identify conditions under which such an argument holds or does not hold. In particular, we show that the opposite relationship holds when (1) there is a strong positive correlation between private information of different agents and (2) public information is endogenously generated.
{"title":"On the Relation between Private Information and Non-Fundamental Volatility","authors":"Myungkyu Shim, Doyoung Song","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2021-0166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2021-0166","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It is a well-established property that more precise private information leads to lower non-fundamental volatility in a coordination economy with dispersed information. In this note, we identify conditions under which such an argument holds or does not hold. In particular, we show that the opposite relationship holds when (1) there is a strong positive correlation between private information of different agents and (2) public information is endogenously generated.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"23 1","pages":"809 - 821"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42379793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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