Abstract Two firms offer product series from which multiple complementary pairs are formed. The firms engage in a price- or quantity-choosing game in the market. It is found that the integration of the two firms may not necessarily lower the equilibrium prices because it precludes “indirect competition” in the market. Therefore, the integration, which may appear as a vertical integration, could be an antitrust concern even in the absence of exclusionary purpose.
{"title":"Integration of Complementary Multiproduct Firms","authors":"Hao Wang","doi":"10.1515/rle-2020-0058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2020-0058","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Two firms offer product series from which multiple complementary pairs are formed. The firms engage in a price- or quantity-choosing game in the market. It is found that the integration of the two firms may not necessarily lower the equilibrium prices because it precludes “indirect competition” in the market. Therefore, the integration, which may appear as a vertical integration, could be an antitrust concern even in the absence of exclusionary purpose.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79242675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Late medieval Englishmen provided for their wellbeing in the hereafter by purchasing intercession for their souls. They traded valuable landed endowments for the promise of posthumous Masses and prayers whose daily observance contractual counterparties agreed to underwrite for decades, centuries, even eternally. Intercessory foundations so contracted were called chantries. Chantry contracts constituted trades with the dead in the sense that the promisees were deceased when the promisors were supposed to perform. I study the special problems that chantry contract promisees faced in enforcing their rights from the grave and analyze the devices they used for that purpose. Chantry founders wary of their fates in the afterlife showed equal concern for the challenges their contracts would encounter in this life long after they were gone. Founders met those challenges by leveraging the economics of incentives to develop a strategy of chantry contract self-enforcement: profit the living, present and future, for monitoring the contractual performance of promisors and promisors’ agents, and for punishing them should they breach. Chantry founders’ strategy was successful, enabling trade with the dead.
{"title":"Trading with the Dead","authors":"P. Leeson","doi":"10.1515/rle-2021-0036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2021-0036","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Late medieval Englishmen provided for their wellbeing in the hereafter by purchasing intercession for their souls. They traded valuable landed endowments for the promise of posthumous Masses and prayers whose daily observance contractual counterparties agreed to underwrite for decades, centuries, even eternally. Intercessory foundations so contracted were called chantries. Chantry contracts constituted trades with the dead in the sense that the promisees were deceased when the promisors were supposed to perform. I study the special problems that chantry contract promisees faced in enforcing their rights from the grave and analyze the devices they used for that purpose. Chantry founders wary of their fates in the afterlife showed equal concern for the challenges their contracts would encounter in this life long after they were gone. Founders met those challenges by leveraging the economics of incentives to develop a strategy of chantry contract self-enforcement: profit the living, present and future, for monitoring the contractual performance of promisors and promisors’ agents, and for punishing them should they breach. Chantry founders’ strategy was successful, enabling trade with the dead.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75299998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Motivated by some recent examples, this paper employs a model of public law enforcement to explain why it may not be in society’s interest to send criminals to prison. We establish two main findings. First, independent of the lawbreaker’s societal position, imprisonment is suboptimal when the harm from the illegal activity is sufficiently small. Second, for a given level of harm, imprisonment is suboptimal when the lawbreaker is sufficiently important. This latter result thus provides a rationale for why some parties are taken to be ‘too big to jail’.
{"title":"A Theory of ‘Too Big To Jail’","authors":"Iwan Bos","doi":"10.1515/rle-2021-0061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2021-0061","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Motivated by some recent examples, this paper employs a model of public law enforcement to explain why it may not be in society’s interest to send criminals to prison. We establish two main findings. First, independent of the lawbreaker’s societal position, imprisonment is suboptimal when the harm from the illegal activity is sufficiently small. Second, for a given level of harm, imprisonment is suboptimal when the lawbreaker is sufficiently important. This latter result thus provides a rationale for why some parties are taken to be ‘too big to jail’.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72779395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Content industries have several profit sources that positively interact with one another, and piracy affects them not only negatively but also positively. For copyright holders, choosing to allow piracy depends upon its total external effects. This paper proves that in such case the profit function is convex with respect to the level of enforcement. This paper shows a convex profit function with respect to the level of enforcement. The convexity leads to a corner solution of optimal enforcement for copyright holders. Which corner solution is selected depends on the relative size of the sub-market, and no enforcement is profitable if the submarket size is relatively large. This result compensates for a shortcoming of discussions that assume only two options regarding the level of enforcement, zero or perfect enforcement.
{"title":"Optimal Enforcement for Content Industries under Positive External Effects of Piracy","authors":"Koji Domon","doi":"10.1515/rle-2020-0029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2020-0029","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Content industries have several profit sources that positively interact with one another, and piracy affects them not only negatively but also positively. For copyright holders, choosing to allow piracy depends upon its total external effects. This paper proves that in such case the profit function is convex with respect to the level of enforcement. This paper shows a convex profit function with respect to the level of enforcement. The convexity leads to a corner solution of optimal enforcement for copyright holders. Which corner solution is selected depends on the relative size of the sub-market, and no enforcement is profitable if the submarket size is relatively large. This result compensates for a shortcoming of discussions that assume only two options regarding the level of enforcement, zero or perfect enforcement.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81075435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Imprisonment and monetary rewards for non-convictions can similarly incentivize potential offenders to refrain from committing crime. Although imprisonment is expensive, it may still enjoy a cost advantage over rewards. This is because only detected criminals are imprisoned, whereas rewards need to be provided to the remaining, much larger, population. In this article, I demonstrate that the possible cost disadvantages of rewards are mitigated when people are offered a choice between an enforcement scheme involving no rewards and another involving rewards coupled with longer imprisonment sentences. Specifically, by using rewards in this manner, one can jointly reduce crime, time served per convict, and the tax burden of the criminal justice system, under the same conditions as one could by introducing rewards without choice in an environment where there is perfect detection. Moreover, monetary rewards provide incentives through wealth transfers, but imprisonment operates by destroying wealth. This leads choice-based reward regimes to be optimal unless the imprisonment elasticity of deterrence is higher than is empirically observed.
{"title":"Rewards versus Imprisonment: The Impact of Choice","authors":"Murat C. Mungan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3881119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3881119","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Imprisonment and monetary rewards for non-convictions can similarly incentivize potential offenders to refrain from committing crime. Although imprisonment is expensive, it may still enjoy a cost advantage over rewards. This is because only detected criminals are imprisoned, whereas rewards need to be provided to the remaining, much larger, population. In this article, I demonstrate that the possible cost disadvantages of rewards are mitigated when people are offered a choice between an enforcement scheme involving no rewards and another involving rewards coupled with longer imprisonment sentences. Specifically, by using rewards in this manner, one can jointly reduce crime, time served per convict, and the tax burden of the criminal justice system, under the same conditions as one could by introducing rewards without choice in an environment where there is perfect detection. Moreover, monetary rewards provide incentives through wealth transfers, but imprisonment operates by destroying wealth. This leads choice-based reward regimes to be optimal unless the imprisonment elasticity of deterrence is higher than is empirically observed.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75794122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Behavioral economics has highlighted the impact of various biases on economic outcomes. This essay reviews how biases have been incorporated into economic models of the law and the resulting implications for the assessment of different legal rules and policies. It focuses on two contexts. The first concerns biases that affect consumer purchases of risky products. Using a standard accident model that incorporates various forms of consumer bias, we discuss how bias can affect the efficient assignment of liability for product-related accidents. The second context concerns biases that affect the administration of law, particularly regarding the adjudication of guilt, the lawmaking function of trials, and criminal sentencing. We examine procedural rules like precedent and sentencing guidelines, both of which are aimed at curtailing judicial bias.
{"title":"The Role of Bias in Economic Models of Law","authors":"Thomas J. Miceli, K. Segerson","doi":"10.1515/rle-2021-0043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2021-0043","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Behavioral economics has highlighted the impact of various biases on economic outcomes. This essay reviews how biases have been incorporated into economic models of the law and the resulting implications for the assessment of different legal rules and policies. It focuses on two contexts. The first concerns biases that affect consumer purchases of risky products. Using a standard accident model that incorporates various forms of consumer bias, we discuss how bias can affect the efficient assignment of liability for product-related accidents. The second context concerns biases that affect the administration of law, particularly regarding the adjudication of guilt, the lawmaking function of trials, and criminal sentencing. We examine procedural rules like precedent and sentencing guidelines, both of which are aimed at curtailing judicial bias.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85420874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Empirical and experimental evidence shows that individuals exhibit behavioral biases in their decision-making processes that depart from the full rationality paradigm. This paper discusses the effectiveness of alternative debiasing strategies, designed to induce socially preferable outcomes. Following Jolls, C. and Sunstein, C.R. (2006). Debiasing through law. J. Leg. Stud. 35: 199–242, this paper examines legal strategies that aim at “debiasing through law”, attempting to reduce or eliminate boundedly rational behavior. Alternatively, policymakers can implement “insulating” legal strategies that separate the outcome from the biased behavior, without attempting to eradicate behavioral biases from the decision-making process. This paper compares these strategies in many areas, such as tort law, consumer safety law, and property law.
摘要经验和实验证据表明，个体在决策过程中表现出偏离完全理性范式的行为偏差。本文讨论了不同的消除偏见策略的有效性，旨在诱导社会更可取的结果。继Jolls, C.和Sunstein, C. r .(2006)。通过法律消除偏见。j .腿。Stud. 35: 199-242，本文考察了旨在“通过法律消除偏见”的法律策略，试图减少或消除有限的理性行为。或者，政策制定者可以实施“隔离”法律策略，将结果与有偏见的行为分开，而不试图从决策过程中消除行为偏见。本文从侵权行为法、消费者安全法和物权法等方面对这些策略进行了比较。
{"title":"Behavioral Biases and the Law","authors":"Barbara Luppi","doi":"10.1515/rle-2021-0065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2021-0065","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Empirical and experimental evidence shows that individuals exhibit behavioral biases in their decision-making processes that depart from the full rationality paradigm. This paper discusses the effectiveness of alternative debiasing strategies, designed to induce socially preferable outcomes. Following Jolls, C. and Sunstein, C.R. (2006). Debiasing through law. J. Leg. Stud. 35: 199–242, this paper examines legal strategies that aim at “debiasing through law”, attempting to reduce or eliminate boundedly rational behavior. Alternatively, policymakers can implement “insulating” legal strategies that separate the outcome from the biased behavior, without attempting to eradicate behavioral biases from the decision-making process. This paper compares these strategies in many areas, such as tort law, consumer safety law, and property law.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72974968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1515/rle-2021-frontmatter2
{"title":"Frontmatter","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/rle-2021-frontmatter2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2021-frontmatter2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81946970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The application of behavioral economics to law and economics has taken a paternalistic turn. Behavioralists believe that the fundamental assumptions regarding individual behavior in standard theory do not reflect reality. If individuals are not “rational” in the standard economic sense, then there will be decisionmaking failures: people cannot be relied upon to make individually optimal decisions and thus to maximize welfare as they see it. This Article is organized as follows. Part One is a prelude and gives context. Part Two discusses the fundamental normative standard in behavioral public policy: true preferences. I then proceed to outline the causes of the divergence between true preferences and actual observed preferences. Part Three analyzes some of the knowledge problems is ascertaining the presence of cognitive and behavioral biases. Part Four presents a case study of the difficulties of behavioral policy analysis in the area of consumer credit. Part Five concludes.
{"title":"The Paternalistic Turn in Behavioral Law and Economics: A Critique","authors":"M. Rizzo","doi":"10.1515/rle-2021-0056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2021-0056","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The application of behavioral economics to law and economics has taken a paternalistic turn. Behavioralists believe that the fundamental assumptions regarding individual behavior in standard theory do not reflect reality. If individuals are not “rational” in the standard economic sense, then there will be decisionmaking failures: people cannot be relied upon to make individually optimal decisions and thus to maximize welfare as they see it. This Article is organized as follows. Part One is a prelude and gives context. Part Two discusses the fundamental normative standard in behavioral public policy: true preferences. I then proceed to outline the causes of the divergence between true preferences and actual observed preferences. Part Three analyzes some of the knowledge problems is ascertaining the presence of cognitive and behavioral biases. Part Four presents a case study of the difficulties of behavioral policy analysis in the area of consumer credit. Part Five concludes.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89760669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Skeptics of rational choice theory have long predicted that behavioral economics would radically transform the legislation, adjudication, and analysis of law. Using tort law as an exemplar, this Article maps out the narrow set of conditions where substantive law can be modified to accommodate irrational decision-makers. Specifically, this Article demonstrates that if injurers are systematically biased, and the due care standard can be expressed quantitatively, and victims are unable to take meaningful precautions, then imposing punitive damages can induce irrational injurers to exercise efficient precautionary care. In all other cases, it is better that the law adopt a presumption of rationality, regardless whether individuals behave rationally in fact.
{"title":"The Limits of Behavioral Economics in Tort Law","authors":"Daniel Pi","doi":"10.1515/rle-2021-0076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2021-0076","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Skeptics of rational choice theory have long predicted that behavioral economics would radically transform the legislation, adjudication, and analysis of law. Using tort law as an exemplar, this Article maps out the narrow set of conditions where substantive law can be modified to accommodate irrational decision-makers. Specifically, this Article demonstrates that if injurers are systematically biased, and the due care standard can be expressed quantitatively, and victims are unable to take meaningful precautions, then imposing punitive damages can induce irrational injurers to exercise efficient precautionary care. In all other cases, it is better that the law adopt a presumption of rationality, regardless whether individuals behave rationally in fact.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88073944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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