Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1515/rle-2023-frontmatter2
{"title":"Frontmatter","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/rle-2023-frontmatter2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2023-frontmatter2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135568871","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The pervasiveness of law enforcement schemes that prescribe harsher penalties for repeat offenders continues to challenge scholars who seek an economic explanation for criminal justice policies. The current paper formalizes an explanation suggested by Dana, D. (2001. Rethinking the puzzle of escalating penalties for repeat offenders. Yale Law J. 110: 733–783), which is based on the role of the law in educating people about wrongful behavior—the so-called “expressive function” of law. The analysis shows that an escalating structure that imposes a lenient sanction on all first-timers and a harsh sanction on repeaters represents a compromise solution that is (second best) optimal if the fraction of unknowing offenders in the population of potential offenders (as opposed to rational calculators) is sufficiently large.
对惯犯实施更严厉惩罚的执法方案的普遍存在，继续挑战着寻求刑事司法政策经济解释的学者。本文正式提出了Dana, D.(2001)提出的解释。重新思考对惯犯加重惩罚的难题。耶鲁法学(Yale Law J. 110: 733-783)，其依据是法律在教育人们了解不法行为方面的作用——即法律的所谓“表达功能”。分析表明，如果不知情的违法者在潜在违法者(与理性计算者相反)中所占比例足够大，那么对所有初犯施加宽松制裁、对重犯施加严厉制裁的逐步升级的结构代表了一种折衷解决方案(次优)。
{"title":"Expressive Law and Escalating Penalties: Accounting for the Educational Function of Punishment","authors":"Thomas J. Miceli","doi":"10.1515/rle-2023-0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2023-0015","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The pervasiveness of law enforcement schemes that prescribe harsher penalties for repeat offenders continues to challenge scholars who seek an economic explanation for criminal justice policies. The current paper formalizes an explanation suggested by Dana, D. (2001. Rethinking the puzzle of escalating penalties for repeat offenders. Yale Law J. 110: 733–783), which is based on the role of the law in educating people about wrongful behavior—the so-called “expressive function” of law. The analysis shows that an escalating structure that imposes a lenient sanction on all first-timers and a harsh sanction on repeaters represents a compromise solution that is (second best) optimal if the fraction of unknowing offenders in the population of potential offenders (as opposed to rational calculators) is sufficiently large.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136230423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The pervasiveness of law enforcement schemes that prescribe harsher penalties for repeat offenders continues to challenge scholars who seek an economic explanation for criminal justice policies. The current paper formalizes an explanation suggested by Dana, D. (2001. Rethinking the puzzle of escalating penalties for repeat offenders. Yale Law J. 110: 733–783), which is based on the role of the law in educating people about wrongful behavior—the so-called “expressive function” of law. The analysis shows that an escalating structure that imposes a lenient sanction on all first-timers and a harsh sanction on repeaters represents a compromise solution that is (second best) optimal if the fraction of unknowing offenders in the population of potential offenders (as opposed to rational calculators) is sufficiently large.
对惯犯实施更严厉惩罚的执法方案的普遍存在，继续挑战着寻求刑事司法政策经济解释的学者。本文正式提出了Dana, D.(2001)提出的解释。重新思考对惯犯加重惩罚的难题。耶鲁法学(Yale Law J. 110: 733-783)，其依据是法律在教育人们了解不法行为方面的作用——即法律的所谓“表达功能”。分析表明，如果不知情的违法者在潜在违法者(与理性计算者相反)中所占比例足够大，那么对所有初犯施加宽松制裁、对重犯施加严厉制裁的逐步升级的结构代表了一种折衷解决方案(次优)。
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Abstract Can stricter community supervision (i.e., parole and probation) requirements lead to an increase in recidivism? I investigate this question by constructing a law enforcement model in which individuals can incur costs to increase their degree of self-control. The analysis reveals that stricter community supervision can, in fact, increase recidivism if these investments lead to ego-depletion. This possibility therefore warrants empirical investigation, and policy makers ought to be mindful of it when determining the strictness of community supervision conditions.
{"title":"Stricter Community Supervision, More Recidivism? An Ego-Depletion Theory","authors":"Murat C. Mungan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.4404989","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4404989","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Can stricter community supervision (i.e., parole and probation) requirements lead to an increase in recidivism? I investigate this question by constructing a law enforcement model in which individuals can incur costs to increase their degree of self-control. The analysis reveals that stricter community supervision can, in fact, increase recidivism if these investments lead to ego-depletion. This possibility therefore warrants empirical investigation, and policy makers ought to be mindful of it when determining the strictness of community supervision conditions.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75927899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Shubhashis Gangopadhyay, Aineas Mallios, Stefan Sjögren
Abstract We explain why competing firms form collective entities to buy patents from other entities, particularly from non-practicing entities (NPEs), and follow a catch and release patent strategy. We show why having competitors bid as a single unit is better than having competitors bid against each other. More important, we show that collusive bidding on patents held by NPEs, even when the patents are not essential for a standard (SEPs), may increase consumer surplus, particularly when technological innovation is drastic, and improve social welfare. This provides a theoretical foundation that explains why competition authorities often allow collusive bidding for patents and why courts employ the “rule of reason” to analyze agreements under competition law. We also show that a cartel of incumbents will always outbid a potential entrant, or a patent assertion entity, over a technology that can destroy the value of the incumbents’ existing assets.
{"title":"Collusive Bidding, Competition Law, and Welfare","authors":"Shubhashis Gangopadhyay, Aineas Mallios, Stefan Sjögren","doi":"10.1515/rle-2022-0042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2022-0042","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We explain why competing firms form collective entities to buy patents from other entities, particularly from non-practicing entities (NPEs), and follow a catch and release patent strategy. We show why having competitors bid as a single unit is better than having competitors bid against each other. More important, we show that collusive bidding on patents held by NPEs, even when the patents are not essential for a standard (SEPs), may increase consumer surplus, particularly when technological innovation is drastic, and improve social welfare. This provides a theoretical foundation that explains why competition authorities often allow collusive bidding for patents and why courts employ the “rule of reason” to analyze agreements under competition law. We also show that a cartel of incumbents will always outbid a potential entrant, or a patent assertion entity, over a technology that can destroy the value of the incumbents’ existing assets.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135478401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Can stricter community supervision (i.e., parole and probation) requirements lead to an increase in recidivism? I investigate this question by constructing a law enforcement model in which individuals can incur costs to increase their degree of self-control. The analysis reveals that stricter community supervision can, in fact, increase recidivism if these investments lead to ego-depletion. This possibility therefore warrants empirical investigation, and policy makers ought to be mindful of it when determining the strictness of community supervision conditions.
{"title":"Stricter Community Supervision, More Recidivism? An Ego-Depletion Theory","authors":"Murat C. Mungan","doi":"10.1515/rle-2022-0088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2022-0088","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Can stricter community supervision (i.e., parole and probation) requirements lead to an increase in recidivism? I investigate this question by constructing a law enforcement model in which individuals can incur costs to increase their degree of self-control. The analysis reveals that stricter community supervision can, in fact, increase recidivism if these investments lead to ego-depletion. This possibility therefore warrants empirical investigation, and policy makers ought to be mindful of it when determining the strictness of community supervision conditions.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135478402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We explain why competing firms form collective entities to buy patents from other entities, particularly from non-practicing entities (NPEs), and follow a catch and release patent strategy. We show why having competitors bid as a single unit is better than having competitors bid against each other. More important, we show that collusive bidding on patents held by NPEs, even when the patents are not essential for a standard (SEPs), may increase consumer surplus, particularly when technological innovation is drastic, and improve social welfare. This provides a theoretical foundation that explains why competition authorities often allow collusive bidding for patents and why courts employ the “rule of reason” to analyze agreements under competition law. We also show that a cartel of incumbents will always outbid a potential entrant, or a patent assertion entity, over a technology that can destroy the value of the incumbents’ existing assets.
{"title":"Collusive Bidding, Competition Law, and Welfare","authors":"S. Gangopadhyay, Aineas Mallios, Stefan Sjögren","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.4251868","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4251868","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We explain why competing firms form collective entities to buy patents from other entities, particularly from non-practicing entities (NPEs), and follow a catch and release patent strategy. We show why having competitors bid as a single unit is better than having competitors bid against each other. More important, we show that collusive bidding on patents held by NPEs, even when the patents are not essential for a standard (SEPs), may increase consumer surplus, particularly when technological innovation is drastic, and improve social welfare. This provides a theoretical foundation that explains why competition authorities often allow collusive bidding for patents and why courts employ the “rule of reason” to analyze agreements under competition law. We also show that a cartel of incumbents will always outbid a potential entrant, or a patent assertion entity, over a technology that can destroy the value of the incumbents’ existing assets.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87589227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Protecting street art faces significant hurdles. To overcome them, Salib, P.N. (2015. The law of Banksy: Who owns street art? The University of Chicago Law Review, pp. 2293–2328) proposes to unbundle the various rights that art ownership usually implies. Specifically, he proposes to treat the finder of a street art piece as a minority shareholder in this piece, granting him some percentage of its value. We provide an economic analysis of this proposal by refining a simple discovery process model involving street art finders and the owners of the premises where street art is found. We consider both the optimal number of researchers and the share of the street art value that should accrue to a finder. We also pay attention to the co-determination of the numbers of seekers and street artists. We find that a change in the share of the value of discovered street art has an ambiguous effect on the numbers of seekers and street artists. Moreover, relying on this share alone cannot guarantee that the equilibrium values of the numbers of seekers and street artists are equal to their socially optimal values.
{"title":"On the Preservation of Illegal Street Art","authors":"B. Crettez, Régis Deloche","doi":"10.1515/rle-2022-0078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2022-0078","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Protecting street art faces significant hurdles. To overcome them, Salib, P.N. (2015. The law of Banksy: Who owns street art? The University of Chicago Law Review, pp. 2293–2328) proposes to unbundle the various rights that art ownership usually implies. Specifically, he proposes to treat the finder of a street art piece as a minority shareholder in this piece, granting him some percentage of its value. We provide an economic analysis of this proposal by refining a simple discovery process model involving street art finders and the owners of the premises where street art is found. We consider both the optimal number of researchers and the share of the street art value that should accrue to a finder. We also pay attention to the co-determination of the numbers of seekers and street artists. We find that a change in the share of the value of discovered street art has an ambiguous effect on the numbers of seekers and street artists. Moreover, relying on this share alone cannot guarantee that the equilibrium values of the numbers of seekers and street artists are equal to their socially optimal values.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87646322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
K. Smyrnova, Mykhailo Mykievych, A. Fedorova, Ivan Bratsuk, Zoryana Makarukha
Abstract The purpose of this study is to identify the principles of taxation of transnational corporations in the European Union (EU), as well as the effectiveness of legal norms in this area based on the analysis of Ukrainian and world studies. The leading approach to the study of this problem is the method of review and critical analysis of the scientific literature on the subject of the study, as well as methods of logical deduction, scientific abstractions and a systematic approach that allows a comprehensive examination of the differences in the taxation procedures of transnational corporations in the EU Member States. The study presents topical issues of tax harmonisation in the field of taxation of transnational corporations in the European Union. The paper notes that the priorities of the EU Member States are aimed to a greater extent at combating the erosion of the tax base and tax evasion by transnational corporations than at eliminating tax obstacles in the internal market.
{"title":"Legal Regulation of Taxation of Transnational Corporations in the European Union","authors":"K. Smyrnova, Mykhailo Mykievych, A. Fedorova, Ivan Bratsuk, Zoryana Makarukha","doi":"10.1515/rle-2022-0077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2022-0077","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The purpose of this study is to identify the principles of taxation of transnational corporations in the European Union (EU), as well as the effectiveness of legal norms in this area based on the analysis of Ukrainian and world studies. The leading approach to the study of this problem is the method of review and critical analysis of the scientific literature on the subject of the study, as well as methods of logical deduction, scientific abstractions and a systematic approach that allows a comprehensive examination of the differences in the taxation procedures of transnational corporations in the EU Member States. The study presents topical issues of tax harmonisation in the field of taxation of transnational corporations in the European Union. The paper notes that the priorities of the EU Member States are aimed to a greater extent at combating the erosion of the tax base and tax evasion by transnational corporations than at eliminating tax obstacles in the internal market.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83265067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-01DOI: 10.1515/rle-2023-frontmatter1
{"title":"Frontmatter","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/rle-2023-frontmatter1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2023-frontmatter1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135238822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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