Abstract An increasingly important form of electronic currency is the ‘stablecoin’. Unlike other high-profile ‘cryptocurrencies’, such as Bitcoin, stablecoins claim to be matched by a corresponding amount of secure assets in a national currency to which the stablecoin can be converted at par. These crypto-assets, however, create significant legal and economic problems. Notably, issues about trust in both issuers and backing assets, the risk of runs, and particular challenges associated with public and private law regimes resist the adoption of stablecoin both in Europe and beyond. This article draws from previous experiences to analyse these issues and propose solutions. Taking a multi-disciplinary approach, the article argues that the legal and economic issues surrounding today’s stablecoins could be addressed using the lessons from prior centuries.
{"title":"Legal Problems and Solutions in Stablecoins: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach Applied to Euro Stablecoins","authors":"B. Sheehy, John Hawkins, Juan Diaz-Granados","doi":"10.1515/rle-2022-0053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2022-0053","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract An increasingly important form of electronic currency is the ‘stablecoin’. Unlike other high-profile ‘cryptocurrencies’, such as Bitcoin, stablecoins claim to be matched by a corresponding amount of secure assets in a national currency to which the stablecoin can be converted at par. These crypto-assets, however, create significant legal and economic problems. Notably, issues about trust in both issuers and backing assets, the risk of runs, and particular challenges associated with public and private law regimes resist the adoption of stablecoin both in Europe and beyond. This article draws from previous experiences to analyse these issues and propose solutions. Taking a multi-disciplinary approach, the article argues that the legal and economic issues surrounding today’s stablecoins could be addressed using the lessons from prior centuries.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88884110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Psychological studies of punitive intuitions demonstrate that the economic theory of optimal deterrence is fundamentally counterintuitive. We punish in response to the moral blameworthiness of the crime with little regard for the consequences. But it is less clear whether optimal deterrence is acceptable. When the law is not accepted by the community it governs, its crime control efficiency suffers. If optimal deterrence is wholly unacceptable, then it is counterproductive as a guide to penal policy. I administered an online survey to university students to examine the acceptability of different applications of optimal deterrence theory. The participants rejected nearly all of the applications, with the sole exception of an increase in punishment severity on the general policy level. They were also more willing to accept smaller, rather than bigger, changes of punishment severity; and increases, rather than decreases of punishment. The results suggest penal policy may be slightly adjusted in the direction suggested by economic analysis of criminal law without a major loss to the law’s moral credibility – especially if the adjustment involves an increase in punishment magnitude.
{"title":"People Want Optimal Deterrence – Just a Little Bit","authors":"Michał Kłusek","doi":"10.1515/rle-2022-0050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2022-0050","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Psychological studies of punitive intuitions demonstrate that the economic theory of optimal deterrence is fundamentally counterintuitive. We punish in response to the moral blameworthiness of the crime with little regard for the consequences. But it is less clear whether optimal deterrence is acceptable. When the law is not accepted by the community it governs, its crime control efficiency suffers. If optimal deterrence is wholly unacceptable, then it is counterproductive as a guide to penal policy. I administered an online survey to university students to examine the acceptability of different applications of optimal deterrence theory. The participants rejected nearly all of the applications, with the sole exception of an increase in punishment severity on the general policy level. They were also more willing to accept smaller, rather than bigger, changes of punishment severity; and increases, rather than decreases of punishment. The results suggest penal policy may be slightly adjusted in the direction suggested by economic analysis of criminal law without a major loss to the law’s moral credibility – especially if the adjustment involves an increase in punishment magnitude.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89585209","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The European Association of Law and Economics (EALE) grants a biennial Lifetime Achievement Award and Honorary Membership to a scholar “for his or her significant contributions to the field of Law and Economics, in particular to the development of this scientific movement in Europe.” Ariel Porat was the recipient of the EALE award in 2020. As per tradition, the recipient of the award is asked to deliver the EALE Award Lecture the year after the announcement of the prize—an event that, due to the pandemic, was postponed until the 2022 EALE Annual Meeting, which was held in Lisbon (Portugal), on September 15, 2022. The award lecture will be published in the Review of Law & Economics, following these remarks on Ariel Porat’s significant contributions to the field of law and economics.
{"title":"Laudatio: Ariel Porat","authors":"Francesco Parisi","doi":"10.1515/rle-2022-0075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2022-0075","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The European Association of Law and Economics (EALE) grants a biennial Lifetime Achievement Award and Honorary Membership to a scholar “for his or her significant contributions to the field of Law and Economics, in particular to the development of this scientific movement in Europe.” Ariel Porat was the recipient of the EALE award in 2020. As per tradition, the recipient of the award is asked to deliver the EALE Award Lecture the year after the announcement of the prize—an event that, due to the pandemic, was postponed until the 2022 EALE Annual Meeting, which was held in Lisbon (Portugal), on September 15, 2022. The award lecture will be published in the Review of Law & Economics, following these remarks on Ariel Porat’s significant contributions to the field of law and economics.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82496788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract After studies of economics and business administration in Cologne my academic career as an economist started 1968 as a doctoral student and later as a post doc in the Institute of Development Research and Development Policy of the University of Bochum in Germany. The economic theories, with which I worked at the time had no relation to legal or social norms. This changed, after I became a professor of economics in the newly established second law department of the University of Hamburg. It was a model trial of a reformed legal education. My lawyer colleagues propagated a more policy oriented and teleological understanding of the law, legal scholarship, and teaching and demanded the integration of social sciences into the study of the law. I began studying and teaching the classical writings of the American law and economics pioneers and related them to German private law. Gradually I shifted the focus of my academic interest and publications from development studies to the economic study of civil law and became increasingly convinced that “law and economics” corrects a scientific fallacy, which emerged when the two disciplines fell apart. Later I joined -together with my lawyer colleague Claus Ott-the European master program in law and economics, established a doctoral program in law and economics and the Hamburg institute of law and economics. After the merger of the two competing law departments the united faculty took supportive and far reaching decisions to consolidate the institute and make it a center for the study of law and economics. The following pages show in more detail the factors and reasons, which made me a convinced supporter and scholar of the economic approach to law and of institutional economics.
{"title":"My Study of Law and Economics. An Educational Journey with Knowledgeable Tour Guides","authors":"H. Schäfer","doi":"10.1515/rle-2022-0074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2022-0074","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract After studies of economics and business administration in Cologne my academic career as an economist started 1968 as a doctoral student and later as a post doc in the Institute of Development Research and Development Policy of the University of Bochum in Germany. The economic theories, with which I worked at the time had no relation to legal or social norms. This changed, after I became a professor of economics in the newly established second law department of the University of Hamburg. It was a model trial of a reformed legal education. My lawyer colleagues propagated a more policy oriented and teleological understanding of the law, legal scholarship, and teaching and demanded the integration of social sciences into the study of the law. I began studying and teaching the classical writings of the American law and economics pioneers and related them to German private law. Gradually I shifted the focus of my academic interest and publications from development studies to the economic study of civil law and became increasingly convinced that “law and economics” corrects a scientific fallacy, which emerged when the two disciplines fell apart. Later I joined -together with my lawyer colleague Claus Ott-the European master program in law and economics, established a doctoral program in law and economics and the Hamburg institute of law and economics. After the merger of the two competing law departments the united faculty took supportive and far reaching decisions to consolidate the institute and make it a center for the study of law and economics. The following pages show in more detail the factors and reasons, which made me a convinced supporter and scholar of the economic approach to law and of institutional economics.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75672487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract When insurance works properly it provides insureds with optimal incentives to prevent losses, alongside coverage for losses that could not be prevented efficiently. But insurance has an overlooked dark side to it as well. Insurers employ various tactics to shift losses to their insureds or to their victims in order to minimize their own costs instead of reducing their insureds’ losses. Worse, insurers might also act to increase or maintain long term risks, ensuring the future of the insurance business that can’t exist without risks. We focus on the incentives of insurers to engage in anti-competitive practices and trigger harmful behaviors of their insureds or third parties, in order to increase demand for insurance coverage. Policymakers should be aware and critical of insurers’ perverse incentives that counteract the interests of the insureds and society.
{"title":"The Dark Side of Insurance","authors":"R. Avraham, A. Porat","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.4203765","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4203765","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract When insurance works properly it provides insureds with optimal incentives to prevent losses, alongside coverage for losses that could not be prevented efficiently. But insurance has an overlooked dark side to it as well. Insurers employ various tactics to shift losses to their insureds or to their victims in order to minimize their own costs instead of reducing their insureds’ losses. Worse, insurers might also act to increase or maintain long term risks, ensuring the future of the insurance business that can’t exist without risks. We focus on the incentives of insurers to engage in anti-competitive practices and trigger harmful behaviors of their insureds or third parties, in order to increase demand for insurance coverage. Policymakers should be aware and critical of insurers’ perverse incentives that counteract the interests of the insureds and society.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80296259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract When insurance works properly it provides insureds with optimal incentives to prevent losses, alongside coverage for losses that could not be prevented efficiently. But insurance has an overlooked dark side to it as well. Insurers employ various tactics to shift losses to their insureds or to their victims in order to minimize their own costs instead of reducing their insureds’ losses. Worse, insurers might also act to increase or maintain long term risks, ensuring the future of the insurance business that can’t exist without risks. We focus on the incentives of insurers to engage in anti-competitive practices and trigger harmful behaviors of their insureds or third parties, in order to increase demand for insurance coverage. Policymakers should be aware and critical of insurers’ perverse incentives that counteract the interests of the insureds and society.
{"title":"The Dark Side of Insurance","authors":"Ronen Avraham, Ariel Porat","doi":"10.1515/rle-2022-0054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2022-0054","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract When insurance works properly it provides insureds with optimal incentives to prevent losses, alongside coverage for losses that could not be prevented efficiently. But insurance has an overlooked dark side to it as well. Insurers employ various tactics to shift losses to their insureds or to their victims in order to minimize their own costs instead of reducing their insureds’ losses. Worse, insurers might also act to increase or maintain long term risks, ensuring the future of the insurance business that can’t exist without risks. We focus on the incentives of insurers to engage in anti-competitive practices and trigger harmful behaviors of their insureds or third parties, in order to increase demand for insurance coverage. Policymakers should be aware and critical of insurers’ perverse incentives that counteract the interests of the insureds and society.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136174250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract From the late 1970s into the 1990s, 20 states in the USA passed’ mandatory arrest laws’, designed to curb domestic violence, by requiring the responding officer to arrest the offender. I show that these laws led to an increase in the mortality rates of African-American women. The increase takes place approximately four years after the law was passed and loses its statistical significance as time passes. I infer from these results that mandatory arrest laws had unintended consequences for the victims whose partners were arrested, but that these unintended consequences impacted the victims only in the few years following the law. I conclude that increased awareness of the law and offender deterrence eventually mitigates these unintended consequences. I propose a potential explanation for the increase in mortality rates, and make a policy recommendation that offenders and victims be informed about the law change if such a change is to be made.
{"title":"Increase in Mortality Rates of African-American Women Following Mandatory Arrest Laws: A Study in Unintended Effects","authors":"Sinan Ozel","doi":"10.1515/rle-2021-0033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2021-0033","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract From the late 1970s into the 1990s, 20 states in the USA passed’ mandatory arrest laws’, designed to curb domestic violence, by requiring the responding officer to arrest the offender. I show that these laws led to an increase in the mortality rates of African-American women. The increase takes place approximately four years after the law was passed and loses its statistical significance as time passes. I infer from these results that mandatory arrest laws had unintended consequences for the victims whose partners were arrested, but that these unintended consequences impacted the victims only in the few years following the law. I conclude that increased awareness of the law and offender deterrence eventually mitigates these unintended consequences. I propose a potential explanation for the increase in mortality rates, and make a policy recommendation that offenders and victims be informed about the law change if such a change is to be made.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86293340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this paper, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is used to calculate the technical efficiency and the Malmquist Total Factor Productivity Index (MPI) of the municipal (JM) and circuit courts (JC) of the ordinary jurisdiction of the Colombian criminal justice system, from 2012 to 2016. The results show an average technical inefficiency of 16, 9% for de JCs, and 17.3% for JMs. Additionally, we find a total factor productivity (TFP) decline for these courts of 24 and 44%, respectively. Although both components of the MPI registered average values lower than one, the decrease in TFP is mainly driven by the decline in the technical change component.
{"title":"Evaluating the Efficiency and Productivity of Colombian Criminal Justice","authors":"Nicolás Enrique Valencia Santiago, Camilo Almanza Ramírez","doi":"10.1515/rle-2021-0082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2021-0082","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is used to calculate the technical efficiency and the Malmquist Total Factor Productivity Index (MPI) of the municipal (JM) and circuit courts (JC) of the ordinary jurisdiction of the Colombian criminal justice system, from 2012 to 2016. The results show an average technical inefficiency of 16, 9% for de JCs, and 17.3% for JMs. Additionally, we find a total factor productivity (TFP) decline for these courts of 24 and 44%, respectively. Although both components of the MPI registered average values lower than one, the decrease in TFP is mainly driven by the decline in the technical change component.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83518745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Highly influential recent work by Benartzi et al. (2017) argues—using comparisons of effectiveness and costs—that behavioral interventions (or nudges) offer more cost-effective means than traditional regulatory instruments for changing individual behavior to achieve desirable policy goals. Based on this finding, these authors further conclude that governments and other organizations should increase their investments in nudging to supplement traditional interventions. Yet a closer look at Benartzi et al.’s (2017) own data and analysis reveals that they variously exclude and include key cost elements to the benefit of behavioral instruments over traditional ones and overstate the utility of cost-effectiveness analysis for policy selection. Once these methodological shortcomings are corrected, a reassessment of key policies evaluated by the authors reveals that nudges do not consistently outperform traditional interventions, neither under cost-effectiveness analysis nor under the methodologically required cost-benefit analysis. These illustrative findings demonstrate that governments concerned with social welfare cannot simply assume the superiority of behavioral instruments and should strive instead to conduct cost-benefit analyses of competing interventions, including nudges, to identify the most efficient of the available instruments.
{"title":"When Should Governments Invest More in Nudging? Revisiting Benartzi et al. (2017)","authors":"Avishalom Tor, Jonathan Klick","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.4189136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4189136","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Highly influential recent work by Benartzi et al. (2017) argues—using comparisons of effectiveness and costs—that behavioral interventions (or nudges) offer more cost-effective means than traditional regulatory instruments for changing individual behavior to achieve desirable policy goals. Based on this finding, these authors further conclude that governments and other organizations should increase their investments in nudging to supplement traditional interventions. Yet a closer look at Benartzi et al.’s (2017) own data and analysis reveals that they variously exclude and include key cost elements to the benefit of behavioral instruments over traditional ones and overstate the utility of cost-effectiveness analysis for policy selection. Once these methodological shortcomings are corrected, a reassessment of key policies evaluated by the authors reveals that nudges do not consistently outperform traditional interventions, neither under cost-effectiveness analysis nor under the methodologically required cost-benefit analysis. These illustrative findings demonstrate that governments concerned with social welfare cannot simply assume the superiority of behavioral instruments and should strive instead to conduct cost-benefit analyses of competing interventions, including nudges, to identify the most efficient of the available instruments.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85516411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Johan Van den Cruijce, Gamble Baffert II, Nicolas Janssens de Bisthoven, J. Tistaert
Abstract The value of an unlisted company is a contentious issue. This is because investors value marketability and liquidity, but vacillate on the appropriate percentage discount that needs to be applied for the valuation of a private company. As more companies find it easier to remain private, a better understanding of this discount is increasingly important. The extant discount studies are mainly derived from financial and transactional data. They provide reliable averages using large sample sizes, but present few determinants to explain the wide ranges in the observations. Our research is based on a unique, alternative data source that complements existing studies by tapping into rich contextual information. Specifically, we examine court decisions that determine the appropriate discount and relate this percentage to an important characteristic of a private company: its “open” character, i.e. its willingness to accept outside shareholders or partners in the venture. We find that open and closed companies differ in value 6.5%. Our conclusions hold after controlling for known determinants of the discount. Our results impact valuation approaches and present real-world application for the owners and managers of private companies who may consider opening ownership to third parties.
{"title":"The Effect of Ownership Structure on the Value of a Private Company","authors":"Johan Van den Cruijce, Gamble Baffert II, Nicolas Janssens de Bisthoven, J. Tistaert","doi":"10.1515/rle-2022-0030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2022-0030","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The value of an unlisted company is a contentious issue. This is because investors value marketability and liquidity, but vacillate on the appropriate percentage discount that needs to be applied for the valuation of a private company. As more companies find it easier to remain private, a better understanding of this discount is increasingly important. The extant discount studies are mainly derived from financial and transactional data. They provide reliable averages using large sample sizes, but present few determinants to explain the wide ranges in the observations. Our research is based on a unique, alternative data source that complements existing studies by tapping into rich contextual information. Specifically, we examine court decisions that determine the appropriate discount and relate this percentage to an important characteristic of a private company: its “open” character, i.e. its willingness to accept outside shareholders or partners in the venture. We find that open and closed companies differ in value 6.5%. Our conclusions hold after controlling for known determinants of the discount. Our results impact valuation approaches and present real-world application for the owners and managers of private companies who may consider opening ownership to third parties.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80628694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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