Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2022.2062986
A. Graness
Today, there is a growing consensus among philosophers in Africa, Latin America and other regions of the world that the history of philosophy has to consider both written and oral sources in the reconstruction of the history of philosophy. Even though it is usually not denied that philosophy also expresses itself in oral practices, such as conversation or instruction, the question remains as to how oral philosophical traditions can become part of a history of philosophy. This is subject to a number of methodological questions. On the basis of discourses in contemporary African philosophy as well as examples from other regions of the world, this article discusses selected methodological challenges that oral traditions pose for the historiography of philosophy, with a focus on the relation between philosophy and written texts and philosophy and practice. It is argued that a turn to philosophical practices can offer new insights into philosophy in oral societies.
{"title":"The status of oral traditions in the history of philosophy: Methodological considerations","authors":"A. Graness","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2022.2062986","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2022.2062986","url":null,"abstract":"Today, there is a growing consensus among philosophers in Africa, Latin America and other regions of the world that the history of philosophy has to consider both written and oral sources in the reconstruction of the history of philosophy. Even though it is usually not denied that philosophy also expresses itself in oral practices, such as conversation or instruction, the question remains as to how oral philosophical traditions can become part of a history of philosophy. This is subject to a number of methodological questions. On the basis of discourses in contemporary African philosophy as well as examples from other regions of the world, this article discusses selected methodological challenges that oral traditions pose for the historiography of philosophy, with a focus on the relation between philosophy and written texts and philosophy and practice. It is argued that a turn to philosophical practices can offer new insights into philosophy in oral societies.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"181 - 194"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49664281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2022.2027178
A. E. Ukhov, E. Simonyan, Eduard L. Kovrov
{"title":"The non-trivial concept of truth in Richard Kirkham’s Theories of truth: a critical introduction","authors":"A. E. Ukhov, E. Simonyan, Eduard L. Kovrov","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2022.2027178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2022.2027178","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"116 - 118"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48237856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2022.2037925
M. Ganjvar
The purpose of this article is to show the efficiency of “Philosophy for Children” (PFC) in their spiritual development and its impact on promoting peace and coexistence with others, both coreligionists and non-coreligionists. While analysing the concept of spirituality, the article also explores the basics, and the goals and methods of the PFC programme. It then examines the influence of this educational programme on fostering children’s prosocial behaviours and strengthening their communication skills with others to develop peace and denial of violence. The results show that the PFC training model strengthening skills (such as creating an acceptance spirit), enhancing the child’s emotional intelligence and teaching moderation in belief and practice and commitment to rationality and morality of belief, can improve their relations with fellow human beings in a rational space associated with compassion, and as a result, reduce tension and violence.
{"title":"Philosophy for Children (PFC) as an educational practice to promote peace and non-violent coexistence","authors":"M. Ganjvar","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2022.2037925","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2022.2037925","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this article is to show the efficiency of “Philosophy for Children” (PFC) in their spiritual development and its impact on promoting peace and coexistence with others, both coreligionists and non-coreligionists. While analysing the concept of spirituality, the article also explores the basics, and the goals and methods of the PFC programme. It then examines the influence of this educational programme on fostering children’s prosocial behaviours and strengthening their communication skills with others to develop peace and denial of violence. The results show that the PFC training model strengthening skills (such as creating an acceptance spirit), enhancing the child’s emotional intelligence and teaching moderation in belief and practice and commitment to rationality and morality of belief, can improve their relations with fellow human beings in a rational space associated with compassion, and as a result, reduce tension and violence.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"49 - 60"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41875457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2022.2049482
Leshaba Tony Lechaba
This article explores the notion of ubuntu philosophy as a praxis by employing Enrique Dussel’s philosophy of liberation as a critical lens. I aim to provide a contextual background to the imposed Euro-modernity that necessitates and dictates for a need for a liberatory praxis. I argue that given its anterior nature, ubuntu can be used as a praxis for the marginalised African subjects if authentically enacted to affirm critical consciousness and social transformation. To this end, I will critically analyse the two key maxims of ubuntu, namely “I am because you are”, and “my humanness is dependent on others’ humanity”.
{"title":"Exploring the concept of ubuntu as a liberatory praxis","authors":"Leshaba Tony Lechaba","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2022.2049482","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2022.2049482","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the notion of ubuntu philosophy as a praxis by employing Enrique Dussel’s philosophy of liberation as a critical lens. I aim to provide a contextual background to the imposed Euro-modernity that necessitates and dictates for a need for a liberatory praxis. I argue that given its anterior nature, ubuntu can be used as a praxis for the marginalised African subjects if authentically enacted to affirm critical consciousness and social transformation. To this end, I will critically analyse the two key maxims of ubuntu, namely “I am because you are”, and “my humanness is dependent on others’ humanity”.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"88 - 102"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44600935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2021.2025326
Magdalena Holy-Luczaj
This article discusses the gap in Martin Heidegger’s ontology pertaining to the transformative affectivity arising in the interactions between beings, particularly how this affectivity is responsible for changes in those beings. It thus explores the possibility of bridging this gap by including an additional dimension of being. For this purpose, it draws upon Aristotle’s concept of affecting/being affected (On Generation and Corruption, Book I), which aims to explain the origin of alteration in beings. The Aristotelian juxtaposition of action and passion serves as a backdrop for the incorporation of the concept of “shapeability” into Heidegger’s ontology. This involves a dimension of revealing being related to the active and passive aspects of beings’ capacity to shape and be shaped by others. Investigating the idea of shapeability, I shall argue, can shed some new light on the multidimensionality of how being is disclosed.
{"title":"Shapeability – Aristotle on poiein-paschein and the other dimension of being in Heidegger","authors":"Magdalena Holy-Luczaj","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2021.2025326","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2021.2025326","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses the gap in Martin Heidegger’s ontology pertaining to the transformative affectivity arising in the interactions between beings, particularly how this affectivity is responsible for changes in those beings. It thus explores the possibility of bridging this gap by including an additional dimension of being. For this purpose, it draws upon Aristotle’s concept of affecting/being affected (On Generation and Corruption, Book I), which aims to explain the origin of alteration in beings. The Aristotelian juxtaposition of action and passion serves as a backdrop for the incorporation of the concept of “shapeability” into Heidegger’s ontology. This involves a dimension of revealing being related to the active and passive aspects of beings’ capacity to shape and be shaped by others. Investigating the idea of shapeability, I shall argue, can shed some new light on the multidimensionality of how being is disclosed.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"37 - 48"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45696927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2022.2055264
Chika C. Mba
A strong, but underexplored linkage exists between the current global order, world poverty and the politics of aid. Exploring this linkage, which is the key concern of this article, is crucial for a fuller understanding of the symbiotic injustice of the global order and the politics of aid. Using a conceptual thought experiment that portrays the framework of post-war global order as an intrinsically unjust “Global Games Arena”, I attempt a “vivisection” of the problematic relationship between the global order and the politics of aid. In the real world, I follow decolonial scholars like Adom Getachew and Olúfẹmi O. Táíwò to argue that the modern and current global order and its social, economic and political structures are founded on the unfair gains of trans-Atlantic slavery and colonialism. The empirical and analytical consequence of this situation, the article shows, is that to make aid effective or altogether end its penurious impact in Africa in particular, would require, at first, a jettisoning or remaking of the current international order. In other words, I argue that aid would not be necessary in the absence of a world order that in fact requires aid to maintain a system of global injustice and inequality.
当前的全球秩序、世界贫困和援助政治之间存在着一种强烈的、但尚未得到充分探索的联系。探索这种联系，这是本文的主要关注点，对于更全面地理解全球秩序和援助政治的共生不公正至关重要。通过一个概念性思维实验，将战后全球秩序框架描绘成一个本质上不公正的“全球游戏竞技场”，我试图对全球秩序与援助政治之间有问题的关系进行“活体解剖”。在现实世界中，我追随Adom Getachew和Olúfẹmi O. Táíwò等非殖民主义学者的观点，认为现代和当前的全球秩序及其社会、经济和政治结构是建立在跨大西洋奴隶制和殖民主义的不公平收益之上的。这篇文章表明，这种情况的经验和分析结果是，要使援助有效或彻底结束其对非洲的不利影响，首先需要抛弃或重建当前的国际秩序。换句话说，我认为，如果没有一种需要援助来维持全球不公正和不平等体系的世界秩序，援助就没有必要。
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Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2022.2045424
M. Hunt
The article argues that procreation is intrinsically valuable because it produces persons. The essential thought of the argument is that among the valuable things in the world are not only products, but the actions by which they are produced. The first premise is that persons have great value, for which a common consent argument is offered. The second premise is that, as an action type, procreation has persons as a product. Procreation is always a part of the action that produces a person. This is because procreators take as their goal the creation of an organism that itself has development into a person as a goal. Such a claim also helps explain the moral obligations of procreators, the affective lives of procreators and the common preference for procreation. The third premise is that if an action type has a product of value, then all its tokens have intrinsic value. I argue that even when such actions fail to produce anything outside the agent, they are intrinsically valuable because of how they actualise the powers and virtues of the agent, in part achieving the agent’s goal. I then apply that argument to the case of procreation and person producing.
{"title":"Procreation is intrinsically valuable because it is person producing","authors":"M. Hunt","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2022.2045424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2022.2045424","url":null,"abstract":"The article argues that procreation is intrinsically valuable because it produces persons. The essential thought of the argument is that among the valuable things in the world are not only products, but the actions by which they are produced. The first premise is that persons have great value, for which a common consent argument is offered. The second premise is that, as an action type, procreation has persons as a product. Procreation is always a part of the action that produces a person. This is because procreators take as their goal the creation of an organism that itself has development into a person as a goal. Such a claim also helps explain the moral obligations of procreators, the affective lives of procreators and the common preference for procreation. The third premise is that if an action type has a product of value, then all its tokens have intrinsic value. I argue that even when such actions fail to produce anything outside the agent, they are intrinsically valuable because of how they actualise the powers and virtues of the agent, in part achieving the agent’s goal. I then apply that argument to the case of procreation and person producing.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"75 - 87"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41754006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2022.2037926
J. Andrade
In this article, I put Emmanuel Levinas and Samantha Vice into conversation on the topics of shame and politics to demonstrate how each’s understanding on these can help attenuate shortcomings in the other’s position. Vice’s ethical inquiry into how white South Africans can be and live well, is I argue, problematically conceptualised. This tracks a problematic distinction between shame and guilt respectively, and consequently, undermines Vice’s suggested remedy of political silence. Levinas’s account of ethical subjectivity, in which the self is hostage to the other person, requiring a total apology for its shameful being, however, renders the subject so fundamentally passive that it becomes unclear how the passage to politics can be negotiated. In the first movement of my argument, I deploy Levinas to recast Vice’s project, to be and live well (in South Africa) as an ethical project always already a political project. In the second (but diachronous) movement of my argument, I argue that Vice’s prescription that those implicated in, and continuing to benefit from, systems of oppression should remain politically silent, offers a practical way to cash out Levinas’s zig-zag movement between ethics and politics. A secondary contribution of the article adds to the project of putting analytic moral philosophy (broadly Vice’s position) into dialogue with continental philosophy as exemplified in Levinasian ethics.
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Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2021.2020514
Kirk Lougheed
In his book, An African Philosophy of Personhood, Morality, and Politics, Motsamai Molefe defends a character-based ethics where the goal of morality is to achieve personhood (in the African normative sense of the term). He moves away from many in the African tradition who hold that community is intrinsically valuable, and instead contends that community is instrumentally valuable in that it is the means by which agents achieve personhood. According to Molefe, if the community is intrinsically valuable, then there will be intuitively unacceptable trade-offs between individuals and the community. I argue that Molefe faces an unpalatable dilemma: Either it is logically impossible to achieve personhood apart from community or it is not. If it is logically impossible, then the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental collapses and his account is susceptible to the unacceptable trade-offs he claims for accounts that hold community is intrinsically valuable. If it is not, then it is difficult to understand the primacy of community in his account when there are other ways of achieving personhood.
{"title":"Molefe on the value of community for personhood","authors":"Kirk Lougheed","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2021.2020514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2021.2020514","url":null,"abstract":"In his book, An African Philosophy of Personhood, Morality, and Politics, Motsamai Molefe defends a character-based ethics where the goal of morality is to achieve personhood (in the African normative sense of the term). He moves away from many in the African tradition who hold that community is intrinsically valuable, and instead contends that community is instrumentally valuable in that it is the means by which agents achieve personhood. According to Molefe, if the community is intrinsically valuable, then there will be intuitively unacceptable trade-offs between individuals and the community. I argue that Molefe faces an unpalatable dilemma: Either it is logically impossible to achieve personhood apart from community or it is not. If it is logically impossible, then the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental collapses and his account is susceptible to the unacceptable trade-offs he claims for accounts that hold community is intrinsically valuable. If it is not, then it is difficult to understand the primacy of community in his account when there are other ways of achieving personhood.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"28 - 36"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47943095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2021.2004799
M. Ramose
This is a reply to Cees Maris. He wrote two articles in Dutch purporting to be a dialogue with Mogobe Ramose. The two articles have subsequently been compressed into one and published in the South African Journal of Philosophy. Mogobe’s reply is directed at all three articles, meaning the two published in Dutch together with the one published in English. The core of the argument is the meaning of ubu-ntu against ubuntu. The former is a philosophical concept and the latter is the everyday language usage presupposing but not explicitly manifesting awareness of its reliance upon ubu-ntu. In elaborating upon his criticism of some of the writings of Mogobe on “ubuntu”, Maris appeals to other writers to support his position. Mogobe dismisses all this on the ground that neither Maris nor his supporters actually address and challenge the philosophical exposition of ubu-ntu in the various writings of Mogobe. Maris and his supporters have at best looked at Ramose but have not seen him. The result is that there never was “a dialogue” with Ramose, except the imaginary one by Maris.
{"title":"Better see than look at Ramose: A reply to Cees Maris","authors":"M. Ramose","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2021.2004799","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2021.2004799","url":null,"abstract":"This is a reply to Cees Maris. He wrote two articles in Dutch purporting to be a dialogue with Mogobe Ramose. The two articles have subsequently been compressed into one and published in the South African Journal of Philosophy. Mogobe’s reply is directed at all three articles, meaning the two published in Dutch together with the one published in English. The core of the argument is the meaning of ubu-ntu against ubuntu. The former is a philosophical concept and the latter is the everyday language usage presupposing but not explicitly manifesting awareness of its reliance upon ubu-ntu. In elaborating upon his criticism of some of the writings of Mogobe on “ubuntu”, Maris appeals to other writers to support his position. Mogobe dismisses all this on the ground that neither Maris nor his supporters actually address and challenge the philosophical exposition of ubu-ntu in the various writings of Mogobe. Maris and his supporters have at best looked at Ramose but have not seen him. The result is that there never was “a dialogue” with Ramose, except the imaginary one by Maris.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"1 - 27"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45686061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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