Cliometrica最新文献

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between output volatility and growth using the standard GARCH-M framework and the US monthly industrial production index (IPI) for the period January 1919–December 2017, by taking into account the presence of shocks and variance changes. The results show that the IPI growth is strongly affected by large shocks which are associated with strikes in some industries, recessions, World War II and natural disasters. We also identify several subperiods with different level of volatility where the volatility declines along the subperiods, with the pre-WWII period (1919–1946) the highest volatile period and the aftermath period of the GFC (2010–2017) the lowest volatile period. We find no evidence of relationship between output volatility and its growth during the full sample 1919–2017 and also for all the subperiods. From a macroeconomic point of view, this implies that economic performances, as measured by IPI growth, do not depend on the uncertainty as measured by IPI volatility.

We model a game between an authority, seeking to implement its state identity, and a parental generation, seeking to socialize a younger generation into their own identity. The authority first selects a coercion level against the non-state identity. The parental generation then chooses whether to insurrect in response to the coercion level and, if not, decides how much to invest in socializing their children into the non-state identity. In this overlapping generations model, we formalize and explore the consequences of an intrinsic negative reaction to coercion: coercion resentment. We show how coercion resentment can create an interval where coercion has negative efficacy in imposing the state identity. This causes the rational legitimacy maximizing authority to restrain its use of coercion. We then show how this inefficacy of coercion can make certain levels of coercion unimplementable without causing the non-state identity to insurrect. This causes the long-run equilibrium size of the non-state identity group to be dependent on their initial size and, thus, path dependence. We consider the validity of the model by reviewing two historical episodes: Stalin’s secularization project (1922–1953) and the Counter-Reformation in early modern France and the Holy Roman Empire (1517–1685).

As it is usually believed that cooperatives made a great contribution to the modernisation of agriculture and when they began to spread agriculture still had a great weight in European economies, it is of interest to know why agricultural cooperatives had uneven success, both from one crop to another and between and within countries. In this article, I focus on the intriguing case of wine, a product of great importance to Mediterranean Europe. After defending that, in actual fact, wine cooperatives were generally unable to offer members important economic advantages; I argue that they only flourished where some ‘local’ factor increased the attraction of belonging to them and, in addition, it was possible to finance their construction. I use what happened in France as a reference and show that in Spain both circumstances only converged in (a part of) Catalonia, as a paradoxical result of inequality and the social conflicts caused by a sharecropping contract called rabassa morta.

The article Crowding out the change: business networks and persisting economic elites in the South of Italy over Unification.

This article provides the first series of Chilean adult male height for the whole of the twentieth century. The height of adult males increased by about 5.5 cm during the twentieth century, primarily during the second half of this period. This is the greatest improvement in biological welfare in Chilean history; Chilean males have never been as tall as they are today. Using a sample of around 36,371 individuals, we document the evolution of the average height of Chilean soldiers (male) born from the 1900s to the 1990s. This sample can be safely taken as a good proxy of the average height of Chilean male population for the period under study. We provide an explanation of both the main determinants of physical stature and the rapid increase in height in Chile over this period.

In this article, we study the effect of the Unification on the network power of economic elites in the South of Italy. We study the persistence of economic elites as evidence of the stability of the institutional set up beyond the effect of Unification, and thus as a primary explaining factor of the persistence of social forces slowing and opposing modernization. We use original archival data on the universe of Naples enterprises to build the networks of business relations between individual economic actors for the 20-year period immediately before and after Unification. The persistence of network power and its determinants is tested via a difference-in-difference model. The main finding is that economic elites persist over Unification. The long-term business relations, rooted in the Bourbon period, the persisting lobbying power of the financial industry, the close collusive ties with potential foreign competitors and the closeness to politics after 1861 are all elements that explain how the Southern economic elites were able to crowd-out the change.

A characterization of the ideas of Francis Bacon and Edward Coke, two preeminent English lawyer-scholars, provides insights into the nature of the legal–intellectual culture of early seventeenth-century England. This emerging culture remains underexplored, even though it immediately preceded and provided essential input into the ‘culture of growth,' the eighteenth-century cultural paradigm viewed as a catalyst for England's historically unprecedented technological advance and economic growth. To develop insights, we employ a methodology not previously used in this context, applying structural topic modeling to a large corpus comprising the works of both Bacon and Coke. Estimated topics span legal, political, scientific, and methodological themes. Legal topics evidence an advanced structure of common-law thought, straddling ostensibly disparate areas of the law. Interconnections between topics reveal a distinctive approach to the pursuit of knowledge, embodying Bacon's epistemology and Coke's legal methodology. A key similarity between Bacon and Coke overshadows their differences: both sought to build reliable knowledge based on generalizing from particulars. The resulting methodological paradigm can be understood as reflecting a legacy of common-law thought and constituting a key contribution to the era's emerging legal–intellectual culture. More generally, our analysis illustrates how machine learning applied to primary texts can aid in exploration of culture.

This paper explores the evolution of the human capital gender gap in Liberal Italy (1871–1921). First, we show that Italy lagged some 50 years behind more advanced countries like France, Prussia and the UK, and that the regional divide in gendered literacy was unparalleled in the rest of Europe. Next, we test whether the shift to primary-school centralization in 1911 (the Daneo-Credaro Reform) brought about a decisive improvement in female literacy. We rely on a brand new, cross-sectional micro (municipal)-dataset of literacy rates in 1911 and 1921, as well as their potential determinants around 1911. Such data, combined with propensity score matching to improve identification, show that primary-school centralization increased the average annual growth of female literacy by 0.78 percentage points. Thus, even though the Reform did not aim at girls specifically, it brought about the unintended consequences of more rapid human capital accumulation for women and—ceteris paribus—a reduced educational gender gap. We briefly discuss why this “Silent Revolution” likely had important implications for Italy’s economic history.

The kinds of goods that richer and poorer households consumed differed more strongly in the past than today. Movements in the relative prices of luxury goods versus staples caused the real inequality to oscillate in ways missed by the usual historiography of (nominal) inequality. On both sides of the North Atlantic and in Australia, real inequality rose substantially less in 1800–1914 than the literature on nominal inequality has revealed. The reasons for this relate to the relative decline of food prices, rural–urban price gaps, and the delayed rise of luxury service prices, especially after 1850. Throughout these centuries, the North Americans enjoyed lower living costs than their counterparts in England.