Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.37977/faithphil.2021.38.1.4
R. J. Hartman
Human persons can act with libertarian freedom in heaven according to one prominent view, because they have freely acquired perfect virtue in their pre-heavenly lives such that acting rightly in heaven is volitionally necessary. But since the character of human persons is not perfect at death, how is their character perfected? On the unilateral model, God alone completes the perfection of their character, and, on the cooperative model, God continues to work with them in purgatory to perfect their own character. I argue that although both models can make sense of all human persons enjoying free will in heaven on various assumptions, the cooperative model allows all human persons in heaven to enjoy a greater degree of freedom. This consideration about the degree of heavenly freedom provides a reason for God to implement the cooperative model.
{"title":"Heavenly Freedom and Two Models of Character Perfection","authors":"R. J. Hartman","doi":"10.37977/faithphil.2021.38.1.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/faithphil.2021.38.1.4","url":null,"abstract":"Human persons can act with libertarian freedom in heaven according to one prominent view, because they have freely acquired perfect virtue in their pre-heavenly lives such that acting rightly in heaven is volitionally necessary. But since the character of human persons is not perfect at death, how is their character perfected? On the unilateral model, God alone completes the perfection of their character, and, on the cooperative model, God continues to work with them in purgatory to perfect their own character. I argue that although both models can make sense of all human persons enjoying free will in heaven on various assumptions, the cooperative model allows all human persons in heaven to enjoy a greater degree of freedom. This consideration about the degree of heavenly freedom provides a reason for God to implement the cooperative model.","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44538893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.2
M. Peterson
{"title":"In Memoriam: William J. Wainwright","authors":"M. Peterson","doi":"10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.2","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"399-400"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42161506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.3
Ted L. Poston
This paper articulates a way to ground a relatively high prior probability for grand explanatory theories apart from an appeal to simplicity. I explore the possibility of enumerating the space of plausible grand theories of the universe by using the explanatory properties of possible views to limit the number of plausible theories. I motivate this alternative grounding by showing that Swinburne’s appeal to simplicity is problematic along several dimensions. I then argue that there are three plausible grand views—theism, atheism, and axiarchism–which satisfy explanatory requirements for plausibility. Other possible views lack the explanatory virtue of these three theories. Consequently, this explanatory grounding provides a way of securing a non-trivial prior probability for theism, atheism, and axiarchism. An important upshot of my approach is that a modest amount of empirical evidence can bear significantly on the posterior probability of grand theories of the universe. My aim in this paper is to articulate an alternative grounding to a relatively high prior probability for grand explanatory theories of the universe. This is important for empirical arguments for such theories. For instance, one argument for theism ∗My thanks to Scott Davidson, Chris Dodsworth, Michael Ferry, Nicholas Jones, Daniel Massey, Kevin McCain, Thomas Metcalf, Calum Miller, Mark Murphy, Richard Swinburne, and Chase Wrenn for helpful comments on a previous draft. An earlier draft of this paper benefited from useful discussion at The Society for Philosophy of Religion. I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers of this journal for in-depth comments. Any errors that remain may be credited to the entropy of the universe, to Karen, or to the author’s failure to heed the sensible advice of superb colleagues.
{"title":"The Intrinsic Probability of Grand Explanatory Theories","authors":"Ted L. Poston","doi":"10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.3","url":null,"abstract":"This paper articulates a way to ground a relatively high prior probability for grand explanatory theories apart from an appeal to simplicity. I explore the possibility of enumerating the space of plausible grand theories of the universe by using the explanatory properties of possible views to limit the number of plausible theories. I motivate this alternative grounding by showing that Swinburne’s appeal to simplicity is problematic along several dimensions. I then argue that there are three plausible grand views—theism, atheism, and axiarchism–which satisfy explanatory requirements for plausibility. Other possible views lack the explanatory virtue of these three theories. Consequently, this explanatory grounding provides a way of securing a non-trivial prior probability for theism, atheism, and axiarchism. An important upshot of my approach is that a modest amount of empirical evidence can bear significantly on the posterior probability of grand theories of the universe. My aim in this paper is to articulate an alternative grounding to a relatively high prior probability for grand explanatory theories of the universe. This is important for empirical arguments for such theories. For instance, one argument for theism ∗My thanks to Scott Davidson, Chris Dodsworth, Michael Ferry, Nicholas Jones, Daniel Massey, Kevin McCain, Thomas Metcalf, Calum Miller, Mark Murphy, Richard Swinburne, and Chase Wrenn for helpful comments on a previous draft. An earlier draft of this paper benefited from useful discussion at The Society for Philosophy of Religion. I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers of this journal for in-depth comments. Any errors that remain may be credited to the entropy of the universe, to Karen, or to the author’s failure to heed the sensible advice of superb colleagues.","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"401-420"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44019818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Are We Bodies or Souls?","authors":"Andrew M. Bailey, Joseph Han, Alcan Sng","doi":"10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.11","url":null,"abstract":"Are We Bodies or Souls?, by Richard Swinburne. Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. 188. $14.99 (hardcover).","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41684378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why I Am Not a Buddhist","authors":"L. Williams","doi":"10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.12","url":null,"abstract":"Why I Am Not a Buddhist, by Evan Thompson. Yale University Press, 2020. Pp. i + 230. $18 (hardcover).","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41760098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Trinity: A Philosophical Investigation","authors":"Alan J. Pihringer","doi":"10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.9","url":null,"abstract":"The Trinity: A Philosophical Investigation, by H.E. Baber. SCM Press, 2019. Pp. v + 204. $92.00 (hardcover).","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"536-540"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47947365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.4
Blake McAllister
Whether evil provides evidence against the existence of God, and to what degree, depends on how things seem to the subject—i.e., on one’s perspective. I explain three ways in which adopting an atheistic perspective can increase support for atheism via considerations of evil. The first is by intensifying the common sense problem of evil by making evil seem gratuitous or intrinsically wrong to allow. The second is by diminishing the apparent fit between theism and our observations of evil. The third is by lowering the initial plausibility of theism. I call this “the perspectival problem of evil”� and argue that skeptical theism does not fully address it.
{"title":"The Perspectival Problem of Evil","authors":"Blake McAllister","doi":"10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.4","url":null,"abstract":"Whether evil provides evidence against the existence of God, and to what degree, depends on how things seem to the subject—i.e., on one’s perspective. I explain three ways in which adopting an atheistic perspective can increase support for atheism via considerations of evil. The first is by intensifying the common sense problem of evil by making evil seem gratuitous or intrinsically wrong to allow. The second is by diminishing the apparent fit between theism and our observations of evil. The third is by lowering the initial plausibility of theism. I call this “the perspectival problem of evil”� and argue that skeptical theism does not fully address it.","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"421-450"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46149932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A New Theist Response to the New Atheists","authors":"G. Peterson","doi":"10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.10","url":null,"abstract":"A New Theist Response to the New Atheists, edited by Joshua Rasmussen and Kevin Vallier. Routlege, 2020. Pp. xii + 216. $155.00 (hardcover).","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49239588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.5
F. Miguel
Suppose that you realize that a substantial majority of the most important philosophers of all time agreed with you on some proposition p. Intuitively, you have gained additional evidence in favor of p and you should increase your confidence that p is true. It turns out that a large number of the most important philosophers of all time (in fact, the vast majority, if we consider, as we will, a recent poll conducted with contemporary philosophers) were theists. In this paper, I explore the epistemic significance of agreement with these philosophers with respect to their theistic beliefs. I argue that agreement with such philosophers does provide evidence in favor of theism.
{"title":"The Epistemic Significance of Agreement with Exceptional Theistic Philosophers","authors":"F. Miguel","doi":"10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.5","url":null,"abstract":"Suppose that you realize that a substantial majority of the most important philosophers of all time agreed with you on some proposition p. Intuitively, you have gained additional evidence in favor of p and you should increase your confidence that p is true. It turns out that a large number of the most important philosophers of all time (in fact, the vast majority, if we consider, as we will, a recent poll conducted with contemporary philosophers) were theists. In this paper, I explore the epistemic significance of agreement with these philosophers with respect to their theistic beliefs. I argue that agreement with such philosophers does provide evidence in favor of theism.","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"451-474"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45695128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.4.1
M. Murphy
{"title":"From the Editor","authors":"M. Murphy","doi":"10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.4.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.4.1","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49547470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：