Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.6
A. G. Holdier, I. H. A. Zoopolis
The concept of service found in Christian theism and related religious perspectives offers robust support for a political defense of nonhuman animal rights, both in the eschaton and in the present state. By adapting the political theory defended by Donaldson and Kymlicka to contemporary theological models of the afterlife and of human agency, I defend a picture of heaven as a harmoniously structured society where humans are the functional leaders of a multifaceted, interspecies citizenry. Consequently, orthodox religious believers (concerned with promoting God’s will “on Earth as it is in Heaven”�) have a duty to promote and protect the interests of nonhuman creatures in the present, premortem state.
{"title":"Is Heaven a Zoopolis?","authors":"A. G. Holdier, I. H. A. Zoopolis","doi":"10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.6","url":null,"abstract":"The concept of service found in Christian theism and related religious perspectives offers robust support for a political defense of nonhuman animal rights, both in the eschaton and in the present state. By adapting the political theory defended by Donaldson and Kymlicka to contemporary theological models of the afterlife and of human agency, I defend a picture of heaven as a harmoniously structured society where humans are the functional leaders of a multifaceted, interspecies citizenry. Consequently, orthodox religious believers (concerned with promoting God’s will “on Earth as it is in Heaven”�) have a duty to promote and protect the interests of nonhuman creatures in the present, premortem state.","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44114822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.8
Joshua C. Thurow, Jada Twedt Strabbing
In Atonement, Eleonore Stump develops a novel and compelling Thomistic account of the atonement and argues that Anselmian interpretations must be rejected. In this review essay, after summarizing her account, we raise worries about some aspects of it. First, we respond to her primary objection to Anselmian interpretations by arguing that, contrary to Stump, love does not require unilateral and unconditional forgiveness. Second, we suggest that the heart of Anselmian interpretations—that reconciliation with God requires reparation/restitution/satisfaction—is plausible and well-supported by some of her own arguments. Third, we raise doubts about her views of the role of surrender in justification and the nature of justification itself. Finally, we question whether Stump’s account can successfully explain how the atonement deals with pre-justification sin. A central theme of our comments is that Stump’s Thomistic interpretation can be entwined with Anselmian interpretations to make a stronger account of the atonement.
{"title":"Entwining Thomistic and Anselmian Interpretations of the Atonement","authors":"Joshua C. Thurow, Jada Twedt Strabbing","doi":"10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.8","url":null,"abstract":"In Atonement, Eleonore Stump develops a novel and compelling Thomistic account of the atonement and argues that Anselmian interpretations must be rejected. In this review essay, after summarizing her account, we raise worries about some aspects of it. First, we respond to her primary objection to Anselmian interpretations by arguing that, contrary to Stump, love does not require unilateral and unconditional forgiveness. Second, we suggest that the heart of Anselmian interpretations—that reconciliation with God requires reparation/restitution/satisfaction—is plausible and well-supported by some of her own arguments. Third, we raise doubts about her views of the role of surrender in justification and the nature of justification itself. Finally, we question whether Stump’s account can successfully explain how the atonement deals with pre-justification sin. A central theme of our comments is that Stump’s Thomistic interpretation can be entwined with Anselmian interpretations to make a stronger account of the atonement.","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45331498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.7
Tien-Chun Lo
In this paper, I will defend a strategy for employing perfect being theology that Jeff Speaks calls “restriction strategy.”� In Section I, I will outline what the restriction strategy is and explicate Speaks’s objection to it. In Section II, I will propose a response to Speaks’s objection. In Section III, the response will be refined to avoid objections. My contention will be that this refined version of perfect being theology avoids Speaks’s objection, and therefore can help theists find what divine attributes God has.
{"title":"F-Duplicates and Trivialization: A Reply to Speaks","authors":"Tien-Chun Lo","doi":"10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.7","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I will defend a strategy for employing perfect being theology that Jeff Speaks calls “restriction strategy.”� In Section I, I will outline what the restriction strategy is and explicate Speaks’s objection to it. In Section II, I will propose a response to Speaks’s objection. In Section III, the response will be refined to avoid objections. My contention will be that this refined version of perfect being theology avoids Speaks’s objection, and therefore can help theists find what divine attributes God has.","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46192851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Religion and the Meaning of Life: An Existential Approach","authors":"Mark S. McLeod-Harrison","doi":"10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.4.13","url":null,"abstract":"Religion and the Meaning of Life: An Existential Approach, by Clifford Williams. Cambridge University Press, 2020. Pp vi + 189. $27.99 (paperback).","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46606275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-01DOI: 10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.3.5
BenjaminThomas Page
I provide an argument from consciousness for God’s existence. I first give a form of the argument which ultimately, I think is difficult to evaluate. As such I move on to provide what I take to be a stronger argument, where I claim that consciousness given our worldly laws of nature offers rather substantial evidence for God’s existence. It is this latter point the paper largely focuses on, both in setting it out and defending it from various objections.
{"title":"Arguing to Theism from Consciousness","authors":"BenjaminThomas Page","doi":"10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.3.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.3.5","url":null,"abstract":"I provide an argument from consciousness for God’s existence. I first give a form of the argument which ultimately, I think is difficult to evaluate. As such I move on to provide what I take to be a stronger argument, where I claim that consciousness given our worldly laws of nature offers rather substantial evidence for God’s existence. It is this latter point the paper largely focuses on, both in setting it out and defending it from various objections.","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47026051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-01DOI: 10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.3.2
A. Law
There is an old and powerful argument for the claim that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with the freedom to do otherwise. A recent response to this argument, sometimes called the “dependence response,” centers around the claim that God’s relevant past beliefs depend on the relevant agent’s current or future behavior in a certain way. This paper offers a new argument for the dependence response, one that revolves around different cases of time travel. Somewhat serendipitously, the argument also paves the way for a new reply to a compelling objection to the dependence response, the challenge from prepunishment. But perhaps not so serendipitously, the argument also renders the dependence response incompatible with certain views of providence.
{"title":"The Dependence Response and Explanatory Loops","authors":"A. Law","doi":"10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.3.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.3.2","url":null,"abstract":"There is an old and powerful argument for the claim that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with the freedom to do otherwise. A recent response to this argument, sometimes called the “dependence response,” centers around the claim that God’s relevant past beliefs depend on the relevant agent’s current or future behavior in a certain way. This paper offers a new argument for the dependence response, one that revolves around different cases of time travel. Somewhat serendipitously, the argument also paves the way for a new reply to a compelling objection to the dependence response, the challenge from prepunishment. But perhaps not so serendipitously, the argument also renders the dependence response incompatible with certain views of providence.","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49425910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-01DOI: 10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.3.6
Elijah Hess, Alan R. Rhoda
Alexander Pruss has recently argued on probabilistic grounds that Christian philosophers should reject Open Futurism—roughly, the thesis that there are no true future contingents—on account of this view’s alleged inability to handle certain statements about infinite futures in a mathematically or religiously adequate manner. We argue that, once the distinction between being true and becoming true is applied to such statements, it is evident that they pose no problem for Open Futurists.
{"title":"IS an Open Infinite Future Impossible? A Reply to Pruss","authors":"Elijah Hess, Alan R. Rhoda","doi":"10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.3.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.3.6","url":null,"abstract":"Alexander Pruss has recently argued on probabilistic grounds that Christian philosophers should reject Open Futurism—roughly, the thesis that there are no true future contingents—on account of this view’s alleged inability to handle certain statements about infinite futures in a mathematically or religiously adequate manner. We argue that, once the distinction between being true and becoming true is applied to such statements, it is evident that they pose no problem for Open Futurists.","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41299523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-01DOI: 10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.3.9
B. Lipscomb
God and Morality, by Anne Jeffrey. Cambridge University Press, 2019. Pp. 84. $18 (paperback).
《上帝与道德》，安妮·杰弗里著。剑桥大学出版社，2019。第84页$18（平装本）。
{"title":"God and Morality","authors":"B. Lipscomb","doi":"10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.3.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.3.9","url":null,"abstract":"God and Morality, by Anne Jeffrey. Cambridge University Press, 2019. Pp. 84. $18 (paperback).","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49333771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Free Will and God’s Universal Causality: The Dual Sources Account","authors":"S. Kittle","doi":"10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.3.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.3.8","url":null,"abstract":"Free Will and God’s Universal Causality: The Dual Sources Account, by W. Matthews Grant. Bloomsbury, 2019. Pp. viii + 248. $114 (hardback).","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46445061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-01DOI: 10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.3.1
M. Schroeder
According to the Book of Common Prayer, we have sinned against God “in thought, word, and deed.” In this paper I’ll explore one way of understanding what it might mean to sin against God in thought—the idea that we can at least potentially wrong God by what we believe. I will be interested in the philosophical tenability of this idea, and particularly in its potential consequences for the epistemology of religious belief and the problem of evil.
根据《公祷书》(Book of Common Prayer)，我们“在思想、言语和行为上”都得罪了上帝。在这篇文章中，我将探索一种理解在思想上得罪上帝的方式，即我们至少可以通过我们的信仰来潜在地得罪上帝。我将对这一观点的哲学站得住脚感兴趣，尤其是它对宗教信仰认识论和邪恶问题的潜在影响。
{"title":"Sins of Thought","authors":"M. Schroeder","doi":"10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.3.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/FAITHPHIL.2020.37.3.1","url":null,"abstract":"According to the Book of Common Prayer, we have sinned against God “in thought, word, and deed.” In this paper I’ll explore one way of understanding what it might mean to sin against God in thought—the idea that we can at least potentially wrong God by what we believe. I will be interested in the philosophical tenability of this idea, and particularly in its potential consequences for the epistemology of religious belief and the problem of evil.","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47282292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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