Pub Date : 2020-04-01DOI: 10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.2.9
S. Yadav
Black Christology and the Quest for Authenticity: A Philosophical Appraisal, by John H. McClendon III. Lexington Books, 2019. Pp. viii + 207. $95.00 (hardcover).
《黑色基督论与对真实性的追求:哲学评价》，作者:约翰·h·麦克伦登三世。列克星敦图书，2019年。Pp. viii + 207。95.00美元(精装)。
{"title":"John H. McClendon III: Black Christology and the Quest for Authenticity: A Philosophical Appraisal","authors":"S. Yadav","doi":"10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.2.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.2.9","url":null,"abstract":"Black Christology and the Quest for Authenticity: A Philosophical Appraisal, by John H. McClendon III. Lexington Books, 2019. Pp. viii + 207. $95.00 (hardcover).","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"253-258"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46881825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dietrich von Hildebrand with Alice von Hildebrand: Morality and Situation Ethics","authors":"Catherine Nolan","doi":"10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.2.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.2.11","url":null,"abstract":"Morality and Situation Ethics, by Dietrich von Hildebrand with Alice von Hildebrand. Hildebrand Press, 2019. Pp. xxxviii + 180. $16.99 (paperback).","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"265-269"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49588462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Nathan Ballantyne: Knowing Our Limits","authors":"M. Bergmann","doi":"10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.2.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.2.7","url":null,"abstract":"Knowing Our Limits, by Nathan Ballantyne. Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. xi + 326. $39.95 (hardcover).","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44234309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-01DOI: 10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.2.8
A. Arlig
The Lost Sheep in Philosophy of Religion: New Perspectives on Disability, Gender, Race, and Animals, edited by Blake Hereth and Kevin Timpe. Routledge, 2020. Pp. xiii + 400. $155.00 (hardcover), $28.98 (e-book).
《宗教哲学中迷失的羊:残疾、性别、种族和动物的新视角》，作者:布莱克·赫雷斯和凯文·蒂姆佩。劳特利奇,2020年。Pp. xiii + 400。155.00美元(精装)，28.98美元(电子书)。
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Pub Date : 2020-04-01DOI: 10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.2.4
C. Cohoe
Pantheists are often accused of lacking a sufficient account of the unity of the cosmos and its supposed priority over its many parts. I argue that complex theists, those who think that God has ontologically distinct parts or attributes, face the same problems. Current proposals for the metaphysics of complex theism do not offer any greater unity or ontological independence than pantheism, since they are modeled on priority monism. I then discuss whether the formal distinction of John Duns Scotus offers a way forward for complex theists. I show that only those classical theists who affirm divine simplicity are better off with respect to aseity and unity than pantheists. Only proponents of divine simplicity can fairly claim to have found a fully independent ultimate being.
{"title":"Accounting for the Whole: Why Pantheism is on a Metaphysical Par with Complex Theism","authors":"C. Cohoe","doi":"10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.2.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.2.4","url":null,"abstract":"Pantheists are often accused of lacking a sufficient account of the unity of the cosmos and its supposed priority over its many parts. I argue that complex theists, those who think that God has ontologically distinct parts or attributes, face the same problems. Current proposals for the metaphysics of complex theism do not offer any greater unity or ontological independence than pantheism, since they are modeled on priority monism. I then discuss whether the formal distinction of John Duns Scotus offers a way forward for complex theists. I show that only those classical theists who affirm divine simplicity are better off with respect to aseity and unity than pantheists. Only proponents of divine simplicity can fairly claim to have found a fully independent ultimate being.","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"202-219"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49454197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-01DOI: 10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.2.1
Daniel M. Johnson
Some have seen in the divine attribute of omnirationality, identified by Alexander R. Pruss, the promise of a dissolution of the usual puzzles of petitionary prayer. Scott Davison has challenged this line of thought with a series of example cases. I will argue that Davison is only partially correct, and that the reasons for this reveal an important new way to approach the puzzles of petitionary prayer. Because explanations are typically interest-relative, there is not one correct account of “answered prayer” but many, corresponding to a variety of reasons to care whether God might answer our prayers. It follows from this that the omnirationality solution can be vindicated and that puzzles of petitionary prayer that are not dissolved thereby will typically contain within themselves the seeds of their own solutions.
{"title":"How Puzzles of Petitionary Prayer Solve Themselves: Divine Omnirationality, Interest-Relative Explanation, and Answered Prayer","authors":"Daniel M. Johnson","doi":"10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.2.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.2.1","url":null,"abstract":"Some have seen in the divine attribute of omnirationality, identified by Alexander R. Pruss, the promise of a dissolution of the usual puzzles of petitionary prayer. Scott Davison has challenged this line of thought with a series of example cases. I will argue that Davison is only partially correct, and that the reasons for this reveal an important new way to approach the puzzles of petitionary prayer. Because explanations are typically interest-relative, there is not one correct account of “answered prayer” but many, corresponding to a variety of reasons to care whether God might answer our prayers. It follows from this that the omnirationality solution can be vindicated and that puzzles of petitionary prayer that are not dissolved thereby will typically contain within themselves the seeds of their own solutions.","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":"35 4","pages":"137-157"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41295783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.1.1
Christopher Hauser
According to the doctrine of the Incarnation, one person, Christ, has both the attributes proper to a human being and the attributes proper to God. This claim has given rise to the coherence objection, i.e., the objection that it is impossible for one individual to have both sets of attributes. Several authors have offered responses which rely on the idea that Christ has the relevant human properties in virtue of having a concrete human nature which has those properties. I show why such responses should be rejected and, in light of that, propose an alternative response to the coherence objection.
{"title":"On Being Human and Divine: The Coherence of the Incarnation","authors":"Christopher Hauser","doi":"10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.1.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.1.1","url":null,"abstract":"According to the doctrine of the Incarnation, one person, Christ, has both the attributes proper to a human being and the attributes proper to God. This claim has given rise to the coherence objection, i.e., the objection that it is impossible for one individual to have both sets of attributes. Several authors have offered responses which rely on the idea that Christ has the relevant human properties in virtue of having a concrete human nature which has those properties. I show why such responses should be rejected and, in light of that, propose an alternative response to the coherence objection.","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"3-31"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69948928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.1.8
J. Beall
{"title":"In Defense of Extended Conciliar Christology: A Philosophical Essay, by Timothy Pawl. Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. xii + 250. $90 (hardcover).","authors":"J. Beall","doi":"10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.1.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.1.8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"128-133"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69949060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.1.5
S. Williams
In “Unity of Action in a Latin Social Model of the Trinity,” I objected to William Hasker’s Social Model of the Trinity (among others) on the grounds that it does not secure the necessary agreement between the divine persons. Further, I developed a Latin Social model of the Trinity. Hasker has responded by defending his Social Model and by raising seven objections against my Latin Social Model. Here I raise a new objection against Hasker on the grounds that it is inconsistent with Conciliar Trinitarianism, and I respond to the seven objections and in so doing further develop the Latin Social Model.
{"title":"In Defense of a Latin Social Trinity: A Response to William Hasker","authors":"S. Williams","doi":"10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.1.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.1.5","url":null,"abstract":"In “Unity of Action in a Latin Social Model of the Trinity,” I objected to William Hasker’s Social Model of the Trinity (among others) on the grounds that it does not secure the necessary agreement between the divine persons. Further, I developed a Latin Social model of the Trinity. Hasker has responded by defending his Social Model and by raising seven objections against my Latin Social Model. Here I raise a new objection against Hasker on the grounds that it is inconsistent with Conciliar Trinitarianism, and I respond to the seven objections and in so doing further develop the Latin Social Model.","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"96-117"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69949278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.1.7
M. B. Willard
{"title":"God, Existence, and Fictional Objects: The Case for Meinongian Theism, by John-Mark L. Miravalle. Bloomsbury, 2018. Pp. 192. $114 (hardback).","authors":"M. B. Willard","doi":"10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.1.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.1.7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"122-127"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69948976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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