Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.58.2.01
Jessica Wahman
Abstract:I argue that the dichotomous treatment of agency and free will is problematic because it rests on a Cartesian interpretation of self and world that many present-day thinkers take themselves to be denying. I do so in order to reconstruct the concept of human agency using the psychologies of American philosophers John Dewey and George Santayana. Identifying the self with the entire organism, as these thinkers do, allows for an importantly different sense of agency. In embracing an organismic interpretation of the self, we achieve a more realistic yet mitigated sense of agency, where real responsibility for action is placed in a context of biological and environmental (including social, cultural, and historical) influences.
{"title":"Psyche as Agent: Overcoming the \"Free/Unfree\" Dichotomy","authors":"Jessica Wahman","doi":"10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.58.2.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.58.2.01","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:I argue that the dichotomous treatment of agency and free will is problematic because it rests on a Cartesian interpretation of self and world that many present-day thinkers take themselves to be denying. I do so in order to reconstruct the concept of human agency using the psychologies of American philosophers John Dewey and George Santayana. Identifying the self with the entire organism, as these thinkers do, allows for an importantly different sense of agency. In embracing an organismic interpretation of the self, we achieve a more realistic yet mitigated sense of agency, where real responsibility for action is placed in a context of biological and environmental (including social, cultural, and historical) influences.","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":"21 1","pages":"79 - 96"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88951799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.58.1.03
Yael Levin Hungerford
Abstract:To better understand Peirce’s practical conservatism, this paper examines Peirce’s views on a liberal arts education and the political potential of the university. Peirce’s views on education raise a puzzle for his political thought: Given his practical conservatism, why does Peirce think it is important to teach citizens and future leaders how to think, not what to think? If tradition, sentiment, and instinct are the best guides for the active life, why should those who lead active lives receive an education that focuses on strengthening and improving reasoning abilities? Why not simply teach them traditional wisdom and morality—as is often the case with conservative institutions and societies? This examination reveals an understanding of both the potential and limits of reason in the practical realm, resulting in a moderate practical conservatism. We also learn of the important moral lessons offered by institutions devoted to the noble pursuit of truth for its own sake.
{"title":"Charles S. Peirce on the University’s Political Potential","authors":"Yael Levin Hungerford","doi":"10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.58.1.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.58.1.03","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:To better understand Peirce’s practical conservatism, this paper examines Peirce’s views on a liberal arts education and the political potential of the university. Peirce’s views on education raise a puzzle for his political thought: Given his practical conservatism, why does Peirce think it is important to teach citizens and future leaders how to think, not what to think? If tradition, sentiment, and instinct are the best guides for the active life, why should those who lead active lives receive an education that focuses on strengthening and improving reasoning abilities? Why not simply teach them traditional wisdom and morality—as is often the case with conservative institutions and societies? This examination reveals an understanding of both the potential and limits of reason in the practical realm, resulting in a moderate practical conservatism. We also learn of the important moral lessons offered by institutions devoted to the noble pursuit of truth for its own sake.","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":"308 1","pages":"40 - 51"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77217141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.58.1.04
Henrik Rydenfelt
Abstract:Environmental pragmatism grew out of dissatisfaction with the inefficaciousness of environmental philosophy in influencing environmental decision-making and policy. Its most central proponent, Bryan G. Norton has provided an extended account of ecological management as a process of revision of the beliefs and values of a community through experience and deliberation. In this article, two lines of criticism of Norton’s view are examined. The first maintains that environmental pragmatism offers limited tools for dealing with major, global environmental crises such as climate change. According to the second, environmental pragmatism cannot provide a viable account of how social learning improves our values rather than that it merely changes them. It is argued that, while the first criticism largely misses its mark, the second points to an important issue that has broad relevance to pragmatist accounts of inquiry and democracy. Norton’s position—like that of many other pragmatists —oscillates between a constructivist and a realist approach to inquiry; it is only the latter approach, however, that can offer an account of the revision of values that can meet this criticism.
摘要:环境实用主义源于对环境哲学在影响环境决策和政策方面的无效的不满。其最核心的支持者布莱恩·诺顿(Bryan G. Norton)将生态管理扩展为一个通过经验和深思熟虑对社区信仰和价值观进行修正的过程。在这篇文章中，对诺顿的观点进行了两种批评。第一种观点认为，环境实用主义在应对气候变化等重大全球环境危机方面提供的工具有限。根据第二种观点，环境实用主义不能提供一个可行的解释，说明社会学习如何改善我们的价值观，而不仅仅是改变它们。有人认为，虽然第一个批评在很大程度上没有击中要害，但第二个批评指出了一个重要问题，这个问题与实用主义者对调查和民主的描述有着广泛的相关性。诺顿的立场——就像许多其他实用主义者的立场一样——在建构主义和现实主义之间摇摆;然而，只有后一种方法才能对价值观的修正提供一种解释，以应对这种批评。
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Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.58.1.02
Laurence E. Heglar
Abstract:My purpose here is to take seriously Dewey’s insistence that the term “experience” be considered from a methodological, rather than a substantive, point of view. To consider its methodological import we must examine the purpose it served in his overall account of inquiry. As a technical term, Dewey considered “experience” to serve an instrumental function of control. By this he meant that the term was to serve a purpose in aiding us in the description of concrete situations, as well as drawing attention to our use of language. Dewey eventually gave up on the term because, although it was useful up to a point, it no longer served the methodological functions for which he originally adopted it. Three issues will be considered. I will discuss the implications of Dewey’s instrumental approach for the status we should award our “conceptual apparatus,” or use of language terms; show why traditional philosophical methods, which make a priori assumptions about the nature of reality, were inadequate for the analysis of the actual conditions of living, or the individual case; and, finally, examine how the term “experience,” if its meaning were refashioned and considered as a methodological term, could do so and in that way served as a means of control within inquiry. A consideration of the third issue will help us see why the term, viewed as a tool, proved expendable.
{"title":"The Term “Experience” as a Tool of Inquiry","authors":"Laurence E. Heglar","doi":"10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.58.1.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.58.1.02","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:My purpose here is to take seriously Dewey’s insistence that the term “experience” be considered from a methodological, rather than a substantive, point of view. To consider its methodological import we must examine the purpose it served in his overall account of inquiry. As a technical term, Dewey considered “experience” to serve an instrumental function of control. By this he meant that the term was to serve a purpose in aiding us in the description of concrete situations, as well as drawing attention to our use of language. Dewey eventually gave up on the term because, although it was useful up to a point, it no longer served the methodological functions for which he originally adopted it. Three issues will be considered. I will discuss the implications of Dewey’s instrumental approach for the status we should award our “conceptual apparatus,” or use of language terms; show why traditional philosophical methods, which make a priori assumptions about the nature of reality, were inadequate for the analysis of the actual conditions of living, or the individual case; and, finally, examine how the term “experience,” if its meaning were refashioned and considered as a methodological term, could do so and in that way served as a means of control within inquiry. A consideration of the third issue will help us see why the term, viewed as a tool, proved expendable.","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":"114 1","pages":"22 - 39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89365351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.4.02
J. Jarocki
Abstract:This paper explores the biography of Edwin Bissell Holt (1873—1946), an American psychologist and philosopher. Although today Holt is almost completely forgotten, he was one of the leading figures in early twentieth century American science. In my work I am going to show that Holt's impact was remarkable and long-lasting both in psychology and in philosophy. In psychology, Holt was a pioneer of behaviorism (plausibly preceding John Watson), academic psychoanalysis and so-called ecological psychology. In philosophy, he arguably influenced the late philosophy of his teacher and cordial friend, William James. Holt was also one of the founders of the New Realism, a tradition that—although short-lived—transferred to American soil many ideas of British analytic movement and paved the way for American analytic philosophy. Unfortunately, due to Holt's early withdrawal from academic life, some of his achievements were adopted by his students (e.g., by Edward Chase Tolman and James Gibson), while other fell into oblivion. By following Holt's biography, I try to give him a proper place in the history of American science and—at the same time—to offer a kind of a prolegomena to more detailed studies on his thought that are certainly needed.
{"title":"Edwin Bissell Holt (1873–1946): A Missing Portrait of a Forgotten Pioneer","authors":"J. Jarocki","doi":"10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.4.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.4.02","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:This paper explores the biography of Edwin Bissell Holt (1873—1946), an American psychologist and philosopher. Although today Holt is almost completely forgotten, he was one of the leading figures in early twentieth century American science. In my work I am going to show that Holt's impact was remarkable and long-lasting both in psychology and in philosophy. In psychology, Holt was a pioneer of behaviorism (plausibly preceding John Watson), academic psychoanalysis and so-called ecological psychology. In philosophy, he arguably influenced the late philosophy of his teacher and cordial friend, William James. Holt was also one of the founders of the New Realism, a tradition that—although short-lived—transferred to American soil many ideas of British analytic movement and paved the way for American analytic philosophy. Unfortunately, due to Holt's early withdrawal from academic life, some of his achievements were adopted by his students (e.g., by Edward Chase Tolman and James Gibson), while other fell into oblivion. By following Holt's biography, I try to give him a proper place in the history of American science and—at the same time—to offer a kind of a prolegomena to more detailed studies on his thought that are certainly needed.","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":"35 1","pages":"434 - 456"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77953710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.4.01
K. Stroh
Abstract:This paper engages with Isaac Levi's approach to justifying changes in our states of full belief and offers a Peircean criticism of his strategy for resolving conflicts between the results of what inquirers deem to be the most reliable programs for a given situation and the settled beliefs about which we have no doubts. In the first section, I discuss the central features of Levi's theory of justifying changes to our state of full belief. In the second section, I present a Peircean approach to evaluating the reliability of these programs for routine expansion of belief, and I argue that there is a conflict between Levi's approach to situations where an inquirer has expanded her beliefs into inconsistency and Peirce's criticisms of non-scientific methods for settling opinion. The third section presents two potential objections to the Peircean approach, objections that emphasize the importance of our concern to avoid error, and in the fourth section, I propose an original supplement to the Peircean approach that better addresses that concern. Ultimately, my aim is to develop and defend a Peircean approach that is in opposition to Levi's views about when it is appropriate to question the reliability of our programs for routine expansion of belief but that also addresses his legitimate worries about underemphasizing our concern to avoid error.
{"title":"A Peircean Approach to Programs for Routine Expansion of Belief","authors":"K. Stroh","doi":"10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.4.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.4.01","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:This paper engages with Isaac Levi's approach to justifying changes in our states of full belief and offers a Peircean criticism of his strategy for resolving conflicts between the results of what inquirers deem to be the most reliable programs for a given situation and the settled beliefs about which we have no doubts. In the first section, I discuss the central features of Levi's theory of justifying changes to our state of full belief. In the second section, I present a Peircean approach to evaluating the reliability of these programs for routine expansion of belief, and I argue that there is a conflict between Levi's approach to situations where an inquirer has expanded her beliefs into inconsistency and Peirce's criticisms of non-scientific methods for settling opinion. The third section presents two potential objections to the Peircean approach, objections that emphasize the importance of our concern to avoid error, and in the fourth section, I propose an original supplement to the Peircean approach that better addresses that concern. Ultimately, my aim is to develop and defend a Peircean approach that is in opposition to Levi's views about when it is appropriate to question the reliability of our programs for routine expansion of belief but that also addresses his legitimate worries about underemphasizing our concern to avoid error.","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":"1 1","pages":"409 - 433"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91276749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.4.06
Gary W. Slater
{"title":"Toward a Global Discourse on Religion in a Secular Age: Essays on Philosophical Pragmatism by Ludwig Nagl (review)","authors":"Gary W. Slater","doi":"10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.4.06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.4.06","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":"17 1","pages":"534 - 538"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75132870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-12DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.2.06
Stjernfelt
Abstract:Until well into the 1890s, Peirce did not pay special attention to the act of asserting a proposition, and he used "proposition" and "assertion" interchangeably. This began to change in the period of the "Grand Logic" and the "Short Logic", and in Peirce's vast semiotic development after 1902, no less than three theories of assertion are developed to account for the ability of certain signs to claim truth. One is assertion as a special self-reference of proposition signs, claiming that the sign itself is indexically connected to its object as a truth grant; another is the assumption of social responsibility for the sign's truth on the part of the utterer; the third is the purpose of asserting a proposition, namely to persuade some interlocutor about the truth of the sign. These three theories are oftentimes developed in isolation, but this paper argues they fit together in the way that the third presupposes the second, in turn presupposing the first.
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Pub Date : 2021-10-12DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.2.01
Odland
Abstract:In early 1909, Charles S. Peirce conducted a series of experiments with three-valued logic, anticipating the pioneering work of Jan Łukasiewicz and Emil Post by ten years. These experiments are entirely contained within six or seven pages of Peirce's Logic Notebook. Due to the work of Atwell Turquette, the formalisms contained in those pages are relatively well understood. What is less understood are Peirce's philosophical reasons for conducting those experiments. His explanation of the need for his "triadic" logic is very brief, taking up little more than a single short page in the Notebook. Here he gives us two clues about his motivations, one connected to modal notions and one to his views on continuity. There are two previous accounts of the philosophical motivations behind triadic logic, due to Max Fisch and Turquette, and to Robert Lane. In this paper, I re-evaluate those views and connect the two clues to Peirce's hypothetical cosmology. I argue that in conducting his three-valued experiments, Peirce was trying to create a logic to capture his notion of the evolving universe.
摘要:1909年初，Charles S. Peirce用三值逻辑进行了一系列实验，比Jan Łukasiewicz和Emil Post的开创性工作早了十年。这些实验全部包含在Peirce的《逻辑笔记》的六到七页中。由于Atwell Turquette的工作，这些页面中包含的形式相对容易理解。人们不太了解的是皮尔斯进行这些实验的哲学原因。他对“三位一体”逻辑的必要性的解释非常简短，在《笔记本》中只占用了短短的一页。这里他给了我们两条关于他动机的线索，一条与模态概念有关，另一条与他关于连续性的观点有关。关于三元逻辑背后的哲学动机，先前有两种说法，分别来自马克斯·菲施和特奎特，以及罗伯特·莱恩。在本文中，我重新评估了这些观点，并将这两条线索与皮尔斯的假设宇宙论联系起来。我认为，在进行他的三值实验时，皮尔斯试图创造一种逻辑来捕捉他对宇宙演化的概念。
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Pub Date : 2021-10-12DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.2.07
F. Bellucci, A. Pietarinen, Chiffi Daniele
Abstract:This paper is about Peirce's understanding and notational realization of the relationship between the logical content of conjunction and the illocutionary force of assertion. The argument moves from an imaginary, subtextual dialogue between several authors in the history of logic and the philosophy of language (Aristotle, Ammonius, Boethius, Frege, Peirce, Geach, and Dummett) and shows that the problem of the relationship between conjunction and assertion is quite old and has received distinct and irreconcilable treatments. Peirce has an original take on the problem, which he addresses, as often happens in his mature writings, in notational terms: the anomaly of conjunction (i.e., the fact that, unlike the other connectives, conjunction is subject to assertion distribution) is not to be hidden behind a uniform notation, like standard sentential calculus, in which the conjunction connective is treated on a par with the other connectives. Rather, a sentential language is possible that embodies rather than conceals the anomaly, and this is Peirce's system of Existential Graphs, which from 1896 onwards understandably becomes his preferred instrument of logical analysis.
{"title":"Assertion, Conjunction, and Other Signs of Logic: A Contribution to the Philosophy of Notation","authors":"F. Bellucci, A. Pietarinen, Chiffi Daniele","doi":"10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.2.07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.2.07","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:This paper is about Peirce's understanding and notational realization of the relationship between the logical content of conjunction and the illocutionary force of assertion. The argument moves from an imaginary, subtextual dialogue between several authors in the history of logic and the philosophy of language (Aristotle, Ammonius, Boethius, Frege, Peirce, Geach, and Dummett) and shows that the problem of the relationship between conjunction and assertion is quite old and has received distinct and irreconcilable treatments. Peirce has an original take on the problem, which he addresses, as often happens in his mature writings, in notational terms: the anomaly of conjunction (i.e., the fact that, unlike the other connectives, conjunction is subject to assertion distribution) is not to be hidden behind a uniform notation, like standard sentential calculus, in which the conjunction connective is treated on a par with the other connectives. Rather, a sentential language is possible that embodies rather than conceals the anomaly, and this is Peirce's system of Existential Graphs, which from 1896 onwards understandably becomes his preferred instrument of logical analysis.","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":"51 2 1","pages":"270 - 287"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76645215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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