Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.2979/csp.2023.a900114
Bethany Henning
Abstract: American philosophy has an uneasy relationship with sex. At least, this is the central claim of Richard Shusterman’s recent article, “Pragmatism and Sex: An Unfulfilled Connection,” in which he provides for us an overview of the failures of Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead to theorize about erotic life in any particularly “useful” way. This paper will critically examine this claim by advocating for a more careful reading of the appearance of sexuality within classical American thought—particularly as it is cast within Dewey’s aesthetics—while ultimately sympathizing with the felt need for American philosophers to engage intimate experience with more frankness, respect, and focus. Although American philosophy has erred on the side of reserve, Shusterman’s misreading of Dewey’s critique of Freud, and his mistaking the appearance of Darwin’s theories as reductive, are critical blunders that paint the tradition as overly prudish, and egregiously dismissive of this important sphere of experience.
{"title":"Where Pragmatism Gets Off: Sexuality and American Philosophy","authors":"Bethany Henning","doi":"10.2979/csp.2023.a900114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/csp.2023.a900114","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: American philosophy has an uneasy relationship with sex. At least, this is the central claim of Richard Shusterman’s recent article, “Pragmatism and Sex: An Unfulfilled Connection,” in which he provides for us an overview of the failures of Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead to theorize about erotic life in any particularly “useful” way. This paper will critically examine this claim by advocating for a more careful reading of the appearance of sexuality within classical American thought—particularly as it is cast within Dewey’s aesthetics—while ultimately sympathizing with the felt need for American philosophers to engage intimate experience with more frankness, respect, and focus. Although American philosophy has erred on the side of reserve, Shusterman’s misreading of Dewey’s critique of Freud, and his mistaking the appearance of Darwin’s theories as reductive, are critical blunders that paint the tradition as overly prudish, and egregiously dismissive of this important sphere of experience.","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135495097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.2979/csp.2023.a900119
Henry Jackman
Reviewed by: William James and the Moral Life: Responsible Self-Fashioning New by Todd Lekan Henry Jackman By Todd Lekan William James and the Moral Life: Responsible Self-Fashioning New York: Routledge, 2022. 156pp., incl. index While William James wrote just a single article in theoretical ethics, it has often been said that ethical concerns animate almost all of his work.1 Indeed, there has been a growing interest in James’s moral philosophy, and Todd Lekan’s William James and the Moral Life: Responsible Self-Fashioning is the latest, and arguably the best, sustained attempt to introduce readers to James’s ethical thought. The task is not an easy one, since the one essay of James’s that explicitly focuses on theoretical ethics, 1891’s “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life”, deals with ‘social’ concerns that don’t clearly align with the more ‘existential’ questions that run through the rest of his corpus.2 In particular, James’s main ‘ethical’ concerns in most of his writings seem to relate more to our living ‘meaningful’ or ‘significant’ lives than it does to our living a ‘moral’ ones. Consequently, writings on James’s ethics tend to treat these two strands separately, either focusing disproportionately on just one of these two aspects, or treating the two as separate components that do not affect one another.3 Weaving both strands of James’s ethical though into a coherent whole may be the primary achievement of Lekan’s book, but he provides much insight into interpretive problems relating to the individual threads along the way. The more ‘social’ strand is admirably explained in Lekan’s first chapter, “Pragmatist Moral Philosophy and Moral Life: Embracing the Tensions”, where he outlines James’s meta-ethical views from “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life”, and gives an account of the regulative assumptions and regulative ideals that James appeals to in order to go from his initial thesis that all goodness originates from the desires of sentient beings to the conclusion that “we are morally obligated to [End Page 105] satisfy as many demands as possible”, and that among the available ideals we might choose, “we are morally obligated to adopt ideals whose realization does not undermine the ideals held by others” (15). Ideals move to center stage in the book’s second chapter, “Ideals and Significant Lives”, which trades the social ethics of the first chapter for more existential concerns, and explains how James takes the strenuous pursuit of our own ideals to amount to a kind of ‘self-fashioning’ that makes for a ‘meaningful’ life (36). This answer to the existential question is, however, ambivalent about the social one. Unlike some other interpreters who focus primarily on the existential question, Lekan notes that James’s pluralism about ideals seems to leave plenty of room for ideals that were very much out of line with the moral injunctions of James’s social ethics to produce perfectly significant lives.4 So, for instance, pursuing
{"title":"William James and the Moral Life: Responsible Self-Fashioning New by Todd Lekan (review)","authors":"Henry Jackman","doi":"10.2979/csp.2023.a900119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/csp.2023.a900119","url":null,"abstract":"Reviewed by: William James and the Moral Life: Responsible Self-Fashioning New by Todd Lekan Henry Jackman By Todd Lekan William James and the Moral Life: Responsible Self-Fashioning New York: Routledge, 2022. 156pp., incl. index While William James wrote just a single article in theoretical ethics, it has often been said that ethical concerns animate almost all of his work.1 Indeed, there has been a growing interest in James’s moral philosophy, and Todd Lekan’s William James and the Moral Life: Responsible Self-Fashioning is the latest, and arguably the best, sustained attempt to introduce readers to James’s ethical thought. The task is not an easy one, since the one essay of James’s that explicitly focuses on theoretical ethics, 1891’s “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life”, deals with ‘social’ concerns that don’t clearly align with the more ‘existential’ questions that run through the rest of his corpus.2 In particular, James’s main ‘ethical’ concerns in most of his writings seem to relate more to our living ‘meaningful’ or ‘significant’ lives than it does to our living a ‘moral’ ones. Consequently, writings on James’s ethics tend to treat these two strands separately, either focusing disproportionately on just one of these two aspects, or treating the two as separate components that do not affect one another.3 Weaving both strands of James’s ethical though into a coherent whole may be the primary achievement of Lekan’s book, but he provides much insight into interpretive problems relating to the individual threads along the way. The more ‘social’ strand is admirably explained in Lekan’s first chapter, “Pragmatist Moral Philosophy and Moral Life: Embracing the Tensions”, where he outlines James’s meta-ethical views from “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life”, and gives an account of the regulative assumptions and regulative ideals that James appeals to in order to go from his initial thesis that all goodness originates from the desires of sentient beings to the conclusion that “we are morally obligated to [End Page 105] satisfy as many demands as possible”, and that among the available ideals we might choose, “we are morally obligated to adopt ideals whose realization does not undermine the ideals held by others” (15). Ideals move to center stage in the book’s second chapter, “Ideals and Significant Lives”, which trades the social ethics of the first chapter for more existential concerns, and explains how James takes the strenuous pursuit of our own ideals to amount to a kind of ‘self-fashioning’ that makes for a ‘meaningful’ life (36). This answer to the existential question is, however, ambivalent about the social one. Unlike some other interpreters who focus primarily on the existential question, Lekan notes that James’s pluralism about ideals seems to leave plenty of room for ideals that were very much out of line with the moral injunctions of James’s social ethics to produce perfectly significant lives.4 So, for instance, pursuing","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135495107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.59.1.03
Paul Showler
Moral prophets are agents who aim to transform the customs and practices of their community. They are critics of the social order whose calls for change are often met by skepticism, resentment, and hostility from those around them. This paper takes up the phenomenon of moral prophecy as a way of elucidating the relationships between three key features of a pragmatist ethics: fallibilism, hope, and sociality. I begin by discussing a problem that moral prophecy poses for pragmatists, wherein their commitment to evaluative fallibilism appears to conflict with the fact that moral prophecy requires resolve in the face of disagreement. I then look to the work of Richard Rorty and John Dewey to develop a pragmatist account of moral prophecy and argue that it can overcome this problem. Finally, I conclude with some thoughts about how a pragmatist account of moral prophecy presents a challenge to forms of evaluative realism.
{"title":"A Pragmatist Account of Moral Prophecy","authors":"Paul Showler","doi":"10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.59.1.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.59.1.03","url":null,"abstract":"Moral prophets are agents who aim to transform the customs and practices of their community. They are critics of the social order whose calls for change are often met by skepticism, resentment, and hostility from those around them. This paper takes up the phenomenon of moral prophecy as a way of elucidating the relationships between three key features of a pragmatist ethics: fallibilism, hope, and sociality. I begin by discussing a problem that moral prophecy poses for pragmatists, wherein their commitment to evaluative fallibilism appears to conflict with the fact that moral prophecy requires resolve in the face of disagreement. I then look to the work of Richard Rorty and John Dewey to develop a pragmatist account of moral prophecy and argue that it can overcome this problem. Finally, I conclude with some thoughts about how a pragmatist account of moral prophecy presents a challenge to forms of evaluative realism.","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136257382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.2979/csp.2023.a900116
Paul Showler
Abstract: Moral prophets are agents who aim to transform the customs and practices of their community. They are critics of the social order whose calls for change are often met by skepticism, resentment, and hostility from those around them. This paper takes up the phenomenon of moral prophecy as a way of elucidating the relationships between three key features of a pragmatist ethics: fallibilism, hope, and sociality. I begin by discussing a problem that moral prophecy poses for pragmatists, wherein their commitment to evaluative fallibilism appears to conflict with the fact that moral prophecy requires resolve in the face of disagreement. I then look to the work of Richard Rorty and John Dewey to develop a pragmatist account of moral prophecy and argue that it can overcome this problem. Finally, I conclude with some thoughts about how a pragmatist account of moral prophecy presents a challenge to forms of evaluative realism.
{"title":"A Pragmatist Account of Moral Prophecy","authors":"Paul Showler","doi":"10.2979/csp.2023.a900116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/csp.2023.a900116","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: Moral prophets are agents who aim to transform the customs and practices of their community. They are critics of the social order whose calls for change are often met by skepticism, resentment, and hostility from those around them. This paper takes up the phenomenon of moral prophecy as a way of elucidating the relationships between three key features of a pragmatist ethics: fallibilism, hope, and sociality. I begin by discussing a problem that moral prophecy poses for pragmatists, wherein their commitment to evaluative fallibilism appears to conflict with the fact that moral prophecy requires resolve in the face of disagreement. I then look to the work of Richard Rorty and John Dewey to develop a pragmatist account of moral prophecy and argue that it can overcome this problem. Finally, I conclude with some thoughts about how a pragmatist account of moral prophecy presents a challenge to forms of evaluative realism.","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135495106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.59.1.02
Scott Metzger
This article builds on Bellucci’s and Murphey’s accounts of Peirce’s early logic of signs by making a pair of contributions to the literature on Peirce’s reduction of illation to the sign relation. First, I reinvesti-gate the connection between the structure of inference and the representative relation, relying here on Peirce’s early accounts of sign inference from 1865 and 1866. Second, with the development of Peirce’s theory of inquiry in mind, I elucidate the implications of Peirce’s early view of sign inference. These contributions deepen our understanding of Fisch’s claim that the Illustrations series “is thought out within the framework of the doctrine of signs.”
{"title":"Reducing Illation to Sign Relation: The Roots of Peirce’s General Theory of Signs","authors":"Scott Metzger","doi":"10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.59.1.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.59.1.02","url":null,"abstract":"This article builds on Bellucci’s and Murphey’s accounts of Peirce’s early logic of signs by making a pair of contributions to the literature on Peirce’s reduction of illation to the sign relation. First, I reinvesti-gate the connection between the structure of inference and the representative relation, relying here on Peirce’s early accounts of sign inference from 1865 and 1866. Second, with the development of Peirce’s theory of inquiry in mind, I elucidate the implications of Peirce’s early view of sign inference. These contributions deepen our understanding of Fisch’s claim that the Illustrations series “is thought out within the framework of the doctrine of signs.”","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136257378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.59.1.07
Cornelis de Waal
Reviewed by: The Correspondence of Charles S. Peirce and the Open Court Publishing Company, 1890–1913 ed. by Stetson J. Robinson Cornelis de Waal Edited by Stetson J. Robinson The Correspondence of Charles S. Peirce and the Open Court Publishing Company, 1890–1913 Berlin: De Gruyter, 2022. 666pp., incl. index The fifth volume in the Peirceana series brings us the extensive correspondence between Peirce and the Open Court Publishing Company (abbreviated to OCP by Robinson). The double-barreled opening shot consists of two letters (one by Francis Russell and one by Open Court’s Editor Paul Carus) aimed at soliciting a contribution from [End Page 109] Peirce for the inaugural issue of a new quarterly journal to be published by the Open Court, called The Monist. Carus had been particularly impressed by Peirce’s Illustrations of the Logic of Science papers, which had appeared over a decade earlier in Popular Science Monthly, and to which Russell had drawn Carus’s attention.1 Peirce quickly responded, suggesting not one but an entire series of articles, the first of which to be titled “The Architecture of Theories.” It proved the beginning of a productive but also turbulent relationship between Peirce and the publishing company. The final letter in the exchange comes again from Carus, written September 10, 1913, about seven months before Peirce died. The Open Court Collection at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, from which much of the correspondence is drawn, is a truly magnificent collection. It contains not only business correspondence and financial records, but also the various stages of the publishing process. It includes the original texts that Peirce sent to the publisher, as well as the often heavily corrected galleys and proofs—material that is used appreciatively by the Peirce Edition Project for its critical edition of Peirce’s Writings. When we combine this record with the Nachlass of a philosopher who lived in a continuously expanding mansion with a penchant for keeping each and every scrap of paper, we get a remarkably full picture of everything that went into the publication of Peirce’s work with the Open Court. In contrast, we know painfully little of what went on at the Century Company, which published the Century Dictionary to which Peirce so heavily contributed, or of James Mark Baldwin’s treatment of Peirce’s submissions when he compiled his Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. Neither venture seems to have left any records, apart from what survived within Peirce’s own papers— at least no such records have so far been found. We know a bit more about Peirce’s dealings with The Nation, but again, almost exclusively because of what has been preserved in Peirce’s papers. Robinson’s hefty tome makes the correspondence between Peirce and the Open Court widely available for the first time. The book opens with a short explanation of the editorial method, a helpful chronology, and a brief historical introduction describing Peirce’s
《查尔斯·s·皮尔斯与公开法庭出版公司的通信》，1890-1913年，斯泰森·j·罗宾逊编辑，科内利斯·德瓦尔编辑，查尔斯·s·皮尔斯与公开法庭出版公司的通信，1890-1913年，柏林:德格鲁伊特出版社，2022年。666页。佩尔西阿纳系列的第五卷为我们带来了佩尔西与公开法庭出版公司(罗宾逊缩写为OCP)之间的广泛通信。这个双管开头的镜头由两封信组成(一封来自Francis Russell，一封来自Open Court的编辑Paul Carus)，目的是请Peirce为Open Court即将出版的新季刊《一元论》(The Monist)的创刊号投稿。皮尔斯十多年前发表在《大众科学月刊》(Popular Science Monthly)上的《科学逻辑图解》给卡鲁斯留下了特别深刻的印象，正是罗素引起了卡鲁斯的注意皮尔斯很快做出了回应，建议他写一系列文章，而不是一篇，其中第一篇的标题是“理论的架构”。这证明了皮尔斯和出版公司之间富有成效但也动荡不安的关系的开始。交流中的最后一封信还是来自卡鲁斯，写于1913年9月10日，大约在皮尔斯去世前七个月。南伊利诺伊大学卡本代尔分校的公开法庭收藏是一个真正宏伟的收藏，其中大部分信件都来自该收藏。它不仅包含业务信函和财务记录，还包含出版过程的各个阶段。它包括皮尔斯寄给出版商的原始文本，以及经常经过大量修改的草稿和校对材料，这些材料被皮尔斯版本项目用于其批评版的皮尔斯作品。当我们把这个记录和一个哲学家的Nachlass结合起来，他住在一个不断扩大的豪宅里，喜欢保存每一张废纸，我们得到了一个非常完整的画面，关于皮尔斯与公开法庭的作品出版的所有事情。相比之下，我们对世纪公司(Century Company)的情况却知之甚少。世纪公司出版了《世纪词典》(Century Dictionary)，皮尔斯为此做出了巨大贡献。我们也不知道詹姆斯·马克·鲍德温(James Mark Baldwin)在编纂《哲学与心理学词典》(Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology)时如何处理皮尔斯提交的意见。这两次探险似乎都没有留下任何记录，除了Peirce自己的文件中幸存下来的记录——至少到目前为止还没有发现这样的记录。我们对皮尔斯与《国家》的交易了解得更多，但同样，这几乎完全是因为皮尔斯的文件中保存的东西。罗宾逊的巨著使得皮尔斯和公开法庭之间的通信第一次被广泛使用。这本书的开头是对编辑方法的简短解释，一个有用的年表，以及一个简短的历史介绍，描述了皮尔斯与公开法庭的关系。该作品还包含14幅插图，大部分是信件。这本书的引言很简短，很大程度上借鉴了一些资料，比如《文集》第8卷的引言，而不是说它的灵感来自于随后的信件收集，或者更熟悉公开法庭的档案。2在他的引言中，罗宾逊将皮尔斯与出版公司的关系分为四个阶段:1890-1894年，他非常活跃，其中包括皮尔斯所熟悉的一元论形而上学的论文，他为两周报《公开法庭》所做的贡献，以及他试图写一个基本的算术。这一时期以皮尔斯和海格勒之间的争吵结束。随后是1894年至1897年的一段平静得多的时期，罗素在很大程度上恢复了与出版商的关系，这导致了皮尔斯对恩斯特Schröder的《代数与逻辑》第三卷的广泛讨论，这本书分两部分出现在《一元论》中。这段时期也以争吵结束。1904年，这一活动再次活跃起来，产生了皮尔斯著名的实用主义论文，以及1908年的“一些惊人的迷宫”系列……
{"title":"The Correspondence of Charles S. Peirce and the Open Court Publishing Company, 1890–1913 ed. by Stetson J. Robinson (review)","authors":"Cornelis de Waal","doi":"10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.59.1.07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.59.1.07","url":null,"abstract":"Reviewed by: The Correspondence of Charles S. Peirce and the Open Court Publishing Company, 1890–1913 ed. by Stetson J. Robinson Cornelis de Waal Edited by Stetson J. Robinson The Correspondence of Charles S. Peirce and the Open Court Publishing Company, 1890–1913 Berlin: De Gruyter, 2022. 666pp., incl. index The fifth volume in the Peirceana series brings us the extensive correspondence between Peirce and the Open Court Publishing Company (abbreviated to OCP by Robinson). The double-barreled opening shot consists of two letters (one by Francis Russell and one by Open Court’s Editor Paul Carus) aimed at soliciting a contribution from [End Page 109] Peirce for the inaugural issue of a new quarterly journal to be published by the Open Court, called The Monist. Carus had been particularly impressed by Peirce’s Illustrations of the Logic of Science papers, which had appeared over a decade earlier in Popular Science Monthly, and to which Russell had drawn Carus’s attention.1 Peirce quickly responded, suggesting not one but an entire series of articles, the first of which to be titled “The Architecture of Theories.” It proved the beginning of a productive but also turbulent relationship between Peirce and the publishing company. The final letter in the exchange comes again from Carus, written September 10, 1913, about seven months before Peirce died. The Open Court Collection at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, from which much of the correspondence is drawn, is a truly magnificent collection. It contains not only business correspondence and financial records, but also the various stages of the publishing process. It includes the original texts that Peirce sent to the publisher, as well as the often heavily corrected galleys and proofs—material that is used appreciatively by the Peirce Edition Project for its critical edition of Peirce’s Writings. When we combine this record with the Nachlass of a philosopher who lived in a continuously expanding mansion with a penchant for keeping each and every scrap of paper, we get a remarkably full picture of everything that went into the publication of Peirce’s work with the Open Court. In contrast, we know painfully little of what went on at the Century Company, which published the Century Dictionary to which Peirce so heavily contributed, or of James Mark Baldwin’s treatment of Peirce’s submissions when he compiled his Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. Neither venture seems to have left any records, apart from what survived within Peirce’s own papers— at least no such records have so far been found. We know a bit more about Peirce’s dealings with The Nation, but again, almost exclusively because of what has been preserved in Peirce’s papers. Robinson’s hefty tome makes the correspondence between Peirce and the Open Court widely available for the first time. The book opens with a short explanation of the editorial method, a helpful chronology, and a brief historical introduction describing Peirce’s","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136257383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.59.1.08
{"title":"Minutes of the Annual General Meeting 2022: [as approved on January 5, 2023]","authors":"","doi":"10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.59.1.08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.59.1.08","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136305587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.2979/csp.2023.a900120
Cornelis de Waal
Reviewed by: The Correspondence of Charles S. Peirce and the Open Court Publishing Company, 1890–1913 ed. by Stetson J. Robinson Cornelis de Waal Edited by Stetson J. Robinson The Correspondence of Charles S. Peirce and the Open Court Publishing Company, 1890–1913 Berlin: De Gruyter, 2022. 666pp., incl. index The fifth volume in the Peirceana series brings us the extensive correspondence between Peirce and the Open Court Publishing Company (abbreviated to OCP by Robinson). The double-barreled opening shot consists of two letters (one by Francis Russell and one by Open Court’s Editor Paul Carus) aimed at soliciting a contribution from [End Page 109] Peirce for the inaugural issue of a new quarterly journal to be published by the Open Court, called The Monist. Carus had been particularly impressed by Peirce’s Illustrations of the Logic of Science papers, which had appeared over a decade earlier in Popular Science Monthly, and to which Russell had drawn Carus’s attention.1 Peirce quickly responded, suggesting not one but an entire series of articles, the first of which to be titled “The Architecture of Theories.” It proved the beginning of a productive but also turbulent relationship between Peirce and the publishing company. The final letter in the exchange comes again from Carus, written September 10, 1913, about seven months before Peirce died. The Open Court Collection at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, from which much of the correspondence is drawn, is a truly magnificent collection. It contains not only business correspondence and financial records, but also the various stages of the publishing process. It includes the original texts that Peirce sent to the publisher, as well as the often heavily corrected galleys and proofs—material that is used appreciatively by the Peirce Edition Project for its critical edition of Peirce’s Writings. When we combine this record with the Nachlass of a philosopher who lived in a continuously expanding mansion with a penchant for keeping each and every scrap of paper, we get a remarkably full picture of everything that went into the publication of Peirce’s work with the Open Court. In contrast, we know painfully little of what went on at the Century Company, which published the Century Dictionary to which Peirce so heavily contributed, or of James Mark Baldwin’s treatment of Peirce’s submissions when he compiled his Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. Neither venture seems to have left any records, apart from what survived within Peirce’s own papers— at least no such records have so far been found. We know a bit more about Peirce’s dealings with The Nation, but again, almost exclusively because of what has been preserved in Peirce’s papers. Robinson’s hefty tome makes the correspondence between Peirce and the Open Court widely available for the first time. The book opens with a short explanation of the editorial method, a helpful chronology, and a brief historical introduction describing Peirce’s
《查尔斯·s·皮尔斯与公开法庭出版公司的通信》，1890-1913年，斯泰森·j·罗宾逊编辑，科内利斯·德瓦尔编辑，查尔斯·s·皮尔斯与公开法庭出版公司的通信，1890-1913年，柏林:德格鲁伊特出版社，2022年。666页。佩尔西阿纳系列的第五卷为我们带来了佩尔西与公开法庭出版公司(罗宾逊缩写为OCP)之间的广泛通信。这个双管开头的镜头由两封信组成(一封来自Francis Russell，一封来自Open Court的编辑Paul Carus)，目的是请Peirce为Open Court即将出版的新季刊《一元论》(The Monist)的创刊号投稿。皮尔斯十多年前发表在《大众科学月刊》(Popular Science Monthly)上的《科学逻辑图解》给卡鲁斯留下了特别深刻的印象，正是罗素引起了卡鲁斯的注意皮尔斯很快做出了回应，建议他写一系列文章，而不是一篇，其中第一篇的标题是“理论的架构”。这证明了皮尔斯和出版公司之间富有成效但也动荡不安的关系的开始。交流中的最后一封信还是来自卡鲁斯，写于1913年9月10日，大约在皮尔斯去世前七个月。南伊利诺伊大学卡本代尔分校的公开法庭收藏是一个真正宏伟的收藏，其中大部分信件都来自该收藏。它不仅包含业务信函和财务记录，还包含出版过程的各个阶段。它包括皮尔斯寄给出版商的原始文本，以及经常经过大量修改的草稿和校对材料，这些材料被皮尔斯版本项目用于其批评版的皮尔斯作品。当我们把这个记录和一个哲学家的Nachlass结合起来，他住在一个不断扩大的豪宅里，喜欢保存每一张废纸，我们得到了一个非常完整的画面，关于皮尔斯与公开法庭的作品出版的所有事情。相比之下，我们对世纪公司(Century Company)的情况却知之甚少。世纪公司出版了《世纪词典》(Century Dictionary)，皮尔斯为此做出了巨大贡献。我们也不知道詹姆斯·马克·鲍德温(James Mark Baldwin)在编纂《哲学与心理学词典》(Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology)时如何处理皮尔斯提交的意见。这两次探险似乎都没有留下任何记录，除了Peirce自己的文件中幸存下来的记录——至少到目前为止还没有发现这样的记录。我们对皮尔斯与《国家》的交易了解得更多，但同样，这几乎完全是因为皮尔斯的文件中保存的东西。罗宾逊的巨著使得皮尔斯和公开法庭之间的通信第一次被广泛使用。这本书的开头是对编辑方法的简短解释，一个有用的年表，以及一个简短的历史介绍，描述了皮尔斯与公开法庭的关系。该作品还包含14幅插图，大部分是信件。这本书的引言很简短，很大程度上借鉴了一些资料，比如《文集》第8卷的引言，而不是说它的灵感来自于随后的信件收集，或者更熟悉公开法庭的档案。2在他的引言中，罗宾逊将皮尔斯与出版公司的关系分为四个阶段:1890-1894年，他非常活跃，其中包括皮尔斯所熟悉的一元论形而上学的论文，他为两周报《公开法庭》所做的贡献，以及他试图写一个基本的算术。这一时期以皮尔斯和海格勒之间的争吵结束。随后是1894年至1897年的一段平静得多的时期，罗素在很大程度上恢复了与出版商的关系，这导致了皮尔斯对恩斯特Schröder的《代数与逻辑》第三卷的广泛讨论，这本书分两部分出现在《一元论》中。这段时期也以争吵结束。1904年，这一活动再次活跃起来，产生了皮尔斯著名的实用主义论文，以及1908年的“一些惊人的迷宫”系列……
{"title":"The Correspondence of Charles S. Peirce and the Open Court Publishing Company, 1890–1913 ed. by Stetson J. Robinson (review)","authors":"Cornelis de Waal","doi":"10.2979/csp.2023.a900120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/csp.2023.a900120","url":null,"abstract":"Reviewed by: The Correspondence of Charles S. Peirce and the Open Court Publishing Company, 1890–1913 ed. by Stetson J. Robinson Cornelis de Waal Edited by Stetson J. Robinson The Correspondence of Charles S. Peirce and the Open Court Publishing Company, 1890–1913 Berlin: De Gruyter, 2022. 666pp., incl. index The fifth volume in the Peirceana series brings us the extensive correspondence between Peirce and the Open Court Publishing Company (abbreviated to OCP by Robinson). The double-barreled opening shot consists of two letters (one by Francis Russell and one by Open Court’s Editor Paul Carus) aimed at soliciting a contribution from [End Page 109] Peirce for the inaugural issue of a new quarterly journal to be published by the Open Court, called The Monist. Carus had been particularly impressed by Peirce’s Illustrations of the Logic of Science papers, which had appeared over a decade earlier in Popular Science Monthly, and to which Russell had drawn Carus’s attention.1 Peirce quickly responded, suggesting not one but an entire series of articles, the first of which to be titled “The Architecture of Theories.” It proved the beginning of a productive but also turbulent relationship between Peirce and the publishing company. The final letter in the exchange comes again from Carus, written September 10, 1913, about seven months before Peirce died. The Open Court Collection at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, from which much of the correspondence is drawn, is a truly magnificent collection. It contains not only business correspondence and financial records, but also the various stages of the publishing process. It includes the original texts that Peirce sent to the publisher, as well as the often heavily corrected galleys and proofs—material that is used appreciatively by the Peirce Edition Project for its critical edition of Peirce’s Writings. When we combine this record with the Nachlass of a philosopher who lived in a continuously expanding mansion with a penchant for keeping each and every scrap of paper, we get a remarkably full picture of everything that went into the publication of Peirce’s work with the Open Court. In contrast, we know painfully little of what went on at the Century Company, which published the Century Dictionary to which Peirce so heavily contributed, or of James Mark Baldwin’s treatment of Peirce’s submissions when he compiled his Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. Neither venture seems to have left any records, apart from what survived within Peirce’s own papers— at least no such records have so far been found. We know a bit more about Peirce’s dealings with The Nation, but again, almost exclusively because of what has been preserved in Peirce’s papers. Robinson’s hefty tome makes the correspondence between Peirce and the Open Court widely available for the first time. The book opens with a short explanation of the editorial method, a helpful chronology, and a brief historical introduction describing Peirce’s","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135495094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.2979/csp.2023.a900115
Scott Metzger
Abstract: This article builds on Bellucci’s and Murphey’s accounts of Peirce’s early logic of signs by making a pair of contributions to the literature on Peirce’s reduction of illation to the sign relation. First, I reinvesti-gate the connection between the structure of inference and the representative relation, relying here on Peirce’s early accounts of sign inference from 1865 and 1866. Second, with the development of Peirce’s theory of inquiry in mind, I elucidate the implications of Peirce’s early view of sign inference. These contributions deepen our understanding of Fisch’s claim that the Illustrations series “is thought out within the framework of the doctrine of signs.”
{"title":"Reducing Illation to Sign Relation: The Roots of Peirce’s General Theory of Signs","authors":"Scott Metzger","doi":"10.2979/csp.2023.a900115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/csp.2023.a900115","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: This article builds on Bellucci’s and Murphey’s accounts of Peirce’s early logic of signs by making a pair of contributions to the literature on Peirce’s reduction of illation to the sign relation. First, I reinvesti-gate the connection between the structure of inference and the representative relation, relying here on Peirce’s early accounts of sign inference from 1865 and 1866. Second, with the development of Peirce’s theory of inquiry in mind, I elucidate the implications of Peirce’s early view of sign inference. These contributions deepen our understanding of Fisch’s claim that the Illustrations series “is thought out within the framework of the doctrine of signs.”","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135495101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.59.1.01
Bethany Henning
American philosophy has an uneasy relationship with sex. At least, this is the central claim of Richard Shusterman’s recent article, “Pragmatism and Sex: An Unfulfilled Connection,” in which he provides for us an overview of the failures of Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead to theorize about erotic life in any particularly “useful” way. This paper will critically examine this claim by advocating for a more careful reading of the appearance of sexuality within classical American thought—particularly as it is cast within Dewey’s aesthetics—while ultimately sympathizing with the felt need for American philosophers to engage intimate experience with more frankness, respect, and focus. Although American philosophy has erred on the side of reserve, Shusterman’s misreading of Dewey’s critique of Freud, and his mistaking the appearance of Darwin’s theories as reductive, are critical blunders that paint the tradition as overly prudish, and egregiously dismissive of this important sphere of experience.
{"title":"Where Pragmatism Gets Off: Sexuality and American Philosophy","authors":"Bethany Henning","doi":"10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.59.1.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.59.1.01","url":null,"abstract":"American philosophy has an uneasy relationship with sex. At least, this is the central claim of Richard Shusterman’s recent article, “Pragmatism and Sex: An Unfulfilled Connection,” in which he provides for us an overview of the failures of Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead to theorize about erotic life in any particularly “useful” way. This paper will critically examine this claim by advocating for a more careful reading of the appearance of sexuality within classical American thought—particularly as it is cast within Dewey’s aesthetics—while ultimately sympathizing with the felt need for American philosophers to engage intimate experience with more frankness, respect, and focus. Although American philosophy has erred on the side of reserve, Shusterman’s misreading of Dewey’s critique of Freud, and his mistaking the appearance of Darwin’s theories as reductive, are critical blunders that paint the tradition as overly prudish, and egregiously dismissive of this important sphere of experience.","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136257377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：