Pub Date : 2021-10-12DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.2.02
R. Atkins
Abstract:Charles Sanders Peirce argued that we have no right to harshly punish criminals, especially by causing them to suffer and die in prison. Summarily stated, his argument is that the state has only those rights and powers conferred on it by its citizens, and as its citizens do not have the right to but are morally prohibited from harshly punishing criminals, the prison system must be reformed. This essay develops and defends Peirce's argument in the context of his nascent sentimentalism and suggests that as the prison system of Peirce's time is akin to our own, his argument is as applicable today as it was then.
{"title":"Peirce, Sentimentalism, and Prison Reform","authors":"R. Atkins","doi":"10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.2.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.2.02","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Charles Sanders Peirce argued that we have no right to harshly punish criminals, especially by causing them to suffer and die in prison. Summarily stated, his argument is that the state has only those rights and powers conferred on it by its citizens, and as its citizens do not have the right to but are morally prohibited from harshly punishing criminals, the prison system must be reformed. This essay develops and defends Peirce's argument in the context of his nascent sentimentalism and suggests that as the prison system of Peirce's time is akin to our own, his argument is as applicable today as it was then.","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73999370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-12DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.2.05
Giovanni Tuzet
Abstract:Some philosophers claim that truth is the norm of assertion, or that asserting that p commits one to the truth of p. In some seminal works Peirce put it in terms of responsibility: asserting that p makes one responsible for the truth of the proposition that p. I take this thesis to be stimulating but inaccurate, since making an assertion generally commits one to sincerity, not to truth. This explains how it is possible to be truthful liars and why we are disappointed by these. Justification of belief is also important, as shown by the cases of the justified falsity-teller and the unjustified truth-teller. So, for the assessment of assertion, what matters is (a) what we believe, (b) whether we assert what we believe and (c) whether we have a justification for what we believe. This does not throw truth out of the picture, however: insofar as asserting that p is asserting that one believes that p, and believing that p is believing that it is true that p, asserting that p is asserting that one believes that it is true that p. The paper also distinguishes some senses in which truth is normative for belief and assertion, and endorses a teleological understanding of this.
{"title":"Truthful Liars: How They and Other Oddities are Possible","authors":"Giovanni Tuzet","doi":"10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.2.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.2.05","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Some philosophers claim that truth is the norm of assertion, or that asserting that p commits one to the truth of p. In some seminal works Peirce put it in terms of responsibility: asserting that p makes one responsible for the truth of the proposition that p. I take this thesis to be stimulating but inaccurate, since making an assertion generally commits one to sincerity, not to truth. This explains how it is possible to be truthful liars and why we are disappointed by these. Justification of belief is also important, as shown by the cases of the justified falsity-teller and the unjustified truth-teller. So, for the assessment of assertion, what matters is (a) what we believe, (b) whether we assert what we believe and (c) whether we have a justification for what we believe. This does not throw truth out of the picture, however: insofar as asserting that p is asserting that one believes that p, and believing that p is believing that it is true that p, asserting that p is asserting that one believes that it is true that p. The paper also distinguishes some senses in which truth is normative for belief and assertion, and endorses a teleological understanding of this.","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74572383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-12DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.2.04
M. Brioschi
Abstract:The aim of this paper is to analyze an apparent paradox that exists in the concept of the assertiveness of terms, an idea put forth by Peirce in the manuscript R 787, c. 1896. The scrutiny of this case sheds new light on Peirce's speculative grammar, especially on his account of subject and predicate. After briefly reviewing the current relevance of Peirce's thought for speech act theories, this paper investigates the role of rudimentary assertions in Peirce's thought, which lies at the crossroads of semiotics, logic and linguistics. In order to reach this goal, this paper (i) considers the place of assertions in Peirce's thought; (ii) analyzes the general conditions for assertion, especially its syntactical structure; (iii) redefines Peirce's original concepts of subject, predicate and copula, which differ from traditional logic and Indo-European grammars; and (iv) explores the structure of reasoning tacitly assumed in our linguistic habits, such that even a term might be understood as assertoric.
{"title":"What if a Term Became an Assertion? Peirce on Rudimentary Assertions","authors":"M. Brioschi","doi":"10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.2.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.2.04","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:The aim of this paper is to analyze an apparent paradox that exists in the concept of the assertiveness of terms, an idea put forth by Peirce in the manuscript R 787, c. 1896. The scrutiny of this case sheds new light on Peirce's speculative grammar, especially on his account of subject and predicate. After briefly reviewing the current relevance of Peirce's thought for speech act theories, this paper investigates the role of rudimentary assertions in Peirce's thought, which lies at the crossroads of semiotics, logic and linguistics. In order to reach this goal, this paper (i) considers the place of assertions in Peirce's thought; (ii) analyzes the general conditions for assertion, especially its syntactical structure; (iii) redefines Peirce's original concepts of subject, predicate and copula, which differ from traditional logic and Indo-European grammars; and (iv) explores the structure of reasoning tacitly assumed in our linguistic habits, such that even a term might be understood as assertoric.","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81896974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-12DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.2.03
F. Bellucci, D. Chiffi, A. Pietarinen
Abstract:Peirce's theory of assertions articulates the original commitment theory of assertions. Commitment theories of assertion have gained considerable recent interest not only in the Peirce scholarship but also in studies of history and philosophy of language, logic and communication. In this preface we point out some recent work on the topic and provide a brief introduction to the papers published in this Transactions symposium. These papers consist of a selection of those presented in the workshop "Peirce on Assertion" held in Lecce, Italy, on 13 September 2019.
{"title":"Peirce on Assertion: Preface to the Symposium","authors":"F. Bellucci, D. Chiffi, A. Pietarinen","doi":"10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.2.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.2.03","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Peirce's theory of assertions articulates the original commitment theory of assertions. Commitment theories of assertion have gained considerable recent interest not only in the Peirce scholarship but also in studies of history and philosophy of language, logic and communication. In this preface we point out some recent work on the topic and provide a brief introduction to the papers published in this Transactions symposium. These papers consist of a selection of those presented in the workshop \"Peirce on Assertion\" held in Lecce, Italy, on 13 September 2019.","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74336776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-01DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.2.08
G. Maddalena
{"title":"Peirce on the Uses of History by Tullio Viola (review)","authors":"G. Maddalena","doi":"10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.2.08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.2.08","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75056840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-01DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.2.10
Veli-Mikko Kauppi
{"title":"The Method of Democracy: John Dewey's Theory of Collective Intelligence by David Ridley (review)","authors":"Veli-Mikko Kauppi","doi":"10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.2.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.2.10","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87691305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-29DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.1.03
Keun-Jae Oh
Abstract:This article aims to investigate Alain Locke and Richard Rorty’s accounts of cultural pluralism. First, I argue that Rorty’s anti-foundationalism and Locke’s critique of absolutes are similar with respect to the nature of value. I then explain their respective conceptions of culture and cultural pluralism. Finally, I argue that their fundamental differences with each other in regards to culture and cultural pluralism lie in their differing theories of value. Whereas Rorty’s nominalist understanding of value only finds the relativity and contingency of culture and value, Locke’s functionalist theory of value allows for the objectivity and universality of culture and value. To make these differences explicit, I introduce a distinction between value content and value process. If my reading of Locke and Rorty’s accounts of cultural pluralism is convincing, then we can find a more robust view of tolerance in Locke’s version of cultural pluralism than in Rorty’s.
{"title":"Locke and Rorty on Cultural Pluralism","authors":"Keun-Jae Oh","doi":"10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.1.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.1.03","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:This article aims to investigate Alain Locke and Richard Rorty’s accounts of cultural pluralism. First, I argue that Rorty’s anti-foundationalism and Locke’s critique of absolutes are similar with respect to the nature of value. I then explain their respective conceptions of culture and cultural pluralism. Finally, I argue that their fundamental differences with each other in regards to culture and cultural pluralism lie in their differing theories of value. Whereas Rorty’s nominalist understanding of value only finds the relativity and contingency of culture and value, Locke’s functionalist theory of value allows for the objectivity and universality of culture and value. To make these differences explicit, I introduce a distinction between value content and value process. If my reading of Locke and Rorty’s accounts of cultural pluralism is convincing, then we can find a more robust view of tolerance in Locke’s version of cultural pluralism than in Rorty’s.","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89677340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-29DOI: 10.2979/TRANCHARPEIRSOC.57.1.07
K. Puolakka
Do not let the subtitle fool you. “An outline” is a far too modest description of Ryder’s book, for it presents an interesting and carefully crafted account of experience in the broadly pragmatic naturalist framework. The author mentions John Dewey’s notion of aesthetic experience as his primary background inspiration and his analysis is at its best in the aesthetic parts of the work, which is by no means to discredit the merits of its other major sections that deal with the cognitive and the political dimensions of experience in interesting ways. Indeed, Ryder’s book is among the most important texts in the tradition of pragmatist aesthetics of recent years and everyone interested in pursuing aesthetics in the spirit of Dewey’s Art as Experience should find it an interesting read. The Deweyan idea of experience as an interaction with the environment, substantiated with recent work on embodiment (Shusterman, Johnson) and enactivism (Rowlands, Noë), serves as the bedrock of Ryder’s approach to experience. He, however, argues that these more contemporary views lack a proper ontological grounding, which Ryder seeks to establish with a position he calls “ordinal ontology.” This kind of ontology views all entities as multilayered complexes, which are constituted by their relationships to other complexes. Instead of trying to distinguish external relations from internal ones, we should be looking at the level of constitution. All relations are constitutive, in Ryder’s view, but some relations are more constitutive of a complex than others. What follows is an emergent view of reality: more complex complexes—mind, culture—emerge from the interaction between simpler complexes, but cannot be reduced to them.
{"title":"Knowledge, Art, and Power: An Outline of a Theory of Experience by John Ryder (review)","authors":"K. Puolakka","doi":"10.2979/TRANCHARPEIRSOC.57.1.07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/TRANCHARPEIRSOC.57.1.07","url":null,"abstract":"Do not let the subtitle fool you. “An outline” is a far too modest description of Ryder’s book, for it presents an interesting and carefully crafted account of experience in the broadly pragmatic naturalist framework. The author mentions John Dewey’s notion of aesthetic experience as his primary background inspiration and his analysis is at its best in the aesthetic parts of the work, which is by no means to discredit the merits of its other major sections that deal with the cognitive and the political dimensions of experience in interesting ways. Indeed, Ryder’s book is among the most important texts in the tradition of pragmatist aesthetics of recent years and everyone interested in pursuing aesthetics in the spirit of Dewey’s Art as Experience should find it an interesting read. The Deweyan idea of experience as an interaction with the environment, substantiated with recent work on embodiment (Shusterman, Johnson) and enactivism (Rowlands, Noë), serves as the bedrock of Ryder’s approach to experience. He, however, argues that these more contemporary views lack a proper ontological grounding, which Ryder seeks to establish with a position he calls “ordinal ontology.” This kind of ontology views all entities as multilayered complexes, which are constituted by their relationships to other complexes. Instead of trying to distinguish external relations from internal ones, we should be looking at the level of constitution. All relations are constitutive, in Ryder’s view, but some relations are more constitutive of a complex than others. What follows is an emergent view of reality: more complex complexes—mind, culture—emerge from the interaction between simpler complexes, but cannot be reduced to them.","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89287576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-29DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.1.01
R. Shusterman
Abstract:After considering why pragmatism should constructively treat issues of sexuality and erotic love and why it traditionally failed to, this paper examines the sexual views of classical pragmatism’s leading figures. Focusing primarily on the canonical, heterosexual, white founding fathers—Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead, it then examines sexuality in Jane Addams and Alain Locke, whose difference of gender or race is complemented by alterity of sexual attitudes. While exposing the shortcomings of these pragmatist sexual theories, the paper conversely shows the resources that classical pragmatism has for a more constructive and fulfilling treatment of sexuality and erotic love.
{"title":"Pragmatism and Sex: An Unfulfilled Connection","authors":"R. Shusterman","doi":"10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.1.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.1.01","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:After considering why pragmatism should constructively treat issues of sexuality and erotic love and why it traditionally failed to, this paper examines the sexual views of classical pragmatism’s leading figures. Focusing primarily on the canonical, heterosexual, white founding fathers—Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead, it then examines sexuality in Jane Addams and Alain Locke, whose difference of gender or race is complemented by alterity of sexual attitudes. While exposing the shortcomings of these pragmatist sexual theories, the paper conversely shows the resources that classical pragmatism has for a more constructive and fulfilling treatment of sexuality and erotic love.","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87040243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-29DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.1.04
Jimmy Aames
Abstract:The aim of this paper is to clarify what Peirce meant by “correlate” in his early paper “On a New List of Categories.” I take up the interpretation of Peirce’s concept of the correlate put forward by André De Tienne in his book L’analytique de la représentation chez Peirce, and I offer my own interpretation by pointing out the problems with De Tienne’s view. De Tienne detects a certain confusion in Peirce’s notion of the correlate in the “New List.” The problem is that Peirce seems to be using the term “correlate” in two incompatible senses, namely: (1) that which occasions the introduction of reference to a ground, and (2) the second term of a dyadic or triadic relation. I will argue, however, that these two senses of the term “correlate” are incompatible only on a narrow, psychological reading of Peirce’s notion of comparison and that there is no incompatibility if we understand comparison in a broader way.
{"title":"The Concept of the Correlate in Peirce’s “New List of Categories”","authors":"Jimmy Aames","doi":"10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.1.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.1.04","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:The aim of this paper is to clarify what Peirce meant by “correlate” in his early paper “On a New List of Categories.” I take up the interpretation of Peirce’s concept of the correlate put forward by André De Tienne in his book L’analytique de la représentation chez Peirce, and I offer my own interpretation by pointing out the problems with De Tienne’s view. De Tienne detects a certain confusion in Peirce’s notion of the correlate in the “New List.” The problem is that Peirce seems to be using the term “correlate” in two incompatible senses, namely: (1) that which occasions the introduction of reference to a ground, and (2) the second term of a dyadic or triadic relation. I will argue, however, that these two senses of the term “correlate” are incompatible only on a narrow, psychological reading of Peirce’s notion of comparison and that there is no incompatibility if we understand comparison in a broader way.","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88195103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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