Abstract:Since the birth of autism as a psychiatric category, autistic individuals have been described as preoccupied with the world of objects and detached from the world of subjects, thus marking a distinction between the “social” and the “non-social” still prevalent in autism research and diagnostic criteria. The aim of this article is to question this distinction by examining the role of things in autistic forms of social interaction. Drawing on qualitative data from an ongoing qualitative and phenomenological study on social interaction among youth with autism, I argue that material things enjoy a sustaining and facilitating role in autistic social interaction for two reasons: First, by being sensible things open to tactile, auditory, and visual engagement, and second, by being things that incorporate normative practices. This relation between the material and the social in which the latter is mediated by the former, is beneficial to individuals with autism because it exploits a particular relation to materiality to consolidate a shaky attunement to the social world. I propose a materially mediated mode of interaction guided by the approaches to perception, embodiment, and materiality developed by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and James Gibson. This account puts pressure on the phenomenological emphasis on the face-to-face encounter and brings intersubjectivity into view as a many-faceted phenomenon realizable not only through interbodily dynamics but also through the material landscapes situating social encounters.
{"title":"Material Encounters: A Phenomenological Account of Social Interaction in Autism","authors":"Sofie Boldsen","doi":"10.1353/ppp.2022.0039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2022.0039","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Since the birth of autism as a psychiatric category, autistic individuals have been described as preoccupied with the world of objects and detached from the world of subjects, thus marking a distinction between the “social” and the “non-social” still prevalent in autism research and diagnostic criteria. The aim of this article is to question this distinction by examining the role of things in autistic forms of social interaction. Drawing on qualitative data from an ongoing qualitative and phenomenological study on social interaction among youth with autism, I argue that material things enjoy a sustaining and facilitating role in autistic social interaction for two reasons: First, by being sensible things open to tactile, auditory, and visual engagement, and second, by being things that incorporate normative practices. This relation between the material and the social in which the latter is mediated by the former, is beneficial to individuals with autism because it exploits a particular relation to materiality to consolidate a shaky attunement to the social world. I propose a materially mediated mode of interaction guided by the approaches to perception, embodiment, and materiality developed by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and James Gibson. This account puts pressure on the phenomenological emphasis on the face-to-face encounter and brings intersubjectivity into view as a many-faceted phenomenon realizable not only through interbodily dynamics but also through the material landscapes situating social encounters.","PeriodicalId":45397,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Psychiatry & Psychology","volume":"9 1","pages":"191 - 208"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90426486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Proof of Efficacy Is No Proof of Validity in Psychotherapy","authors":"J. Gaab","doi":"10.1353/ppp.2022.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2022.0015","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45397,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Psychiatry & Psychology","volume":"99 1","pages":"95 - 96"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75977920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:A back injury forces the author, a retired psychiatrist, to confront the realities of aging. More than that, though, the experience of patienthood engenders an examination of long and deeply considered convictions regarding scientific medicine and its alternatives. One particular "complementary and alternative medicine" modality is employed as an exemplar. The reported usefulness of that therapy for some patients with chronic pain—a condition that is often poorly responsive to conventional methods—is juxtaposed to the implausible mechanism of action claimed by its practitioners, producing an enigma for which the standard explanation of "non-specific" (placebo) effects might be accurate but incomplete. The complexities involved—not least those of human heterogeneity and of the current limitations of modern medicine—point to the imperative of epistemic humility, raising the question of whether the pluralism it entails is compatible with the putative protections afforded by adherence to scientific standards in clinical care.
{"title":"Epistemic Humility: Accruing Wisdom or Forsaking Standards?","authors":"G. Waterman","doi":"10.1353/ppp.2022.0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2022.0017","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:A back injury forces the author, a retired psychiatrist, to confront the realities of aging. More than that, though, the experience of patienthood engenders an examination of long and deeply considered convictions regarding scientific medicine and its alternatives. One particular \"complementary and alternative medicine\" modality is employed as an exemplar. The reported usefulness of that therapy for some patients with chronic pain—a condition that is often poorly responsive to conventional methods—is juxtaposed to the implausible mechanism of action claimed by its practitioners, producing an enigma for which the standard explanation of \"non-specific\" (placebo) effects might be accurate but incomplete. The complexities involved—not least those of human heterogeneity and of the current limitations of modern medicine—point to the imperative of epistemic humility, raising the question of whether the pluralism it entails is compatible with the putative protections afforded by adherence to scientific standards in clinical care.","PeriodicalId":45397,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Psychiatry & Psychology","volume":"5 1","pages":"101 - 106"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79892217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), one of the most popular schools of psychotherapy, associates mental illnesses such as depression, with patterns of distorted thoughts, referred to interchangeably as "cognitive distortions" or "negative automatic thoughts." CBT's theoretical account claims: first, that these distortions involve various epistemic issues and second, that its therapeutic techniques are capable of rectifying these epistemic issues. Together these claims spell out a model of mental illness and a mechanism of action, that is, a means through which CBT's techniques act to address mental illness. In this paper, I challenge both these claims and thus CBT's epistemic characterization of mental illness and its therapeutic mechanism. I begin with the second claim and show that the ability of CBT's therapeutic techniques to address epistemic issues is likely to be overstated. In turning to the first claim, I show that even if CBT were able to rectify epistemic issues, the thinking of mentally ill individuals is not characterized straightforwardly by epistemic issues. In concluding, I suggest an alternate way in which CBTs account of mental illness and its mechanism should be understood.
{"title":"It's Been Utility All Along: An Alternate Understanding of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy and The Depressive Realism Hypothesis","authors":"Sahanika Ratnayake","doi":"10.1353/ppp.2022.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2022.0013","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), one of the most popular schools of psychotherapy, associates mental illnesses such as depression, with patterns of distorted thoughts, referred to interchangeably as \"cognitive distortions\" or \"negative automatic thoughts.\" CBT's theoretical account claims: first, that these distortions involve various epistemic issues and second, that its therapeutic techniques are capable of rectifying these epistemic issues. Together these claims spell out a model of mental illness and a mechanism of action, that is, a means through which CBT's techniques act to address mental illness. In this paper, I challenge both these claims and thus CBT's epistemic characterization of mental illness and its therapeutic mechanism. I begin with the second claim and show that the ability of CBT's therapeutic techniques to address epistemic issues is likely to be overstated. In turning to the first claim, I show that even if CBT were able to rectify epistemic issues, the thinking of mentally ill individuals is not characterized straightforwardly by epistemic issues. In concluding, I suggest an alternate way in which CBTs account of mental illness and its mechanism should be understood.","PeriodicalId":45397,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Psychiatry & Psychology","volume":"8 1","pages":"75 - 89"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73049292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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