Australian Journal of Politics and History最新文献

A double-barrelled question underpins this special edition: can International Relations (IR) be decolonised? If so, how? I argue that IR's insistence on more-or-less concretised subjects, which engage in dialectical relations of struggle, renders the discipline (and the practice it engenders) constitutionally blind to the origins of colonial violence. Traditional theory necessarily elides the violence which forges legible concrete actors and which culminates in colonialism and slavery. I offer a critique of this theoretical structure through Achille Mbembe's reading of Bataille, Fanon, Hegel, and Kojève, and I close by touching on the decolonising potential of Édouard Glissant's work for academic IR. I conclude that IR can indeed be decolonised, but it must become something quite unrecognisable if it is to do so.

In the context of this special issue's inquiry into whether it is possible to decolonise Australian international relations, this article investigates the service of Indigenous people in the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The military is a crucial site to investigate the colonial state of Australian international relations not only because it is an institution that performs key international relations practices such as war and diplomacy, but also because it defines and projects the identity of the state both domestically and internationally. In the past two decades, there has been a sustained effort to include Indigenous people in the ADF. An inclusive and multicultural defence purports to represent a post-colonial state where Indigenous and non-Indigenous people stand next to one another for the defence of their shared country. However, in Australia, Indigenous people do not enjoy the wealth of the nation equally and remain dispossessed from their land and economically disadvantaged. Using discourse analysis of publicly available materials praising Indigenous military inclusion, this article argues that the inclusion of Indigenous people in the Australian Defence Force risks further entrenching the settler colonial project.

Addressing issues of political tribalism in Kuwait, the study reported here examined the political role of tribes in Kuwait, particularly to determine why badū tribespeople in Kuwait have shifted from being the regime's political ally to its political opponent. To that end, a survey questionnaire was created and distributed to 696 badū individuals living in Kuwait. The results suggest that most badū in Kuwait agree with the political opposition's agenda and feel excluded, marginalised, powerless, deprived of equal social justice, and deliberately targeted by certain local media networks. Furthermore, most badū sampled agreed that parliamentary elections are an effective way to exercise their political influence and that their tribes provide them with social protection as well as political power.

The discipline of International Relations (IR) in Australia, as elsewhere, is steeped in historical and ongoing violence, including violences of colonisation. The way that IR is taught and practised in Australia reproduces the discipline's erasures and ignorance of the effects of colonisation and ongoing forms of marginalisation, knowledge extraction, and harm that normalise existing structures of power. In this article, we ask how mainstream theories, pedagogies, and practices of IR scholarship in Australia contribute to the ongoing coloniality of the discipline and reproduce these geospatial hierarchies and structures of marginalisation and exclusion. We argue that, as teachers, we have to consistently engage in un-doing the violence of disciplinary history. We theorise that this is so because the artefacts we teach are the product of a knowledge life cycle immersed in, and structured by, coloniality and hierarchy. Drawing on a survey of Australian universities' IR curricula and interviews with their instructors, in addition to our own research training and practice as Australian IR academics, we examine how, if, and when it is possible to connect decolonial theory with practice and to thus generate decolonial praxis in the production of IR knowledge.

A divisive row over whether the Tasmanian government should spend $750 million to build a new stadium on Hobart's waterfront to secure a team in the AFL competition dominated state politics in the second half of 2022. The issue managed to overshadow ongoing concerns over the provision of hospital services, the housing crisis, rising cost of living pressures and the resignation from parliament of yet another minister. Yet, at the end of the period, the government enjoyed continued popularity.

The proposed Australian Rules football stadium at the languishing Macquarie Point site near the Hobart waterfront became a significant political issue, both within the Liberal Party and between the state's north and south. Specified as a precondition for Tasmania to join the AFL following decades-long obfuscation from the Melbourne-based body, the Premier backed its construction provided federal funding could be found. In so doing, previous plans to redevelop the Point including a reconciliation park were consigned to the waste bin.

While its cost, estimated at around $750 million, was compared with money that might instead be spent on much-needed health facilities and social housing, Premier Jeremy Rockliff and the state Liberals insisted that it would provide a major economic boost to construction and tourism, as it could be used for entertainment spectacles as well as other sports. However, federal Liberals, such as Senators Duniam, Askew and Chandler, opposed the idea as their electorates are statewide, and outside of Hobart the southern stadium was unpopular, as both current AFL stadiums – in Bellerive and York Park – could be upgraded at considerably less cost than Macquarie Point. The state Labor Party and the Greens opposed the stadium, while there was less than overwhelming support from local government.

Nevertheless, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese did not rule out funding for a stadium against the position of his state counterparts but signalled that it must include a full plan for the Macquarie Point site – for which he had already authorised an allocation of $50 million a decade prior when a minister in the Gillard government (ABC News, 15 December 2022).

In the meantime, there was more evidence that local Australian Rules football was in decline. Floods devasted many local grassroots clubs in October, when for example the Deloraine clubrooms and ground went completely underwater. Many facilities were “severely impacted” according to AFL Tasmania (Media Release, 18 October 2022). This was in contrast to the fortunes of basketball, where the Tasmanian team in the national league, the JackJumpers, reached the final, much to the benefit of local participation and membership.

In July, Police Minister Jacquie Petrusma resigned from state parliament becoming the fourth to exit the nine-minister cabinet since the state election in May 2021, including former Premier Peter Gutwein and ministers Jane Howlett and Sara

Thousands of Palestinians have been imprisoned in Israeli jails since 1948, reflecting an objective of Israel's occupation of Palestine to break the spirit of Palestinians in their struggle for liberation. A form of protest often undertaken by Palestinians in response to their political imprisonment is hunger strike. Indeed, when considered in relation to governance as an enactment of power upon people in prison, hunger strikes are an attempt of powerless prisoners to exercise some level of power over their circumstances. Concepts around hunger strike as form of protest are complex and multidimensional, and may reflect the interests of an individual or group, and/or speak more to the broader rights of people. Of interest to this study is the relationship between hunger strike and human dignity as manifest as a form of protest by Palestinians incarcerated in Israeli jails. Specifically, this study aimed to investigate the extent to which the concept of human dignity is a fundamental principle guiding Palestinian political prisoners' initial decision to hunger strike and then to continue to hunger strike. To facilitate the investigation, a stratified sampling approach was used to support the collection of quantitative data via a survey of 29 expolitical prisoners who had participated in hunger strikes during their imprisonment in Israeli jails. The collected data were related to three core dimensions of the protest construct: motivations for undertaking the protest (hunger strike); personal feelings when undertaking protest; and the experienced responses to/outcomes of the protest. Analysis of the participants' responses and the reporting of the main findings was informed by reference to key theoretical frameworks developed by Habermas, Kant, Sartre, and Durkheim. This study found that Palestinian political prisoners often considered human dignity to be more important than food. They therefore believed that hunger strike was a way to express that they would not surrender their dignity nor stray from their resistance. This article contributes to the important debate on the extent to which the hunger strike is an effective way to protest against the loss of human dignity experienced as a Palestinian political prisoner.

The reception of John Stuart Mill's The Subjection of Women (1869) has changed considerably during the last half century. In the increasingly positive reading and re-reading of the book, one criticism persists unchallenged: Mill's argument was universalistic. Not only did his analysis posit a uniform trajectory of both the subjection and the liberation of women, critics argue; also, they add, Mill failed to acknowledge the interrelation of identity and society by adhering to an abstract view of persons. This interpretation does not do justice to Subjection's text and context: Mill's legal prescriptions were not merely a symptom of a liberal theory of progress. He thought the unobstructed participation in the public life of the community the only way out of the vicious circle of habituation and oppression for women. This paper argues that his conclusion was grounded on ethological analyses of English national character, legal history, social institutions, and practices.

The anticipated political highlight in Victoria was the state election that would be held on the last Saturday of November. The Daniel Andrews-led Labor Party was focusing on winning its third election in a row. Having first been elected in 2014, Labor had extended its majority in the Legislative Assembly in 2018. This election, however, would be the first in Victoria since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. With lingering debates about ethics and accountability in government, as well as health and the state's economy, Victorians would be treated to a vigorous contest by the major parties.

The second half of 2022 was a very busy period for those who were following ethics and accountability in government in Victoria. On 20 July, the recommendations from Operation Watts were released. This operation was the first that was jointly undertaken by the state's Independent Broad-based Anti-Corruption Commission (IBAC) and the state's Ombudsman. It examined claims of branch stacking in the ALP as well as alleged cases of Labor MPs misusing public money. The report highlighted that while some actions could not be regarded as criminal offences, there were examples of behaviours that may not have aligned with community expectations (Operation Watts Special Report, July 2022).

Operation Watts resulted in 21 recommendations that aimed to strengthen integrity and accountability in the public sector, but especially in the Victorian Parliament. These included establishing a new Parliamentary Ethics Committee and Parliamentary Integrity Commissioner. Additional recommendations included reviewing the Electorate Officers Code of Conduct to forbid staffers from undertaking party-political work during hours they were employed as an electorate officer, as well as stopping MPs from employing members of their family in electoral offices. Premier Daniel Andrews announced that all recommendations would be adopted and announced that “as leader of the party and leader of our state, I take full responsibility for that conduct” (The Age, 20 July 2022).

Additionally, the so-called ‘red shirts’ affair, in which approximately $400,000 of state money was reportedly misused by paying electoral officers and other staff to undertake party-related campaigning in the lead-up to the 2014 election, re-appeared on the political radar (see The Guardian, 28 July 2022). The Ombudsman had already presented a report on these matters to the Victorian Parliament in 2018 but had been asked to investigate once more by the Legislative Council, a move that was spearheaded by former Labor minister, Adem Somyurek.

The Ombudsman also took the opportunity to restate calls for an independent investigative agency, making ethics and accountability critical issues in the political debate in Victoria.

These issues provided the opposition leader, Matthew Guy, with opportunities to attack the government. The focus, however, quickly shifted to the Liberal Party af

The second half of 2022 saw the newly elected Australian Labor Party take their new brand of foreign policy on the road. After a turbulent first half of the year where foreign policy took an unusually large focus of the 2022 election campaign, in July to December the Albanese government was able to settle into government and carve out their foreign policy agenda. As James Blackwell highlighted in his assessment of the January to June 2022 period, “we do indeed live in interesting times”.1 The election saw more Australians talking about foreign policy, which enabled the government to “go strong” on foreign policy. Just days after being elected, Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong flew to Japan for the annual Quad Leaders' Meeting in Tokyo. Collectively, Albanese, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles and Wong travelled to 32 states in 2022, Wong alone visiting 24. Throughout 2022 this set the pace for an Albanese government that engaged regularly with international peers, carving out a more internationalist foreign policy that is typical of Labor governments.

In a similar way to the collective sigh of relief felt when Biden was elected,2 the foreign policy community was looking forward to an Albanese government with a more predictable and sensible foreign policy, where public rhetoric and “wolf warriors” did not typify the foreign policy agenda. A moment of calm, ironically despite the regular international visits, was setting over Australian foreign policy.

This foreign policy review will seek to unpack the beginnings of the Albanese and Wong approach to overseas affairs, looking at their typically-Labor regional focus, and how the new government is seeking to separate its foreign policy brand from previous governments. It will also delve into some of the key issues and challenges for the new government, including living up to expectations on climate change and engaging with more traditional allies.

Traditional Labor foreign policy has been described as being more internationalist, characterised by enhanced multilateralism, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. While the Liberal party had its own foreign policy agenda, which included the 'Pacific Step Up', enhancing relations with the Quad, and going hard on China, since the election of the new Albanese Government we have seen Australia become a ‘global citizen’ once more.

In a 2016 article Tanya Plibersek outlined the ‘Labor approach’ to Australian foreign policy, suggesting that “good international citizenship is a critical driver to achieving a secure and prosperous Australia”, leaning on former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans' conception of “good international citizenship”.3 Plibersek went on to highlight Labor multilateralism with Foreign Minister H.V. “Doc” Evatt at the United Nations 1945 San Francisco conference and Labor's tradition in Asia and on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Interestingly for 2022 and noting the AUKUS ag