{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhac001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhac001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61533319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines the relationship between the environment, sustainability, and European competition law. It shows that the European Commission’s decisional practice not to exempt anticompetitive agreements under Article 101(3) TFEU is because it selectively prosecutes hardcore cartels. The alleged ‘sustainability gap’ in EU antitrust is, therefore, more apparent than real. It is also shown that the Commission has adopted an efficient enforcement approach given the institutional and budgetary constraints it faces. On the other hand, the Commission’s guidelines on Article 101 TFEU lack coherence and consistency with its overarching Treaty obligations. The pros and cons of expanding Article 101(3) TFEU to take account of the third-party environmental and public policy factors are examined.
{"title":"Collusion as Environmental Protection—An Economic Assessment","authors":"C. Veljanovski","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhab025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhab025","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article examines the relationship between the environment, sustainability, and European competition law. It shows that the European Commission’s decisional practice not to exempt anticompetitive agreements under Article 101(3) TFEU is because it selectively prosecutes hardcore cartels. The alleged ‘sustainability gap’ in EU antitrust is, therefore, more apparent than real. It is also shown that the Commission has adopted an efficient enforcement approach given the institutional and budgetary constraints it faces. On the other hand, the Commission’s guidelines on Article 101 TFEU lack coherence and consistency with its overarching Treaty obligations. The pros and cons of expanding Article 101(3) TFEU to take account of the third-party environmental and public policy factors are examined.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43487154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We provide a description of ownership patterns in the top 25 European banks for the period 2003–2015, where we especially focus on the global financial crisis. Investment managers, such as Blackrock, are dominant in terms of number of blockholdings in different banks, maintaining fairly stable “common ownership” networks throughout our sample. However, the financial crisis led to capital injections by governments in several banks in trouble, which in turn led to a jump in holdings by governments, which typically are “non-common owners” (i.e., they hold only shares in only one bank). This jump translated into these investors temporarily being the top investor with a large share, and non-common owners being the majority among large shareholders. A brief comparison with US banks uncovers large ownership differences between the European and US banking sectors. We briefly discuss what these ownership patterns might imply for competition, stability and performance in the banking industry.
{"title":"Common Ownership Patterns in the European Banking Sector—The Impact of the Financial Crisis1","authors":"Albert Banal-Estañol, Nuria Boot, J. Seldeslachts","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhab023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhab023","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We provide a description of ownership patterns in the top 25 European banks for the period 2003–2015, where we especially focus on the global financial crisis. Investment managers, such as Blackrock, are dominant in terms of number of blockholdings in different banks, maintaining fairly stable “common ownership” networks throughout our sample. However, the financial crisis led to capital injections by governments in several banks in trouble, which in turn led to a jump in holdings by governments, which typically are “non-common owners” (i.e., they hold only shares in only one bank). This jump translated into these investors temporarily being the top investor with a large share, and non-common owners being the majority among large shareholders. A brief comparison with US banks uncovers large ownership differences between the European and US banking sectors. We briefly discuss what these ownership patterns might imply for competition, stability and performance in the banking industry.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45463002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a recent influential paper Coate et al. (2021) have criticized the sequential product-level approach to market definition in merger review. They argue that a simultaneous market-level approach to critical loss is more appropriate than a product-level critical loss analysis, because under certain plausible demand scenarios (nonlinear demand functions) the latter could yield the wrong answer on market definition—i.e., excessively broad or narrow markets. We extend their analysis by showing that a sequential product-level approach actually leads to an excessively narrow market definition when the typical nonlinear demand functions used in merger analysis are employed.
{"title":"On the Risks of Using the Sequential Product-Level SSNIP Approach to Identify Relevant Antitrust Markets‡","authors":"Jorge Padilla, S. Piccolo, Pekka Sääskilahti","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhab020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhab020","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In a recent influential paper Coate et al. (2021) have criticized the sequential product-level approach to market definition in merger review. They argue that a simultaneous market-level approach to critical loss is more appropriate than a product-level critical loss analysis, because under certain plausible demand scenarios (nonlinear demand functions) the latter could yield the wrong answer on market definition—i.e., excessively broad or narrow markets. We extend their analysis by showing that a sequential product-level approach actually leads to an excessively narrow market definition when the typical nonlinear demand functions used in merger analysis are employed.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61532420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we outline how a future change in consumers’ willingness-to-pay can be accounted for in a consumer welfare effects analysis in antitrust. Key to our solution is the prediction of preferences of new consumers and changing preferences of existing consumers in the future. The dimension of time is inextricably linked with that of sustainability. Taking into account the welfare of future cohorts of consumers, concerns for sustainability can therefore be integrated into the consumer welfare paradigm to a greater extent. As we argue in this paper, it is expedient to consider changes in consumers’ willingness-to-pay, in particular if society undergoes profound changes in such preferences, for example, caused by an increase in generally available information on environmental effects of consumption, and a rising societal awareness about how consumption can have irreversible impacts on the environment. We offer suggestions on how to conceptionalize and operationalize the projection of such consumers’ changing preferences in a “prospective welfare analysis.” This increases the scope of the consumer welfare paradigm and can help to solve conceptual issues regarding the integration of sustainability into antitrust enforcement while keeping consumer surplus as a quantitative gauge.
{"title":"Prospective Welfare Analysis—Extending Willingness-To-Pay Assessment to Embrace Sustainability","authors":"R. Inderst, Stefan Thomas","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhab021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhab021","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this paper, we outline how a future change in consumers’ willingness-to-pay can be accounted for in a consumer welfare effects analysis in antitrust. Key to our solution is the prediction of preferences of new consumers and changing preferences of existing consumers in the future. The dimension of time is inextricably linked with that of sustainability. Taking into account the welfare of future cohorts of consumers, concerns for sustainability can therefore be integrated into the consumer welfare paradigm to a greater extent. As we argue in this paper, it is expedient to consider changes in consumers’ willingness-to-pay, in particular if society undergoes profound changes in such preferences, for example, caused by an increase in generally available information on environmental effects of consumption, and a rising societal awareness about how consumption can have irreversible impacts on the environment. We offer suggestions on how to conceptionalize and operationalize the projection of such consumers’ changing preferences in a “prospective welfare analysis.” This increases the scope of the consumer welfare paradigm and can help to solve conceptual issues regarding the integration of sustainability into antitrust enforcement while keeping consumer surplus as a quantitative gauge.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44046103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Regulatory interventions aimed at promoting competition in digital markets face a challenge: How to design remedies that actually improve welfare? This article helps provide an answer to this question. First, it maps out the frontier of remedy design: Part II.A summarizes antitrust and regulatory remedies imposed on digital companies over the past decades, while Part II.B reviews nineteen reports on competition in digital markets to identify proposals to advance antitrust or regulatory interventions. Part III, the core of the article, builds on this review to propose a new, two-level framework for remedy design that integrates pro-competition antitrust and regulatory interventions as part of a single policy. First, at the substantive level, it develops a compounded error-cost framework that helps authorities to choose between different remedies applicableto a given conduct: when policymakers accept higher risks of over-enforcement in deciding to intervene, they should compensate by taking lower risks of over-enforcement in remedy design and vice-versa. Second, at the institutional level, the article proposes that authorities consider separating three connected but different key activities in remedy design: (i) identifying harmful behavior, (ii) designing interventions, and (iii) monitoring and adapting remedies. It also outlines four criteria (legal mandate, need for technical expertise, relative risks of regulatory capture, and overall administrative costs) that can help authorities allocate these tasks among different regulators. Part IV concludes by applying this framework to seven types of conduct that Part II identified as potentially problematic: (i) discrimination, unfair treatment, and self-preferencing; (ii) exclusivity contracts; (iii) tying or bundling; (iv) MFNs and other price parity clauses; (v) refusals to deal, limited interoperability, and lack of data portability; (vi) exploitative or exclusionary terms of service; and (vii) nudges, sludges, and other concerns around user interfaces.
{"title":"Designing Remedies for Digital Markets: The Interplay Between Antitrust and Regulation","authors":"Filippo Lancieri, Caio Mario S Pereira Neto","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhab022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhab022","url":null,"abstract":"Regulatory interventions aimed at promoting competition in digital markets face a challenge: How to design remedies that actually improve welfare? This article helps provide an answer to this question. First, it maps out the frontier of remedy design: Part II.A summarizes antitrust and regulatory remedies imposed on digital companies over the past decades, while Part II.B reviews nineteen reports on competition in digital markets to identify proposals to advance antitrust or regulatory interventions. Part III, the core of the article, builds on this review to propose a new, two-level framework for remedy design that integrates pro-competition antitrust and regulatory interventions as part of a single policy. First, at the substantive level, it develops a compounded error-cost framework that helps authorities to choose between different remedies applicableto a given conduct: when policymakers accept higher risks of over-enforcement in deciding to intervene, they should compensate by taking lower risks of over-enforcement in remedy design and vice-versa. Second, at the institutional level, the article proposes that authorities consider separating three connected but different key activities in remedy design: (i) identifying harmful behavior, (ii) designing interventions, and (iii) monitoring and adapting remedies. It also outlines four criteria (legal mandate, need for technical expertise, relative risks of regulatory capture, and overall administrative costs) that can help authorities allocate these tasks among different regulators. Part IV concludes by applying this framework to seven types of conduct that Part II identified as potentially problematic: (i) discrimination, unfair treatment, and self-preferencing; (ii) exclusivity contracts; (iii) tying or bundling; (iv) MFNs and other price parity clauses; (v) refusals to deal, limited interoperability, and lack of data portability; (vi) exploitative or exclusionary terms of service; and (vii) nudges, sludges, and other concerns around user interfaces.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":"27 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138513975","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When parties present divergent econometric evidence, the court might either combine such evidence in an ad hoc way or view such evidence as contradictory and thus ignore it completely, without conducting closer analysis of the possible sources of the contradiction. We believe that the reasons for this development are (i) that the statistical evidence is often interpretated in a simplistic manner and (ii) that the fact is ignored that any statistical test tests within the boundary of a prespecified model which might be wrong. Contradictory evidence might therefore either occur by chance or because the underlying assumptions contradict each other. Based on the concept of severity, we propose a method to avoid common fallacies in the interpretation of empirical evidence. We further set out a simple method for distinguishing between actual and merely apparent contradiction based on the statistical concept of the “severity” of the furnished evidence. Our chosen application is that of damage estimation in follow-on cases.
{"title":"Using the Statistical Concept of “Severity” to Assess the Compatibility of Seemingly Contradictory Statistical Evidence (With a Particular Application to Damage Estimation)","authors":"Peter Bönisch, R. Inderst","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhab017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhab017","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 When parties present divergent econometric evidence, the court might either combine such evidence in an ad hoc way or view such evidence as contradictory and thus ignore it completely, without conducting closer analysis of the possible sources of the contradiction. We believe that the reasons for this development are (i) that the statistical evidence is often interpretated in a simplistic manner and (ii) that the fact is ignored that any statistical test tests within the boundary of a prespecified model which might be wrong. Contradictory evidence might therefore either occur by chance or because the underlying assumptions contradict each other. Based on the concept of severity, we propose a method to avoid common fallacies in the interpretation of empirical evidence. We further set out a simple method for distinguishing between actual and merely apparent contradiction based on the statistical concept of the “severity” of the furnished evidence. Our chosen application is that of damage estimation in follow-on cases.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48159113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Our starting point is the following simple but potentially underappreciated observation: When assessing willingness to pay (WTP) for hedonic features of a product, the results of such measurement are influenced by the context in which the consumer makes her real or hypothetical choice or in which the questions to which she replies are set (such as in a contingent valuation analysis). This observation is of particular relevance when WTP regards sustainability, the ‘non-use value’ of which does not derive from a direct (physical) sensation and where perceived benefits depend heavily on available information and deliberations. The recognition of such context sensitivity paves the way for a broader conception of consumer welfare (CW), and our proposed standard of ‘reflective WTP’ may materially change the scope for private market initiatives with regards to sustainability, while keeping the analytical framework within the realm of the CW paradigm. In terms of practical implications, we argue, for instance, that actual purchasing decisions may prove insufficient to measure consumer appreciation of sustainability, as they may rather echo learnt but unreflected heuristics and may be subject to the specific shopping context, such as heavy price promotions. Also, while preferences may reflect the current social norm, the latter may change considerably over time as more consumers adapt their behaviour.
{"title":"Reflective Willingness to Pay: Preferences for Sustainable Consumption in a Consumer Welfare Analysis","authors":"Roman Inderst, Stefan Thomas","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhab016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhab016","url":null,"abstract":"Our starting point is the following simple but potentially underappreciated observation: When assessing willingness to pay (WTP) for hedonic features of a product, the results of such measurement are influenced by the context in which the consumer makes her real or hypothetical choice or in which the questions to which she replies are set (such as in a contingent valuation analysis). This observation is of particular relevance when WTP regards sustainability, the ‘non-use value’ of which does not derive from a direct (physical) sensation and where perceived benefits depend heavily on available information and deliberations. The recognition of such context sensitivity paves the way for a broader conception of consumer welfare (CW), and our proposed standard of ‘reflective WTP’ may materially change the scope for private market initiatives with regards to sustainability, while keeping the analytical framework within the realm of the CW paradigm. In terms of practical implications, we argue, for instance, that actual purchasing decisions may prove insufficient to measure consumer appreciation of sustainability, as they may rather echo learnt but unreflected heuristics and may be subject to the specific shopping context, such as heavy price promotions. Also, while preferences may reflect the current social norm, the latter may change considerably over time as more consumers adapt their behaviour.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":"27 12","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138513973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 2011, Italy introduced a ban on interlocking directorates in the financial sector, prohibiting members of the boards of directors and of the internal control bodies, as well as top managers of banking, insurance, and financial companies, from holding any such office in a competing company or group. Empirical studies have demonstrated conflicting results concerning the effectiveness of the Italian anti-interlocking provision. Some studies claim that interlocking directorates have decreased but have not been completely eliminated, which suggests possible persisting limits to competition. Other studies instead show the ban to have a procompetitive effect, at least in the banking sector, which would be at odds with a slight reduction in personal ties. Our article addresses this inconsistency by mapping the interlocking directorates among the 25 largest banking groups and the 25 largest insurance groups operating in Italy before and after the introduction of the ban. We show that although interlocking directorates were widespread at the end of 2010, the interlocking ban reached its goal in the banking and insurance sectors. Anticompetitive effects may, however, still exist, especially considering that the anti-interlocking provision does not affect ownership connections among competing financial companies and groups.
{"title":"Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Italian Interlocking Ban: An Empirical Analysis of the Personal Ties Among The Largest Banking and Insurance Groups in Italy","authors":"F. Ghezzi, Chiara Picciau","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhab014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhab014","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In 2011, Italy introduced a ban on interlocking directorates in the financial sector, prohibiting members of the boards of directors and of the internal control bodies, as well as top managers of banking, insurance, and financial companies, from holding any such office in a competing company or group. Empirical studies have demonstrated conflicting results concerning the effectiveness of the Italian anti-interlocking provision. Some studies claim that interlocking directorates have decreased but have not been completely eliminated, which suggests possible persisting limits to competition. Other studies instead show the ban to have a procompetitive effect, at least in the banking sector, which would be at odds with a slight reduction in personal ties. Our article addresses this inconsistency by mapping the interlocking directorates among the 25 largest banking groups and the 25 largest insurance groups operating in Italy before and after the introduction of the ban. We show that although interlocking directorates were widespread at the end of 2010, the interlocking ban reached its goal in the banking and insurance sectors. Anticompetitive effects may, however, still exist, especially considering that the anti-interlocking provision does not affect ownership connections among competing financial companies and groups.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41431952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Both leniency programs and private antitrust enforcement are essential in combating cartels. The literature demonstrates that society benefits from both increased private actions and leniency applications. However, the present view is that private enforcement discourages cartel members from seeking leniency. Proponents of this view blame follow-on civil actions in the wake of successful public antitrust enforcement cases. This concern hinders the development of private antitrust enforcement. Nevertheless, the literature that expresses such a concern fails to consider standalone civil actions’ impact. Building on a game theory model of leniency programs by Professor Joseph E. Harrington, this article reinvestigates the relationship between the two seemingly contradictory procedural devices of leniency programs and private enforcement. Considering a revised leniency game, this article reveals that incentivizing private antitrust enforcement does not necessarily discourage leniency applications. Accordingly, this article proposes ways for legislators to use private enforcement as a tool to promote leniency applications.
{"title":"Incentivizing Private Antitrust Enforcement to Promote Leniency Applications","authors":"Sinchit Lai","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAB009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAB009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Both leniency programs and private antitrust enforcement are essential in combating cartels. The literature demonstrates that society benefits from both increased private actions and leniency applications. However, the present view is that private enforcement discourages cartel members from seeking leniency. Proponents of this view blame follow-on civil actions in the wake of successful public antitrust enforcement cases. This concern hinders the development of private antitrust enforcement. Nevertheless, the literature that expresses such a concern fails to consider standalone civil actions’ impact. Building on a game theory model of leniency programs by Professor Joseph E. Harrington, this article reinvestigates the relationship between the two seemingly contradictory procedural devices of leniency programs and private enforcement. Considering a revised leniency game, this article reveals that incentivizing private antitrust enforcement does not necessarily discourage leniency applications. Accordingly, this article proposes ways for legislators to use private enforcement as a tool to promote leniency applications.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47211277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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