Journal of Competition Law & Economics最新文献

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An Analysis of the Altria-Juul Labs Deal: Antitrust and Population Health Implications. 奥驰亚- juul实验室交易分析:反垄断和人口健康影响。

IF 1.5 4区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Competition Law & Economics

Pub Date : 2021-01-23 eCollection Date: 2021-06-01 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhaa033

David T Levy, Luz María Sánchez-Romero, Clifford E Douglas, David T Sweanor

On December 19, 2018, Altria announced an offer of $12.8 billion for Juul Labs, combining the largest U.S. cigarette manufacturer with the largest U.S. e-cigarette company. This deal is currently being challenged by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). We consider the antitrust implications. We also consider population health implications, which we argue are essential to a comprehensive analysis of the impact on consumers. Although the FTC antitrust investigation has focused on closed vaping systems, we argue that the relevant market is the broader nicotine delivery product market, which includes all vaping products along with tobacco products. With Altria having a large market share in the key nicotine delivery product submarkets and with important entry barriers, the merger potentially places Altria in a dominant position in the relevant market. In particular, competition in the vaping submarket is reduced, thereby likely to reduce the availability of less harmful alternatives to cigarettes.

2018年12月19日，奥驰亚宣布以128亿美元收购美国最大的卷烟制造商Juul Labs，将其与美国最大的电子烟公司合并。这项交易目前正受到美国联邦贸易委员会(FTC)的质疑。我们考虑反垄断的影响。我们还考虑了对人口健康的影响，我们认为这对于全面分析对消费者的影响至关重要。尽管联邦贸易委员会的反垄断调查主要集中在封闭的电子烟系统上，但我们认为相关的市场是更广泛的尼古丁输送产品市场，包括所有的电子烟产品和烟草产品。由于奥驰亚在关键的尼古丁输送产品子市场占有很大的市场份额，并且存在重要的进入壁垒，合并可能使奥驰亚在相关市场占据主导地位。特别是，电子烟子市场的竞争减少了，因此可能会减少危害较小的香烟替代品的供应。

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引用次数: 5

OUP accepted manuscript OUP接受稿件

IF 1.5 4区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Competition Law & Economics

Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhab026

引用次数: 2

OUP accepted manuscript OUP接受稿件

IF 1.5 4区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Competition Law & Economics

Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhab012

引用次数: 0

OUP accepted manuscript OUP接受稿件

IF 1.5 4区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Competition Law & Economics

Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhab028

引用次数: 0

OUP accepted manuscript OUP接受稿件

IF 1.5 4区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Competition Law & Economics

Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhab019

引用次数: 0

OUP accepted manuscript OUP接受稿件

IF 1.5 4区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Competition Law & Economics

Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhab018

引用次数: 0

OUP accepted manuscript OUP接受稿件

IF 1.5 4区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Competition Law & Economics

Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhab030

引用次数: 1

Interim Measures in Antitrust Investigations: An Economic Discussion 反垄断调查暂行办法的经济学探讨

IF 1.5 4区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Competition Law & Economics

Pub Date : 2020-12-30 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhaa027

J. Caminade, Antoine Chapsal, Jacob Penglase

After a period of dormancy, the topic of interim measures (IMs) in antitrust investigations has been brought back into the spotlight in the context of fast-moving digital markets. We analyze historical practices and criteria surrounding IMs in the United States and Europe. Then we present an economic model of the parameters underlying IMs, which can inform the decision of whether to pursue them. The two key parameters needed to determine the benefits of taking an IM are the relative magnitudes of irreparable harm to each party and the probability that the conduct is found to be anticompetitive. A resulting insight is that the overall size of the irreparable harms is not as relevant as their relative size (that is, asymmetry). Increasing both types of harm in the same proportion would not change the decision to use an IM. However, an increase in the overall size of irreparable harms increases the expected benefit from IMs as a tool, if they are used optimally. Finally, we examine the characteristics of the digital economy, finding that while such characteristics are likely to increase the benefits of IMs as a general tool, there is a need to carefully assess IM decisions on a case-by-case basis.

在经历了一段时间的休眠之后，在快速发展的数字市场背景下，反垄断调查中的临时措施话题再次成为人们关注的焦点。我们分析了美国和欧洲围绕IM的历史实践和标准。然后，我们提出了一个IMs基础参数的经济模型，该模型可以为是否追求IMs的决策提供信息。确定采取IM的好处所需的两个关键参数是对各方造成的不可弥补的伤害的相对程度和该行为被认定为反竞争行为的可能性。由此得出的见解是，无法弥补的伤害的总体规模不如其相对规模（即不对称性）相关。以相同的比例增加这两种类型的伤害不会改变使用IM的决定。然而，不可弥补的伤害的总体规模的增加增加了IM作为一种工具的预期收益，如果它们得到了最佳使用的话。最后，我们研究了数字经济的特征，发现虽然这些特征可能会增加IM作为一种通用工具的好处，但有必要根据具体情况仔细评估IM决策。

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引用次数: 0

Collaboration and Competition Policy in a Market-Based Hospital System: A Case Study from the Netherlands 基于市场的医院系统中的合作与竞争政策——以荷兰为例

IF 1.5 4区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Competition Law & Economics

Pub Date : 2020-04-24 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhaa009

W. V. D. Schors, R. Kemp, M. Varkevisser

In the Dutch healthcare system, provider competition is used as a tool to improve efficiency. From a competition policy perspective, little is known about how collaboration among healthcare providers contributes to overall patient welfare, and how a balance is achieved between scale benefits and preventing anti-competitive collusion. This paper examines the ex-post effects of a Dutch case study in which three competing hospitals have collaborated to provide high-complexity low-volume cancer surgery, an arrangement that tests the limits of permissibility under the Dutch cartel prohibition. Our preliminary empirical research demonstrated only a modest increase in price and travel time for some of the tumour surgeries. Volume analysis showed that the intended centralization of surgical procedures has not been fully realized. Our findings highlight the importance of a comprehensive self-assessment by the collaborating hospitals to ex-ante assess (potential) efficiencies and antitrust risks. Such self-assessments could benefit from research focused on which collaborations are most appropriate to achieve quality gains. For the ex-post assessment by competition authorities following the cartel prohibition, a more thorough insight into the (long-term) changes in hospital prices, profitability, and quality after collaboration is needed.

在荷兰的医疗保健系统中，供应商竞争被用作提高效率的工具。从竞争政策的角度来看，人们对医疗保健提供者之间的合作如何促进患者的整体福利，以及如何在规模效益和防止反竞争勾结之间取得平衡知之甚少。本文考察了一个荷兰案例研究的事后影响，其中三家相互竞争的医院合作提供高复杂性的小容量癌症手术，这种安排测试了荷兰卡特尔禁令下的许可限度。我们的初步实证研究表明，一些肿瘤手术的价格和旅行时间只有适度的增加。体积分析表明，预期的外科手术集中化尚未完全实现。我们的研究结果强调了合作医院对事前评估(潜在)效率和反垄断风险进行全面自我评估的重要性。这种自我评估可以受益于侧重于哪些合作最适合实现质量收益的研究。在卡特尔禁令实施后，竞争主管部门的事后评估需要更深入地了解合作后医院价格、盈利能力和质量的(长期)变化。

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引用次数: 4

Innovation Considerations in Horizontal Merger Control 横向并购控制中的创新思考

IF 1.5 4区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Competition Law & Economics

Pub Date : 2020-04-15 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhaa008

Ioannis P. Kokkoris, T. Valletti

This paper focuses on the assessment of mergers and in particular on unilateral effects analysis where innovation plays an important role. The paper discusses the economic theories behind innovation, how we move from the traditional product-by-product market definition to pipeline competition and innovation competition and the concept of innovation space. The paper provides a structural analysis of unilateral effects in such markets analyzing how competition authorities should assess a transaction where the main theory of harm is based on innovation considerations.

本文侧重于对合并的评估，特别是对创新发挥重要作用的单边效应分析。本文讨论了创新背后的经济学理论，我们如何从传统的逐产品市场定义转向管道竞争和创新竞争，以及创新空间的概念。本文对此类市场中的单边效应进行了结构性分析，分析了竞争主管部门应如何评估主要损害理论基于创新考虑的交易。

引用次数: 5

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