Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5771/9783828873377-11
D. Parluhutan
{"title":"Chapter Two The Cartel Prohibition Pursuant to the European Union (EU) Competition and the German Cartel Laws and the Law Number 5/1999","authors":"D. Parluhutan","doi":"10.5771/9783828873377-11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/9783828873377-11","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76543213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5771/9783828873377-245
D. Parluhutan
{"title":"Chapter Four Conceptual and Judicial Praxis of the Indirect (Circumstancial) Evidence in the EU Competition Law, the German Cartel Law and the Law Number 5/1999","authors":"D. Parluhutan","doi":"10.5771/9783828873377-245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/9783828873377-245","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72892706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5771/9783828873377-293
D. Parluhutan
{"title":"Chapter Five Conclusions","authors":"D. Parluhutan","doi":"10.5771/9783828873377-293","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/9783828873377-293","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91210421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5771/9783828873377-127
D. Parluhutan
{"title":"Chapter Three Procedural Law Pursuant to the EU Competition Law, the German Cartel Law and the Law Number 5/1999","authors":"D. Parluhutan","doi":"10.5771/9783828873377-127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/9783828873377-127","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75497396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis","authors":"D. Parluhutan","doi":"10.5771/9783828873377-i","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/9783828873377-i","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91239941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"HOSPITAL MERGERS AND ANTITRUST IMMUNITY: THE ACQUISITION OF PALMYRA MEDICAL CENTER BY PHOEBE PUTNEY HEALTH","authors":"Christopher J. Garmon, Laura Kmitch","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHY015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHY015","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHY015","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43819640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
After arguing that collusion by software programs which choose pricing rules without any human intervention is not a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the paper offers a path toward making collusion by autonomous artificial agents unlawful.
{"title":"DEVELOPING COMPETITION LAW FOR COLLUSION BY AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS†","authors":"J. Harrington","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHY016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHY016","url":null,"abstract":"After arguing that collusion by software programs which choose pricing rules without any human intervention is not a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the paper offers a path toward making collusion by autonomous artificial agents unlawful.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHY016","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49315418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The maverick firm concept recognizes the fact that certain firms may be inherently different from their rivals. This paper provides evidence on the use of this concept in European Commission merger decisions. We find that it has been relatively rarely used. However, where it has, maverick behaviour has been considered in a diverse range of industries and the candidate firms have been both insiders and outsiders to the merger. We then examine in detail the few cases where the existence of a maverick was eventually established by the Commission. All of these cases occurred after the 2004 change in the Merger Regulation and predominantly when analyzing the likelihood that unilateral effects would result from the merger. We suggest that this may be reconciled with economic theory by a more general need to take into account post-merger product repositioning.
{"title":"THE ROLE OF THE MAVERICK FIRM CONCEPT IN EUROPEAN COMMISSION MERGER DECISIONS","authors":"J. Bromfield, M. Olczak","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHY004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHY004","url":null,"abstract":"The maverick firm concept recognizes the fact that certain firms may be inherently different from their rivals. This paper provides evidence on the use of this concept in European Commission merger decisions. We find that it has been relatively rarely used. However, where it has, maverick behaviour has been considered in a diverse range of industries and the candidate firms have been both insiders and outsiders to the merger. We then examine in detail the few cases where the existence of a maverick was eventually established by the Commission. All of these cases occurred after the 2004 change in the Merger Regulation and predominantly when analyzing the likelihood that unilateral effects would result from the merger. We suggest that this may be reconciled with economic theory by a more general need to take into account post-merger product repositioning.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHY004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42136776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper proposes a method to detect bid-rigging by applying mutually reinforcing screens to a road construction procurement data set from Switzerland in which no prior information about collusion was available. The screening method is particularly suited to deal with the problem of partial collusion, i.e. collusion which does not involve all firms and/or all contracts in a specific data set, implying that many of the classical markers discussed in the corresponding literature will fail to identify bid-rigging. In addition to presenting a new screen for collusion, it is shown how benchmarks and the combination of different screens may be used to identify subsets of suspicious contracts and firms in a data set. The discussed screening method succeeds in isolating a group of “suspicious” firms exhibiting the characteristics of a local bid-rigging cartel operating with cover bids and a – more or less pronounced – bid rotation scheme. Based on these findings the Swiss Competition Commission (ComCo) decided to open an investigation.
{"title":"SCREENING FOR BID RIGGING—DOES IT WORK?","authors":"David Imhof, Yavuz Karagök, Samuel Rutz","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHY006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHY006","url":null,"abstract":"This paper proposes a method to detect bid-rigging by applying mutually reinforcing screens to a road construction procurement data set from Switzerland in which no prior information about collusion was available. The screening method is particularly suited to deal with the problem of partial collusion, i.e. collusion which does not involve all firms and/or all contracts in a specific data set, implying that many of the classical markers discussed in the corresponding literature will fail to identify bid-rigging. In addition to presenting a new screen for collusion, it is shown how benchmarks and the combination of different screens may be used to identify subsets of suspicious contracts and firms in a data set. The discussed screening method succeeds in isolating a group of “suspicious” firms exhibiting the characteristics of a local bid-rigging cartel operating with cover bids and a – more or less pronounced – bid rotation scheme. Based on these findings the Swiss Competition Commission (ComCo) decided to open an investigation.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHY006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43598492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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