In this article, we extend the literature on merger simulation models by incorporating its potential synergy gains into structural econometric analysis. We present an integrated approach. We estimate a structural demand and supply model dealing with two-part tariff contracts between manufacturers and retailers as in Bonnet and Dubois (2010). This model allows us to recover the marginal cost of each differentiated product. Then we estimate potential efficiency gains using the data envelopment analysis approach of Bogetoft and Wang (2005), and some assumptions about exogenous cost shifters. In the last step, we simulate the new price equilibrium post-merger by taking into account synergy gains, and derive price and welfare effects. We use a home scan data set of dairy dessert purchases in France, and show that synergy gains could offset the upward pressure on prices post. Moreover, in this market, the increase in industry profit due to the merger is more driven by its induced synergy gains than by the market power increase.
{"title":"AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MERGERS: EFFICIENCY GAINS AND IMPACT ON CONSUMER PRICES","authors":"Céline Bonnet, Jan Philip Schain","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAA001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAA001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this article, we extend the literature on merger simulation models by incorporating its potential synergy gains into structural econometric analysis. We present an integrated approach. We estimate a structural demand and supply model dealing with two-part tariff contracts between manufacturers and retailers as in Bonnet and Dubois (2010). This model allows us to recover the marginal cost of each differentiated product. Then we estimate potential efficiency gains using the data envelopment analysis approach of Bogetoft and Wang (2005), and some assumptions about exogenous cost shifters. In the last step, we simulate the new price equilibrium post-merger by taking into account synergy gains, and derive price and welfare effects. We use a home scan data set of dairy dessert purchases in France, and show that synergy gains could offset the upward pressure on prices post. Moreover, in this market, the increase in industry profit due to the merger is more driven by its induced synergy gains than by the market power increase.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2020-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAA001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48029852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The traditional legal approach for distinguishing between illicit collusion and legitimate oligopoly conduct is to rely on criteria that relate to the means and form of how rivals interact, such as elements of “practical cooperation”, or on the finding of an anticompetitive intent. These criteria ultimately refer to the inner sphere of natural persons and its emanations in communicative acts. Some authors therefore conclude that the cartel prohibition of Article 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) or Section 1 of the U.S. Sherman Act is unable to capture collusion if it is achieved by autonomously acting computers relying on machine learning capabilities. It is instead suggested here to define collusion as parallel informational signals, which achieve a supracompetitive equilibrium, and to use the consumer welfare standard as a proxy for distinguishing between illicit collusion and legitimate oligopoly conduct. This approach is not tantamount to the idea of prohibiting tacit collusion as such. Rather, it is to check singular elements of communication, that is, “informational signals”, within an existing oligopolistic setting for their propensity to create consumer harm. This approach can help to close potential regulatory gaps currently associated with the surge of algorithmic pricing.
{"title":"HARMFUL SIGNALS: CARTEL PROHIBITION AND OLIGOPOLY THEORY IN THE AGE OF MACHINE LEARNING","authors":"Stefan Thomas","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhz011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhz011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The traditional legal approach for distinguishing between illicit collusion and legitimate oligopoly conduct is to rely on criteria that relate to the means and form of how rivals interact, such as elements of “practical cooperation”, or on the finding of an anticompetitive intent. These criteria ultimately refer to the inner sphere of natural persons and its emanations in communicative acts. Some authors therefore conclude that the cartel prohibition of Article 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) or Section 1 of the U.S. Sherman Act is unable to capture collusion if it is achieved by autonomously acting computers relying on machine learning capabilities. It is instead suggested here to define collusion as parallel informational signals, which achieve a supracompetitive equilibrium, and to use the consumer welfare standard as a proxy for distinguishing between illicit collusion and legitimate oligopoly conduct. This approach is not tantamount to the idea of prohibiting tacit collusion as such. Rather, it is to check singular elements of communication, that is, “informational signals”, within an existing oligopolistic setting for their propensity to create consumer harm. This approach can help to close potential regulatory gaps currently associated with the surge of algorithmic pricing.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2019-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/joclec/nhz011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49557477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In recent years, buzz terms such as “geo-blocking”, “online content portability”, and “digital copyright” have been making rounds in EU policy circles. This is largely attributed to the “Digital Single Market Strategy”, an ambitious reform the objective of which is to ensure seamless cross-border access to online services. Pursuit of this objective appears to be largely driven by the assumption that limiting the exclusivity of copyright would stimulate intra-Union competition in content markets. Against the background of EU competence limitations in the field of copyright and the increasing popularity of global U.S. firms in European audiovisual markets, this paper argues that EU Competition Law has vainly been instrumentalized to complete a single market for content. More particularly, based on legal and policy developments, which appear to challenge widespread licensing practices, sector-specific economics, and the case law that sets the conditions under which competition enforcement may introduce limits to copyright protection, this study develops the following twofold argument: in an attempt to create a single market for copyright-protected broadcast content, the EU has stretched the boundaries of competition law in an excessive manner and such unjustified interference with copyright is simply inadequate to promote competition and market integration.
{"title":"THE EFFECTS OF BROADCASTING DIGITIZATION ON EU COMPETITION LAW: A TALE OF EU COPYRIGHT POLICIES","authors":"Konstantina Bania","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhz013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhz013","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In recent years, buzz terms such as “geo-blocking”, “online content portability”, and “digital copyright” have been making rounds in EU policy circles. This is largely attributed to the “Digital Single Market Strategy”, an ambitious reform the objective of which is to ensure seamless cross-border access to online services. Pursuit of this objective appears to be largely driven by the assumption that limiting the exclusivity of copyright would stimulate intra-Union competition in content markets. Against the background of EU competence limitations in the field of copyright and the increasing popularity of global U.S. firms in European audiovisual markets, this paper argues that EU Competition Law has vainly been instrumentalized to complete a single market for content. More particularly, based on legal and policy developments, which appear to challenge widespread licensing practices, sector-specific economics, and the case law that sets the conditions under which competition enforcement may introduce limits to copyright protection, this study develops the following twofold argument: in an attempt to create a single market for copyright-protected broadcast content, the EU has stretched the boundaries of competition law in an excessive manner and such unjustified interference with copyright is simply inadequate to promote competition and market integration.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2019-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/joclec/nhz013","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44907886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The widespread use of algorithmic technologies makes rules on tacit collusion, which are already controversial in antitrust law, more complicated. These rules have obvious limitations in effectively regulating algorithmic collusion. Although some scholars and practitioners within antitrust circles in the United States, Europe and beyond have taken notice of this problem, they have failed to a large extent to make clear its specific manifestations, root causes, and effective legal solutions. In this article, the authors make a strong argument that it is no longer appropriate to regard algorithms as mere tools of firms, and that the distinct features of machine learning algorithms as super-tools and as legal persons may inevitably bring about two new cracks in antitrust law. This article clarifies the root causes why these rules are inapplicable to a large extent to algorithmic collusion particularly in the case of machine learning algorithms, classifies the new legal cracks, and provides sound legal criteria for the courts and competition authorities to assess the legality of algorithmic collusion much more accurately. More importantly, this article proposes an efficacious solution to revive the market pricing mechanism for the purposes of resolving the two new cracks identified in antitrust law.
{"title":"Collusive Algorithms as Mere Tools, Super-tools or Legal Persons","authors":"G. Zheng, Hong Wu","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhz010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhz010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The widespread use of algorithmic technologies makes rules on tacit collusion, which are already controversial in antitrust law, more complicated. These rules have obvious limitations in effectively regulating algorithmic collusion. Although some scholars and practitioners within antitrust circles in the United States, Europe and beyond have taken notice of this problem, they have failed to a large extent to make clear its specific manifestations, root causes, and effective legal solutions. In this article, the authors make a strong argument that it is no longer appropriate to regard algorithms as mere tools of firms, and that the distinct features of machine learning algorithms as super-tools and as legal persons may inevitably bring about two new cracks in antitrust law. This article clarifies the root causes why these rules are inapplicable to a large extent to algorithmic collusion particularly in the case of machine learning algorithms, classifies the new legal cracks, and provides sound legal criteria for the courts and competition authorities to assess the legality of algorithmic collusion much more accurately. More importantly, this article proposes an efficacious solution to revive the market pricing mechanism for the purposes of resolving the two new cracks identified in antitrust law.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2019-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/joclec/nhz010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42065930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper conducts an event study analysis to empirically assess the industry-wide impact of cartels. Using a sample of recent European cartel cases, we estimate the effect of the surprise inspection and final decision on the stock market value of cartel and noncartel firms. The overall effect of both events is negative for cartel members and statistically insignificant for noncartel members. However, the impact of the inspection is significantly negative for European noncartel suppliers and for noncartel suppliers in nonchemicals industries. This is consistent with the theory that cartels can create additional damages through positively affecting the performance of their competitors.
{"title":"INDUSTRY IMPACT OF CARTELS: EVIDENCE FROM THE STOCK MARKET1","authors":"Iwan Bos, Wilko Letterie, Nina M. Scherl","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhz017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhz017","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper conducts an event study analysis to empirically assess the industry-wide impact of cartels. Using a sample of recent European cartel cases, we estimate the effect of the surprise inspection and final decision on the stock market value of cartel and noncartel firms. The overall effect of both events is negative for cartel members and statistically insignificant for noncartel members. However, the impact of the inspection is significantly negative for European noncartel suppliers and for noncartel suppliers in nonchemicals industries. This is consistent with the theory that cartels can create additional damages through positively affecting the performance of their competitors.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2019-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/joclec/nhz017","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47414577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the European Union, private litigation of competition law violations is in its nascence. As this article shows, excessive pricing raises strong concerns for such litigation, for three reasons: (1) the inherent difficulty of defining what constitutes an unfair price; (2) additional challenges inherent to private excessive pricing litigation, such as the need to pinpoint when exactly a price becomes unfair; and (3) the institutional features of general courts in EU member states, which are ill-suited to the required tasks. We elaborate on these concerns, pointing to four specific challenges inherent to private litigation and to three instances where a lack of sufficient economic understanding could entrap general courts (a cost trap, a fairness trap, and a monopolistic competition trap). Together, these factors create a risk of error costs much higher than any experienced so far, which could potentially reduce welfare. The article suggests some measures that can be taken to ensure that welfare is served.
{"title":"THE CASE FOR LIMITING PRIVATE EXCESSIVE PRICING LITIGATION","authors":"M. Gal","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhz015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhz015","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In the European Union, private litigation of competition law violations is in its nascence. As this article shows, excessive pricing raises strong concerns for such litigation, for three reasons: (1) the inherent difficulty of defining what constitutes an unfair price; (2) additional challenges inherent to private excessive pricing litigation, such as the need to pinpoint when exactly a price becomes unfair; and (3) the institutional features of general courts in EU member states, which are ill-suited to the required tasks. We elaborate on these concerns, pointing to four specific challenges inherent to private litigation and to three instances where a lack of sufficient economic understanding could entrap general courts (a cost trap, a fairness trap, and a monopolistic competition trap). Together, these factors create a risk of error costs much higher than any experienced so far, which could potentially reduce welfare. The article suggests some measures that can be taken to ensure that welfare is served.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2019-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/joclec/nhz015","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41799484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Chicago School advanced a particular conceptualisation of the relationship between law and economics in antitrust that has been misunderstood for decades. A well-known consequence for US antitrust of their scholarship was for greater determinations of legality through the ad hoc, conduct-specific analysis of the rule of reason standard, inspiring advocacy for a similarly “more economic” approach to EU competition law. But although supporting the substantive economic outcomes of overturning rules of per se illegality, Bork, Posner, Easterbrook, and other Chicagoans routinely and consistently rejected this form of market intervention for determining legality. Rather than ex post effects-based analysis, the Chicagoan approach was to incorporate economics ex ante into the design of generalised norms (rules, presumptions, structured tests) to thereby foster legal certainty and administrability, virtues associated with the formal rule of law. The overlooked importance of the formal rule of law ideal can be discerned from Bork and Easterbrook’s antitrust writing, Posner’s economic analysis of law, and even traced back to the foundational scholarship of the Chicago School of economics. Reemphasising the importance of legal form in Chicagoan writing challenges their common contemporary portrayal, supporters of a particular version of “more economic” European enforcement, and the supposedly “neo”-Chicago approach.
{"title":"THE CHICAGO SCHOOL AND THE FORMAL RULE OF LAW","authors":"R. Stones","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHZ002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHZ002","url":null,"abstract":"The Chicago School advanced a particular conceptualisation of the relationship between law and economics in antitrust that has been misunderstood for decades. A well-known consequence for US antitrust of their scholarship was for greater determinations of legality through the ad hoc, conduct-specific analysis of the rule of reason standard, inspiring advocacy for a similarly “more economic” approach to EU competition law. But although supporting the substantive economic outcomes of overturning rules of per se illegality, Bork, Posner, Easterbrook, and other Chicagoans routinely and consistently rejected this form of market intervention for determining legality. Rather than ex post effects-based analysis, the Chicagoan approach was to incorporate economics ex ante into the design of generalised norms (rules, presumptions, structured tests) to thereby foster legal certainty and administrability, virtues associated with the formal rule of law. The overlooked importance of the formal rule of law ideal can be discerned from Bork and Easterbrook’s antitrust writing, Posner’s economic analysis of law, and even traced back to the foundational scholarship of the Chicago School of economics. Reemphasising the importance of legal form in Chicagoan writing challenges their common contemporary portrayal, supporters of a particular version of “more economic” European enforcement, and the supposedly “neo”-Chicago approach.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2019-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHZ002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42493202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An important focus of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) is “administrative monopolies”—government-imposed restraints on competition. Since adopting the AML in 2008, China gradually has strengthened its efforts to curb administrative monopolies. Despite notable reforms such as the creation of the Fair Competition Review System (FCRS), government restrictions remain a major obstacle to competition in China’s economy. The 2008 legislation narrowly defined what constitutes improper government intervention, adopted a permissive standard for determining when public restraints were legitimate, and relied heavily on internal administrative controls to correct infringements. This paper draws upon experience in China and abroad to enhance the ability of China’s competition authorities to challenge administrative monopolies. Suggested upgrades include augmenting the robustness of FCRS, introducing new tools to improve competition advocacy, bolstering the ability of competition authorities to initiate or join litigation to attack administrative monopolies, and narrowing the range of justifications that can immunize public restraints.
{"title":"GOVERNING CHINA’S ADMINISTRATIVE MONOPOLIES UNDER THE ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: A TEN-YEAR REVIEW (2008–2018) AND BEYOND","authors":"Zhanjiang Zhang, Baiding Wu","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHZ009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHZ009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 An important focus of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) is “administrative monopolies”—government-imposed restraints on competition. Since adopting the AML in 2008, China gradually has strengthened its efforts to curb administrative monopolies. Despite notable reforms such as the creation of the Fair Competition Review System (FCRS), government restrictions remain a major obstacle to competition in China’s economy. The 2008 legislation narrowly defined what constitutes improper government intervention, adopted a permissive standard for determining when public restraints were legitimate, and relied heavily on internal administrative controls to correct infringements. This paper draws upon experience in China and abroad to enhance the ability of China’s competition authorities to challenge administrative monopolies. Suggested upgrades include augmenting the robustness of FCRS, introducing new tools to improve competition advocacy, bolstering the ability of competition authorities to initiate or join litigation to attack administrative monopolies, and narrowing the range of justifications that can immunize public restraints.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2019-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHZ009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46565100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Understanding patient choice is vital in assessing the closeness of competition between hospitals. The standard technique used in the UK is to estimate substitution patterns based on historical general practitioner (GP) referrals. In this paper we compare the results of the ‘GP referral’ methodology to a demand estimation approach. Using patient-level data over a 3-year period (2012/13–2014/15) we apply both methodologies to every hypothetical merger between hospitals in England, for three specialties. We find a high degree of consistency between the two approaches, suggesting that GP referral analysis is a useful and reliable filter in merger cases. There are a small number of cases, however, in which the GP referral approach filters out potentially problematic mergers. This is particularly true for ‘borderline’ cases. Filtering should therefore be done with caution and in conjunction with additional evidence.
{"title":"ESTIMATING DIVERSION RATIOS IN HOSPITAL MERGERS","authors":"C. Rossi, R. Whitehouse, A. Moore","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHZ006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHZ006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Understanding patient choice is vital in assessing the closeness of competition between hospitals. The standard technique used in the UK is to estimate substitution patterns based on historical general practitioner (GP) referrals. In this paper we compare the results of the ‘GP referral’ methodology to a demand estimation approach. Using patient-level data over a 3-year period (2012/13–2014/15) we apply both methodologies to every hypothetical merger between hospitals in England, for three specialties. We find a high degree of consistency between the two approaches, suggesting that GP referral analysis is a useful and reliable filter in merger cases. There are a small number of cases, however, in which the GP referral approach filters out potentially problematic mergers. This is particularly true for ‘borderline’ cases. Filtering should therefore be done with caution and in conjunction with additional evidence.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2019-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHZ006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46728142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The European Union (EU) formally changed its merger policy in 2004, moving from a dominance standard to one based on a significant impediment of effective competition, which appears more closely aligned with the U.S. substantial lessening of competition standard. We use data from both before and after this reform to explore whether EU policy has converged toward the U.S. standard. We start by identifying changes in the EU regime and detect a softer EU policy for unilateral effects. We model the outcomes of EU and U.S. investigations with logit models and use their predictions in decompositions and other exercises to show policy convergence for unilateral effects cases.
{"title":"DOES MERGER POLICY CONVERGE AFTER THE 2004 EUROPEAN UNION REFORM?","authors":"M. Bergman, M. Coate, A. Mai, Shawn W. Ulrick","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHZ007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHZ007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The European Union (EU) formally changed its merger policy in 2004, moving from a dominance standard to one based on a significant impediment of effective competition, which appears more closely aligned with the U.S. substantial lessening of competition standard. We use data from both before and after this reform to explore whether EU policy has converged toward the U.S. standard. We start by identifying changes in the EU regime and detect a softer EU policy for unilateral effects. We model the outcomes of EU and U.S. investigations with logit models and use their predictions in decompositions and other exercises to show policy convergence for unilateral effects cases.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2019-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHZ007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47485373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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