Japanese Economic Review最新文献

We show that real indeterminacy of stationary equilibria, by which the set of stationary equilibria is a continuum and the real allocation varies among equilibria, may arise in some general equilibrium models with fiat money. The conditions under which such equilibria arise are: (i) each household optimally saves a constant amount of money; and (ii) at least two households face different budget constraints. We present various models, including a decentralized money search model and a centralized model with a monopoly firm, to explain how these conditions lead to real indeterminacy. Finally, we present a policy that uniquely implements any desirable outcome.

This study, using microdata from the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities, empirically examines the relationship among innovation, labour hoarding and employment growth at Japanese firms from 1991 to 2010. The main findings are as follows. First, the labour force of many firms in Japan is above the optimal level (labour hoarding). Second, labour hoarding is more serious among larger firms. Third, firms do not adjust employment instantaneously; if they have surplus labour in the current period, they will gradually reduce it. This is consistent with the theoretical model on employment adjustment that we propose. Fourth, all else being equal, firms’ conducting R&D are more likely to increase employment. Fifth, while we observe a negative correlation between firms’ total factor productivity growth and employment, total factor productivity growth through innovation has a positive impact on employment. Finally, in the manufacturing sector, product innovation, which we proxy by R&D expenditure, has a positive impact on employment, while in the nonmanufacturing sector, process innovation, which we proxy by capital investment, has a positive effect on employment.

Given that an owner lacks the ability to commit to his or her timing decisions under a manager's hidden action, we consider the optimal design of the contract and the owner's optimal timing decisions. Using a real options approach, we show that, compared with the full commitment case, a higher (lower)-quality project is launched later than (at the same time as) the first-best case, whereas the replacement of the manager is (is not necessarily) made later if the hidden-action problem is severe enough (is not severe enough). Severance pay may serve to minimize the compensation for the manager's loss of corporate control.

This study estimates the intergenerational wealth elasticity using original Japanese survey data and assesses factors explaining the intergenerational wealth elasticity, such as income, educational level, bequests and preferences. The age-adjusted elasticity of child wealth with respect to parental wealth ranges from 0.266 to 0.367, and transition matrices indicate that the intergenerational transmission of wealth persists more strongly in the tails of the distributions. The correlation between parent and child wealth mainly stems from income, education and bequests, which jointly constitute 63.9% of the wealth elasticity.

This study investigates the effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic dynamics in Japan with a particular focus on the effects of anticipated fiscal policy shock and the recent policies of Abenomics. We identify anticipated fiscal policy shock by combining excess stock returns for the construction industry and the vector autoregressive model with robust sign restrictions derived from a theoretical model. The primary result is that GDP and consumption respond positively to anticipated fiscal policy shock. In addition, the result of the historical decomposition that focuses on the period of Abenomics reveals that anticipated fiscal policy shock positively contributes to consumption dynamics.

This paper examines the privatization neutrality theorem when a public firm pursues general objectives other than welfare maximization. This theorem states that when the government gives firms optimal subsidies, welfare is exactly the same before and after privatization. However, we present a seemingly paradoxical result. When a public firm incorrectly assumes that subsidies change the welfare size, privatization is necessarily welfare neutral, whereas when the public firm correctly recognizes that subsidies only bring about income redistribution, without affecting welfare, the situations in which neutrality holds are limited.

Japan is faced with rapid demographic ageing and fiscal challenges. This paper simulates pension reform to reduce the replacement rate by 20% and raise the retirement age by 3 years gradually over a 30-year period. We consider three scenarios with different points in time to initiate reform in 2020, 2030 and 2040, respectively. A delay would suppress economic activities, lowering output by up to 4% and raising tax burden by more than 8% of total consumption. Delaying reform implies a transfer of costs of demographic ageing to the young and deteriorates the welfare of future generations by up to 3% in terms of consumption equivalence.

This paper takes a game theoretic approach to disability-related issues by constructing a model that studies the case of hereditary deafness on Martha's Vineyard Island, USA from the seventeenth century to the early years of twentieth, where the island community adjusted itself to the hereditary deafness so that it was not treated as a disability. The model of the present paper has two stages. First of all, there are two types of continua of agents, the deaf and the non-deaf. In the first stage, the non-deaf agents become either bilinguals or monolinguals. In the second stage, agents are classified into deaf people, bilinguals and monolinguals. They are then randomly matched to form a trio to play a three-person bargaining game with infinite horizon, random proposers and language constraints. Two bargaining games are considered. The first one is a majority bargaining game where only two out of three can agree to implement a bargaining outcome. The second one is a unanimity bargaining game where all three agents are required to reach an agreement. The majority game exhibits strategic complementarity, while the unanimity game exhibits strategic substitutability. This paper also takes an inductive approach to examine how prejudice against people with disability may emerge.

This paper proposes a focused information criterion for variable selection in partially linear models. Our criterion is designed to select an optimal model for estimating a focus parameter, which is a parameter of interest. We estimate the model using the series method and jointly select the variables in the linear part and the series length in the nonparametric part. A Monte Carlo simulation shows that the proposed focused information criterion successfully selects the model that has a relatively small mean squared error of the estimator for the focus parameter.