Abstract When legal theorists ask questions about legal interpretation—such as what it fundamentally is, what it aims at, or how it should work—they often do so in ways closely tethered to existing legal practice. For example: they try to understand how an activity legal actors (purportedly) already engage in should be done better, such as how judges can better learn about the content of the law. In this paper, I discuss a certain kind of “conceptual ethics” approach to thinking about legal interpretation, which is less tethered to existing legal practice (or the existing meaning of core pieces of legal terminology). The approach I explore asks questions about legal interpretation in a way that is tethered to what legal (or “legal‐ish”) concepts people should deploy, as part of arguments on behalf of engaging in legal (or “legal‐ish”) practices different from our current ones. In exploring this approach, I aim to help us better understand the landscape of philosophical issues about legal interpretation, including parts of it that I think have been underexplored.
{"title":"Legal Interpretation, Conceptual Ethics, and Alternative Legal Concepts","authors":"David Plunkett","doi":"10.1111/raju.12395","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12395","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract When legal theorists ask questions about legal interpretation—such as what it fundamentally is, what it aims at, or how it should work—they often do so in ways closely tethered to existing legal practice. For example: they try to understand how an activity legal actors (purportedly) already engage in should be done better, such as how judges can better learn about the content of the law. In this paper, I discuss a certain kind of “conceptual ethics” approach to thinking about legal interpretation, which is less tethered to existing legal practice (or the existing meaning of core pieces of legal terminology). The approach I explore asks questions about legal interpretation in a way that is tethered to what legal (or “legal‐ish”) concepts people should deploy, as part of arguments on behalf of engaging in legal (or “legal‐ish”) practices different from our current ones. In exploring this approach, I aim to help us better understand the landscape of philosophical issues about legal interpretation, including parts of it that I think have been underexplored.","PeriodicalId":45892,"journal":{"name":"Ratio Juris","volume":"128 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135726062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Natural law theories affirm that it belongs to the nature of law to be apt to promote the common good or do something similar. I defend a weak version of this thesis according to which part of what constitutes something as a nondefective central case of a posited law is that it is apt to promote the common good. Just as the rules of Pictionary require the drawing player to design her drawing to reveal the word in play, the rules of a central case of a legal system require lawmakers to design laws to promote the common good. Therefore, just as a Pictionary drawing that is inapt to reveal the word in play is defective, a central case of a posited law that is inapt to promote the common good is defective.
{"title":"The Weaker Natural Law Thesis","authors":"Charles F. Capps","doi":"10.1111/raju.12394","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12394","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Natural law theories affirm that it belongs to the nature of law to be apt to promote the common good or do something similar. I defend a weak version of this thesis according to which part of what constitutes something as a nondefective central case of a posited law is that it is apt to promote the common good. Just as the rules of Pictionary require the drawing player to design her drawing to reveal the word in play, the rules of a central case of a legal system require lawmakers to design laws to promote the common good. Therefore, just as a Pictionary drawing that is inapt to reveal the word in play is defective, a central case of a posited law that is inapt to promote the common good is defective.","PeriodicalId":45892,"journal":{"name":"Ratio Juris","volume":"37 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134974044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract David Estlund and Massimo Renzo argue that, given the right background conditions, combatants are obligated to obey orders to fight in unjust wars, a thesis they put forward even as they recognize that this involves committing serious moral wrongs. Their views, then, fall between traditionalism and revisionism in the theory of just war. We argue that both Estlund and Renzo fail to adequately distinguish between binding and nonbinding serious morally wrong orders, that their views are incompatible with their assumed fact‐relative understanding of morality, and that they fail to establish that combatants are obligated to obey orders to fight in unjust wars. We conclude that just as untenable as these two middle‐ground positions is the traditionalist view.
David Estlund和Massimo Renzo认为，在适当的背景条件下，战斗人员有义务在非正义战争中服从命令，尽管他们认识到这涉及严重的道德错误。因此，他们的观点是介于传统主义和修正主义之间的正义战争理论。我们认为，埃斯特伦德和伦佐都未能充分区分具有约束力和非约束性的严重道德错误命令，他们的观点与他们对道德的假设事实相对理解不相容，他们未能确立战斗人员有义务在非正义战争中服从命令。我们的结论是，传统主义的观点和这两种中间立场一样站不住脚。
{"title":"Between Traditionalism and Revisionism: Estlund and Renzo on the Obligation to Obey Orders to Fight in Unjust Wars","authors":"Luciano Venezia, Rodrigo E. Sánchez Brígido","doi":"10.1111/raju.12393","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12393","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract David Estlund and Massimo Renzo argue that, given the right background conditions, combatants are obligated to obey orders to fight in unjust wars, a thesis they put forward even as they recognize that this involves committing serious moral wrongs. Their views, then, fall between traditionalism and revisionism in the theory of just war. We argue that both Estlund and Renzo fail to adequately distinguish between binding and nonbinding serious morally wrong orders, that their views are incompatible with their assumed fact‐relative understanding of morality, and that they fail to establish that combatants are obligated to obey orders to fight in unjust wars. We conclude that just as untenable as these two middle‐ground positions is the traditionalist view.","PeriodicalId":45892,"journal":{"name":"Ratio Juris","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135462223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The main goal of my text is to generalize Alexy's explicative argument against human rights skeptics in order to minimize the overall room for their escape. This argument tries to show that any attempt to intersubjectively justify the nonexistence of human rights as moral rights necessarily commits the so‐called performative self‐contradiction. Alexy worries that the effect of his argument can be weakened by a group reduction of discourse. But I will argue that this worry is overstated because the price of such a reduction is much higher than Alexy estimates. I will then turn to the issue of moral relativism. I will try to show that the explicative argument, if suitably generalized, can cope even with human rights skeptics who think in terms of moral relativism.
{"title":"Against Human Rights Skeptics","authors":"Tomáš Sobek","doi":"10.1111/raju.12392","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12392","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The main goal of my text is to generalize Alexy's explicative argument against human rights skeptics in order to minimize the overall room for their escape. This argument tries to show that any attempt to intersubjectively justify the nonexistence of human rights as moral rights necessarily commits the so‐called performative self‐contradiction. Alexy worries that the effect of his argument can be weakened by a group reduction of discourse. But I will argue that this worry is overstated because the price of such a reduction is much higher than Alexy estimates. I will then turn to the issue of moral relativism. I will try to show that the explicative argument, if suitably generalized, can cope even with human rights skeptics who think in terms of moral relativism.","PeriodicalId":45892,"journal":{"name":"Ratio Juris","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135462517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Rule of Law, Comprehensive Doctrines, Overlapping Consensus, and the Future of Europe","authors":"Matej Avbelj","doi":"10.1111/raju.12391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12391","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45892,"journal":{"name":"Ratio Juris","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47952328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"In Defense of the Standard Picture: Overcoming Death by a Thousand Cuts","authors":"L. Alexander","doi":"10.1111/raju.12390","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12390","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45892,"journal":{"name":"Ratio Juris","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46361290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Interpretation, Argumentation, and the Determinacy of Law","authors":"G. Sartor","doi":"10.1111/raju.12389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12389","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45892,"journal":{"name":"Ratio Juris","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47979820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Theory of Rights Based on Autonomy","authors":"G. Maniaci","doi":"10.1111/raju.12388","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12388","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45892,"journal":{"name":"Ratio Juris","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44591515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Este artículo describe cómo la evolución del Estado de Derecho a Estado Social de derecho generó entre otros escenarios jurídicos un cambio en la interpretación de la norma, así las cosas, el surgimiento de tal concepto y los elementos que lo conforman, no solamente deben ser considerados como disposiciones normativas constitucionales, sino también como parámetro hermenéutico para procesos de creación y aplicación normativa. Si bien, dentro de procesos interpretativos se encuentra un abanico de métodos, es importante considerar la importancia y alcance que ostenta el concepto de Estado social de derecho como uno de aquellos, esto por cuanto al encontrarnos en un Estado Constitucional los criterios dispuestos en la norma de normas y de acuerdo al principio de juridicidad, tales parámetros deben acatarse en distintos escenarios dentro del ámbito jurídico.
{"title":"Estado social de derecho como parámetro hermenéutico","authors":"Catherine Córdoba Chamorro","doi":"10.24142/raju.v18n36a7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24142/raju.v18n36a7","url":null,"abstract":"Este artículo describe cómo la evolución del Estado de Derecho a Estado Social de derecho generó entre otros escenarios jurídicos un cambio en la interpretación de la norma, así las cosas, el surgimiento de tal concepto y los elementos que lo conforman, no solamente deben ser considerados como disposiciones normativas constitucionales, sino también como parámetro hermenéutico para procesos de creación y aplicación normativa.\u0000Si bien, dentro de procesos interpretativos se encuentra un abanico de métodos, es importante considerar la importancia y alcance que ostenta el concepto de Estado social de derecho como uno de aquellos, esto por cuanto al encontrarnos en un Estado Constitucional los criterios dispuestos en la norma de normas y de acuerdo al principio de juridicidad, tales parámetros deben acatarse en distintos escenarios dentro del ámbito jurídico.\u0000 ","PeriodicalId":45892,"journal":{"name":"Ratio Juris","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48272431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
María Yulissa Moreno Córdoba, Heiler Palacios Córdoba
En la mente de la sociedad colombiana, existe la idea de que las comunidades negras afrocolombianas, llegaron a los territorios como un grupo homogéneo, teniendo así una idea errónea. La población afrocolombiana posee una diversidad cultural y regional, se incluye la población afro integradas en costas atlántica y pacífica, además de ello las comunidades raizales y palenqueras; quienes además consideran que la naturaleza es fuente de vida, el cuidado de la tierra, del agua, del aire es prioridad por cuanto todo ello genera el sostenimiento del planeta. Los afrocolombianos, vienen en una constante lucha por el reconocimiento de sus derechos como comunidad, el reconocimiento de su cultura, de sus territorios, de su economía, por la no discriminación racial entre otras situaciones. Así mismo, estas comparten una historia en común, una cultura y en especial unas prácticas tradicionales que sirvieron como base para definir su carácter étnico y así establecer que sus derechos territoriales deberían ser colectivos; de allí la lucha por el reconocimiento y titulación de las tierras, como fuente fundamental del sustento de las comunidades asentadas en estos territorios.
{"title":"Predios baldíos que han sido adjudicados a las comunidades negras mediante la Ley 70 de 1993; prohibición para la enajenación de predios que han sido adjudicados","authors":"María Yulissa Moreno Córdoba, Heiler Palacios Córdoba","doi":"10.24142/raju.v18n36a18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24142/raju.v18n36a18","url":null,"abstract":"En la mente de la sociedad colombiana, existe la idea de que las comunidades negras afrocolombianas, llegaron a los territorios como un grupo homogéneo, teniendo así una idea errónea. La población afrocolombiana posee una diversidad cultural y regional, se incluye la población afro integradas en costas atlántica y pacífica, además de ello las comunidades raizales y palenqueras; quienes además consideran que la naturaleza es fuente de vida, el cuidado de la tierra, del agua, del aire es prioridad por cuanto todo ello genera el sostenimiento del planeta. Los afrocolombianos, vienen en una constante lucha por el reconocimiento de sus derechos como comunidad, el reconocimiento de su cultura, de sus territorios, de su economía, por la no discriminación racial entre otras situaciones. Así mismo, estas comparten una historia en común, una cultura y en especial unas prácticas tradicionales que sirvieron como base para definir su carácter étnico y así establecer que sus derechos territoriales deberían ser colectivos; de allí la lucha por el reconocimiento y titulación de las tierras, como fuente fundamental del sustento de las comunidades asentadas en estos territorios.","PeriodicalId":45892,"journal":{"name":"Ratio Juris","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43093921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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