{"title":"Climate and Carnism: Regulatory Pathways towards a Sustainable Food System","authors":"V. Chen, Cary di Lernia","doi":"10.53637/gvrn1279","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/gvrn1279","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47232249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mabo v Queensland [No 2] opened for re-examination the fundamental principles underpinning the colonial foundations of Australia, stating the native title of Indigenous peoples could survive the assertions of territorial sovereignty by Great Britain. Finding their territories were ‘sovereign’-less because they were ‘backward peoples’, an original, plenipotent sovereignty swept across the 3,000,000 square kilometres of ‘New South Wales’ on 7 February 1788, and across the balance of continental Australia in 1824 and 1829. This orthodox theory of sovereignty was unchallenged until Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria in 2002, where the High Court stressed the traditional laws and customs sourcing these native titles must be housed in pre-existing yet vital normative systems which likewise survived the assertions of sovereignty. Each native title determination thus acknowledges an Indigenous society whose laws and customs are sourced outside of the formal constitutional framework. The orthodox theory needs renovating in order to achieve a legally congruent and historically coherent framework.
{"title":"Renovating the Orthodox Theory of Australian Territorial Sovereignty","authors":"Daniel Lavery","doi":"10.53637/wdei5411","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/wdei5411","url":null,"abstract":"Mabo v Queensland [No 2] opened for re-examination the fundamental principles underpinning the colonial foundations of Australia, stating the native title of Indigenous peoples could survive the assertions of territorial sovereignty by Great Britain. Finding their territories were ‘sovereign’-less because they were ‘backward peoples’, an original, plenipotent sovereignty swept across the 3,000,000 square kilometres of ‘New South Wales’ on 7 February 1788, and across the balance of continental Australia in 1824 and 1829. This orthodox theory of sovereignty was unchallenged until Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria in 2002, where the High Court stressed the traditional laws and customs sourcing these native titles must be housed in pre-existing yet vital normative systems which likewise survived the assertions of sovereignty. Each native title determination thus acknowledges an Indigenous society whose laws and customs are sourced outside of the formal constitutional framework. The orthodox theory needs renovating in order to achieve a legally congruent and historically coherent framework.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44905514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The purpose of this article is to explain and critique how courts have interpreted the paramount interest provisions in Torrens system legislation. The discussion pivots around Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Smith (‘Perpetual’), which concerned ‘the interest of a tenant in possession’ in the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) section 42(2)(e), an exception to indefeasibility recognised in all Australian jurisdictions to varying extents. We analyse the two High Court cases upon which the Court in Perpetual relied and critically compare the ‘two step manner’ in which the Court analysed priority under section 42(2)(e) with the ‘one step manner’ in which priority is dealt with in other exceptions to indefeasibility. Proceeding on the assumption that the interpretation of section 42(2)(e) adopted in Perpetual is correct, we consider whether the judges characterised the parties’ interests correctly and whether Perpetual’s approach to section 42(2)(e) could, and should, be taken to other paramount interests.
本文的目的是解释和批判法院如何解释托伦斯制度立法中的最高利益条款。讨论围绕Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd诉Smith(“Perpetual”)展开，该案涉及《1958年土地转让法案》(Vic)第42(2)(e)条中的“占有承租人的利益”，这是澳大利亚所有司法管辖区在不同程度上承认的不可行性例外。我们分析了永久法院所依据的两个高等法院案件，并对法院根据第42(2)(e)条分析优先权的“两步方式”与在其他不可行性例外情况下处理优先权的“一步方式”进行了批判性比较。在假设Perpetual对第42(2)(e)条的解释是正确的基础上，我们考虑法官是否正确地描述了双方的利益，以及Perpetual对第42(2)(e)条的处理方法是否可以而且应该适用于其他最高利益。
{"title":"The Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Smith Priority Paradox: Just How Paramount Are Paramount Interests?","authors":"Lisa Spagnolo, Sharon Rodrick","doi":"10.53637/ntoh3716","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/ntoh3716","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this article is to explain and critique how courts have interpreted the paramount interest provisions in Torrens system legislation. The discussion pivots around Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Smith (‘Perpetual’), which concerned ‘the interest of a tenant in possession’ in the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) section 42(2)(e), an exception to indefeasibility recognised in all Australian jurisdictions to varying extents. We analyse the two High Court cases upon which the Court in Perpetual relied and critically compare the ‘two step manner’ in which the Court analysed priority under section 42(2)(e) with the ‘one step manner’ in which priority is dealt with in other exceptions to indefeasibility. Proceeding on the assumption that the interpretation of section 42(2)(e) adopted in Perpetual is correct, we consider whether the judges characterised the parties’ interests correctly and whether Perpetual’s approach to section 42(2)(e) could, and should, be taken to other paramount interests.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43917977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Accountable? Author Natalie Sheard The use by employers of Algorithmic Hiring Systems (‘AHSs’) to automate or assist with recruitment decisions is occurring in Australia without legal oversight. Regulators are yet to undertake an analysis of the legal issues posed by their use. Academic literature on this topic is limited and judicial guidance is yet to be provided. This article examines to what extent, if at all, Australian anti- discrimination laws are able to regulate the use by employers of discriminatory AHSs. First, it examines the re-emergence of blatant discrimination by digital job advertising systems. Second, it considers who, if anyone, is liable for automated discrimination. Third, it examines the law’s ability to regulate ‘proxy’ discrimination. Finally, it explores whether indirect discrimination provisions can provide redress for the disparate impact of an AHS. Australia’s anti-discrimination laws are long overdue for reform. This article concludes that new legislative provisions, as well as non- binding guidelines, specifically tailored to the use by employers of algorithmic decision systems are needed.
{"title":"Employment Discrimination by Algorithm: Can Anyone Be Held Accountable?","authors":"Natalie Sheard","doi":"10.53637/xtqy4027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/xtqy4027","url":null,"abstract":"Accountable? Author Natalie Sheard The use by employers of Algorithmic Hiring Systems (‘AHSs’) to automate or assist with recruitment decisions is occurring in Australia without legal oversight. Regulators are yet to undertake an analysis of the legal issues posed by their use. Academic literature on this topic is limited and judicial guidance is yet to be provided. This article examines to what extent, if at all, Australian anti- discrimination laws are able to regulate the use by employers of discriminatory AHSs. First, it examines the re-emergence of blatant discrimination by digital job advertising systems. Second, it considers who, if anyone, is liable for automated discrimination. Third, it examines the law’s ability to regulate ‘proxy’ discrimination. Finally, it explores whether indirect discrimination provisions can provide redress for the disparate impact of an AHS. Australia’s anti-discrimination laws are long overdue for reform. This article concludes that new legislative provisions, as well as non- binding guidelines, specifically tailored to the use by employers of algorithmic decision systems are needed.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49256856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Legal Epidemiology Author Ben Mathews Studies of the prevalence of child maltreatment respond to a public policy imperative to better understand and prevent child abuse and neglect. These studies span domains of law, public health, and legal epidemiology. When conducting them, researchers must comply with legal duties to protect research participants. Australia has a complex legal environment, with additional challenges when participants are children, or are in danger. Duties arise in three bodies of law, vary across States and Territories, and require statutory interpretation, conceptual analysis, and operationalisation. This article conducts the first comprehensive analysis of researchers’ legal duties to protect participants in child maltreatment surveys. It contributes new understandings of the operation of mandatory reporting duties in child protection law, duties to report child abuse offences in criminal law, and the duty of care in negligence law. The analysis informs conclusions about the applicability of these duties, and indicates a legally compliant, ethically sound, and operationally practicable approach. Findings are relevant to multiple settings.
{"title":"Legal Duties of Researchers to Protect Participants in Child Maltreatment Surveys: Advancing Legal Epidemiology","authors":"Benjamin Mathews","doi":"10.53637/oakc2052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/oakc2052","url":null,"abstract":"Legal Epidemiology Author Ben Mathews Studies of the prevalence of child maltreatment respond to a public policy imperative to better understand and prevent child abuse and neglect. These studies span domains of law, public health, and legal epidemiology. When conducting them, researchers must comply with legal duties to protect research participants. Australia has a complex legal environment, with additional challenges when participants are children, or are in danger. Duties arise in three bodies of law, vary across States and Territories, and require statutory interpretation, conceptual analysis, and operationalisation. This article conducts the first comprehensive analysis of researchers’ legal duties to protect participants in child maltreatment surveys. It contributes new understandings of the operation of mandatory reporting duties in child protection law, duties to report child abuse offences in criminal law, and the duty of care in negligence law. The analysis informs conclusions about the applicability of these duties, and indicates a legally compliant, ethically sound, and operationally practicable approach. Findings are relevant to multiple settings.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48970077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
‘Mercy Killing’ Cases Author Katrine Del Villar, Lindy Willmott and Ben P White This article examines the sentencing remarks in all publicly reported Australian cases on assisted suicide and mercy killing since 1980. Themes emerging from judicial reasons for sentencing confirm that many traditional aims of sentencing – such as specific deterrence, retribution or rehabilitation – are inapposite in cases where relatives or friends act outside the law to end the suffering of a loved one. Pronounced leniency in sentencing, observed across the spectrum of cases, demonstrates a gap between the law on the books and the sentences imposed in practice. We identify inconsistent outcomes, both in charges laid and sentences imposed, which have the potential to undermine public confidence in the rule of law. We conclude that criminal law simultaneously provides both too much protection and insufficient protection for members of the community. We recommend law reform to enable judges to better distinguish between voluntary and non-voluntary assisted suicides and mercy killings.
“安乐死”案件作者Katrine Del Villar、Lindy Willmott和Ben P White本文研究了自1980年以来澳大利亚所有公开报道的协助自杀和安乐死案件中的量刑言论。司法量刑理由中出现的主题证实，在亲属或朋友为结束亲人的痛苦而采取法律之外的行动的情况下，许多传统的量刑目的，如具体威慑、报复或康复，都是不可行的。在各种案件中观察到，判决中宣布的宽大处理表明，法律上的规定与实践中的判决之间存在差距。我们发现，无论是在指控还是判刑方面，结果都不一致，这有可能破坏公众对法治的信心。我们的结论是，刑法同时为社会成员提供了过多的保护和不足的保护。我们建议进行法律改革，使法官能够更好地区分自愿和非自愿协助自杀以及安乐死。
{"title":"Voluntary Requests, or Vulnerable Adults? A Critique of Criminal Sentencing in Assisted Suicide and ‘Mercy Killing’ Cases","authors":"Katrine Del Villar, L. Willmott, B. White","doi":"10.53637/sosl1176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/sosl1176","url":null,"abstract":"‘Mercy Killing’ Cases Author Katrine Del Villar, Lindy Willmott and Ben P White This article examines the sentencing remarks in all publicly reported Australian cases on assisted suicide and mercy killing since 1980. Themes emerging from judicial reasons for sentencing confirm that many traditional aims of sentencing – such as specific deterrence, retribution or rehabilitation – are inapposite in cases where relatives or friends act outside the law to end the suffering of a loved one. Pronounced leniency in sentencing, observed across the spectrum of cases, demonstrates a gap between the law on the books and the sentences imposed in practice. We identify inconsistent outcomes, both in charges laid and sentences imposed, which have the potential to undermine public confidence in the rule of law. We conclude that criminal law simultaneously provides both too much protection and insufficient protection for members of the community. We recommend law reform to enable judges to better distinguish between voluntary and non-voluntary assisted suicides and mercy killings.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43900598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The comment of Commissioner Hayne in his Final Report of the Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry – that ‘industry codes … occupy an unusual place in the prescription of generally applicable norms of behaviour’ – was directed to voluntary industry codes. The term is nevertheless used indiscriminately, and industry codes inhabit each regulatory strategy – self-regulation, quasi-regulation, co-regulation and explicit government regulation. The term ‘industry code of conduct’ is not a term of art with a settled meaning and is widely used as a convenient term to describe a diverse range of industry rules –from aspirational ethical statements of industry associations with no effective coverage, content or enforcement, to legislated prescriptions in various forms which are imposed by, and attract, the full majesty of the law. This article examines the role, operation, and legal effect of industry codes under each of the regulatory strategies and proposes a more rigorous taxonomy.
{"title":"The Unusual Place of Industry Codes of Conduct in the Regulatory Framework","authors":"A. Terry","doi":"10.53637/pmnv9100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/pmnv9100","url":null,"abstract":"The comment of Commissioner Hayne in his Final Report of the Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry – that ‘industry codes … occupy an unusual place in the prescription of generally applicable norms of behaviour’ – was directed to voluntary industry codes. The term is nevertheless used indiscriminately, and industry codes inhabit each regulatory strategy – self-regulation, quasi-regulation, co-regulation and explicit government regulation. The term ‘industry code of conduct’ is not a term of art with a settled meaning and is widely used as a convenient term to describe a diverse range of industry rules –from aspirational ethical statements of industry associations with no effective coverage, content or enforcement, to legislated prescriptions in various forms which are imposed by, and attract, the full majesty of the law. This article examines the role, operation, and legal effect of industry codes under each of the regulatory strategies and proposes a more rigorous taxonomy.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45999383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
on the Rights of the Child Author Meda Couzens This article challenges the position of the Australian executive that the Counter-Terrorism (Temporary Exclusion Orders) Act 2019 (Cth) is compatible with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘CRC’). Placing the discussion in the context of Australian children detained in Kurdish camps in Northern Syria on the ground of their involvement, or their parents’ involvement, with Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the article contends that the Act does not permit the best interests of the child to be meaningfully taken into consideration (contrary to article 3(1) of the CRC). The article also argues that the Act has negative consequences for nationality rights and rights concerning the protection of the relationship between children and their parents (articles 7–9 and 16 of the CRC).
{"title":"A Critique of the Counter-Terrorism (Temporary Exclusion Orders) Act 2019 (Cth) in Light of Australia’s Obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child","authors":"M. Couzens","doi":"10.53637/biqj7640","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/biqj7640","url":null,"abstract":"on the Rights of the Child Author Meda Couzens This article challenges the position of the Australian executive that the Counter-Terrorism (Temporary Exclusion Orders) Act 2019 (Cth) is compatible with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘CRC’). Placing the discussion in the context of Australian children detained in Kurdish camps in Northern Syria on the ground of their involvement, or their parents’ involvement, with Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the article contends that the Act does not permit the best interests of the child to be meaningfully taken into consideration (contrary to article 3(1) of the CRC). The article also argues that the Act has negative consequences for nationality rights and rights concerning the protection of the relationship between children and their parents (articles 7–9 and 16 of the CRC).","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48298858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Australian directors, whether volunteering or serving a commercial or charitable company, have similar legal responsibilities and exposure to personal liability for unintentional mistakes. In 1991, the Supreme Court of Victoria awarded $97 million, equivalent to almost $200 million today, against a volunteer director of a not-for- profit charitable company. More recently, the Federal Court imposed a $90,000 penalty on a former Tennis Australia director, Harold Mitchell. Should volunteer charity directors and their fee-earning corporate counterparts be subject to the same legal duties, obligations and liability exposure? This article considers the potential impact of the 2018 Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (‘ACNC’) Legislation Review Recommendation 11, that the statutory directors’ duties in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) be turned ‘back on’ for directors of ACNC registered charitable companies, with specific reference to individual directors, charities, and the regulation of the charity sector. It cautions against regulatory changes that impose unrealistic compliance obligations and complexity that could do significant long-term damage to the sector.
{"title":"Regulating Volunteer Directors’ Duties in Companies Registered with the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission","authors":"Jeanne Nel de Koker","doi":"10.53637/yths8021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/yths8021","url":null,"abstract":"Australian directors, whether volunteering or serving a commercial or charitable company, have similar legal responsibilities and exposure to personal liability for unintentional mistakes. In 1991, the Supreme Court of Victoria awarded $97 million, equivalent to almost $200 million today, against a volunteer director of a not-for- profit charitable company. More recently, the Federal Court imposed a $90,000 penalty on a former Tennis Australia director, Harold Mitchell. Should volunteer charity directors and their fee-earning corporate counterparts be subject to the same legal duties, obligations and liability exposure? This article considers the potential impact of the 2018 Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (‘ACNC’) Legislation Review Recommendation 11, that the statutory directors’ duties in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) be turned ‘back on’ for directors of ACNC registered charitable companies, with specific reference to individual directors, charities, and the regulation of the charity sector. It cautions against regulatory changes that impose unrealistic compliance obligations and complexity that could do significant long-term damage to the sector.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41592461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Social housing is reserved for the most vulnerable tenants, yet social housing tenants are subject to the same residential tenancy laws as private tenants and may even be held to a higher standard of behaviour. As a result, social housing tenants are at high risk of eviction. This article reports on the results of a mixed methods study on eviction proceedings involving social housing tenants. The study involved textual analysis of 98 published judgments and focus group research with 43 tenants’ advocates. It was found that the very factors that make someone eligible for social housing in Australia simultaneously put them at risk of eviction. This research suggests that the law provides limited protection against eviction to homelessness. Despite the importance of individuals’ interests in having a home, rights-based arguments are generally ineffective in this context.
{"title":"Social Housing, Homelessness and Human Rights","authors":"T. Walsh","doi":"10.53637/kfed5275","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/kfed5275","url":null,"abstract":"Social housing is reserved for the most vulnerable tenants, yet social housing tenants are subject to the same residential tenancy laws as private tenants and may even be held to a higher standard of behaviour. As a result, social housing tenants are at high risk of eviction. This article reports on the results of a mixed methods study on eviction proceedings involving social housing tenants. The study involved textual analysis of 98 published judgments and focus group research with 43 tenants’ advocates. It was found that the very factors that make someone eligible for social housing in Australia simultaneously put them at risk of eviction. This research suggests that the law provides limited protection against eviction to homelessness. Despite the importance of individuals’ interests in having a home, rights-based arguments are generally ineffective in this context.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43172407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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