Pub Date : 2021-06-13DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2021.1937681
K. Kristjánsson
ABSTRACT This paper is about the interplay between intuition and reason in Aristotle’s moral psychology. After discussing briefly some other uses of ‘intuition’ in Aristotle’s texts, I look closely at (a) Aristotle’s notion of virtue and emotion (Section 2); (b) affinities, or lack thereof, between Aristotle’s view and the Two-System (dual-process) model of moral judgement that has made headlines in contemporary moral psychology (Section 3); and some complications of the Aristotelian picture related to the specifics of moral functioning at different developmental levels (Section 4). The lesson drawn is that, despite recent attempts to co-opt Aristotle to the Two-System camp, he was, for all intents and purposes, a One-System theorist with respect to the relationship between intuitive emotion and reason. In that sense, his theories are in line with recent findings in neuroscience which show how emotion stimulates reflection rather than directly driving action. Even the motivational make-up of the ‘incontinent’ does not (as might perhaps be urged) provide a persuasive counter-example to a One-System interpretation of Aristotle.
{"title":"Reason and intuition in Aristotle's moral psychology: why he was not a two-system dualist","authors":"K. Kristjánsson","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2021.1937681","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2021.1937681","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper is about the interplay between intuition and reason in Aristotle’s moral psychology. After discussing briefly some other uses of ‘intuition’ in Aristotle’s texts, I look closely at (a) Aristotle’s notion of virtue and emotion (Section 2); (b) affinities, or lack thereof, between Aristotle’s view and the Two-System (dual-process) model of moral judgement that has made headlines in contemporary moral psychology (Section 3); and some complications of the Aristotelian picture related to the specifics of moral functioning at different developmental levels (Section 4). The lesson drawn is that, despite recent attempts to co-opt Aristotle to the Two-System camp, he was, for all intents and purposes, a One-System theorist with respect to the relationship between intuitive emotion and reason. In that sense, his theories are in line with recent findings in neuroscience which show how emotion stimulates reflection rather than directly driving action. Even the motivational make-up of the ‘incontinent’ does not (as might perhaps be urged) provide a persuasive counter-example to a One-System interpretation of Aristotle.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"25 1","pages":"42 - 57"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/13869795.2021.1937681","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47711118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-11DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2021.1937679
Leonhard Menges
ABSTRACT Recently, many authors have argued that claims about determinism and free will are situated on different levels of description and that determinism on one level does not rule out free will on another. This paper focuses on Christian List’s version of this basic idea. It will be argued for the negative thesis that List’s account does not rule out the most plausible version of incompatibilism about free will and determinism and, more constructively, that a level-based approach to free will has better chances to meet skeptical challenges if it is guided by reasoning at the moral level – a level that has not been seriously considered so far by proponents of this approach.
{"title":"Free will, determinism, and the right levels of description","authors":"Leonhard Menges","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2021.1937679","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2021.1937679","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Recently, many authors have argued that claims about determinism and free will are situated on different levels of description and that determinism on one level does not rule out free will on another. This paper focuses on Christian List’s version of this basic idea. It will be argued for the negative thesis that List’s account does not rule out the most plausible version of incompatibilism about free will and determinism and, more constructively, that a level-based approach to free will has better chances to meet skeptical challenges if it is guided by reasoning at the moral level – a level that has not been seriously considered so far by proponents of this approach.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"25 1","pages":"1 - 18"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/13869795.2021.1937679","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48692309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-06DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2021.1937680
M. Maiese
ABSTRACT Most philosophical discussions of psychopathy have centered around its significance in relation to empathy, moral cognition, or moral responsibility. However, related questions about the extent to which psychopaths are capable of exercising autonomous agency have remained underexplored. Two central conditions for autonomous agency that are highlighted by many existing accounts include (1) reasons-responsivity, and (2) authenticity. However, available evidence indicates that psychopaths are inadequately responsive to reasons in general and other-regarding reasons in particular, and also seem to lack a set of enduring concerns that might reveal which desires and attitudes are truly theirs. This leads them to behave impulsivity and to disregard the interests and concerns of others. Drawing from the enactivist approach in philosophy of mind and the notions of habit and affordance, I argue that both their prudential deficits and apparent moral failings are rooted, at a deeper level, in a lack of well-developed affective framing patterns and a corresponding disruption to selective attention.
{"title":"Autonomy, enactivism, and psychopathy","authors":"M. Maiese","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2021.1937680","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2021.1937680","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Most philosophical discussions of psychopathy have centered around its significance in relation to empathy, moral cognition, or moral responsibility. However, related questions about the extent to which psychopaths are capable of exercising autonomous agency have remained underexplored. Two central conditions for autonomous agency that are highlighted by many existing accounts include (1) reasons-responsivity, and (2) authenticity. However, available evidence indicates that psychopaths are inadequately responsive to reasons in general and other-regarding reasons in particular, and also seem to lack a set of enduring concerns that might reveal which desires and attitudes are truly theirs. This leads them to behave impulsivity and to disregard the interests and concerns of others. Drawing from the enactivist approach in philosophy of mind and the notions of habit and affordance, I argue that both their prudential deficits and apparent moral failings are rooted, at a deeper level, in a lack of well-developed affective framing patterns and a corresponding disruption to selective attention.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"25 1","pages":"19 - 41"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/13869795.2021.1937680","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41735893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-09DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2021.1923783
Casey Woodling
ABSTRACT A serious problem for adverbialism about intentionality is the many-property problem, one major aspect of which is the claim that natural inferences between thought contents are blocked if adverbialism is true. Kriegel (2007. “Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality.” Philosophical Perspectives 21: 307–340. doi: 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00129.x., 2008. “The Dispensability of (Merely) Intentional Objects.” Philosophical Studies 141: 79–95. doi: 10.1007/s11098-008-9264-7., 2011. The Sources of Intentionality. New York: Oxford UP) argues that the determinable-determinate relation can be pressed into service by adverbialists to respond to this problem. Grzankowski (2018. “The determinable-determinate relation can’t save adverbialism.” Analysis 78: 45–52. doi: 10.1093/analys/anx068) argues that this doesn’t work because when applied to intentional properties absurd results follow and thus the victory is pyrrhic. In this paper, I examine how we must understand the inferences at the heart of the many-property problem if we are to avoid attributing unwanted assumptions to adverbialists. With this understanding in place, there is a reply to Grzankowski on behalf of the adverbialist that holds that the determinable-determinate relation can be used as one tool among others for assessing the thought content of others. So, Grzankowski’s objection to Kriegel can be met. In the end, however, this entire dialectic is a dead end because it treats the ascriptions of intentional states as fused adverbs forming compound adverbial modifiers, and these fused adverbs lack compositionality and are syntactically simple. As such, interpreters cannot decompose the linguistic content of adverbialist ascriptions, which is nearly always a necessary step in assessing the thought content of others. So, the determinable-determinate reply actually fails because we do need these ascriptions to be subject to compositionality. In the end, adverbialists must opt for a structural approach to the many-property problem, as recently seen in the work of Banick (2021. “How to be an adverbialist about phenomenal intentionality.” Synthese 198: 661–686. doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-02053-0) and D'Ambrosio (2021. “The many-property problem is your problem, too.” Philosophical Studies 178: 811–832. doi:10.1007/s11098-020-01459-2).
{"title":"Adverbialism, the many-property problem, and inference: reply to Grzankowski","authors":"Casey Woodling","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2021.1923783","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2021.1923783","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT A serious problem for adverbialism about intentionality is the many-property problem, one major aspect of which is the claim that natural inferences between thought contents are blocked if adverbialism is true. Kriegel (2007. “Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality.” Philosophical Perspectives 21: 307–340. doi: 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00129.x., 2008. “The Dispensability of (Merely) Intentional Objects.” Philosophical Studies 141: 79–95. doi: 10.1007/s11098-008-9264-7., 2011. The Sources of Intentionality. New York: Oxford UP) argues that the determinable-determinate relation can be pressed into service by adverbialists to respond to this problem. Grzankowski (2018. “The determinable-determinate relation can’t save adverbialism.” Analysis 78: 45–52. doi: 10.1093/analys/anx068) argues that this doesn’t work because when applied to intentional properties absurd results follow and thus the victory is pyrrhic. In this paper, I examine how we must understand the inferences at the heart of the many-property problem if we are to avoid attributing unwanted assumptions to adverbialists. With this understanding in place, there is a reply to Grzankowski on behalf of the adverbialist that holds that the determinable-determinate relation can be used as one tool among others for assessing the thought content of others. So, Grzankowski’s objection to Kriegel can be met. In the end, however, this entire dialectic is a dead end because it treats the ascriptions of intentional states as fused adverbs forming compound adverbial modifiers, and these fused adverbs lack compositionality and are syntactically simple. As such, interpreters cannot decompose the linguistic content of adverbialist ascriptions, which is nearly always a necessary step in assessing the thought content of others. So, the determinable-determinate reply actually fails because we do need these ascriptions to be subject to compositionality. In the end, adverbialists must opt for a structural approach to the many-property problem, as recently seen in the work of Banick (2021. “How to be an adverbialist about phenomenal intentionality.” Synthese 198: 661–686. doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-02053-0) and D'Ambrosio (2021. “The many-property problem is your problem, too.” Philosophical Studies 178: 811–832. doi:10.1007/s11098-020-01459-2).","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"24 1","pages":"312 - 324"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/13869795.2021.1923783","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44466012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-06DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2021.1923785
Dario Cecchini
ABSTRACT Dual-process theories of the mind emphasize how reasoning is an interplay between intuitive and reflective thinking. This paper aims to understand how the two types of processing interact in the moral domain. According to a ‘default-interventionist’ model of moral reasoning intuition and reflection are conflicting cognitions: intuitive thinking would elicit heuristic and deontological responses, whereas reflection would favour utilitarian judgements. However, the evidence for the default interventionist view is inconclusive and challenged by a growing amount of counterevidence in recent years. The recent empirical findings favour an interdependent rather than conflicting view of the two types of information processing in the moral domain. In this view, which I call dual-process reflective equilibrium, intuition and reflection cooperate in moral reasoning to reach a reflective goal, which is supposedly normative justification. In sum, on the one hand, the scope of moral intuitions extends to selecting relevant information and calling for reflection whenever a problem presents conflicting aspects; on the other hand, the purpose of moral reflection is to rationalize pre-reflective intuitions to provide articulated and accessible reasons.
{"title":"Dual-process reflective equilibrium: rethinking the interplay between intuition and reflection in moral reasoning","authors":"Dario Cecchini","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2021.1923785","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2021.1923785","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Dual-process theories of the mind emphasize how reasoning is an interplay between intuitive and reflective thinking. This paper aims to understand how the two types of processing interact in the moral domain. According to a ‘default-interventionist’ model of moral reasoning intuition and reflection are conflicting cognitions: intuitive thinking would elicit heuristic and deontological responses, whereas reflection would favour utilitarian judgements. However, the evidence for the default interventionist view is inconclusive and challenged by a growing amount of counterevidence in recent years. The recent empirical findings favour an interdependent rather than conflicting view of the two types of information processing in the moral domain. In this view, which I call dual-process reflective equilibrium, intuition and reflection cooperate in moral reasoning to reach a reflective goal, which is supposedly normative justification. In sum, on the one hand, the scope of moral intuitions extends to selecting relevant information and calling for reflection whenever a problem presents conflicting aspects; on the other hand, the purpose of moral reflection is to rationalize pre-reflective intuitions to provide articulated and accessible reasons.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"24 1","pages":"295 - 311"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/13869795.2021.1923785","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46254459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-04DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2021.1935515
S. Mantel
ABSTRACT The Normative Competence Account characterizes acting for a normative reason as action which manifests the agent’s complex normative competence. But which role does the correspondence between the normative reason and the agent’s motivating reason play and how is correspondence to be understood in this context? In this response, I argue that correspondence is to be understood merely as an interesting by-product of manifesting normative competence, namely as a representational relation between a proposition believed by the agent and it’s truth maker (i.e. the fact that is the normative reason acted for). In this response, I will answer further questions about this relation of correspondence, such as whether it can be described in more substantial terms and whether the representation of the normative reason has to meet further conditions to play it’s role in the manifestation of competence.
{"title":"Correspondence and dispositional relations","authors":"S. Mantel","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2021.1935515","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2021.1935515","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Normative Competence Account characterizes acting for a normative reason as action which manifests the agent’s complex normative competence. But which role does the correspondence between the normative reason and the agent’s motivating reason play and how is correspondence to be understood in this context? In this response, I argue that correspondence is to be understood merely as an interesting by-product of manifesting normative competence, namely as a representational relation between a proposition believed by the agent and it’s truth maker (i.e. the fact that is the normative reason acted for). In this response, I will answer further questions about this relation of correspondence, such as whether it can be described in more substantial terms and whether the representation of the normative reason has to meet further conditions to play it’s role in the manifestation of competence.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"24 1","pages":"288 - 293"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/13869795.2021.1935515","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41907751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-11DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2021.1908580
H. Sauer
ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue that recent evidence regarding the psychological basis of moral cognition supports a form of (moderate) moral abolitionism. I identify three main problems undermining the epistemic quality of our moral judgments – contamination, reliability, and bad incentives – and reject three possible responses: neither moral expertise, nor moral learning, nor the possibility of moral progress succeed in solving the aforementioned epistemic problems. The result is a moderate form of moral abolitionism, according to which we should make fewer moral judgments much more carefully.
{"title":"Against moral judgment. The empirical case for moral abolitionism","authors":"H. Sauer","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2021.1908580","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2021.1908580","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue that recent evidence regarding the psychological basis of moral cognition supports a form of (moderate) moral abolitionism. I identify three main problems undermining the epistemic quality of our moral judgments – contamination, reliability, and bad incentives – and reject three possible responses: neither moral expertise, nor moral learning, nor the possibility of moral progress succeed in solving the aforementioned epistemic problems. The result is a moderate form of moral abolitionism, according to which we should make fewer moral judgments much more carefully.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"24 1","pages":"137 - 154"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/13869795.2021.1908580","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41503534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-09DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2021.1908576
Martina Orlandi, Sarah Stroud
ABSTRACT Self-control is normally, if only tacitly, viewed as an inherently practical capacity or achievement: as exercised only in the domain of action. Questioning this assumption, we wish to motivate the perhaps unexpected idea that self-control is in fact a transversal phenomenon which is applicable both to action and to belief. While there may be some differences in how self-control is manifested in the respective realms of action and belief, these differences do not undermine the basic takeaway: that agents can and do exercise self-control with respect to both actions and beliefs. These arguments target synchronic self-control, or the exercise of self-control on a discrete occasion; in the final section, we examine whether there is also a more holistic trait or stable state of a person which could aptly be considered a form of self-control.
{"title":"Self-control in action and belief","authors":"Martina Orlandi, Sarah Stroud","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2021.1908576","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2021.1908576","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Self-control is normally, if only tacitly, viewed as an inherently practical capacity or achievement: as exercised only in the domain of action. Questioning this assumption, we wish to motivate the perhaps unexpected idea that self-control is in fact a transversal phenomenon which is applicable both to action and to belief. While there may be some differences in how self-control is manifested in the respective realms of action and belief, these differences do not undermine the basic takeaway: that agents can and do exercise self-control with respect to both actions and beliefs. These arguments target synchronic self-control, or the exercise of self-control on a discrete occasion; in the final section, we examine whether there is also a more holistic trait or stable state of a person which could aptly be considered a form of self-control.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"24 1","pages":"225 - 242"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/13869795.2021.1908576","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41919925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-09DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2021.1908584
G. Lorini, Stefano Moroni, O. Loddo
ABSTRACT Since the middle of the last century, normative language has been much studied. In particular, the normative function performed by certain sentences and by certain speech acts has been investigated in depth. Still, the normative function performed by certain physical artifacts designed and built to regulate human behaviors has not yet been thoroughly investigated. We propose to call this specific type of artifacts with normative intent ‘deontic artifacts’. This article aims to investigate this normative phenomenon that is so widespread in our daily reality, but so often forgotten by scholars of norms and normativity.
{"title":"Deontic artifacts. Investigating the normativity of objects","authors":"G. Lorini, Stefano Moroni, O. Loddo","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2021.1908584","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2021.1908584","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Since the middle of the last century, normative language has been much studied. In particular, the normative function performed by certain sentences and by certain speech acts has been investigated in depth. Still, the normative function performed by certain physical artifacts designed and built to regulate human behaviors has not yet been thoroughly investigated. We propose to call this specific type of artifacts with normative intent ‘deontic artifacts’. This article aims to investigate this normative phenomenon that is so widespread in our daily reality, but so often forgotten by scholars of norms and normativity.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"24 1","pages":"185 - 203"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/13869795.2021.1908584","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41545837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-07DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2021.1908578
H. Glock, Eva Schmidt
ABSTRACT This paper maintains that objectivism about practical reasons should be combined with pluralism both about the nature of practical reasons and about action explanations. We argue for an ‘expanding circle of practical reasons’, starting out from an open-minded monist objectivism. On this view, practical reasons are not limited to actual facts, but consist in states of affairs, possible facts that may or may not obtain. Going beyond such ‘that-ish’ reasons, we argue that goals are also bona fide practical reasons. This makes for a genuine pluralism about practical reasons. Furthermore, the facts or states of affairs that function as practical reasons are not exclusively natural or descriptive, but include normative facts. That normative facts can be reasons justifies a pluralism about reason explanations, one which allows for what we call enkratic explanations in addition to teleological ones.
{"title":"Pluralism about practical reasons and reason explanations","authors":"H. Glock, Eva Schmidt","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2021.1908578","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2021.1908578","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper maintains that objectivism about practical reasons should be combined with pluralism both about the nature of practical reasons and about action explanations. We argue for an ‘expanding circle of practical reasons’, starting out from an open-minded monist objectivism. On this view, practical reasons are not limited to actual facts, but consist in states of affairs, possible facts that may or may not obtain. Going beyond such ‘that-ish’ reasons, we argue that goals are also bona fide practical reasons. This makes for a genuine pluralism about practical reasons. Furthermore, the facts or states of affairs that function as practical reasons are not exclusively natural or descriptive, but include normative facts. That normative facts can be reasons justifies a pluralism about reason explanations, one which allows for what we call enkratic explanations in addition to teleological ones.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"24 1","pages":"119 - 136"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/13869795.2021.1908578","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49109890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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