Pub Date : 2023-02-27DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2023.2175021
Víctor M. Verdejo
{"title":"On the self-ascription of deafferented bodily action","authors":"Víctor M. Verdejo","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2175021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2175021","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44176461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-10DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2023.2172202
Jean Moritz Müller
{"title":"Motivation reasons, responses and the Taking Condition","authors":"Jean Moritz Müller","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2172202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2172202","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47956820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2023.2168033
Anna Drożdżowicz
ABSTRACT Self-illness ambiguity is a difficulty to distinguish the ‘self’ or ‘who one is’ from one's mental disorder or diagnosis. Although self-illness ambiguity in a psychiatric context is often deemed to be a negative phenomenon, it may occasionally have a positive role too. This paper investigates whether and in what sense self-illness ambiguity could have a positive role in the process of recovery and self-development in some psychiatric contexts by focusing on a specific case of mental disorder – anorexia nervosa.
{"title":"Self-illness ambiguity and anorexia nervosa","authors":"Anna Drożdżowicz","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2168033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2168033","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Self-illness ambiguity is a difficulty to distinguish the ‘self’ or ‘who one is’ from one's mental disorder or diagnosis. Although self-illness ambiguity in a psychiatric context is often deemed to be a negative phenomenon, it may occasionally have a positive role too. This paper investigates whether and in what sense self-illness ambiguity could have a positive role in the process of recovery and self-development in some psychiatric contexts by focusing on a specific case of mental disorder – anorexia nervosa.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"26 1","pages":"127 - 145"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44996126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-28DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2160875
Michael Omoge
ABSTRACT What representational state mediates between perception and action? Bence Nanay says pragmatic representations, which are outputs of perceptual systems. This commits him to the view that optic ataxics face difficulty in performing visually guided arm movements because the relevant perceptual systems output their pragmatic representations incorrectly. Here, I argue that it is not enough to say that pragmatic representations are output incorrectly; we also need to know why they are output that way. Given recent evidence that optic ataxia impairs peripersonal space representation, I argue that pragmatic representations are output incorrectly because the organizing principle of the vision-for-action system is blocked by optic ataxia. I then show how this means that this principle, not pragmatic representations, is the representational state that mediates between perception and action, i.e. the principle, not pragmatic representations, is the immediate mental antecedent of action.
{"title":"On the immediate mental antecedent of action","authors":"Michael Omoge","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2022.2160875","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2022.2160875","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT What representational state mediates between perception and action? Bence Nanay says pragmatic representations, which are outputs of perceptual systems. This commits him to the view that optic ataxics face difficulty in performing visually guided arm movements because the relevant perceptual systems output their pragmatic representations incorrectly. Here, I argue that it is not enough to say that pragmatic representations are output incorrectly; we also need to know why they are output that way. Given recent evidence that optic ataxia impairs peripersonal space representation, I argue that pragmatic representations are output incorrectly because the organizing principle of the vision-for-action system is blocked by optic ataxia. I then show how this means that this principle, not pragmatic representations, is the representational state that mediates between perception and action, i.e. the principle, not pragmatic representations, is the immediate mental antecedent of action.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"26 1","pages":"276 - 292"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47373235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-28DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2160876
T. Ho
{"title":"Positive illusion and the normativity of substantive and structural rationality","authors":"T. Ho","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2022.2160876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2022.2160876","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59992172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-27DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2140186
A. Snoek
ABSTRACT McConnell and Golova [2022. “Narrative, Addiction, and Three Aspects of Self-Ambiguity.” Philosophical Explorations. doi:10.1080/13869795.2022.2115532] argue that people with addiction often struggle to recover because there is a conflict between their self-narrative of ‘hopeless addict’ and their evaluative judgment that they value recovery. They add ‘narrative ambiguity’ as a third source of self-ambiguity, next to essential characteristics/embodiment and values/judgments. I argue that McConnell and Golova [2022. “Narrative, Addiction, and Three Aspects of Self-Ambiguity.” Philosophical Explorations. doi:10.1080/13869795.2022.2115532] pay insufficient attention to how a self-narrative of ‘hopeless addict’ is formed. This hopeless script is not a given narrative, but emerges due to conflicts in the other two sources of self-ambiguity: long-term addiction changes embodiment, and results in the experience that people fail to let their behaviour be guided by their values. Hence, they label themselves hopeless and not able to recover. In that sense, narrative ambiguity is not simply a third source of self-ambiguity, but is both a standalone source, as an organizing principle that tries to make sense of conflicts in the other sources of self-ambiguity. To overcome this narrative ambiguity, it is important to make sense of one’s addiction, rather than experiencing it as simply alienating. I give some examples of how people manage to do this: to incorporate their years of addiction into their life story without identifying with it in a hopeless manner.
{"title":"How to overcome self-illness ambiguity in addiction: making sense of one’s addiction rather than just rejecting it. A reply to McConnell and Golova","authors":"A. Snoek","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2022.2140186","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2022.2140186","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT McConnell and Golova [2022. “Narrative, Addiction, and Three Aspects of Self-Ambiguity.” Philosophical Explorations. doi:10.1080/13869795.2022.2115532] argue that people with addiction often struggle to recover because there is a conflict between their self-narrative of ‘hopeless addict’ and their evaluative judgment that they value recovery. They add ‘narrative ambiguity’ as a third source of self-ambiguity, next to essential characteristics/embodiment and values/judgments. I argue that McConnell and Golova [2022. “Narrative, Addiction, and Three Aspects of Self-Ambiguity.” Philosophical Explorations. doi:10.1080/13869795.2022.2115532] pay insufficient attention to how a self-narrative of ‘hopeless addict’ is formed. This hopeless script is not a given narrative, but emerges due to conflicts in the other two sources of self-ambiguity: long-term addiction changes embodiment, and results in the experience that people fail to let their behaviour be guided by their values. Hence, they label themselves hopeless and not able to recover. In that sense, narrative ambiguity is not simply a third source of self-ambiguity, but is both a standalone source, as an organizing principle that tries to make sense of conflicts in the other sources of self-ambiguity. To overcome this narrative ambiguity, it is important to make sense of one’s addiction, rather than experiencing it as simply alienating. I give some examples of how people manage to do this: to incorporate their years of addiction into their life story without identifying with it in a hopeless manner.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"26 1","pages":"86 - 90"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44633551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-21DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2147982
Sidney Carls-Diamante
ABSTRACT This paper addresses an important yet neglected existential issue sometimes faced by persons with bipolar disorder (BD): confusion about the extent to which what one is like is influenced by BD. Although such confusion is common in psychiatric illnesses, BD raises idiosyncratic difficulties due to its intricate interactions with personality, cognition and behavior. The fluctuating mood phases of BD can generate inconsistency in one's self-experience and sense of self. One way to resolve this confusion would be to coherently account for BD within one's overall self-concept. To facilitate this task, this paper introduces a heuristic taxonomy of different relationships wherein BD can be viewed in light of self-related beliefs. The relationships are as follows: (1) BD contributes to the self, (2) BD scaffolds the self, (3) BD gradually becomes part of the self and (4) BD is not part of the ‘real self’. As the individual presentation of BD varies extensively, the type of relationship one feels holds true depends on one's personal experience of managing and living with the disorder. These relationships act as an organizing framework for one's self-related beliefs about how to account for the effects of BD on personality, behavior, cognitive patterns and other self-expressions.
{"title":"Know thyself: bipolar disorder and self-concept","authors":"Sidney Carls-Diamante","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2022.2147982","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2022.2147982","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper addresses an important yet neglected existential issue sometimes faced by persons with bipolar disorder (BD): confusion about the extent to which what one is like is influenced by BD. Although such confusion is common in psychiatric illnesses, BD raises idiosyncratic difficulties due to its intricate interactions with personality, cognition and behavior. The fluctuating mood phases of BD can generate inconsistency in one's self-experience and sense of self. One way to resolve this confusion would be to coherently account for BD within one's overall self-concept. To facilitate this task, this paper introduces a heuristic taxonomy of different relationships wherein BD can be viewed in light of self-related beliefs. The relationships are as follows: (1) BD contributes to the self, (2) BD scaffolds the self, (3) BD gradually becomes part of the self and (4) BD is not part of the ‘real self’. As the individual presentation of BD varies extensively, the type of relationship one feels holds true depends on one's personal experience of managing and living with the disorder. These relationships act as an organizing framework for one's self-related beliefs about how to account for the effects of BD on personality, behavior, cognitive patterns and other self-expressions.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"26 1","pages":"110 - 126"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41636286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-19DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2146160
L. Braddock
ABSTRACT Projection does not reliably serve cognition; it all too often contributes to failures of knowledge. Our projecting not only imaginatively misrepresents the world by attributing a feature of ourself to it. In doing so it can misrepresent us as lacking that feature. It is an act of the imagination which re-locates unwanted attributes into a motivated misrepresentation which distorts our grasp of reality and of ourselves. The imaginative act itself is not consciously intended so that we take the resulting picture at face value, despite the distortion. Without a strong reason to question this misperception the projection remains undetected and the misrepresentation affects our relations to others. Projection serving motivated self-deception thus evades correction. Realistic self-knowledge becomes possible through psychoanalysis when the patient's projections are received by the analyst as communications impinging on her capacity for sympathy. I show how the psychology of sympathy we find in Hume and Smith provides a philosophical frame of reference for understanding this interaction between sympathy and projection. I bring sympathy together with contemporary Kleinian psychoanalytic theory to explain how psychoanalytic interpretation engages with this interaction to reduce the effects of projection and enable a self-knowledge grounded in the subject's own experience of herself.
{"title":"‘What it is like to be me’: from paranoia and projection to sympathy and self-knowledge","authors":"L. Braddock","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2022.2146160","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2022.2146160","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Projection does not reliably serve cognition; it all too often contributes to failures of knowledge. Our projecting not only imaginatively misrepresents the world by attributing a feature of ourself to it. In doing so it can misrepresent us as lacking that feature. It is an act of the imagination which re-locates unwanted attributes into a motivated misrepresentation which distorts our grasp of reality and of ourselves. The imaginative act itself is not consciously intended so that we take the resulting picture at face value, despite the distortion. Without a strong reason to question this misperception the projection remains undetected and the misrepresentation affects our relations to others. Projection serving motivated self-deception thus evades correction. Realistic self-knowledge becomes possible through psychoanalysis when the patient's projections are received by the analyst as communications impinging on her capacity for sympathy. I show how the psychology of sympathy we find in Hume and Smith provides a philosophical frame of reference for understanding this interaction between sympathy and projection. I bring sympathy together with contemporary Kleinian psychoanalytic theory to explain how psychoanalytic interpretation engages with this interaction to reduce the effects of projection and enable a self-knowledge grounded in the subject's own experience of herself.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"26 1","pages":"254 - 275"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45419549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-31DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2137568
E. Hughes
ABSTRACT Disturbances to one's sense of self, the feeling that one has ‘lost a part of oneself’ or that one ‘no longer feels like oneself,’ are frequently recounted throughout the bereavement literature. Engaging Allan Køster's important contribution to this issue, this article reinforces his suggestion that, by rupturing the existential texture of self-familiarity, bereavement can result in experiences of estrangement that can be meaningfully understood according to the concept of self-alienation. Nevertheless, I suggest that whilst Køster's relational interpretation of alienation as the withdrawal of heteronomy can be applied to the experience of world-collapse in bereavement, what sets bereavement apart from other limit situations is the fact that it involves an intersubjective relation between the living and the dead. In contrast to Køster, therefore, I suggest that the experience of self-alienation that is distinctive to bereavement results from the fact that the bereaved is exposed to, and co-opted by, the absolute alterity of death itself.
{"title":"Grief, alienation, and the absolute alterity of death","authors":"E. Hughes","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2022.2137568","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2022.2137568","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Disturbances to one's sense of self, the feeling that one has ‘lost a part of oneself’ or that one ‘no longer feels like oneself,’ are frequently recounted throughout the bereavement literature. Engaging Allan Køster's important contribution to this issue, this article reinforces his suggestion that, by rupturing the existential texture of self-familiarity, bereavement can result in experiences of estrangement that can be meaningfully understood according to the concept of self-alienation. Nevertheless, I suggest that whilst Køster's relational interpretation of alienation as the withdrawal of heteronomy can be applied to the experience of world-collapse in bereavement, what sets bereavement apart from other limit situations is the fact that it involves an intersubjective relation between the living and the dead. In contrast to Køster, therefore, I suggest that the experience of self-alienation that is distinctive to bereavement results from the fact that the bereaved is exposed to, and co-opted by, the absolute alterity of death itself.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"26 1","pages":"61 - 65"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43760358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-19DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2136397
Kael McCormack
ABSTRACT According to the guise of the good, a desire for P represents P as good in some respect. ‘Perceptualism’ further claims that desires involve an awareness of value analogous to perception. Perceptualism explains why desires justify actions and how desires can end the regress of practical justification. However, perception paradigmatically represents the actual environment, while desires paradigmatically represent prospective states. An experience E is an awareness of O when the nature of E depends on the nature of O. How could desires depend on the merely possible? Extant perceptualist accounts have not adequately addressed this question. I propose a novel account of how desires can be an awareness of value. An awareness of value involves the successful exercise of a capacity to discriminate value out of non-evaluative representations. The resulting content and phenomenology of such a desire depends in the right way on the value properties of the desired state. An agent requires the right view of the non-evaluative features of a state to discriminate its evaluative features. I argue that imaginings are uniquely able to provide such a view, and so enable value discriminations. My account retains the epistemological attractions of perceptualism despite the disanalogy between desire and perception.
{"title":"Desire, imagination, and the perceptual analogy","authors":"Kael McCormack","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2022.2136397","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2022.2136397","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT According to the guise of the good, a desire for P represents P as good in some respect. ‘Perceptualism’ further claims that desires involve an awareness of value analogous to perception. Perceptualism explains why desires justify actions and how desires can end the regress of practical justification. However, perception paradigmatically represents the actual environment, while desires paradigmatically represent prospective states. An experience E is an awareness of O when the nature of E depends on the nature of O. How could desires depend on the merely possible? Extant perceptualist accounts have not adequately addressed this question. I propose a novel account of how desires can be an awareness of value. An awareness of value involves the successful exercise of a capacity to discriminate value out of non-evaluative representations. The resulting content and phenomenology of such a desire depends in the right way on the value properties of the desired state. An agent requires the right view of the non-evaluative features of a state to discriminate its evaluative features. I argue that imaginings are uniquely able to provide such a view, and so enable value discriminations. My account retains the epistemological attractions of perceptualism despite the disanalogy between desire and perception.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"26 1","pages":"234 - 253"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46728612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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